July 11, 2016

Worldwide, antitrust enforcement continues to spread and grow, with enforcement authorities in Asia becoming increasingly active and aggressive.  By contrast, in the United States, where the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has long championed aggressive anti-cartel enforcement, 2016 has so far seen less publicly visible activity.  There, if FY2015 ended with the bang of record-breaking fines and penalties of $3.89 billion, 2016 has so far begun with a whimper.  Few could reasonably have expected that FY2016 could match FY2015, or involve a third consecutive year of record fines, but surely few also would have predicted that criminal antitrust fines and assessments would fall to less than 3% of FY2015’s record sum, or that they would be at the lowest level of penalties assessed in a decade.  It remains to be seen whether developments later this year will lessen the apparent disparity between this year and prior years as it is widely speculated that the Antitrust Division continues to be busily engaged with a number of active investigations.  That activity may yet paint a different picture for 2016.

We begin this Update with an overview, touching on significant developments over the past six months, starting with the U.S.  We also revisit themes from our 2015 Year-End Update that continue to gather steam in 2016–the prioritization of individual prosecutions outlined in the “Yates Memo” and enhanced scrutiny of the financial sector.  We will then highlight developments in enforcement “hot spots” in Asia and the Americas.  Of course, no discussion of developments in the first half of the year is complete without considering the “Brexit,” which may ultimately have significant repercussions in UK and European enforcement, and for which we provide our early views.  We end our overview with an analysis of several high court decisions out of the European Union that are likely to impact enforcement across the continent.

As with prior Updates, detailed summaries of enforcement activities during the first half of 2016 follow this overview and are organized by geography and jurisdiction.

Trends in U.S. Enforcement

For the first time in recent memory, domestic investigations dominate the story of U.S. enforcement efforts.  The headlines for this year have included a string of convictions, indictments, guilty pleas, and sentences in connection with public real estate foreclosure auctions, water treatment chemicals, heir location services, and posters.  In connection with these domestic investigations, since January, we have seen:

• Over $7 million in fines levied;
• 9 individuals and 2 companies pleaded guilty;
• 4 individuals indicted; and
• 11 other individuals and 1 company sentenced in connection with prior pleas or convictions.

Domestic investigations are likely to remain active, with two trials scheduled before the end of the year and another two scheduled for early 2017 in connection with real estate foreclosure auctions.  The DOJ’s domestic investigation into price fixing of packaged tuna, which it launched last year, is also ongoing–with the DOJ recently joining in a stipulation with parties to related class action lawsuits to stay discovery for the remainder of the year while a grand jury continues to investigate the conduct.

Although domestic enforcement has taken center stage during the first half of 2016, several long-standing global investigations saw significant developments as well, with the auto parts investigation accounting for the bulk of the DOJ’s global enforcement activity.  That investigation has resulted in $73.4 million in fines for FY2016 and a plea deal with a former president of an automotive parts company who agreed to a jail sentence of 18 months for his role in a conspiracy related to automotive body sealing products.  Most notable, however, the DOJ obtained indictments of two auto parts companies, as well as six additional individuals.  Corporate indictments in particular are rare; the last one was the indictment of AU Optronics in 2010, which ended with a conviction and a $500 million fine.  These indictments tee up the possibility of criminal trials against corporate defendants in what the DOJ has called the largest price-fixing investigation in its history.  As to its other pending global investigations, the DOJ secured a further $17.6 million in fines, a corporate guilty plea and three individual indictments in connection with its capacitors, LIBOR and “roll-on, roll-off” cargo investigations.

Lastly, just as fines have fallen dramatically compared to last year, the average length of jail sentences is also down significantly from 16 months to 12 months.  We noted a similar decline in our 2015 Year-End Update when the average sentence dropped from 38 months to 16 months between FY2014 and FY2015 and suggested then that this could be an aberration.  We continue to believe this may be the case; the overall decline appears to be driven by a combination of the relatively few sentences imposed over the past two years, and that the majority of this year’s sentences involved the New Jersey Tax Lien investigation, which affected relatively low volumes of commerce and thus allowed for rare probationary sentences for those pleading guilty to Section 1 violations.  We believe that scenario is unlikely to reoccur in the majority of the DOJ’s investigations going forward.

Early Returns on the Yates Memo

As we predicted in our 2015 Year-End Update, the “Yates Memo,” named after its author, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates, which outlines the Department’s priorities for the prosecution of individuals engaged in corporate wrongdoing, may already be having an effect on what was already a systematic focus on culpable individuals by the Antitrust Division.  To date, both the number of individuals and, as a result, the number of total days sentenced for criminal antitrust violations in the U.S., have already exceeded FY2015’s totals.  And while some could argue that this apparent uptick was set in motion by the Antitrust Division’s prosecutorial choices long before the release of the Yates Memo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Brent Snyder, has said that the Division is “embracing . . . [Yates’s] directive to do better” and has taken concrete steps in the form of “new internal procedures” crafted to “ensure that [the Division] is identifying and investigating all senior executives who potentially condoned, directed, or participated in the criminal conduct.”[1]  He has also signaled that the memo is affecting the Division’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, saying that “after the Yates memo . . . [the Antitrust Division is] even more inclined to charge and try even the toughest cases,” including those against top executives who tacitly condoned a subordinate’s conduct and for which there is “usually less evidence” of criminal liability.[2]

Continued Focus on the Financial Sector

As we explained in our last Update, the financial sector has been under intense scrutiny by a diverse range of financial regulators, competition agencies and prosecuting authorities around the globe, which have placed significant, sometimes competing demands on this sector and which have resulted in numerous, sometimes-overlapping sanctions–even before accounting for inevitable follow-on litigation.  We do not see this scrutiny abating in the near term.

The most significant development in this sector in 2016 involves the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office’s (“SFO”) prosecution of individuals tied to alleged LIBOR manipulation, notwithstanding the acquittal of six derivatives brokers earlier this year.  On June 29, 2016, after an 11-week trial, a London jury found two former Barclays traders and a former Barclays LIBOR submitter guilty of plotting to manipulate LIBOR; the court later handed down jail sentences ranging from six-and-a-half to three years.[3]  The jury failed to reach a verdict on the involvement of two other former Barclays traders, and the SFO has since announced plans to retry the case against them.[4]  In a related investigation, the SFO has issued arrest warrants against four former Deutsche Bank traders and one former Société Générale trader accused of manipulating the EURIBOR benchmark rate, signaling that the UK’s criminal prosecutions in the financial sector are unlikely to end soon.

In the U.S., jail sentences of two years and one year, respectively, were imposed on two former Rabobank traders convicted last November of manipulating U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen LIBOR.  And, just last month, the DOJ announced that a grand jury had returned indictments against two former Deutsche Bank traders, one located in the U.S. and the other in London, for their participation in an alleged scheme to manipulate U.S. Dollar LIBOR.  The U.S.-based trader, Michael Connolly, was taken into custody and appeared before a judge on the same day the indictments were announced.[5]  Mr. Connolly entered a plea of not guilty and was released on a $500,000 bond.  The DOJ has not indicated whether it intends to seek extradition of the London-based trader, Gavin Black.

Competition Enforcement Hot Spots

In our last Update, we highlighted the flurry of enforcement activity and increasing intolerance of cartel behavior in Asia.  The area continues to be a focal point of anti-cartel activity.  Perhaps the most significant developments this year have been the February release by China’s National Development and Reform Commission of draft “Guidelines for Applying Leniency Program to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements” and the subsequent release of draft “Guidelines on Determining the Illegal Gains Generated from Monopoly Conduct and on Setting Fines” issued by China’s Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council.  Both agencies have sought public comment on these drafts and, once finalized, these Guidelines will provide welcome clarity for companies assessing potential fine exposure and leniency protection in China.

South America is also increasingly the center of enforcement activity.  Since January, Brazil’s competition authority, CADE (Conselho Administrative de Defensa Econômica), collected 82.5 million reals (approximately $24 million) in fines from 19 companies and 22 individuals and has opened seven new investigations.  Chile’s National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía Nacional Económica or “FNE”), has enjoyed recent success in prosecutions involving ocean shipping and poultry production, and has brought charges this year against three supermarket chains for fixing the minimum retail prices of fresh chicken.  None of the companies self-reported the conduct, which resulted in FNE recommending that each company be fined the legal maximum of 30,000 UTA (approximately $22.9 million).  And Chile may soon join an increasing number of jurisdictions that criminalize “hard core” cartel conduct; its Senate is currently considering passage of such a law, providing for up to 10 years in jail for individuals, increased maximums for corporate fines, and codified leniency protections for the first- and second- in applicants.  Lastly, Columbia also merits mention for its issuance of 185 billion pesos (approximately $62 million) in fines against four manufacturers and 21 individuals in the tissue paper industry.

Heading north, Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission (“COFECE”) has steadily increased its enforcement efforts over the past year.  So far this year, it has issued fines of nearly 89 million pesos (approximately $4.8 million) against 17 corporations and individuals who admitted to using a trade association to facilitate price fixing of sugar and initiated several “Statements of Probable Responsibility” covering a diverse range of industries, including air conditioner compressors, pension fund providers, vehicle towing services, and taxis servicing Mexico City’s international airport.  Such Statements initiate a trial-like procedure in which the accused have the opportunity to contest allegations of monopolistic practices.  Separately, this year COFECE has opened investigations into the pricing and supply of tortillas in the State of Jalisco, information-monitoring services provided to the Mexican government, and the production of live performances, including venues and ticketing services.

The “Brexit” Creates Uncertainty for Future European and UK Enforcement

It is important to note at the outset that the referendum passed by the UK electorate does not itself trigger any legal consequences.  The actual timing for a UK exit (“Brexit”) from the European Union (“EU”) is uncertain.  While the soon-to-be former Prime Minister, David Cameron, has indicated that the UK government will not invoke the mechanisms required under the Treaty of Lisbon to trigger negotiations leading to Brexit until a new administration is in place, the presidents of the EU institutions have said that they expect the UK to give effect to the vote “as soon as possible.”

EU law is perhaps more closely associated with competition law and regulation than any other area.  While there has been significant congruence reached within the EU over the past 40 years, the UK has always maintained its own independent competition regime and agencies, all of which will play a larger role after Brexit, especially if the UK economy diverges from the rest of Europe such that it is considered separate from the EU.

We think it unlikely that the UK government will invoke the exit mechanisms under Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon until the end of 2016 at the earliest.  A departing state invoking those mechanisms will leave the EU, and the EU Treaties will cease to apply to that state, at the end of a two-year period following the commencement of exit negotiations (save where that period is extended by unanimous vote of all member states).  It thus seems unlikely that the UK will actually leave the EU until the end of 2018 at the earliest.

The immediate consequence for those doing business in the UK is to understand the uncertainties that prevail.  On every transaction or investigation many issues will emerge and it will be important to consider what, if anything, can be done to manage and allocate the risks that now exist.  But until such time as the UK leaves the EU, it will remain an EU member and all EU law will remain in force in the UK.  There has been, and no doubt will continue to be, considerable market volatility and political uncertainty, but, for now at least, it is very much a case of “business as usual” when it comes to doing business with and in the UK and the EU–including with respect to new and ongoing anti-cartel investigations.

Court Decisions Affecting EU Enforcement

We conclude our overview by highlighting a few of the significant decisions issued by the courts of the European Union in 2016 that hold particular interest.

In Toshiba v. Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) held that the EC was within its powers to apply worldwide sales figures as the “relevant geographic area” from which to calculate Toshiba’s fine for its involvement in a worldwide cartel involving the power transformer market.  The CJEU found that limiting the relevant geographic area to the European Economic Area (“EEA”) or Japan would not have appropriately reflected the “weight and economic power” of Toshiba in the overall conduct or ensured (consistent with the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines) that the fine had sufficient deterrent effect.  This decision confirms the EC’s broad powers to issue fines based on conduct and sales outside of Europe when the case merits such an approach.

However, the CJEU does not always find in favor of the EC.  In a series of decisions involving formal requests for information (“RFIs”) that the EC issued to various companies in the cement sector, the CJEU overturned the judgments of the General Court and annulled the RFIs because the EC had failed to clearly and unequivocally explain the legal basis and purpose of its requests.  The CJEU held that this is a fundamental requirement designed not only to show that a request is justified but also to enable the targets of an investigation to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate while safeguarding their right of defense.

Lastly, the CJEU has issued a preliminary ruling with respect to the independence of the EU’s and member state’s leniency programs.  The Court held that the leniency programs of the EU and member states are autonomous and independent, meaning that the grant of immunity or leniency by the EC does not entitle the recipient to similar treatment in other related member-state investigations.  The practical result of this decision is that leniency applicants–in order to ensure full leniency protection–will need to consider whether the circumstances of a particular case necessitate the filing of applications with the EC as well as competition agencies of any other relevant member states that may have a significant interest in the matter.

I.                   THE AMERICAS

A.                UNITED STATES

1.                  Overview of U.S. Enforcement Trends

a.                  Criminal Fines & Other Monetary Assessments

The Antitrust Division has secured approximately $99 million in criminal fines and monetary penalties thus far in FY2016.  This is a dramatic slowdown from FY2015’s record-topping $3.9 billion in fines and penalties, a level largely spurred by significant fines and penalties arising from the Division’s investigation into the manipulation of certain foreign exchange rates and the LIBOR investigation.  Indeed, not only is this a marked decline from last year’s record, but it is also a significant decline from the level of penalties assessed in each of the last ten years.  It represents less than one-third of the fines assessed in 2005, the year with the lowest total fines in the last decade.  While one would not have anticipated a third consecutive year of record fines, this dramatic drop off is, to say the least, unexpected.  Of course, several months remain in the fiscal year, and subsequent penalties may be announced and bring this year closer to the level of penalties prevailing over the last decade.

Of the $99 million in criminal fines and monetary penalties thus far, approximately $97 million consisted of criminal fines for violations of the Sherman Act.  The largest single criminal fine of the year was levied against Corning International K.K. for price fixing and bid rigging as to ceramic substrates used in automobiles.  The Corning fine was the latest in the DOJ’s long-running investigation into collusive activity in the automotive parts industry.

We assess the Antitrust Division’s performance by considering all of its available monetary sanctions, including criminal fines, restitution, disgorgement, and penalties (for the reasons explained at length in the 2013 Year-End Criminal Antitrust Update).  While the Antitrust Division continues to embrace multi-agency investigations, the below chart indicates a significant dip in the use of other monetary assessments as a prosecutorial tool.  Nonetheless, we believe this combined metric remains the most accurate gauge of fining activity.

Monetary asesssments are also down dramatically from prior years, with just $1.6 million levied so far this Fiscal Year.  The lone non-fine monetary assessment levied in FY2016 was against American Pipe Bending & Manufacturing Co., following its conviction for price fixing and bid rigging as to industrial pipes.  This represents just a tenth of last year’s monetary assessment activity and approximately 0.2% of the monetary assessments collected in FY2011, when non-fine assessments peaked.

More than half of this year’s criminal fines result from corporate plea agreements in the DOJ’s long-running investigation into the auto parts industry.  These fines account for almost 76% of the total fines.

Just as fine activity has fallen dramatically thus far in FY2016, the average length of prison sentences secured by the Antitrust Division has also decreased.  The average length of a prison sentence decreased from 16 months in FY2015 to 13 months this year.  Both numbers are a significant departure from the average sentence secured in FY2014, when average sentence length peaked at 38 months after four years of consecutive increases.  In our last Update, we noted that it would remain to be seen whether this initial reduction (from 38 months to 16 months) was a trend or an aberration.  Despite a second consecutive reduction, we believe that the specific details of the largely domestic cases in which sentences have been imposed this year explain the apparent departure from past records.  We believe the Antitrust Division will continue to seek significant prison terms in price-fixing cases.

While the average prison sentence thus far in FY2016 is lower than in FY2015, the number of individuals sentenced is up slightly.  Ten have been sentenced so far this fiscal year, compared to a total of eight in FY2015.  Because the number of individuals sentenced has increased, the total number of prison days sentenced represents a slight increase over the number of days sentenced in FY2015.  This change appears reflective only of simple arithmetic, with more defendants yielding more total days in prison, rather than a broader trend in enforcement policy.

2.                  Developments in International Investigations

a.                  London InterBank Offered Rates (“LIBOR”)

In June 2016, two former Deutsche Bank AG traders were indicted for their alleged role in a scheme to manipulate the U.S. Dollar (“USD”) London InterBank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).[6]  The defendants were Matthew Connolly, the bank’s director of the pool trading desk in New York, and Gavin Campbell Black, a derivatives trader and director of the money market derivatives desk in London.  A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York returned a 10-count indictment charging each defendant with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, and nine counts of wire fraud, for their participation in an alleged scheme to manipulate certain USD LIBOR benchmark rates.

In another LIBOR-related case previously covered in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust Update,[7] two former derivatives traders at Rabobank Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (“Rabobank”) were sentenced on March 10, 2016 for manipulating LIBOR for USD and Japanese Yen (“JPY”).  Anthony Allen, the bank’s former global head of liquidity and finance in London, was sentenced to 24 months in prison.  Anthony Conti, a former senior trader on the bank’s money markets desk in London, was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison.[8]  Both defendants were convicted on November 5, 2015, after a four-week jury trial.  Allen was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud and 18 counts of wire fraud.  Conti was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud and eight counts of wire fraud.  On July 6, 2016, Paul Thompson, a former Rabobank trader and one of Conti and Allen’s codefendants, consented to his extradition from Australia to the United States to respond to the indictment.[9]

In still another LIBOR-related case, on June 29, 2016, Magistrate Judge James L. Cott of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the indictments of three traders.[10]  The traders were charged in September 2013 with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud for their roles in a scheme to manipulate the Yen LIBOR.[11]  All three were charged with the same conduct in the UK, and were acquitted by a Southwark Crown Court in January.  Because they were acquitted in the UK of “the same underlying conduct,” the DOJ moved to dismiss the charges against them in the United States.[12]

b.                  Auto Parts

In the first half of 2016, the Antitrust Division’s ongoing investigation into the auto parts industry continued at a steady pace, culminating with two corporate indictments.  To date, the Antitrust Division has charged a total of 64 individuals and 44 companies as part of its federal antitrust investigation into anticompetitive conduct in the automotive parts industry.  In total, these individuals and companies have agreed to pay more than $2.7 billion in criminal fines,[13] and 30 have been sentenced to prison.

In a particularly notable development, the Antitrust Division announced on June 15, 2016 that federal grand juries had indicted two Japanese automotive parts companies, their U.S. subsidiaries, and a total of five executives for their alleged participation in international conspiracies to eliminate competition in the sale of certain automotive parts.  The first indictment charged Tokai Kogyo Co. Ltd., its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Green Tokai Co. Ltd., and executive Akitada Tazumi with conspiring to rig bids for and fix the prices of automotive body sealing products.  The second indictment charged Maruyasu Industries Co. Ltd., its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Curtis-Maruyasu America Inc., and executives Tadao Hirade, Satoru Murai, Kazunori Kobayashi and Yoshihiro Shigematsu with conspiring to fix prices, allocate customers, and rig bids for automotive steel tubes.[14]

These indictments are notable not only because they are the first indictments of corporations in the auto parts investigation, but also because they represent two of only a handful of such indictments in antitrust cases in the last two decades.  These cases will likely attract significant interest as they proceed, whether or not they are ultimately resolved before trial.

Two additional corporations agreed to plead guilty in the auto parts investigation this spring:  Omron Automotive Electronics and Corning International.  On March 17, 2016, Omron Automotive Electronics Co. Ltd. agreed to plead guilty and pay a $4.55 million fine for conspiring to rig bids on power window switches.[15]  U.S. District Judge George Steeh of the Eastern District of Michigan approved the plea agreement and imposed the agreed-upon fine at a sentencing hearing held on June 13, 2016.[16]  On May 16, 2016, Corning International Kabushiki Kaisha agreed to plead guilty and pay a $66.5 million criminal fine for conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate the market for ceramic substrates used in catalytic converters supplied to automobile manufacturers.  Just a week prior to the announcement of the plea agreement, the company’s former executive Nobuhiko Niwa was indicted for his role in the conspiracy.[17]

On April 20, 2016, Keiji Kyomoto, who was indicted in October 2015,[18] pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in prison for his role in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids of automotive body sealing products sold in the U.S.  As part of his plea agreement, Kyomoto also agreed to pay a $20,000 criminal fine.[19]

c.                   Roll-on, Roll-off Cargo

During the first half of 2016, the DOJ has shown continued commitment to its ongoing investigation of the international roll-on, roll-off ocean shipping industry.  The roll-on, roll-off ocean shipping industry involves international shipments of non-containerized cargo, such as cars, trucks, agricultural equipment, and construction equipment.[20]  In June 2016, Mauricio Javier Garrido Garcia of Compañia Sudamericana de Vapores S.A. (CSAV) was indicted.  Garcia is the eighth executive charged in the investigation to date.  Garcia is charged with involvement in a long-running conspiracy that allegedly includes allocating customers and routes, bid rigging, and price fixing for international shipping services for roll-on, roll-off cargo.  Four of the eight individuals charged in the investigation thus far have pleaded guilty.[21]

As we reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, three international firms–CSAV, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha–have pleaded guilty to charges arising from the investigation.  The three firms have paid more than $136 million in criminal fines collectively.[22]

d.                  Cathode Ray Tubes

The DOJ obtained its first–and thus far only–individual guilty plea in its long-running investigation into price fixing in the market for cathode ray tubes late last year, when Chun-Cheng “Alex” Yeh, a former executive of a Taiwanese company, pleaded guilty to price fixing on November 17, 2015.[23]  On March 1, 2016, Yeh was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay a $20,000 fine.[24]  This sentence was 2 months less than the 8-month sentence contemplated by Mr. Yeh’s plea agreement, but higher than the 4-month sentence recommended by the probation office in advance of sentencing.  The DOJ’s investigation has been ongoing since at least 2009, when the DOJ indicted six individuals in connection with an investigation into an alleged price-fixing conspiracy by manufacturers of color display tubes (“CDTs”), a type of cathode ray tube.  CDTs are display components once used in computer monitors.[25]

e.                   Capacitors

As we reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, enforcement authorities in Asia, South America, Europe, and the U.S. have opened investigations into manufacturers of certain types of capacitors.[26]  In January 2016, NEC TOKIN, the first company to plead guilty in the investigation, was sentenced to pay a $13.8 million fine.[27]  In April 2016, Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd. agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to fix the prices of electrolytic capacitors.[28]  The DOJ requested that the court impose a $3.8 million criminal fine and a three-year term of probation.  In June 2016, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California accepted the DOJ’s recommendation as to the fine, but imposed a sentence of five years of probation.[29]  Also in January, on the DOJ’s motion, the March 2015 indictment of Takuro Isawa was unsealed.[30]

3.                  Developments in Domestic Investigations

a.                  New Jersey Tax Lien Auctions

In 2016, the DOJ continued to pursue its long investigation into bid rigging in municipal tax lien auctions in New Jersey.  The DOJ recently reported that its investigation has resulted in the conviction or guilty plea of 13 individuals and three companies.[31]  These individuals and companies have been sentenced to pay a collective total of over $2,000,000 in criminal fines.[32]

The first of these defendants to go to trial was James Jeffers, Jr., who was convicted by a jury on October 2, 2015.  On March 29, 2016, Mr. Jeffers was sentenced to serve a term of 12 months and one day in prison and to pay a $25,000 fine.[33]

Following Mr. Jeffers’ sentencing, eight individuals who had pleaded guilty to bid rigging with regard to New Jersey tax lien auctions and to cooperate with the DOJ in its prosecution of other conspirators also were sentenced.  Each was sentenced to one year of probation, a fine of approximately $20,000, and certain restrictions on future employment, including refraining from employment and/or capital ventures involving the investment of tax liens.  All but one defendant were further ordered to refrain from incurring debt.[34]  Two were also ordered to undergo mental health treatment.[35]

Additionally, on April 6, 2016, DSBD, LLC was sentenced to two years of probation, to pay a fine of $35,000, and to abide by restrictions on the incurring of new debt.[36]

b.                  Real Estate Auctions

The DOJ continues to aggressively pursue its investigations into bid rigging in real estate foreclosure auctions nationwide.  The first half of 2016 in particular saw several significant developments in real estate foreclosure cases, particularly in Northern California.

In March 2016, defendants in cases before United States District Judge Phyllis Hamilton in the Northern District of California filed a motion to suppress recordings that they claim were made in violation of their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.[37]  This follows a similar motion made by defendants in another foreclosure case before U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer (also in the Northern District) to suppress more than 200 hours of allegedly unconstitutional recordings.[38]  The recordings at issue were made from devices hidden around local courthouses where the foreclosure auctions occurred, including at a bus stop, in a sprinkler control box, and on an unmarked law enforcement vehicle.[39]  At the time of this Update, neither judge has ruled on the suppression motions.

In addition, on June 21, 2016, Judge Hamilton denied a motion to dismiss the indictments against two groups of defendants in the foreclosure cases before her.[40]  The defendants had argued that the indictments against them contained boilerplate and conclusory allegations of fraud that were legally insufficient, but Judge Hamilton rejected the argument.  Judge Hamilton also denied a separate motion made by four real estate investors to have their case tried under the so-called “rule of reason” standard.  The defendants contended that their activity “performed like an efficiency-enhancing buying collective that actually encouraged competition.”[41]  Judge Hamilton rejected the argument in an order issued June 21, 2016.  The foreclosure cases before Judge Hamilton are nearing trial:  the first is scheduled for September 19, 2016 with subsequent trials scheduled to begin in October 2016, January 2017, and April 2017.[42]  To date, the investigation into real estate foreclosure auctions in the San Francisco Bay area has resulted in over 50 agreements to plead guilty and 22 indictments.[43]

Outside of California, as reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, the Antitrust Division has also investigated bid rigging at public real estate foreclosure auctions in Georgia and Alabama, and this investigation continued apace with eight additional guilty pleas and two new indictments issued in the first half of 2016.

In Georgia, the DOJ secured seven new guilty pleas from real estate investors who admitted to participating in bid-rigging and fraud conspiracies in the Atlanta area.  First, in January 2016, Paul Chen and Ira Eisenberg each pleaded guilty for their roles in bid-rigging and mail fraud conspiracies involving real estate foreclosure auctions in Georgia’s DeKalb and Fulton Counties.[44]  Chen and Eisenberg admitted that they had agreed not to bid against others at certain public real estate foreclosure auctions and that they conspired to defraud mortgage holders and homeowners using the mail system from 2009 to 2011.  Then in late June 2016, Michael Stock and Jon Stovall Jr. each pleaded guilty to similar charges–that they conspired with other real estate investors to rig bids at public foreclosure auctions and that they used the mail to defraud homeowners and mortgage holders.[45]  Stock admitted to participating in a conspiracy in Fulton and DeKalb Counties from approximately August 2009 to November 2011, and Stovall admitted to participating in Fulton County from approximately October 2008 to January 2012.  Two days later on July 1, 2016, three more individuals–Jeffrey Wayne Brock, David Wallace Doughty, and Stanley Ralph Sullivan–pleaded guilty to agreeing to rig auctions of foreclosed homes in Cobb County, Georgia, from June 2007 until January 2012.[46]

Separately, in February 2016, a federal grand jury in Atlanta indicted two real estate investors for bid rigging and bank fraud.[47]  The indictments alleged that the conspirators held secret “second auctions” on properties they had obtained through rigged bids.  Douglas L. Purdy was charged with one count of bid rigging and five counts of bank fraud for participating in an alleged conspiracy in Forsyth County, Georgia from 2008 to 2012.  Clifford Wayne Hill was charged with one count of bid rigging and seven counts of bank fraud relating to foreclosure auctions that occurred in Gwinnett County, Georgia from 2007 to 2012.  To date, the Division’s investigation into foreclosure bid rigging in Georgia has yielded charges against 20 defendants.  Of those, 18 have pleaded guilty.[48]

Finally, in June 2016, real estate investor Adrian J. Beach pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud at public real estate foreclosure auctions in southern Alabama from January 2004 to March 2010.[49]  This marks the fourteenth defendant charged in the Division’s ongoing investigation of bid ridding of real estate foreclosure auctions in Alabama.

c.                   Heir Location Services

The Department of Justice has recently secured additional guilty pleas from heir location service providers–firms that locate potential heirs and secure inheritances for individuals whose relatives have died intestate–as a result of an investigation into market division and customer allocation in the industry.

In January, Richard A. Blake, Jr., the owner of a Massachusetts-based heir location service firm, agreed to plead guilty to charges of price fixing and admitted to engaging in an illegal conspiracy to allocate the market and to share fees with competitors lasting from 1999 to 2014.  Blake is awaiting criminal sentencing in the Northern District of Illinois.

Blake is the second individual to plead guilty in the ongoing investigation after Bradley N. Davis pleaded guilty in December 2015.  Both Blake and Davis are cooperating with the Justice Department’s ongoing investigation into customer allocation, price fixing, bid rigging and other anticompetitive activities in the heir location services industry.[50]

d.                  Water Treatment Chemicals

The DOJ continues to prosecute an alleged decade-and-a-half-long conspiracy to eliminate competition among suppliers of liquid aluminum sulfate provided to municipalities and private companies.  Two water treatment chemical manufacturing executives were indicted on February 17, 2016 for their alleged roles in the conspiracy.  The indictment alleges that Vincent Opalewski and Brian Steppig, along with other co-conspirators, met and agreed not to compete for each other’s customers, submitted intentionally losing bids, withdrew inadvertently winning bids, and coordinated prices to be quoted to customers.[51]

In June, GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc. pleaded guilty for its role in the conspiracy.  The company admitted to conspiring to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate customers, and was sentenced to pay a $5 million fine.  The company is the first corporate defendant to be charged in this conspiracy and the fourth defendant overall.[52]

In addition to the federal investigation, the Ohio Attorney General is actively investigating an alleged bid-rigging scheme involving the sale of liquid aluminum sulfate.  No formal charges have been brought.[53]

e.                   Tuna

As reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, in July 2015, the Department of Justice issued subpoenas to Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee as part of an investigation into alleged price fixing in the packaged seafood sector.[54]  Subsequently, nine class action lawsuits alleging violations of the Sherman Act with respect to the sale of packaged seafood were filed in five federal district courts.  These cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of California, and the DOJ subsequently intervened.[55]  On April 21, 2016, the DOJ stipulated with the parties to stay discovery referring or relating to the criminal grand jury investigation until December 31, 2016.[56]  To date, the DOJ has not announced the filing of any criminal charges in connection with this investigation.

f.                    Posters

On June 30, 2016, the Antitrust Division secured its first plea agreement in its ongoing investigation into the price fixing of certain posters sold on Amazon.com.[57]  UK-based Trod Limited, which is now insolvent, agreed to plead guilty to one count of violating the Sherman Act and to pay a $50,000 criminal fine.  Trod and its sole director and part-owner, Daniel William Aston, were indicted in August 2015.  Both Trod and the DOJ agreed, in a jointly filed sentencing memorandum, that the volume of commerce affected by Trod’s conduct was $175,000.  Trod is scheduled to appear before Judge William Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 11, 2016, to enter a change of plea.  Judge Orrick sought further briefing from the parties regarding counsel’s authority to enter a plea on behalf of the now-insolvent corporation prior to the hearing.[58]

4.                  Developments in the Antitrust Division

a.                  Speeches by Key Division Personnel

Over the last six months, senior officials in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division have made a number of noteworthy statements regarding key criminal antitrust law enforcement issues.

On March 9, 2016, Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Competition Policy and Consumer Rights.[59]  Mr. Baer noted that “antitrust enforcement remains a good value proposition,” and observed that the prior year had yielded over $3.6 billion in criminal fines and penalties.  Mr. Baer highlighted the 85% increase in the number of individuals imprisoned on an annual basis over the last decade and the corresponding 65% increase in the average sentence.  In particular, Mr. Baer pointed to the even greater increases in the number of foreign individuals imprisoned over the same period for misconduct that affected U.S. commerce.  The long-term trend of increasing criminal antitrust enforcement by U.S. authorities has been reported in this publication on previous occasions.[60]

Mr. Baer’s testimony also signaled that the so-called “Yates Memorandum,” issued in September 2015, has already resulted in an important shift in the Antitrust Division’s enforcement policies towards a greater emphasis in investigations of corporate malfeasance on individual wrongdoers from the very beginning, a shift predicted in our 2015 Year-End Update.[61]  Echoing the Yates Memorandum, Mr. Baer testified that the Antitrust Division “strive[s] to hold accountable the highest level executives who participated” in wrongdoing, believing “the threat of prison time for individuals is the single most valuable deterrent” against hard-core pricing fixing and per se illegal conduct.

Speeches from other key Division personnel make clear that the Yates Memorandum has already affected Division policy.  In remarks to the Yale School of Management made on February 16, 2016, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brent Snyder remarked that “individual accountability is fundamental to Antitrust Division prosecutors” and acknowledged that “we are embracing . . . Deputy Attorney General [Yates’s] directive to do better.”  Mr. Snyder referred to the adoption of “new internal procedures” that provided for a “more comprehensive review of the organizational structure of culpable companies to ensure that we are identifying and investigating all senior executives who potentially condoned, directed, or participated in the criminal conduct.”[62]  At a June 2016 conference, Mr. Snyder left little doubt that a movement was afoot, noting that “after the Yates memo . . . we are even more inclined to charge and try even the toughest cases,” including those against top executives who tacitly condoned a subordinate’s conduct and for whom there is “usually less evidence” of criminal liability.[63]

In the first half of 2016, the globalization of competition law remained an important topic in speeches by senior Division officials.  Dedicating a significant portion of his March 6 testimony to the topic, Assistant Attorney General Baer noted that the Division devotes “significant resources to providing assistance to our sister agencies around the globe” to promote the growth of “enforcement policies that are economically and legally sound and consistent.”[64]  Mr. Baer said that progress over the last 15 years has been “noteworthy” and committed that the Division will “continue to strengthen [its] working relationships” with international competition authorities.  In a June 23, 2016 speech in London, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata B. Hesse embraced Mr. Baer’s views, pointing to the “remarkable” growth in international coordination in the investigation and punishment of hard-core anticompetitive conduct as “the most conspicuous area of convergence.”[65]  On April 20, 2016, Section Chief Lisa Phelan provided an overview of those past and current efforts in a presentation to a largely international audience at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, DC, noting that the ongoing international investigation in the auto parts investigation is a high priority for the DOJ.

b.                  Personnel Changes

Several key changes to the leadership of the Antitrust Division have taken place since the beginning of 2016.  Assistant Attorney General Baer, who had led the Antitrust Division since January 2013, began serving as Acting Associate Attorney General effective April 17, 2016.[66]  The Associate Attorney General is the third-highest position at the DOJ.  In the press release announcing the promotion, Attorney General Loretta Lynch praised Mr. Baer’s leadership of the Antitrust Division.

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata B. Hesse has been selected to lead the Antitrust Division since Acting Associate Attorney General Baer’s promotion.[67]  Before assuming leadership of the division, Ms. Hesse had served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal and Civil Operations in the Antitrust Division for four years.  She had also served as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division immediately prior to Mr. Baer’s confirmation.

In June 2016, the Antitrust Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Litigation, David Gelfand, announced that he would be leaving the DOJ after three years and rejoining private practice.[68]  The Division has yet to announce his successor.

June 2016 also brought a rearrangement of the Antitrust Division’s senior enforcement leadership.[69]  Juan Arteaga, who had previously served as chief of staff and senior counsel to Assistant Attorney General Baer, was promoted to Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Enforcement.  He replaces Sonia Pfaffenroth, who is now the Antitrust Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations.  Both Deputy Assistant Attorney General Arteaga and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Pfaffenroth joined the Antiturst Division in 2013, and had previously worked in private practice.

Finally, in San Francisco, Marc Siegel has announced that he will step down as Chief of the office.  Kate Patchen, who was already serving as Assistant Chief, has been named as the new Chief.

B.                 CANADA

1.                  Enforcement

A Japanese auto parts manufacturer was fined C$13 million (approximately $10.2 million) by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in April after having pleaded guilty to bid rigging in connection with the sale of electric power steering (EPS) gears.  This represents the second largest penalty imposed by a Canadian court for bid rigging; the manufacturer is the ninth Japanese auto parts manufacturer fined for its role in pricing fixing.[70]

­Nearly five years after charges were first brought, a government contracting firm in Montreal pleaded guilty to rigging bids for municipal sewer-services contracts and was fined C$118,000 (approximately $92,000).  Of the six companies originally charged, five have now pleaded guilty; the sixth conspirator obtained leniency.[71]  In the private sector, a corporation and its president pleaded guilty and were fined a total of C$140,000 ($109,000) for bid rigging in the market for residential ventilation services.  Eight companies were charged in 2010, but only one other company has pleaded guilty.[72]

2.                  Policy

The Canadian Competition Bureau (“CCB”) continues to seek significant non-monetary sanctions as well, but with few results to date.  John Pecman, the head of the CCB, acknowledged as much during the ABA-IBA’s International Cartel Workshop in February, when he expressed disappointment that the CCB has not obtained a jail sentence for any individual convicted under the competition laws, despite 2010 amendments to Canada’s Competition Act intended to reduce the burden of proof for a violation.  Pecman cast some of the blame on Canadian prosecutors, who prosecute criminal cases referred to them by the CCB, as well as the “inefficient” system of coordination between the CCB and prosecutors.[73]  A few months later, Pecman stated that the CCB is working with prosecutors to overcome various hurdles, but prosecutors have moved to become more independent, which has further reduced the CCB’s ability to obtain prison sentences.[74]  As recently as May, Pecman characterized the relationship between the CCB and prosecutors as “rocky.”[75]  Regardless, when the CCB announced its priority areas in May, enforcement against bid rigging–particularly in public-sector infrastructure projects–was at the top of its list.[76]  Further, with 27 individuals currently facing criminal charges, Pecman views the imposition of a sentence requiring jail time for a violation of competition laws as inevitable.

At the same time as the CCB continues to push for enhanced punishment of individuals violating the nation’s competition laws, it is seeking to limit the extent to which criminal charges may be used to enforce Canada’s intellectual property law.  The CCB issued new intellectual property enforcement guidelines on March 31 in which it announced a shift in position in stating that patent violations rarely merit criminal charges.  Rather, the CCB believes that criminal charges are appropriate only in instances where the use of the patent constitutes behavior that is otherwise unlawful under the competition laws as, for example, when a maker of a branded pharmaceutical and a generic competitor enter an agreement that extends beyond the life of a patent.[77]

C.                BRAZIL

1.                  Preliminary Remarks

During the first half of 2016, Brazil’s Competition Authority, CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica), continued its vigorous cartel enforcement by conducting new on-the-spot investigations, imposing fines on companies and individuals, reaching settlement agreements in eleven cartel investigations, and initiating a number of new investigations.

CADE keeps refining its legal tools to prosecute collusive conduct and has published a draft English version of its Guidelines on Cease and Desist Agreements (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação de Prática, “TCC”), and is currently soliciting comments from a wide range of interested parties.

2.                  Statistics

CADE consists of the Administrative Tribunal (the “Tribunal Administrativo,” or “Tribunal”) and the Superintendence (“Superintendência-Geral“).  The Superintendence investigates cases before referring them to the Tribunal for final decision.

On January 20, 2016, CADE published a report (available in Portuguese only here) on its activities in 2015 (the “Report”).[78]  According to the Report, CADE entered into 58 settlement agreements (known as cease and desist agreements or “TCCs”) in 2015, which resulted in fines totaling BRL 465 million (approximately $136.1 million).  CADE’s Tribunal issued decisions in 52 infringement proceedings in 2015, 39 of which ended with a finding of infringement.  CADE imposed fines in these proceedings totaling BRL 296 million (approximately $86.7 million).  In addition, CADE announced that it entered into ten leniency agreements in 2015, the most since Brazil’s current Leniency Program went into force in 2011.  2015 also saw the first application of CADE’s “leniency plus” program, which is modelled on a similar program used by the DOJ in the U.S.

According to the latest available data, in the first half of 2016, the Tribunal issued decisions imposing fines in at least ten administrative proceedings.

Furthermore, CADE reached more than ten settlement / TCC agreements during the first half of 2016:

3.                  Institutional Developments

a.                  CADE’s President Steps Down After Four Years

CADE’s President, Vinicius Marques de Carvalho, ended his mandate on May 29, 2016.[79]  Mr. de Carvalho was appointed to the highest office within CADE in 2012, coinciding with the entry into force of the “new” Brazilian Competition Act (Act 12,529/2011), and is widely credited with steering CADE to the forefront of worldwide competition enforcers.

Strong prosecution of cartel conduct has been the priority of Mr. de Carvalho.  According to a CADE press release, since Mr. de Carvalho’s appointment, CADE’s Tribunal issued 170 decisions in infringement proceedings, of which 110 ended with a finding of infringement–47% were cartel cases.  During this same time period, CADE imposed more than BRL 4.2 billion (approximately $1.2 billion) in fines.

Márcio de Oliveira Júnior, a member of CADE’s Tribunal, is now acting as President.  Mr. de Oliveira Júnior was appointed to CADE’s Tribunal on January 16, 2014.  His term as member of the Tribunal will end on January 15, 2017.

b.                  CADE’s Chief Prosecutor is Confirmed for a New Mandate of Two Years

On January 13, 2016, CADE’s Chief Prosecutor, Victor Santos Rufino, was reappointed for a new mandate of two years.  Mr. Rufino joined CADE in 2008, became deputy chief prosecutor in 2011, and became chief prosecutor in 2014.

4.                  Fines Imposed and TCCs Approved by CADE’s Tribunal

Since January 1, 2016, CADE has imposed a number of sanctions against companies and individuals:

• On January 20, 2016, CADE imposed a fine of BRL 6 million (approximately $1.8 million) on three Brazilian entities (Aurobindo Pharma Indústria Farmacêutica Ltda., Brasvit Indústria, and Comércio Ltda.) and four individuals for their alleged participation in a price-fixing and bid-rigging conspiracy related to the acquisition by public laboratories of inputs for the fabrication of retroviral drugs used in the treatment of HIV.  According to reporting commissioner Gilvandro Vasconcelos Coelho de Araújo, the companies reached agreements on prices and engaged in a variety of modalities of bid rigging, including the presentation of cover bids and the subsequent fraudulent subcontracting of the entity whose bid had been rejected.[80]
• On January 20, 2016, CADE imposed a fine of BRL 27.3 million (approximately $8 million) on seven companies (Brasil Sul Indústria e Comércio Ltda., Lógica Lavanderia e Limpeza Ltda., Lido Serviços Gerais Ltda., Lavanderia São Sebastião de Nilópolis Ltda., Ferlim Serviços Técnicos Ltda., Prolav Serviços Técnicos Ltda., and Sindicato das Empresas de Lavanderia do Rio de Janeiro–Sindilav) and eleven individuals for their alleged participation in a bid-rigging conspiracy related to the cleaning services of public hospitals in Rio de Janeiro.  In addition, and according to reporting commissioner Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo, Brasil Sul has been prohibited from contracting with the Brazilian public authorities for five years.  Other members of the conspiracy did not receive a similar prohibition as a sanction in order to avoid CADE’s intervention in an already overly concentrated market.[81]
• In addition, on January 20, 2016, CADE approved a TCC negotiated by CADE’s Superintendence in relation to an alleged conspiracy in the markets for air and maritime freight to and from Brazil.[82]  The TCC was entered into between CADE, Deutsche Bahn AG, Schenker do Brasil Transportes Internacionais Ltda., Bax Global do Brasil Ltda., and two individuals.  CADE collected a total of BRL 9.5 million (approximately $2.8 million) from the settling parties.
• On February 24, 2016, CADE imposed a fine of BRL 17.4 million (approximately $5 million) on Belgian-based Solvay S/A for its participation in a conspiracy in the sodium perborate market.  According to the reporting commissioner, João Paulo de Resende, between 1999 and 2001, Solvay and Degussa entered into market sharing agreements whereby Degussa would cease to supply Unilever in the United Kingdom in order to supply this company in Brazil.  Conversely, Solvay would cease to supply Unilever in Brazil in order to supply this company in the United Kingdom.  The investigation began in 2006 with the signing of a leniency agreement between CADE, Degussa, and one individual that reported the infringement to CADE.[83]
• On March 16, 2016, CADE imposed a total of BRL 21.3 million (approximately $6.2 million) in fines on two companies (Household Compressors Holding S.p.A and Danfoss A/S e Panasonic Electric Works Co. Ltd.) and on three individuals for their alleged participation in an international conspiracy in the market for refrigerator hermetic compressors.  Hermetic compressors are devices used in refrigerator systems, especially in household appliances.  According to the reporting commissioner, Márcio de Oliveira Júnior, representatives of the companies held meetings, exchanged sensitive commercial information, and discussed price readjustment rates and the control of compressors supply between 1996 and 2008.  CADE had opened proceedings in July 2009 based on evidence gathered by operation of Brazil’s leniency program.  Notably, this was the first case in which CADE had coordinated with foreign competition authorities for the purpose of conducting dawn raids.[84]
• On April 13, 2016, CADE imposed a total of BRL 1 million (approximately $290,000) in fines on three companies (namely, The American National Red Cross–ARC, Swiss-based Octapharma AG, and its subsidiary, Octapharma Brasil S.A.) and two individuals in relation to the alleged rigging of tenders conducted by the Ministry of Health in 2004 to buy blood used in transfusions.[85]

5.                  Activities of the Superintendence

a.                  New Investigations Initiated by the Superintendence

Since January 1, 2016, the Superintendence has opened several investigations including:

• On January 25, 2016, the Superintendence opened infringement proceedings in relation to an alleged conspiracy in the market for wheat flour in Northern Brazil.  According to the Superintendence, the parties involved had fixed prices both at the production and distribution levels.  In addition, the parties are alleged to have boycotted the operations of distributors who did not adhere to the fixed prices.[86]
• On February 23, 2016, the Superintendence opened an investigation against nine companies in relation to an alleged international conspiracy in the market for maritime transportation of automobiles through Roll-On Roll-Off (RoRo) ships.[87]  According to the Superintendence, the arrangement allocated clients between the members of the conspiracy.  According to CADE’s press release, although the alleged anticompetitive conduct may have begun in 1978,[88] its most noticeable elements apparently took place between 2000 and 2012, when the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice,[89] the European Commission, and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission initiated investigations.
• On March 9, 2016, the Supreintendence announced that it was investigating, together with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of São Paulo, a suspected conspiracy in the markets for devices for measuring energy.[90]  The following companies (and a number of individuals affiliated with them) have been investigated since October 2014: Dowertech da Amazônia Indústria de Instrumentos Eletrônicos Ltda., Eletra Energy Solutions, Elo Sistemas Eletrônicos S.A., Elster Medição de Energia Ltda., Itron Sistemas e Tecnologia Ltda., Itron Soluções para Energia e Água Ltda., Itron Inc., Landis+Gyr Equipamentos de Medição Ltda., Nansen S.A. Instrumentos de Precisão e FAE Ferragens, and Aparelhos Elétricos.  According to the Superintendence, the conduct lasted from 1990 to 2013.
• On March 28, 2016, the Superintendence opened infringement proceedings against nine auto parts suppliers in relation to an alleged conspiracy in the domestic and international markets for electronic power steering systems (“EPS”) for automobiles between 2007 and 2011.  According to the Superintendence, the companies may have reached agreements, in Brazil and elsewhere, with the purpose of fixing prices and other trading conditions, as well as allocating bids for customers and sharing markets among them.[91]  As referenced in our 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update and our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update,[92] in 2014 and 2015, the Superintendence opened nine investigations into suspected cartels in relation to different automobile parts, and conducted dawn raids with respect to certain products in August 2014.
• On May 9, 2016, the Superintendence opened two investigations against 18 companies and 46 individuals in relation to an alleged conspiracy in the Brazilian market for pipes and fittings.[93]  The first investigation relates to an alleged conspiracy in the domestic market of PVC pipes and fittings, which allegedly affected bids launched by public companies in the sewage and water infrastructure sector and private companies operating with civil construction and installation services.  The second investigation relates to an alleged conspiracy in the national market of PEAD pipes and fittings, which allegedly affected bids launched by concessionary companies operating infrastructure in the gas sector.  In both cases, the Superintendence’s preliminary opinion describes price-fixing agreements and client division implemented during meetings and telephone calls between management-level employees of these companies, with the authorization of board members and through possible e-mail exchanges discussing specific bids.
• On May 13, 2016, the Superintendence opened infringement proceedings against 12 companies and 54 individuals in relation to an alleged conspiracy in the domestic markets for the production and distribution of resins.  It alleged that the accused companies and individuals agreed to restrict competition through fixing resins prices and exchanging sensitive information.[94]  As referenced in our 2014 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update,[95] the investigation started in 2014 when CADE conducted dawn raids at the offices of the investigated companies.  Between the dawn raids and the opening of the proceedings, five companies approached CADE in order to negotiate TCCs.  These agreements resulted in the companies paying fines for a total of BRL 50 million (approximately $14.4 million).

b.                  Cases referred by the Superintendence to the Tribunal

Since January 1, 2016, the Superintendence has referred the following cases to the Tribunal, recommending a finding of infringement:

• On March 28, 2016, in relation to a suspected conspiracy in relation to DRAM chips, the Superintendence recommended the prosecution of Elpida Memory Inc., Hitachi Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Nanya Technology Corporation, and the Toshiba Corporation, together with two individuals associated with the companies. According to the Superintendence, the companies engaged in a “classic cartel” harming both direct purchasers and the final consumers of goods using DRAM chips (which are used in personal computers, printers, mobile phones, game consoles, and digital cameras).  The Superintendence alleged that the conspiracy occurred between 1988 and 2002 and consisted of information exchanges related to expected capacity, market conditions, and the prices at which the end goods using DRAM chips were sold.  TCCs previously entered into by CADE with other corporate entities and individuals resulted in BRL 8.2 million (approximately $2.4 million) in fines.  TCCs also previously entered into by CADE with other corporate entities and individuals resulted in BRL 8.2 million (approximately $2.4 million) in fines.[96]
• On June 9, 2016, the Superintendence referred a suspected conspiracy between distributors of fuel in São Luís, in the Brazilian State of Maranhão.  The participants are alleged to have fixed prices and tried to influence non-conspirators to raise prices.  The evidence of the infringement apparently includes both transcripts of phone conversations (authorized by Maranhão’s judiciary) and economic analysis developed by the Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis, on the markets for sale of fuel in São Luís.[97]
• Also on June 9, 2016, the Superintendence referred to the Tribunal a suspected conspiracy for the provision of medical and hospital services in Fortaleza, the capital of the State of Ceará in Northern Brazil.  According to the Superintendence, the Association of the Hospitals of the State of Ceará (Associação dos Hospitais do Estado do Ceará) and a number of its members conspired to impose prices and trading conditions on insurance companies.[98]

c.                   CADE’s Superintendence Adopts an Interim Measure and Conducts Further Dawn Raids in “Operation Dubai”

The Superintendence has continued its investigation of a suspected fuel conspiracy in Brazil’s Federal District (the so-called “Operation Dubai” described in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update).[99]  On January 25, 2016, the Superintendence adopted an interim measure, which consisted of the appointment of an interim administrator who would independently manage “BR” gas stations owned by Cascol, accounting for approximately two-thirds of the company’s stations.  In the event of non-compliance, Cascol would be subject to a daily fine of BRL 300,000 (approximately $75,000).  On May 6, 2016, CADE, together with Brazil’s federal police, conducted dawn raids at the homes of four individuals as part of “Operation Dubai.”[100]

6.                  Regulatory developments

a.                  CADE Adopts New Leniency Guidance

On May 25, 2016, CADE adopted Leniency Guidance in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”).[101]  As reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, on November 11, 2015, CADE released a preliminary version of the FAQs for public comment until February 11, 2016.[102]  The goal of the Leniency Guidance is to strengthen and expand Brazil’s Leniency Program and provide enhanced transparency and predictability in relation to leniency agreements.

Also on May 26, 2016, CADE amended a number of leniency provisions included in its Internal Rules concerning, among other things, the marker system and the calculation of Leniency Plus discounts.  As described in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, Leniency Plus is available in Brazil to those applicants who do not qualify for immunity (because they are not the first to come forward), but who offer information concerning a separate conspiracy about which CADE had no prior knowledge.[103]

b.                  CADE Publishes Preliminary English Version of the TCC Guidelines

On May 11, 2016, CADE adopted a formal set of guidelines for TCCs (the “TCC Guidelines”). TCCs, which are provided for under Article 85 of Act 12,529/11, are agreements entered into between CADE and the entities and/or individuals investigated for economic infringements (and, thus, not only for cartel infringements.  Under the TCC Guidelines, in order to enter into a TCC in a cartel case, a company is required to: (i) admit its participation in the conduct; (ii) collaborate with the investigations; and (iii) pay a fine (technically called “pecuniary amount” and not fine).   According to CADE, however, the TCC Guidelines reflect existing practices and the parameters that have previously been used in the negotiation of settlements over the past several years.[104]

c.                   CADE Publishes English Version of its Guidance on Compliance Programs

On February 18, 2016, CADE published an English version of its Guidance on Compliance.[105]  The Guidance sets forth in detail the actions required to execute a “consistent compliance program” and the benefits of doing so.  Unlike in certain jurisdictions (most notably, the U.S. and the EU), Brazil’s Guidance on Compliance expressly provides that having such programs in place at the time of the violation might constitute a criterion to be taken into consideration when determining the amount of fines.  However, according to CADE’s press release, the Guidance is not binding on CADE.[106]

7.                  Other developments

On January 25, 2016, it was reported that CADE had suffered a cyber-attack, with hackers gaining access to information stored on the enforcer’s internal databases, although no sensitive information or data from ongoing investigations or analyses were obtained or distributed over the internet.  The hacking group Anonymous claimed responsibility for the security breach, explaining it was a response to a presidential veto by Dilma Rousseff, who blocked the passage of legislation that included a proposed audit of the country’s public debt.[107]

On May 19, 2016, CADE entered into agreements with the competition authorities of Russia, India, and China to share information and experience in competition law, as well as to promote the joint participation of the authorities in investigations and in international events in this area.  According to Mr. Oliveira Júnior, this agreement should “constitute the base for future cooperation agreements to be celebrated between [these countries].”[108]

D.                CHILE

1.                  Enforcement Actions

Building on successes in several prosecutions involving the ocean shipping and poultry industries,[109] Chile continued its aggressive enforcement of cartels in the first half of 2016, bringing charges in two separate investigations–one involving tissue products and the other against supermarkets for allegedly fixing minimum retail prices for chicken meat.  The difference in treatment of the defendants across the two cases reinforces Chile’s continued strategy of encouraging self-reporting through leniency applications.

In January 2016, the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalia Nacional Economica, “FNE”) announced charges against three supermarket chains for fixing prices of fresh chicken between 2008 and 2011.  The investigation against the supermarkets was initiated based on information obtained during a separate investigation into a decade-long market sharing agreement among the country’s three largest poultry producers, and not the involvement of a leniency applicant.  The FNE has requested the maximum fine allowed under the law, 30,000 UTA ($22.9 million) for each company.[110]

In contrast, as initially reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, in the fourth quarter of 2015, the FNE announced charges against two tissue product manufacturers, CMPC Tissue and SCA Chile, alleging that the two manufacturers–which account for nearly 90% of tissue product sales–engaged in at least a decade-long conspiracy between 2001 and 2011.  Both manufacturers filed leniency applications, and the FNE recommended that CMPC Tissue receive complete immunity and that SCA Chile receive a reduced fine of $15.5 million.[111]  This year, in April, an appeals court prevented Chilean prosecutors from obtaining confidential information provided to the FNE in the defendants’ leniency petitions.  This was reported to be the first time the criminal prosecutor sought confidential material from FNE, and it has appealed the denial.[112]

2.                  Policy Developments

Chile’s Senate is currently considering a new criminal antitrust law.  The bill would criminalize “hardcore” cartels, with potential sentences of up to 10 years, and modify the maximum fine for unlawful conduct to the greater of 30% of the company’s revenues during the violation or double the economic benefit from the violation (the current maximum fine is 30,000 UAT ($22.9 million)).  The legislation provides that first-in leniency applicants would be immune from any fines and criminal sanctions and that second-in applicants may obtain a 50% reduction on the fine and a reduction on the criminal sanction.[113]

In addition, the FNE is working on a revised draft of its “Internal Guidelines for Leniency in Collusion Cases” to address comments from local attorneys as well as the American Bar Association and the International Bar Association, particularly regarding the need to keep information submitted in leniency petitions confidential, so that applicants are not placed in a worse position than other cartel participants vis-à-vis potential class action litigation.  The revised draft has not yet been made available to the public.

E.                 COLOMBIA

In May 2016, the Colombian competition authority, the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (“SIC”), announced that it issued fines totaling 185 billion pesos (approximately $62 million) to four manufacturers and 21 individuals for conspiratorial activity in the tissue paper market.  Pursuant to its Leniency Program, the SIC awarded a 100% reduction in fines to the first company to come forward and cooperate with its investigation and a 30% penalty reduction to a second company.  A third company had its application seeking a 50% reduction in fines rejected when the SIC concluded that it provided misleading statements and failed to fully cooperate with the investigation.[114]

F.                 MEXICO

In a year in which Mexico City hosted the International Bar Association’s Annual Competition Mid-Year Conference, the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) showed it is active in a variety of industries and geographic markets.

In February 2016, COFECE concluded an investigation into an alleged horizontal conspiracy among producers of air conditioner compressors used in automobiles, which it began in 2013, by issuing a Statement of Probable Responsibility explaining its allegations.[115]  Also in February, in response to proposed industry rules that would govern the price of tortillas, COFECE issued guidance urging producers to set prices unilaterally and threatening to conduct investigations if producers failed to do so.[116]

In March 2016, COFECE publicly announced it has been conducting an ongoing investigation since December 2015 into whether government-contracting firms that provide information-monitoring services may have shared information and rigged bids.[117]

In April 2016, COFECE’s Investigative Authority concluded an investigation and issued a Statement of Probable Responsibility to COFECE’s Commissioners alleging collusive conduct between providers of pension funds.[118]

In May 2016, COFECE brought formal allegations of a price-fixing and/or supply-restricting conspiracy among providers of vehicle towing services in the State of Guerrero; it had been investigating this conduct since 2014.[119]  Later that month, COFECE opened an investigation into potential collusion between competing producers of live performances (as well as the venues in which they are held and the accompanying ticketing services).[120]  Also in May, COFECE announced that an administrative trial will occur related to alleged collusion between taxi drivers serving Mexico City’s International Airport.[121]

In June 2016, COFECE announced an investigation of a horizontal conspiracy related to the pricing and supply of tortillas in the State of Jalisco.[122]  Finally, in June, COFECE announced fines of nearly 89 million pesos (approximately $4.8 million) against sugar producers who fixed sugar prices during a sharp decline in prices in late-2013.  The fines were assessed on 17 corporations and individuals, who admitted to using a trade association to facilitate price fixing.[123]

G.                URUGUAY

In November 2015, Uruguay’s competition authority, the Comisión de Promoción y Defensa de la Competencia (“CPDC”), announced that it would initiate an investigation into possible collusion in the tissue paper market, similar to the investigations conducted by Chile, Peru, and Colombia.  The Chilean paper company, CMPC, through its Uruguay branch, Ipusa SA, has offered to cooperate with the investigation.  Ipusa currently holds 80% of the market share in Uruguay for tissue paper.  The CPDC has not yet confirmed whether price fixing occurred in Uruguay.[124]

On the policy front, legislation has been introduced that would provide the CPDC greater evidence-gathering tools and bring the enforcement agency in line with international standards.[125]

II.                EUROPE

A.                EUROPE

1.                  European Commission

a.                  Fines

In the first half of 2016, the European Commission (“Commission”) imposed relatively few fines.  However, as several cartel investigations are ongoing, the year-end total fine amounts imposed in cartel cases may be significantly higher than the mid-year figure suggests.

* The figures above do not take into account subsequent rulings of the European courts adjusting the levels of fines, but does reflect adjustments made by the Commission.  For example, the original fine imposed in the EIRD cartel in 2013 was adjusted by the European Commission on April 6, 2016 (the Commission amended the fine, which is based on the value of sales data, for Société Générale because the bank had initially provided incorrect data to the Commission).

(i)                 Auto Parts

On January 27, 2016, the Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 137.79 million (approximately $153 million) on two auto parts producers, Mitsubishi Electric and Hitachi, for participating in collusion related to alternators and starters between September 2004 and February 2010.  A third car parts producer, DENSO, was granted full immunity from fines under the EU’s Leniency Guidelines for revealing the conduct to the Commission.  The three Japanese car parts producers colluded to coordinate prices and allocate customers or bids with regard to alternators and starters, and further, exchanged commercially sensitive information on price components and market strategies.  The Commission noted that while the contacts between the competitors did not take place within the European Economic Area (“EEA”), the collusion did have an impact on customers in the EEA given that the participants sold alternators and starters to car manufacturers there.  Under the Commission’s 2008 Settlement Notice, Mitsubishi Electric and Hitachi each received a 10% reduction in fines for their cooperation and acknowledgement of their involvement.[126]

(ii)              Canned Mushrooms

As reported in our 2014 and 2015 Mid-Year Updates,[127] in June 2014 the Commission reached a settlement with several producers of canned mushrooms in its investigation into price fixing and market allocation.  Almost two years later, on April 6, 2016, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 5.2 million (approximately $5.8 million) on Grupo Riberebro for its participation.  Grupo Riberebro is the only participant that did not settle the case in 2014.  Following the settlement with other parties, the Commission continued its investigation into Grupo Riberebro’s involvement and issued a Statement of Objections in May 2015.  The Commission concluded that the cartel: (i) exchanged confidential information with regard to tenders, (ii) set minimum prices, (iii) colluded with regard to volume targets, and (iv) allocated customers.  The Commission also found that Grupo Riberebro participated in the cartel from September 10, 2010 until February 28, 2012.  Grupo Riberebro received a fine reduction of 50% for cooperating with the Commission’s investigation.[128]

(iii)            Steel Abrasives

On May 25, 2016, the Commission imposed a fine of EUR 6.2 million (approximately $6.9 million) on Pometon S.p.A. for its participation in a price-fixing cartel concerning steel abrasives (loose steel particles used either for cleaning or enhancing metal surfaces in the steel, automotive, metallurgy, and petrochemical industries, or for cutting hard stones such as granite and marble).  The Commission found that Pometon participated in the cartel for almost four years, and imposed a fine of EUR 6.2 million (approximately $6.9 million).  As reported in our 2014 Year-End Update,[129] the Commission had reached a settlement with four other steel abrasive producers with regard to their participation in the cartel, including fines totaling EUR 30.7 million (approximately $33.4 million).

b.                  Ongoing Investigations

(i)                 Natural Gas

On June 6, 2016, the European Commission conducted dawn raids on several suppliers and transporters of natural gas in Romania.  The Commission is investigating alleged anticompetitive conduct in the transmission and supply of natural gas there, including the hindering of natural gas exports from Romania to other EU Member States.

(ii)              Credit Default Swaps

As reported in our 2015 Year-End Update,[130] the European Commission greatly reduced the scope of its investigation into alleged collusion in the credit derivatives business between 2006 and 2009.  In December 2015, the Commission dropped its inquiries into 13 investment banks, but continued to investigate other parties with respect to the licensing of certain data feeds and indices that are used by the industry to price credit default swaps.

>(iii)            Liner Shipping

Following dawn raids in May 2011 and the opening of a formal investigation in November 2013, the European Commission began a market test of proposed commitments in the liner shipping sector in February 2016. The Commission alleges that container liner shipping companies’ long-standing practice of announcing General Rate Increases may harm consumers by raising prices on services to and from Europe.  The price announcements in question did not set a fixed final price for the service concerned, but indicated the proposed increase in USD per container on the relevant route that would be applied beginning on a certain specified date.  The Commission has expressed concern that, while the announcements do not provide full information on prices, they may allow shipping lines to coordinate their pricing behavior.  The fifteen shipping companies under investigation have each proposed compatible behavioral commitments to resolve the Commission’s concerns.

2.                  Significant Rulings by the European Courts

The EU courts adopted a number of significant decisions during the first half of 2016.

a.                  Gas Insulated Switchgear

In January 2016, the General Court (“GC”) ruled on a long-running appeal arising out of the gas insulated switchgear (“GIS”) cartel.

The case goes back to January 2007, when the Commission imposed fines on a large number of companies for their participation in an alleged cartel in relation to GIS between 1988 and 2004.  The highest fines were imposed on Mitsubishi and Toshiba:  EUR 114 million (approximately $129.42 million) and EUR 86 million (approximately $97.63 million), respectively.[131]  Both entities appealed the Commission’s Decision.  In 2011, while upholding the companies’ liability, the GC annulled the fines because the Commission used a different reference year for these companies as compared to the European cartel participants (more specifically, it used 2001, rather than 2003, as for the other participants).[132]

On June 27, 2012, the Commission issued a new decision re-imposing fines on Mitsubishi and Toshiba and re-calculating their respective fines, this time using 2003 as the reference year.  It imposed fines of EUR 75 million (approximately $85.14 million) and EUR 57 million (approximately $64.71 million) on Mitsubishi and Toshiba, respectively.  An additional EUR 4.65 million (approximately $5.27 million) fine was imposed on both companies jointly and severally for the activities of their joint venture.[133]

Both companies separately appealed the 2012 Decision, arguing, inter alia, that the Commission had breached their rights of defense, as well as the principles of equal treatment and proportionality in calculating the fines.[134]  In its January 19, 2016 judgment, the GC rejected the arguments the applicants put forward, confirming, inter alia, that the Commission was right to rely on the sales realized by the joint venture in 2003 for the purposes of calculating the fines.

b.                  Power Transformers

On January 20, 2016, the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) upheld a May 2014 ruling from the GC, which itself confirmed a 2009 Commission decision,[135] finding Toshiba liable for participating in a market sharing agreement with six other Japanese and European companies in the power transformer market between June 1999 and May 2003.[136]

Toshiba had appealed the 2014 GC judgment, arguing inter alia, that the GC had erred in law by:  (i) characterizing the “gentlemen’s agreement” as a restriction of competition by object (the EU’s nearest equivalent to a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act) whereas the participating companies were not, in Toshiba’s view, potential competitors; (ii) erroneously concluding that Toshiba had not distanced itself from the cartel activities at one of the meetings of the participants; and (iii) unduly resorting to worldwide figures (rather than just EEA and Japan sales) when calculating the fine.

The CJEU dismissed the appeal on all grounds.  On the first ground, according to the court, the Japanese and European producers in question could indeed be considered potential competitors, in particular due to the fact that barriers to enter European markets were not insurmountable.  In addition, the mere existence of the “gentlemen’s agreement” constituted an indication of potential competition between the parties concerned.

On the second ground, the CJEU stressed “the concept of ‘public distancing’ reflects a factual situation, the existence of which is found . . . on a case-by-case basis, taking account of a number of coincidences and indicia submitted to it and accordingly an overall assessment of all the relevant evidence and indicia.”  In the present case, the CJEU found that Toshiba had not distanced itself from the cartel, especially since the main terms of the “agreement” were confirmed during a meeting at which Toshiba was present.

Finally, with respect to the “relevant geographic area” taken into account for calculating the amount of the fine imposed on Toshiba, the CJEU held that limiting the relevant geographic area to the EEA and Japan would not have appropriately reflected the weight of the allegedly infringing entities in a worldwide cartel and would not have ensured the deterrent effect of the fine.  More specifically, the CJEU endorsed the Commission’s position that limiting the geographic scope to sales in the EEA would result in Toshiba avoiding the imposition of a fine, since it did not realize any relevant sales in the EEA during the reference year used by the Commission.  In addition, even if the sales in Japan had been taken into account, such an approach would have ignored the fact that the parties to the gentlemen’s agreement, i.e., the power transformer producers, have activities worldwide.

c.                   Calcium Carbide and Magnesium Reagents

On June 16, 2016, the CJEU issued its judgments on the appeals by SKW[137] and Evonik Degussa and AlzChem[138] upholding a judgement of the GC with respect to the calcium carbide and magnesium reagents cartel.

SKW’s main ground of appeal was that the GC was wrong not to find that the Commission had breached its rights of defense by refusing to allow it an in-camera hearing.  The CJEU agreed that the Commission’s decision[139] to reject the request for an in-camera hearing had been erroneously based on the protection of the rights of defense of a third party who was not the subject of the relevant proceedings.  However, it did not annul the contested judgment because SKW had failed to show that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without this procedural irregularity.

The main argument raised by Evonik Degussa and Alzchem was that they incorrectly had been held responsible for the participation of their former subsidiary (SKW) in the calcium carbide cartel, despite the fact that the companies had specifically asked the manager of the subsidiary not to participate in anticompetitive agreements with competitors.

As per settled case law, where a parent company owns 100% (or nearly 100%) of the subsidiary’s share capital (which was the case in the proceedings at issue), the Commission will systematically seek to establish parental liability on the basis of a rebuttable presumption that the parent exercises “decisive influence” over the subsidiary and should therefore be held liable for the conduct of the subsidiary.[140]  This presumption can be rebutted only with concrete evidence that the subsidiary acted independently of its parents at the relevant time.

The CJEU dismissed the appellants’ claim and ruled that the “General Court did not rely on the existence of the potential or theoretical influence [of Evonik Degussa and AlzChem] over SKW, but merely found that their arguments did not show the absence of their actual exercise of decisive influence over SKW and thus were not sufficient to rebut the . . . presumption deriving from the shareholding.”  Importantly, the CJEU clarified that “the fact that a subsidiary does not comply with an instruction given by its parent company is not sufficient, by itself, to establish the absence of actual exercise of decisive influence by the parent over the subsidiary.”

d.                  Industrial Bags

On November 30, 2005, the Commission imposed fines on certain industrial bag producers for their participation in an alleged cartel between 1982 and 2002.[141]  Trioplast Industrier (“Trioplast”) was held jointly and severally liable for a fine of approximately EUR 7.73 million (approximately $8.77 million).  Trioplast appealed the Commission’s decision to the GC and shortly afterwards provided the Commission with a bank guarantee of approximately EUR 4.87 million (approximately $5.52 million).  In 2010, the GC partially annulled the Commission’s decision for having wrongly calculated the fines imposed on Trioplast and set the fine at EUR 2.73 million (approximately $3.09 million).  In March 2012, following the resolution of the appeal brought by FLSmidth (another participant) against the Commission’s decision, the Commission informed Trioplast of the definitive nature of the fine imposed on it and requested a payment of EUR 3.32 million (approximately $3.76 million), which corresponded to the initial fine of EUR 2.73 million (approximately $3.09 million) plus default interest starting from March 2006, when Trioplast had first provided the bank guarantee.  Trioplast agreed to pay the reduced fine, but not the default interest.  In July 2014, the EC sent a letter to Trioplast requesting the payment of the default interest.  Trioplast complied with the request but also appealed the decision to the GC seeking the cancellation or reduction of the amount of interest it had to pay to the Commission.[142]

On May 12, 2016, the GC dismissed the action brought by Trioplast, confirming the Commission’s view that the Commission decision of 2005, even though not final (as the amount was indeed corrected following Trioplast’s first appeal), was immediately enforceable and should have therefore been complied with immediately.  The GC added that, “where, as in the present case, the essential condition for suspension of the payment of the fine disappears, namely the existence of appeals against the judgments of the Court in the FLS cases pending before the Court of Justice, the decision becomes binding and final on the addressee and the fine must be paid immediately.”  Finally, the GC noted that the damages suffered by Trioplast flowed from its choice not to immediately pay the fine, but rather offer a bank guarantee.  Had Trioplast paid the fine immediately, the GC held, it would not have been liable for the interest.

e.                   Spanish Bitumen

In June 2016, the CJEU ruled on a number of appeals arising out of the Commission’s 2007 Spanish bitumen cartel decision.

In October 2007, the Commission imposed fines on 13 companies, including Compañía Española de Petróleos (“CEPSA”), its wholly owned subsidiary Productos Asfálticos (“PROAS”), and Repsol, for their alleged participation in a series of complex arrangements aiming at market-sharing and price coordination in relation to bitumen in Spain.[143]  A fine of approximately EUR 80.5 million (approximately $91.39 million) was imposed on Repsol, while CEPSA and PROAS were jointly fined EUR 83.8 million (approximately $95.13 million).  All three companies unsuccessfully appealed the Commission’s decision to the GC.  They then appealed the GC judgments to the CJEU as follows:[144]

• Repsol Appeal:  Repsol challenged its fine, inter alia, on the basis that: (i) the duration of the investigation was unreasonably lengthy (five years and nine months); and (ii) it had not exercised decisive influence over some of its subsidiaries.  The CJEU rejected Repsol’s claims.  While the court accepted that there was no objective justification for the lengthy duration of the proceedings, it ruled that this could not serve as a legal basis for a reduction in fines and that the only recourse available to Repsol would be a damages action before the GC.  Further, it held that the evidence provided by Repsol was not sufficient to reverse the rebuttable presumption that it exercised actual decisive influence resulting from Repsol’s ownership of almost all subsidiaries at issue.
• CEPSA/PROAS Appeal:  CEPSA/PROAS argued that: (i) the Commission had violated their rights of defense by sending the statement of objections to a Spanish company in English; (ii) the imposed fine was excessive because it amounted to 90% of the turnover of its subsidiary (PROAS), thereby breaching the 10% annual turnover ceiling provided for antitrust fines under EU law;[145] and (iii) the duration of the investigation was unreasonably lengthy (five years and nine months).
• In response to these claims the CJEU ruled that a failure to send a statement of objections to a recipient in a Member State in the language of that Member State does not constitute an essential procedural requirement.  Moreover, CEPSA-PROAS had agreed to have the statement of objections sent in English fearing that a further delay in the proceedings might lead to larger fines.  Further, as CEPSA and PROAS are a single economic entity, the fine imposed did not exceed 10% of the group turnover.
• In parallel, Galp Energía SGPS SA (“Galp”), Galp Energía España SA, and Petróleos de Portugal (Petrogal) SA, which were among the 13 entities fined by the Commission in October 2007 for their alleged participation in the Spanish bitumen cartel, also challenged the decision to the GC.  On September 16, 2013, the GC had granted a small reduction in Galp’s fine.  On appeal, the CJEU agreed that the participation of two subsidiaries of Galp (Galp Energía España SA and Petróleos de Portugal (Petrogal) SA) was not central (they participated in two aspects of the cartel in question relating to the compensation mechanism and the monitoring system).[146]  The CJEU thus further reduced the fine imposed on the appellants from EUR 8.7 million (approximately $9.87 million) to EUR 7.7 million (approximately $8.74 million).

f.                    Hydrogen Peroxide

By order of March 3, 2016,[147] the Vice-President of the CJEU granted interim relief, temporarily prohibiting the Commission from publishing certain confidential leniency information disclosed to it by the whistleblower in the hydrogen peroxide cartel, until the court decides the case on the merits.

The case derives from a 2006 decision of the Commission to fine seven producers of hydrogen peroxide for alleged participation in a cartel from 1994 to 2000.[148]  Evonik Degussa reported the existence of the cartel to the Commission in 2002 in exchange for immunity, thereby avoiding a sanction by the Commission.  The Commission published a short non-confidential version of the Decision in 2007.

The 2016 ruling of the CJEU reversed an earlier 2016 decision by the GC,[149] which had held that the Commission was entitled to publish the leniency information.  The CJEU ruled that Evonik Degussa would likely suffer irreversible damage if the information was made public before the court had a chance to issue a final ruling in appeal proceedings brought by the chemicals company against the GC’s decision.  In addition, the court was of the view that the Commission had already served the public interest by publishing the shorter, non-confidential version of its decision in 2007.

g.                  Requests for Information Regarding Potential Cement Cartel

On March 10, 2016, the Court of Justice of the EU handed down four judgments that will provide crucial guidance on how the Commission addresses requests for information from potential cartel participants in antitrust investigations.[150]

Following the opening of an investigation into suspected infringements in the cement sector, on March 30, 2011, the Commission sent formal requests for information (i.e., under the form of a Commission decision) to various cement companies asking them to provide information on the suspected infringements.  These formal requests were unsuccessfully challenged before the GC by four cement companies:  HeidelbergCement, Schwenk Zement, Buzzi Unicem, and Italmobiliare.  The four cement companies then appealed to the CJEU.  While the appeal was pending, the Commission closed the investigation without issuing a decision, since the evidence obtained from the investigation was not “sufficiently conclusive” to confirm its initial concerns.

The CJEU overturned the judgements of the GC and annulled the Commission’s formal requests for information for not having been adequately reasoned.  In particular, the CJEU reiterated that, according to EU law, when issuing a formal request for information the Commission must include in the decision the legal basis and the purpose of the request, while also specifying what information is required and the time limit within which the requested information must be provided.  This obligation to state specific reasons is a fundamental requirement, designed not only to show that the request for information is justified, but also to enable the targets of the investigation to assess the scope of their duty to cooperate while safeguarding their rights of defense.

Further, the CJEU found that the formal request for information contained extremely numerous and broad questions (e.g., the parties were asked to disclose detailed information relating to domestic and international transactions in 12 EU Member States over a period of ten years).  Since the formal requests for information did not disclose clearly and unequivocally the basis for the suspicion of infringement, it was impossible to determine whether the requested information was necessary for the purposes of the investigation.

In conclusion, the statement of reasons of the formal requests for information was excessively brief, vague, and generic.  This was considered particularly unjustifiable given the information that the Commission possessed at the time the requests were issued, which should have allowed it to present more precisely its suspicions of infringement.

h.                  Freight Forwarding

On March 28, 2012, the Commission imposed fines on 14 international groups for their alleged participation in four distinct cartels aimed at fixing prices and other trading conditions in relation to international air freight-forwarding services between 2002 and 2007.[151]  The entities filed an appeal against the Commission’s decision before the GC.  The GC confirmed the Commission’s decision on February 29, 2016 based on its case law regarding the allocation of a fine between a parent company not participating in an alleged infringement and the directly participating subsidiaries.[152]  According to this case law, the fine imposed on the parent company, which is liable for the activity of its subsidiaries without having participated in the cartel, cannot exceed the overall amount of the fines for the subsidiaries.[153]

i.                    Preliminary Ruling on Overlapping Leniency Procedures

On January 20, 2016, the CJEU issued a preliminary ruling with respect to the relationship between EU and Member State leniency programs in response to a request from the Italian Supreme Court in relation to proceedings between DHL and the Italian Competition Authority (“AGCM”).[154]  More specifically, the CJEU held that the leniency programs of the EU and Member States are autonomous and independent, with the result that the grant of immunity or leniency in the context of an EU cartel investigation does not entitle the leniency/immunity applicant to similar treatment in other related national investigations.

In the underlying case, the AGCM had imposed fines on DHL for its alleged participation in a conspiracy related to international road freight forwarding to and from Italy.  DHL had submitted an immunity application to the Commission on June 5, 2007, with respect to the international freight-forwarding sector and was granted conditional immunity for the entire freight-forwarding industry (including maritime, air, and road forwarding).  The Commission, however, decided to pursue investigations only in relation to international air freight-forwarding services.  On July 12, 2007, DHL submitted a summary immunity application to the ACGM without specifically mentioning the road transport sector.  Although DHL later submitted an additional summary application to the ACGM to cover the road transport sector, Deutsche Bahn (on behalf of both Deutsche Bahn and Schenker) had already submitted leniency applications to both the Commission and the ACGM requesting leniency in relation to that sector.  In June 2011, the AGCM awarded Schenker immunity as to the road freight-forwarding sector.  DHL sought to annul the ACGM’s decision, arguing that a national authority that receives a summary leniency application must assess that application taking into account leniency applications submitted to the Commission.  The CJEU ruled as follows:

• The instruments adopted in the context of the European Competition Network, in particular the ECN Model Leniency Program, are not binding on national competition authorities or courts and tribunals of the EU Member States.
• There is no legal link between an application for immunity submitted to the Commission and one submitted to a national competition authority, which would require that authority to assess the summary application in the light of the application for immunity.  The treatment of a leniency application is determined by the law of each EU Member State.
• Where a summary application submitted to a national competition authority has a more limited material scope than the application for immunity submitted to the Commission, that national authority is not required to contact the Commission.

j.                    Pre-Stressing Steel

As noted in our 2015 Year-End Update, on June 30, 2010, the Commission imposed fines on a large number of companies for their participation in an alleged cartel involving pre-stressing steel between 1984 and 2002.[155]  Between 2010 and 2014, 28 entities brought cases before the GC seeking to reduce fines imposed on them in connection with the conspiracy.

On June 2, 2016, the GC delivered its judgment as to the applications lodged by four pre-stressing steel suppliers (Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías, Trefilerías Quijano, Trenzas y Cables de Acero PSC, and Global Steel Wire) in the Spanish Celsa group, which had been found to constitute a single economic entity.[156]  Following the Commission’s initial decision, those companies sought reconsideration and a fine reduction, arguing that they were not able to pay the fines imposed on them, which totalled EUR 54.38 million (approximately $61.73 million).  That application was rejected by letter on July 25, 2012.  The four companies brought actions against (i) the initial Commission decision, as amended, and (ii) the Commission letter of July 25, 2012, disputing both liability and the holding that they constituted a single economic unit.

The GC upheld the Commission decision, holding, inter alia, that (i) the companies constituted a single economic entity in light of their economic integration; (ii) the Commission did not err in attributing liability to these companies given the single and continuous nature of the infringement;  and (ii) the companies had the means to obtain the necessary funding or guarantees to pay the fines, even if they did not have the means to immediately pay the fines in their entirety.

B.                 EU MEMBER STATES

1.                  Austria

In February 2015, the Austrian Federal Administrative Court imposed penalties of EUR 4.2 million (approximately $4.7 million) against four service providers in the rail transport and logistics sector.[157]  ETRANSA Speditions AG was fined EUR 3.5 million (approximately $3.87 million), PANALPINA Welttransport GmbH was fined EUR 2 million (approximately $2.21 million), Schenker & Co. KG was fined EUR 318,000 (approximately $351,000), and Rail Cargo Logistics Austria GmbH was fined EUR 184,000 (approximately $203,000).  Kühne und Nagel International AG successfully applied for leniency and escaped the imposition of a fine.  The five companies were accused of colluding with regard to transport volumes and prices for an Austrian customer between 2005 and 2010. ETRANSA’s appeal against the decision was dismissed by the Austrian Supreme Court in March 2016.

In March 2016, the Austrian Supreme Court also ruled that a juice producer (Rauch Fruchtsäfte) had acted together with retailers to fix consumer prices of carbonated soft drinks and non-carbonated drinks and fruit juices.[158]  The Court found that the collusion took place from 2003 to 2010.  The Court found the behavior constituted a hardcore violation and dismissed efficiency arguments.  It fined Rauch Fruchtsäfte EUR 1.7 million (approximately $1.9 million).

2.                  Belgium

On February 23, 2016, the Belgian Competition Authority (“BCA”) imposed fines totaling EUR 3.9 million (approximately $4.3 million) on six companies in the industrial batteries industry for participating in a price-fixing conspiracy.[159]  The BCA’s investigation showed that Battery Supplies, Celectric, Emrol, Enersys, Exide Technologies, and Hoppecke agreed to apply a surcharge on lead between 2004 and 2014.  The BCA noted that lead is one of the most important components, and thus the main cost factor, of industrial batteries, including motive power batteries.  Exide Technologies brought the conspiracy to light when it applied for leniency in 2013, and received full immunity from fines.  Hoppecke, Battery Supplies, and Enersys also submitted leniency applications and received partial immunity from fines for providing evidence to the BCA.  These companies were fined EUR 1.23 million (approximately $1.36 million), EUR 517,000 (approximately $575,000), and EUR 1.8 million (approximately $2 million), respectively, following a respective 40%, 20% and 30% reduction in fines under the leniency program, and an additional 10% reduction for acknowledging their participation.  Celectric and Emrol were fined EUR 71,000 (approximately $79,000) and EUR 241,000 (approximately $268,000) respectively, following a 10% reduction for acknowledging their participation.

On March 4, 2016, the BCA adopted new leniency guidelines, following a public consultation held between November 2015 and January 2016.[160]  The guidelines have three objectives.  First, because the Belgian Code of Economic Law, adopted in 2013, introduced penalties for individuals  of up to EUR 10,000 (approximately $11,000), the guidelines now cover individuals cooperating with the BCA.  Second, the guidelines aim to integrate the established practices of the European Commission with regard to leniency into the Belgian system.  Third, the guidelines clarify the practicalities of submitting a leniency application to the BCA.  The new guidelines were published in the Belgian Official Journal and became effective on March 27, 2016.

On May 27, 2016, the BCA confirmed that its Prosecutor’s Office held dawn raids at the premises of various companies that sell products in pharmacies without a medical prescription.[161]  The BCA claimed it had information that the companies’ practices were in breach of the provisions of the Belgian Code of Economic Law regarding restrictive practices and/or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Function of the EU.  The dawn raids constitute a preliminary step in the BCA’s investigation into possible restrictive practices.

3.                  Czech Republic

On February 8, 2016, the Chairman of the Czech Competition Office reduced the fine imposed on November 6, 2015 on several construction companies for bid rigging.  The fine was reduced from CZK 2.036 billion (approximately $83.6 million) to CZK 1,659,993 (approximately $63,000).  The reduction was granted in order to take into account the gravity of the conduct of individual participants, as well as the overall gravity of the conduct.[162]  The conduct involved illegal bid rigging in relation to a number of highway construction contracts between 2006 to 2008, including bid-rotation schemes and the use of “cover” bids.

Separately, in May 2016, the Czech Competition Office imposed fines of CZK 278 million ($11.4 million) on another 12 businesses for bid rigging in the construction sector.[163]

4.                  France

On May 12, 2016, France’s competition authority, the Autorité de la concurrence (“Autorité”), fined several companies for anticompetitive practices in the construction and public works sector in La Réunion (a French island in the Indian Ocean).[164]  These companies divided the market and prevented new entry in the market for welded mesh and metal frames (steel components used in the construction of reinforced concrete structures).  Although demand for metal frames and welded mesh in La Réunion increased substantially between 2004 and 2009 because of a number of major infrastructure projects, the largest welded mesh and metal frames processors on the island and the main trading and resale company agreed not to compete over the new projects.  In addition, between 2005 and 2011, a substantial number of the sector’s operators (transporters, processors, and traders/resellers) implemented a series of anticompetitive practices aimed at limiting market entry by new welded mesh resellers.  In particular, the participants ensured that the price of welded mesh was higher for potential competitors.  Finally, the group also implemented measures to block imports.  The Autorité imposed fines totaling EUR 5 million (approximately $5.5 million).

5.                  Germany

a.                  Cartel Prosecution and Bundeskartellamt Investigations

The German Cartel Office (the Bundeskartellamt, or BKartA) was very active in the first half of 2016.  While the prosecution of hardcore horizontal conspiracies is still the primary focus of the Bundeskartellamt’s enforcement activities, a very large part of the Bundeskartellamt’s investigations and fines imposed in 2016 actually concerned allegedly anti-competitive vertical arrangements.[165]

Regarding horizontal pricing agreements, the BKartA completed its proceedings against manufacturers of both concrete and wooden railway sleepers, finding that there was an illicit agreement between five concrete railway sleeper manufacturers.  The BKartA found that at least three of the manufacturers had rigged bids for framework contracts for the German railway operator Deutsche Bahn.  Nevertheless, the BKartA fined only Durtrack GmbH, Germany’s biggest sleeper manufacturer EUR 1.5 million (approximately $1.7 million), as the two other participating firms benefitted from the authority’s leniency program.  The proceedings against the remaining two alleged participants were dropped.  Similarly, proceedings against wooden railway sleeper manufacturers have been terminated due to lack of evidence.[166]

In March, the BKartA fined nine companies and an individual involved in the sanitary, heating, and air conditioning sector about EUR 21.3 million (approximately $24 million), for coordinating their gross price lists and sales prices during the period 2005 to 2013.  In calculating the fine, the BKartA took into account the cooperation of all participants and the significantly larger market shares of their remaining competitors.[167]

Also in March, the BKartA closed the so-called “rail case”–involving a number of collusive agreements in the market for track construction material–by imposing a fine of approximately EUR 3.5 million (approximately $4 million) on Vossloh Laeis GmbH, a German transport technology manufacturer.  The cartel participants had agreed on the allocation of rail and switch sales and the allocation of tenders and projects from 2001 to 2011.  The BKartA had already imposed fines of nearly EUR 100 million (approximately $113 million) on eight other participants in a settlement reached in 2013.[168]

Finally, on June 23, 2016, the Bundeskartellamt conducted unannounced inspections at the premises of several German automotive companies over suspicions of collusion in connection with a steel buying.  The investigation is at a very early stage.

b.                  Other developments and upcoming legislation

On the legislative front, Germany is currently discussing the contemplated ninth revision to the German Competition Act (“GWB”), which will implement the EU Cartel Damages Directive (2014/104/EU).  The Directive must be implemented by the end of 2016.  While the current German legislation already largely meets the requirements under the directive, certain amendments will be required including (i) a rebuttable presumption that a conspiracy has caused damage; (ii) new regulations concerning the disclosure of evidence or inspection of files; (iii) certain exceptions to the principle of joint and several liability for cartel damages to the benefit of small and medium-sized companies; and (iv) an extension of the statutory limitation period for damage claims from three to five years.

As described in our 2014 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update,[169] in 2014, the Italian businessman Romano Pisciotti was the first individual to be extradited from Germany to the United States for prosecution for alleged participation in collusive conduct.  Following his extradition, he brought an action for damages against the Federal Republic of Germany before the Regional Court of Berlin, claiming that his extradition was a violation of the European non-discrimination principle.  He alleges that, despite his Italian citizenship, Article 16(2) of the German Constitution (which prevents the extradition of German nationals) should have been equally applied to him as an EU citizen.  In April 2016, the Regional Court of Berlin submitted this legal question to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

Finally, the French Competition authority and the German BKartA published a joint paper in May on big data and its implications for competition, especially regarding business models in the digital economy that involve the collection of personal data and the correlation of big data with an increase in market power.[170]  The German BKartA internet think tank published a complementary working paper regarding platforms and networks.[171]

6.                  Ireland

Proceedings were initiated in 2016 by two Irish cement companies, CRH plc and its subsidiary, Irish Cement Limited, regarding allegations of improper seizure by the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (“CCPC”) during a dawn raid continued in early 2016.[172]  The companies were the subject of dawn raids relating to alleged criminal abuses of dominance in the Irish bagged cement sector.  The High Court ruled on April 5, 2016 that the CCPC could not access or review seized material until an agreement is put in place between the CCPC and CRH that would allow for an independent third party to “sift” the seized documents to identify material relevant to the CCPC’s investigation.  The CCPC lodged an appeal against the High Court ruling on May 20, 2016.[173]

In January 2016, the CCPC issued a warning to trade associations not to issue minimum price recommendations to their members.  The warning followed an investigation into the display of minimum recommended rates for tour guide services on the Approved Tour Guides of Ireland’s (ATGI) website.  The CCPC directed the ATGI to remove the list from its website and to inform its members that tour guides must decide individually what price they charge for their services.[174]

7.                  The Netherlands

On March 23, 2016, the Dutch Competition Authority (Autoriteit Consument en Markt, “ACM”) fined four businesses in the cooling and freezing storage sector a total of EUR 12.5 million (approximately $13.9 million) for participating in a conspiracy involving exchanges of commercially sensitive information.  Eimskip, Kloosbeheer, Samskip, and Van Bon (now H&S Coldstores) each received fines ranging from EUR 450,000 to EUR 9.6 million (approximately $499,000 to $10.7 million).  In addition, five managers also were fined, with the highest fine being EUR 144,000 (approximately $160,000).  The ACM found that in the context of merger discussions between 2006 and 2009, the companies exchanged commercially sensitive information, including price information and information on capacity utilization rates.  The undertakings also colluded to fix prices and allocate customers, significantly reducing competition between cooling and freezing storages.  Kloosbeheer acknowledged its involvement and cooperated with the ACM’s investigation, receiving a 10% reduction in fines.[175]

On April 18, 2016, the ACM also fined the two largest producers of prefabricated concrete garage units in the Netherlands for engaging in illegal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements.  Rekers Betonwerk, which had informed the ACM of the existence of the cartel and actively cooperated in the ACM’s investigation, received full immunity from fines, escaping a fine of at least EUR 3 million ($3.3 million).  Juwel Betonbauteile was fined EUR 306,500 (approximately $340,000).[176]

In the first half of 2016, the District Court of Rotterdam ruled on appeals brought in connection with two decisions of the ACM.  First, on April 7, 2016, the Court upheld the majority of the ACM’s decision finding that approximately 50 real estate traders had participated in a cartel to manipulate foreclosure auctions.  The Court reduced some of the fines in light of financial hardship on the part of the traders and the long duration of the ACM’s procedure.[177]

On May 12, 2016, the Court upheld a 2011 ACM decision fining four textile laundry companies for allocating the Dutch market for laundry services in the health sector. The conspiracy operated between 1998 and 2009.  The Court ruled that three of the four appeals were inadmissible.  However, the Court annulled the fine imposed by the ACM on the fourth appellant, as the ACM did not sufficiently investigate that company’s involvement.  Under the Dutch statute of limitations, the ACM is barred from further enforcement action in relation to this entity, as it did not participate in the conduct after August 2003.  The Court upheld a total fine of EUR 12.5 million (approximately $13.86 million).[178]

Finally, on March 24, 2016, the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal rejected appeals against a 2014 judgment of the District Court of Rotterdam upholding a 2012 decision of the ACM imposing approximately EUR 8 million ($8.9 million) in fines on certain producers and processors of silver onions.  The Tribunal found that ACM was correct to find that the companies had concluded illegal agreements to restrict supply and fix prices from 1998 through 2010.  In addition, it affirmed that the cartel members had ensured the purchase of equipment from other producers and processors of silver onions who had ceased production, in order to prevent new market entry.[179]

8.                  Spain

The Spanish Competition Authority (the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia or CNMC) has been very active in the first half of 2016, opening a series of investigations and imposing a number of significant fines on companies active across different sectors.[180]

On April 20, 2016, the CNMC imposed total fines of EUR 6.12 million (approximately $6.8 million) on six producers of Spanish nougat for allocating the Spanish market for private label distribution.  The CNMC found that for more than two years the companies (who constituted 58% of the market) had shared strategic information on prices, customers and other sensitive data with regard to private label distributors.[181]

On May 12, 2016, the CNMC imposed fines up to EUR 1.72 million (approximately $1.9 million) on seven car dealers and a consulting firm for collusive activities.[182]  This decision adds to the EUR 41.1 ($45.7 million) imposed on 95 car dealers, two consulting firms, and two trade associations for their participation in a similar practice, as discussed in our 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust Update.[183]

On May 31, 2016, the CNMC imposed a EUR 128.8 million (approximately $143 million) fine on eight adult diapers producers, a trade association, and four members of the boards of these companies for their participation in a price-fixing conspiracy between 1996 and 2014.  The conduct was considered by the CNMC to be particularly serious, given the breadth of the market covered by the infringement (95%) and the people affected (2.5 million people).  For the first time since the creation of the CNMC in 1989, four individuals were fined for their roles in the conspiracy, with amounts ranging from EUR 4,000 to EUR 15,000 (approximately $4,400 to $16,700).[184]

On July 6, 2016, the CNMC imposed a EUR 5.64 million (approximately $6.25 million) fine on four rail turnout manufacturers and nine of their executives for bid rigging with respect to public bids organized by the ADIF, the Spanish administrator of rail infrastructure, and its predecessor over a 15-year period from July 1999 to October 2014.  The anticompetitive agreements between the companies related to rail turnouts and other complementary elements.  The fines came after dawn raids at all four companies.  The individual executives were fined between EUR 4,750 and EUR 11,400 (between approximately $5,000 and $12,000).  This was only the second time that the CNMC had fined individual executives.[185]

The CNMC has also opened a number of infringement proceedings against companies in numerous different sectors for their possible violation of EU and Spanish competition rules.

• On January 26, 2016, the CNMC opened infringement proceedings against ten companies for alleged market sharing, price fixing and information sharing in the market for the production and supply of medical gases.[186]
• On March 7, 2016, the CNMC also opened infringement proceedings against 16 companies and one trade association for price fixing and public bid rigging in relation to cables.[187]  The decision followed dawn raids in July 2015 and on February 16, 2016 at the premises of several low and middle-tension cables producers and distributors and the sectoral trade association.[188]
• On April 25, 2016, the CNMC also opened infringement proceedings against 11 providers of IT and application services.  The proceedings were opened after the Spanish Tax Authority had provided the CNMC with data on public procurement bids, which led the CNMC to conduct inspections at the affected companies.[189]

On the regulatory side, in February 2016 the Spanish Ministry of Justice published the first draft of the law to transpose the EU damages directive under national law for infringements of the Competition Law.[190]

Finally, in an April 6, 2016 ruling, the Spanish Supreme Court aligned Spanish law with EU jurisprudence regarding the validity and treatment of the information “revealed by chance” by a competition authority during an inspection.[191]  In the underlying proceedings, the CNMC had opened infringement proceedings against two companies after having identified an incriminating e-mail between the companies during an inspection carried out in relation to different proceedings.  The National Court (“Audiencia Nacional”) annulled the second proceedings opened by the CNMC against the companies, on the basis that the e-mail was not related to the subject-matter of the investigation.  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conclusions of the National Court, ruling that “if an entry and inspection of premises are duly authorized by the relevant court order, and if the inspection and collection of documentation are carried out adequately and proportionately by reference to the subject matter of the inspection and the investigation, the information obtained by chance and unrelated to the subject-matter of the investigation may be used legitimately for infringement proceedings with regard to the illegal activity that was different than that which led to the court order for entry and inspection.”

9.                  Switzerland

In December 2015, the Swiss competition authority fined two piano retailers for price fixing in relation to pianos manufactured by two leading piano manufacturers.[192]  Both retailers had mutually agreed on catalogue prices and discounts.  A third participant was granted leniency.  Although the piano manufacturers had not directly participated in the conspiracy, they were found to have supported the retailers by printing the agreed-on catalogue prices.  The retailers were fined a total of CHF 518,000 (approximately $520,000).

10.              United Kingdom

The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) has been active in its pursuit of suspected anticompetitive arrangements in the first half of 2016.

a.                  Steel Tanks

A milestone was reached in the steel tanks investigation, with three businesses admitting to participating in an illegal conspiracy in relation to the supply of cylindrical galvanized steel tanks in the UK.[193]  In a March 2016 settlement with the CMA, the companies agreed to pay penalties totaling more than £2.6 million (approximately $3.3 million) for their role in dividing up customers and agreeing on prices for a range of galvanized steel tanks.  The CMA was alerted to the cartel by one of the participating companies, which thereafter escaped sanction under the CMA’s leniency policy.[194]

The settlement in the civil investigation follows verdicts in related criminal proceedings against directors of the companies.  As reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, one of the directors pleaded guilty to the offense and was given a six-month suspended prison sentence, while the other two directors were acquitted.[195]

In May, the CMA issued a statement of objections which also includes a separate allegation that some of the suppliers exchanged competitively sensitive pricing information at (or shortly after) a meeting in July 2012.[196]  This allegation concerns three of the suppliers involved in the main collusive arrangement who admitted this conduct as part of the settlement announced in March (Franklin Hodge Industries Ltd, Galglass Ltd, and KW Supplies Ltd), plus another supplier, Balmoral Tanks Ltd.  The information exchange allegation against the non-settling party, Balmoral, will be considered by a new case decision group.[197]

b.                  Building and Construction

Following an investigation into suspected collusive conduct related to the supply of UK precast concrete drainage products, on March 7, 2016, the CMA confirmed that it had charged one individual, Barry Cooper, for the criminal offense.[198]  Cooper has been charged with dishonestly agreeing with others to divide supply, fix prices and divide customers between 2006 and 2013 with respect to UK precast concrete drainage products.  The businesses Stanton Bonna (UK) Ltd, FP McCann Ltd, CPM Group Ltd, and Milton Pipes Ltd. were involved in the alleged arrangements.[199]  Cooper pleaded guilty to the criminal offense at a Pre-Trial Preparatory Hearing on March 21, 2016.[200]

The CMA is carrying out a related civil investigation into whether businesses have infringed the Competition Act of 1998.[201]

c.                   Modeling Agencies

In May, the CMA alleged that five modelling agencies breached competition law by agreeing to exchange confidential and competitively sensitive information on pricing, and in some cases to a common approach to pricing.[202]  The trade association of the modelling agencies, AMA, was also alleged to have circulated emails to its members encouraging them to reject the fees being offered by specific customers and to negotiate a higher fee.  The case is the first enforcement case pursued by the CMA in the creative industries.

d.                  Financial Services

The first half of 2016 also saw a number of UK developments regarding the ongoing enforcement actions against banks and their employees for alleged manipulation of certain financial benchmarks.

In January, six individuals charged with conspiracy to defraud in connection with the criminal investigation into manipulation of certain LIBOR benchmark rates were acquitted by a jury at Southwark Crown Court.[203]  The Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) had alleged that the six defendants had conspired with Tom Hayes, the first individual convicted after a trial, to manipulate certain rates.

On June 29, 2016, three individuals were convicted of conspiring to defraud in connection with the manipulation of the U.S. Dollar LIBOR.[204]  The defendants were convicted of dishonestly submitting rates specifically intended to advantage Barclays and themselves financially and of defrauding those with whom they were trading.  Of the defendants, two (Jonathan Mathew and Jay Merchant) are UK citizens and one (Alex Pabon) is a U.S. citizen.[205]  A senior LIBOR submitter, Peter Johnson, had also pleaded guilty in October 2014.

The jury was unable to reach verdicts on two other defendants, Stylianos Contogoulas and Ryan Reich.  On July 6, 2016, the UK SFO announced that it would seek to retry both men, but did not announce a timeline for doing so.[206]

On July 7, 2016, the Southwark Crown Court announced the sentences for the convicted defendants.  Merchant was sentenced to six and half years in prison, Mathew to four years, Pabon to two years and nine months, and Johnson (who had pleaded guilty) to four years.[207]

Finally, in March, the SFO obtained arrest warrants for four former Deutsche Bank traders and one former Société Générale trader accused of manipulating the EURIBOR benchmark.[208]  In January, the traders declined a requisition request to attend London’s Westminster Magistrates’ Court to be charged with conspiracy to defraud.[209]  The SFO is in the process of enforcing the warrants.

III.             ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

A.                AUSTRALIA

The long-pending litigation relating to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (“ACCC”) investigation of price fixing in the air cargo industry remained the lead-story in Australia.  As described in our 2014 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, Australia’s Federal Court dismissed all charges against Air New Zealand Ltd. and PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd. stemming from that investigation.[210]  But the ACCC was vindicated in March 2016 when it won its appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia against those two companies for fixing air cargo surcharges.[211]  In lower court proceedings, in 2014, Justice Nye Perram of the Federal Court had dismissed the proceedings, finding that conduct relating to surcharges for the carriage of air cargo from ports outside Australia to points within Australia did not contravene the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 since such conduct did not occur in a “market in Australia.”  On appeal, a majority of the Full Court reversed that decision and held that the conduct did in fact occur in a “market in Australia” and consequently breached the price-fixing laws.  The court noted that “all aspects of the market are relevant in determining whether it is in Australia,” and that “the presence of importers (customers) in Australia” is relevant “to the determination of whether the market is in Australia.”  The proceedings have been remanded to the Federal Court to determine the appropriate relief.

The ACCC was also successful in its enforcement action against several members of an alleged laundry detergent conspiracy.[212]  The ACCC filed proceedings in the Federal Court in 2013 against detergent manufacturers Colgate-Palmolive Pty. Ltd. and PZ Cussons Australia Pty. Ltd., and supermarket Woolworths Limited, after being alerted to possible collusion by rival detergent manufacturer Unilever Australia Limited, which received immunity under the ACCC’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct.  The ACCC alleged that the detergent manufacturers participated in a cartel since 2009 to cease supplying standard concentrate laundry detergents and instead supply only ultra concentrates, and to sell those ultra concentrates at the same price as the equivalent standard concentrated products without passing on the cost savings to consumers.  Both Colgate and Woolworths admitted to their involvement and were ordered by the Federal Court to pay penalties of AUD $18 million (approximately $13.3 million) and AUD $9 million (approximately $6.7 million) respectively.  The ACCC’s action against PZ Cussons is ongoing.  The fine against Woolworths represents the largest ever penalty obtained by the ACCC against a party that was a knowing accessory to anticompetitive conduct.

In April, Loyal Coal Pty. Ltd. agreed to settle a bid-rigging case brought against it by the ACCC for entering into an understanding with Cascade Coal Pty. Ltd. to refrain from bidding against each other during a tender process for mining licenses in the Bylong Valley.[213]

The ACCC was granted special leave to appeal the Full Federal Court’s decision in the Flight Centre case to the High Court of Australia.[214]  We reported this decision in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update.[215]  The Full Federal Court had held that Flight Centre and the allegedly colluding airlines did not actually compete with one another because booking and distribution services, which Flight Centre provided, were ancillary to the international air travel market and not a separate market itself.  The Full Court further held that Flight Centre acted as an agent for the airlines and was not in competition with them.  Given the issues involved, the ACCC’s appeal to the High Court may have significant implications for businesses that use agency agreements since the court will determine what it means for parties to such arrangements to be in competition with each other.  We will continue to monitor this litigation for future updates.

The ACCC suffered a loss in February, however, when the Federal Court dismissed a case it brought against various egg producers and their directors for allegedly attempting to restrict egg supply.[216]  The court found that while the ACCC had established that the respondents intended that egg producers should address an “oversupply” of eggs, it did not establish that this action was pursuant to an agreement or understanding involving reciprocal obligations by competing producers as required.  (One of the directors admitted to attempting to induce a cartel, however, and was fined AUD $120,000 (approximately $89,000).)[217]  The ACCC is appealing the dismissal.[218]

In general, cartel enforcement remains a priority area for the ACCC, and the ACCC has indicated that it has around 20 ongoing cartel investigations at any given time.  The ACCC has also said that it expects to bring one or two new criminal prosecutions this year.[219]

B.                 CHINA

In February 2016, the Price Supervision & Inspection and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) released its draft Guidelines for Applying Leniency Program to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements (“Draft Leniency Guidelines”) for public comment.[220]  This is a significant step as the previous guidelines were lacking details.

To qualify for leniency, applicants are required to fulfill the following obligations: (1) cessation of allegedly illegal acts unless required otherwise; (2) prompt, continuing, extensive, and sincere cooperation with the investigation; (3) proper reservation and provision of evidentiary documents and information; (4) no disclosure of the leniency application without the enforcement authority’s consent; and (5) no undertaking of activities that may adversely impact the anti-monopoly enforcement.[221]  In a monopoly agreement case, no more than three undertakings normally can be granted leniency and will receive reduced punishment, but organizers of a horizontal monopoly agreement normally will not be granted full immunity.[222]  As to determining the rankings of leniency applicants, the Draft Leniency Guidelines provide for circumstances where enforcement authorities will cancel applicants’ places in queues,[223] but in the meantime do not give the applicants whose position are in jeopardy any contesting opportunity before being removed from the Leniency program.[224]  Last but not least, the Draft Leniency Guidelines stipulate enforcement authorities’ obligations in relation to confidentiality and exclude materials submitted for leniency applications from being used as evidence in relevant civil litigation, unless otherwise provided for by the laws.[225]

In addition, in June 2016, China’s Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council (“SAIC”) released draft guidelines for the calculation of fines and determining illegal gains.  Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”), the enforcement agencies have the right to impose fines between 1 and 10% of turnover (although the AML still does not indicate which turnover is to be taken into account).  For price-fixing activities, the draft guidelines propose to set the basis for fines at 3% of the sales value of the alleged products in the relevant geographic market.  For worldwide cartels, the revenues will (normally) be limited to China.  The basic amount will be increased by 1% for each year of the cartel’s duration.  The enforcement agencies then have the ability to adjust the amount depending on aggravating (ringleaders, repeat offenders, etc.) or mitigating (cooperation, coercion, etc.) circumstances.  The draft guidelines are currently open for public comments and there is no indication as to when they will be finalized.  While recent cases have shed some light on the enforcement agencies’ policy in terms of fines, the guidelines will be welcomed by practitioners as they will increase the predictability of the agencies’ enforcement actions.[226]

On the enforcement side, SAIC and NDRC’s activities mainly have involved domestic conspiracies.  For example, in January 2016, the NDRC imposed a total of approximately 4 million yuan ($607,000) fines, ranging from 5% to 8% of company revenues for the previous year, on Chongqing Qingyang Pharmaceuticals and four related companies in one allopurinol conspiracy case for entering into anticompetitive agreements that involved price fixing, market division, and bid rigging.[227]

C.                HONG KONG

Before the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance took full affect, the Hong Kong Competition Commission (“HKCC”) had already made it clear that prosecuting collusive activity would be high up on its enforcement agenda.[228]  The Ordinance brought into force the “First Conduct Rule” in December 2015 (Section 6) which prohibits anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices and decisions of members of associations of undertakings (such as industry associations) having either the object or effect of preventing, restricting or harming competition in Hong Kong.  Section 80 of the Ordinance grants the HKCC the possibility to enter into so-called “Leniency Agreements” not to initiate proceedings seeking a “pecuniary penalty” before the Tribunal in exchange for the applicant’s timely cooperation in an investigation.  The HKCC published its Leniency Policy in November 2015.  The Leniency Policy applies only to cartel conduct.[229]  The benefits of leniency extend to any current officers, employees and agents of the leniency applicant who cooperate with the HKCC’s investigation.  Former officers, employees and agents may also receive leniency protection at the HKCC’s discretion.

Full immunity from pecuniary sanctions is available for the first to report the conduct to the HKCC.  Immunity is based on a marker system used in other jurisdictions such as the United States and the EU.  Successful immunity applicants, as part of the Leniency Agreement, will be required to sign a statement of facts admitting to participation in the cartel.  In return, the HKCC will be obliged not to seek penalties against the applicant in the Tribunal.  However, the Tribunal could still impose non-pecuniary penalties (for example, issuance of a disqualification order) of its own motion.

For companies that do not meet the requirements to receive immunity–but cooperate fully–the Leniency Policy gives the HKCC discretion to seek a lower level of enforcement action before the Tribunal, but provides limited guidance on how that discretion might be exercised.

D.                INDIA

On April 18, 2016, India’s Competition Appellate Tribunal (“CAT”) set aside fines against Jet Airways, IndiGo, and SpiceJet for alleged price fixing air cargo fuel surcharges.  The CAT stated that the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) had not provided the defendants with a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate that they had not entered into a conspiracy, given that the Director General of the CCI had informed the defendants there was no evidence of a conspiracy, and the defendants did not offer the defense that they normally would have if they had known the CCI did not agree with the Director General.[230]

In the first half of 2016, the CCI also held several hearings on an alleged tire manufacturing conspiracy.[231]  The CCI investigator’s report alleged that “[d]espite a significant decline in input costs, particularly in 2012-13 and 2013-14, prices were kept higher, which could not have been possible without an agreement among these companies.  The presence of conducive conditions in the market facilitated a cartel among the companies.”[232]  The investigation is ongoing.

Also, as discussed in the 2015 Year-End Update,[233] Devender Kumar Sikri, a former secretary at the Department of Justice, took office as Chairman of the CCI on January 11, 2016, replacing Ashok Chawla.[234]

E.                 INDONESIA

In March 2016, Indonesia’s Supreme Court upheld a 77 billion rupiah (approximately $5.8 million) penalty that Indonesia’s Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (“KPPU”) imposed in 2008 on nine telecommunications companies for fixing the prices of short message service (SMS) use, or text messaging.  The decision overturned a lower court’s order annulling the KPPU’s ruling against the companies.[235]

The KPPU, continuing its previously reported focus on the food industry,[236] alleged in March 2016 that “at least 12” companies had participated in a cartel to control chicken prices, and commenced court proceedings against them.[237]

The KPPU also imposed a fine of 107 billion rupiah (approximately $8.1 million) on 32 companies in April 2016 for fixing beef prices by withholding cattle from slaughter.  That decision drew some criticism attributing the price increases to the government’s reduction of cattle import quotas rather than to the private conduct.[238]

F.                 JAPAN

In the first half of 2016, Japanese Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) staff members’ public presentations suggested that the JFTC is increasing the use of research reports and economic analyses to tailor its compliance and enforcement efforts.[239]

Additionally, the JFTC was active in criminal proceedings and other enforcement in 2016.  In February 2016, following an investigation of bid rigging for disaster recovery paving works following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the JFTC filed a criminal accusation with the Public Prosecutor-General under the Antimonopoly Act.  The charges were against 10 companies and 11 individuals.  As grounds for criminal proceedings, the JFTC noted that the 11 individuals met on multiple occasions in 2011, during which they reached agreements to designate successful bidders and to bid at prices that allowed the designated entities to win particular disaster restoration paving contracts.[240]

Thus far in 2016, the JFTC has issued fines totaling nearly ¥7.5 billion (approximately $68 million).  By far the largest share–¥6.7 billion (approximately $61 million)–was through penalties assessed against five companies for price fixing agreements in markets for aluminum and tantalum electrolytic capacitors.[241]  The five companies fined were Nichicon Corp.; Nippon Chemi-con Corp.; Rubycon Corp., Matsuo Electric Co., Ltd; and NEC TOKIN Corp.  These fines were the largest levied by the JFTC in over a year.[242]

The JFTC also issued cease-and-desist orders and levied fines of just over ¥100 million (approximately $9.1 million) to manufacturing distributors for conduct related to sales of poly aluminum chloride (coagulant chemicals used in water treatment) ordered by local governments in the Tohoku, Niigata, and Hokuriku districts of Japan.[243]  The JFTC found that the manufacturing distributors substantially restrained competition by determining prospective suppliers, and then enabling those suppliers to supply the chemicals in the three districts.

Continuing a series of enforcement actions related to “country elevators,” which we first reported on in our 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Update,[244] the JFTC issued cease-and-desist orders and levied fines totaling ¥671.5 million ($5.92 million) to agricultural cooperatives that engaged in bid rigging on the island of Hokkaido.[245]

G.                MALAYSIA

The Malaysian Competition Commission (“MyCC”) suffered a loss in February 2016 when Malaysia’s Competition Appeal Tribunal set aside a 10 million ringgit (approximately $2.4 million) penalty MyCC had imposed on Malaysia Airlines and AirAsia in September 2013 for allegedly agreeing to divide the nation’s air transport market, the first penalty MyCC had issued.[246]  The tribunal concluded that the MyCC misinterpreted a collaboration agreement between the two air carriers and had not established collusion to share the market.[247]

MyCC imposed a 645,800 ringgit (approximately $159,000) fine in a June 2016 decision against a shipping logistics company and four container depot operators for fixing prices in the market for empty container storage and maintenance and handling services at the nation’s Penang port.[248]

H.                NEW ZEALAND

As previously reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, New Zealand is considering amending its cartel laws by enacting the proposed Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill.[249]  In February 2016, Prime Minister John Key noted that the government intends to “progress legislation to strengthen New Zealand’s anti-cartel regime.”[250]

In the first half of 2016, New Zealand’s Commerce Commission continued to prosecute 14 cases against real estate companies suspected of fixing prices for online property sales and rentals.  The cases were brought in late December 2015.  On May 20, 2016, the High Court of New Zealand ordered the defendant in the first of these cases–which had already admitted to price fixing–to pay NZ $1.25 million (approximately $900,000).[251]  The other cases are ongoing.[252]

I.                   PAKISTAN

The Competition Commission of Pakistan (“CCP”) continued its enforcement efforts against cartel activity in the first half of 2016, with particular focus on trade associations and their constituent members.  As part of its “National Road Show on Competition Law,” held at the offices of the Pakistan Poultry Association (“PPA”), CCP members gave speeches emphasizing the importance of trade associations avoiding anticompetitive agreements.[253]

Shortly after its visit to the PPA, on February 29, 2016, the CCP imposed a fine of 100 million rupees (approximately $950,000) on the poultry trade association for allegedly fixing the prices of broiler chicken and chicken eggs through newspaper advertisements.  Notably, the CCP rejected the PPA’s defense that it lacked actual power to set poultry prices, which are set by “market committees of local governments.”  According to the CCP, the PPA was nonetheless liable for “signal[ ]ing to both consumers and undertakings in the poultry market that these prices have the approval of PPA, and constitute an optimum rate to be followed.”[254]

We noted in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update that the CCP had commenced an inquiry into allegedly unreasonable and collusive airfares.[255]  The CCP concluded this investigation in February 2016, finding no prima facie violation of the Competition Act.[256]

J.                  PHILIPPINES

As discussed in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, the Philippine Competition Act (“Competition Act”), the nation’s first comprehensive antitrust regime, was signed into law on July 21, 2015, and established the Philippine Competition Commission (“PCC”).[257]  On January 25, 2016, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III appointed Arsenio Balisacan as the first chairman of the PCC.  Balisacan, former Director General of the National Economic and Development, was appointed to a seven-year term.  President Aquino also appointed four commissioners to the PCC:  Stella Alabastro-Quimbo and Johannes Bernabe to seven-year terms, and Elcid Butuyan and Menardo Guevarra to five-year terms.[258]

In March, Balisacan and three of the commissioners met with top officials of Australia’s competition authority and other Australian antitrust experts.[259]

Balisacan spoke out in defence of the Competition Act in June, when he responded to concerns that the law would be a burden to businesses and add “red tape” to the process of investing.  Balisacan opined that the law will make the business environment more conducive to investing by giving a level playing field to all participants and pointed out that every other nation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has seen economic improvement under their respective comprehensive competition laws.[260]

Also in June, the PCC released the Implementing Rules and Regulations (“IRR”) for the Competition Act.  The Act itself had required the Commission to promulgate the IRRs within 180 days,[261] but a draft was not released for public comments until May 10, 2016.  The PCC also invited business groups and other stakeholders to attend consultations in order “ensure sound implementation of the law” and provide the PCC with valuable feedback.[262]

K.                SINGAPORE

The first half of 2016 saw developments in three Singapore investigations discussed previously in our 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update.[263]  First, on February 23, 2016, the Competition Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) announced that it had found no evidence to suggest collusion in its investigation into petrol prices that began in February 2015.[264]

Second, on March 8, the CCS issued a Proposed Infringement Decision against poultry distributors for engaging in anti-competitive agreements to fix prices and not to compete.[265]  As reported in the 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update, this investigation began a year prior.[266]  The thirteen defendants control more than 90% of the fresh chicken market and their combined turnover amounts to approximately half a billion Singapore dollars annually (approximately $370,432,115).[267]

Third, the CCS issued a final decision fining ten financial advisory companies a total of S$909,302 (approximately $677,144) for pressuring another company to withdraw a customer rebate offer.[268]  The ruling is notable because it marks the CCS’ first infringement decision in more than a year and the first-ever decision regarding financial advisory services.  It is also noteworthy because the  infringing conduct lasted only a few days and was classified as a “restriction by object”–a classification previously reserved for explicit restrictions of competition, such as price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging, and the exchange of forward-looking pricing information.[269]

The CCS also announced proposed changes to the Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of a Penalty (“Penalty Guidelines”) and the Guidelines on Enforcement (“Enforcement Guidelines”).  With respect to its Penalty Guidelines, the CCS announced that it intends to change its method for calculating financial penalties by considering the turnover for the financial year preceding the end date of the infringement, as opposed to using the date on which the CCS makes its decision.  This change would ensure that the financial penalty better reflects the turnover derived from the infringing conduct, provides more certainty, and brings the CCS in line with the method utilized by the European Union and the UK.  With respect to the Enforcement Guidelines, the CCS announced that the proposed amount of the financial penalty will be set out in the PID, so that parties can make arguments on the penalty amount.[270]  These revised guidelines are anticipated to be effective before the end of 2016.[271]

In an interview, the Chief Executive of the CCS, Toh Han Li, reported that e-commerce is a key sector that the CCS has been studying.  He also explained that in 2016, the CCS intends to provide the public with more information on its enforcement and investigation work.[272]

L.                 SOUTH KOREA

The Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) has come under scrutiny for imposing penalties without sufficient justification.  On June 9, 2016, the Board of Audit and Inspection (“BAI”), Korea’s government watchdog agency, issued a report criticizing the KFTC for a lack of consistency in fining decisions.  The BAI issued penalties to the KFTC, took disciplinary action against two KFTC employees and gave a warning to five employees.  According to the BAI, the KFTC collected less than half of the total fines imposed from January 2012 to July 2015 because the fines as originally imposed were unjustifiably high.[273]  This criticism comes on the heels of last year’s Korean Supreme Court ruling annulling fines the KFTC imposed for alleged price fixing of ramen, about which we reported in our 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update.[274]

The KFTC continued to investigate and sanction alleged bid-rigging activity related to construction projects.  On April 26, 2016, the KFTC announced a penalty against 13 construction firms for rigging tenders to build liquefied natural gas tanks.  Totaling 351.6 billion won (approximately $300 million), the fine was the largest imposed against a bid-rigging cartel in Korea’s construction industry since July of 2014, when the KFTC fined 28 companies 435.5 billion won (approximately $394 million) for colluding on tenders for a nationwide bullet train project,[275] discussed in our 2014 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update.[276]

The KFTC’s enforcement efforts against rigging bids for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities continued into 2016.  On January 4, 2016, the KFTC imposed penalties of 2.432 billion won (approximately $2.1 million) on three construction companies for agreeing on bids for waste-water treatment facilities at several locations.  The KFTC referred all three firms for criminal prosecution.[277]  Similarly, on May 9, 2016, the KFTC penalized two more firms 1.39 billion won (approximately $1.2 million) for rigging bids for treatment facilities in the Ansan Industrial Complex.[278]

The KFTC also imposed a number of penalties for bid rigging in connection with supply contracts for both governmental entities and private companies.  On January 15, 2016, the KFTC announced remedies and a penalty of 1.18 billion won (approximately $1.6 million) against four companies for rigging bids to supply hardtack to the Korean military.[279]  And on May 3, 2016, the KFTC imposed a combined fine of 38 million won (approximately $33,000) on three companies for deciding the successful bidder and bidding price to supply biochemical analyzers to the Korean Military Manpower Administration.[280]  With respect to the private sector, on February 24, 2016, the KFTC announced an order to cease and a penalty of 1.14 billion won (approximately $983,000) against two Japanese auto parts manufacturers who had allegedly colluded in July 2008 to rig bidding to General Motors to supply starter motors for cars sold in Korea.[281]

The KFTC also continued to pursue allegations against alleged collusive activity.  In the first half of 2016, the KFTC fined a total of 57 pulp and paper makers a combined 214.8 billion won (approximately $185 million) for allegedly conspiring to fix the price of corrugated cardboard from 2007 to 2014.  According to the KFTC, the conspiracy inflated the price of cardboard by up to 25%.[282]  The KFTC also concluded an investigation of an alleged conspiracy comprising eight duty free shops that fixed the exchange rate for U.S. dollars and Korean won between 2007 and 2012.  In an unusual move, the KFTC declined to impose any fines, accepting the shops’ arguments that they fixed the exchange rate out of convenience and that they had suffered both losses and gains as a result of the agreement.[283]

M.               TAIWAN

In April 2016, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission imposed on Evergreen International Storage & Transport Corp. and 20 other enterprises a total of NT$ 72.6 million (US$ 2.27 million) in administrative fines, ranging from NT$ 100,000 (approximately US$ 3,000) to NT$ 15.25 million (approximately US$ 475,000) respectively, in connection with these enterprises’ concerted action to resume collection of charges for use of loading equipment from businesses exporting CFS cargo below a certain threshold.[284]

IV.             MIDDLE EAST

A.                EGYPT

Egypt’s Competition Authority recently issued an infringement decision against the Egyptian Union for Insurance and the Egyptian Association for Healthcare Companies for colluding to divide the market for healthcare insurance policies by agreeing that the former would be the sole issuer of health insurance policies in Egypt while the latter would manage those policies.  The Competition Authority ordered both entities to remove the infringing terms and conditions from their market-sharing agreement, but declined to refer the case to criminal prosecutors–a move that some have speculated may be due to tension between the Competition Authority and Egypt’s insurance regulator.  This is the third cartel case in Egypt’s insurance sector in less than two years.[285]

B.                 ISRAEL

The Israeli Antitrust Authority (“IAA”) has been active during the first half of 2016.  On January 13, 2016, the district court of Jerusalem imposed significant jail sentences on two participants in an industrial bread bakery conspiracy.[286]  The current and former heads of two of the largest bakeries in Israel were each sentenced to one year in prison and fined between NIS 200,000 to 300,000 (approximately $52,000 to $78,000) for their role in the price-fixing scandal, and the companies were also fined a total of NIS 2.1 million (approximately $550,000).  The conspiracy, which covered approximately 90% of the bread market in Israel, operated for three months beginning in 2010, with the companies allocating the market between themselves and raising prices on a pre-determined basis.

On January 18, 2016, the IAA, in coordination with the National Fraud Investigation Unit of the Israeli Police, announced they were investigating a number of leading travel agencies involved in the marketing, organization, and logistics of travel packages for high-school youth delegations to Poland for Holocaust remembrance trips.[287]  Nine suspects were arrested, and others detained for interrogation, on suspicion that the travel agencies fixed prices and divided the market so that schools choosing between the various agencies would face no real competition in the bidding.

In February, the district court in Jerusalem convicted three companies and two of their chief executives for rigging a public tender issued by the country’s meteorological service for the maintenance of weather stations.[288]  The court found that executives at the companies had coordinated their bids just prior to the tender submission so that one company would win, and then allocated the proceeds between the others.  The executives unsuccessfully argued that the requirements of the tender were unclear about whether they were required to meet to discuss the technical specifications.  The court accepted that fact, but rejected that they had been instructed to collude and change their bids just prior to submission.  Indeed, the court found that one company’s bid was 200% higher after coordination than before the companies met.  The investigation was launched after one of the companies inadvertently left a coordination document in its bid file.[289]

Finally, on May 9, 2016, the IAA announced its plan to indict seven companies and fifteen executives for coordinating bids for computing equipment and services.  According to the IAA, the companies agreed to allocate projects–primarily in the aerospace industry–and share profits through a bid-rigging scheme.[290]

C.                SAUDI ARABIA

Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia’s Administrative Court of Appeals upheld a penalty against a regional bottler of Pepsi Cola products, affirming its earlier imposition of a fine of 5 million riyals (approximately $1.3 million) against Saudi Industrial Projects Company for geographic market allocation.[291]  The decision came as part of a broader investigation into Saudi Arabia’s carbonated drinks market.

On February 9, 2016, the Administrative Court of Appeals also upheld the latest fine against a participant in a rice cartel, taking the overall fines stemming from an investigation into that cartel to 140 million riyals (approximately $37 million).  The court imposed a penalty of 3 million riyals (approximately $800,000) on Saeed Ahmed Almahroos & Sons–the 12th company in the cartel to be fined–for price fixing and retail price maintenance.[292]

D.                TURKEY

Following an 18-month investigation into the cement industry, Turkey’s Competition Authority fined six cement producers 71 million lira (approximately $24.9 million) after finding that they had conspired to divide local markets and increase prices, particularly in the Aegean region of Turkey.[293]  The investigation began following a complaint and without the assistance of a leniency applicant.  The fines imposed were between three and 4.5% of each company’s annual income.  In addition, in May 2016, the Competition Authority announced an additional investigation into the “ready-mix concrete” market in the same region, implicating ten additional companies.[294]

Finally, in March, the Competition Board also made the decision to move forward with an investigation in the market for “Compulsory Automobile Financial Liability Insurance (Traffic Insurance).”[295]  Following an initial inquiry, the Board concluded that there was sufficient information to launch an investigation into 33 companies for distorting competition by jointly increasing prices and implementing excessive pricing.

V.                AFRICA

A.                SOUTH AFRICA

The Competition Commission of South Africa (“CCSA”) continues to use raids to investigate suspected collusive conduct.  On March 23, 2016, the CCSA conducted a raid on four companies in the automotive glass industry as part of its investigation into alleged price fixing and market division between automotive glass fitment and repair service providers.[296]  A week later, the CCSA raided the only two manufacturers of particleboard and medium density fiberboard in South Africa as part of its investigation into collusion between the two companies.[297]  Finally, on May 26, 2016, the CCSA raided the premises of the two largest producers of packaging paper products in South Africa based on allegations of collusion between them.[298]

So far this year, the CCSA has referred only one case to the Competition Tribunal of South Africa.  On April 28, 2016, the CCSA referred to the Tribunal a complaint against ZTE Corporation South Africa Ltd and ZTE Mzanzi Ltd, both distributors of telecommunication equipment and network solutions, for allegedly colluding to allocate customers between themselves under a 2011 agreement.[299]

In an interesting development, on June 10, 2016, the Tribunal refused to quash the immunity status of Tiger Brands, a company that obtained leniency for its involvement in a maize milling conspiracy, as requested by another participant, Blinkwater Mills.[300]  Under the CCSA’s Corporate Leniency Policy, a conspirator may be granted immunity from prosecution for fines if it is the first to voluntarily disclose its participation in a conspiracy.[301]  In this case, the CCSA initially received information about a regional bread baking conspiracy from another leniency applicant, Premier Foods; Blinkwater was not involved in that conspiracy.  Later, through Tiger’s subsequent leniency application, the CCSA became aware of a wider conspiracy in the national wheat and milling market, which did implicate Blinkwater.  The Tribunal reasoned that because the CCSA needed Tiger’s information to successfully prosecute the broader cartel, the CCSA did not act irrationally in extending leniency to Tiger despite having also granted leniency to Premiere Foods during the more limited investigation.  Accordingly, the Tribunal refused to overturn Tiger’s immunity status.

On April 22, 2016, South African president Jacob Zuma approved legislation that introduced criminal liability for directors and managers of companies that commit cartel offenses.  Beginning May 1, 2016, company directors and managers who “knowingly acquiesce[]” to their companies’ involvement in cartel conduct while having actual knowledge of that conduct can face penalties of up to 500,000 rand (approximately $35,000) and 10 years in prison.[302]

____________________________________________

[1]   Brent Snyder, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes: Remarks as Prepared for the Yale School of Management Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference (Feb. 19, 2016), at 4, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/826721/download.

    [2]   Ron Knox, Snyder: Yates memo could lead to pursuit of top executives, Global Competition Review (June 7, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41208/snyder-yates-memo-lead-pursuit-top-executives/?utm_source=Law%20Business%20Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=7189594_GCR%20Briefing&dm_i=1KSF,4A3IY,9GQ80Q,FNCPC,1.

    [3]   Press Release, SFO, Convicted LIBOR manipulators sentenced (July 7, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/07/convicted-libor-manipulators-sentenced/.

    [4]   Melissa Lipman, UK to Retry 2 Ex-Barclays Traders, Law 360 (July 6, 2016), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/814217/breaking-uk-to-retry-2-ex-barclays-traders-on-libor-charges.

    [5]   Tom Schoenberg, Two Ex-Deutsche Bank traders charged by US in Libor probe, Boston Globe (June 2, 2016), available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/06/02/two-deutsche-bank-traders-charged-libor-probe/JcNzob1VmyZaleYrfds3NO/story.html.

    [6]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Deutsche Bank Employees Indicted on Fraud Charges in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor (June 2, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-employees-indicted-fraud-charges-connection-long-running.

    [7]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.a.

    [8]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Rabobank Traders Sentenced to Prison for Manipulating U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen LIBOR Interest Rates (Mar. 10, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-rabobank-traders-sentenced-prison-manipulating-us-dollar-and-japanese-yen-libor; see also United States’ Sentencing Memorandum Regarding Anthony Conti, United States v. Anthony Allen, et al., No. 1:14-cr-00272 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 226 (government sought a “substantial term of incarceration” but described the guidelines range of 57–71 months as an “imperfect tool for evaluating Mr. Conti’s culpability and the punishment he should ultimately receive”); United States’ Sentencing Memorandum Regarding Anthony Allen, United States v. Anthony Allen, et al., No. 1:14-cr-00272 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 225 (same, though the guidelines range was 87–108 months).

    [9]   United States v. Allen, No. 1:14-cr-00272-JSR (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016), ECF No. 250.

   [10]   United States v. Read, No. 1:13-mj-02224-UA (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2016), ECF No. 8.

   [11]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ICAP Brokers Face Felony Charges for Alleged Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Interest Rates (Sept. 25, 2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/icap-brokers-face-felony-charges-alleged-long-running-manipulation-libor-interest-rates.

   [12]   Braden Campbell, US Ends Libor Case Against ICAP Trio After UK Acquittals, Law360 (July 7, 2016), available at http://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/814838?nl_pk=56669d7b-6cc6-47f5-a0fb-080606dd79b7.

   [13]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Japanese Auto Parts Companies, U.S. Subsidiaries, and Five Executives Indicted for Rigging Automotive Parts Bids (June 15, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-japanese-auto-parts-companies-us-subsidiaries-and-five-executives-indicted-rigging.

   [14]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Japanese Auto Parts Companies, U.S. Subsidiaries, and Five Executives Indicted for Rigging Automotive Parts Bids (June 15, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-japanese-auto-parts-companies-us-subsidiaries-and-five-executives-indicted-rigging.

   [15]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Omron Automotive Electronics Co. Ltd. to Pay $4.55 Million for Bid Rigging on Power Window Switches (Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/omron-automotive-electronics-co-ltd-pay-455-million-bid-rigging-power-window-switches.

   [16]   United States v. Omron Automotive Electronics, Co., Ltd., No. 16-20182 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2016), ECF No. 11.

   [17]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Corning International Kabushiki Kaisha to Pay $66.5 Million for Fixing Prices of Automotive Parts (May 16, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/corning-international-kabushiki-kaisha-pay-665-million-fixing-prices-automotive-parts.

   [18]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.b.

   [19]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former President of Auto Parts Company Pleads Guilty to Participating in Body Sealing Products Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-president-auto-parts-company-pleads-guilty-participating-body-sealing-products-bid.

   [20]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fourth Ocean Shipping Executive Indicted for Price Fixing and Bid Rigging (June 7, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fourth-ocean-shipping-executive-indicted-price-fixing-and-bid-rigging.

   [21]   Id.

   [22]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.c.

   [23]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Sales Executive Pleads Guilty to Participation in Color Display Tube Conspiracy (Nov. 18, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-sales-executive-pleads-guilty-participation-color-display-tube-conspiracy.

   [24]   Criminal Minutes, United States v. Chung-Cheng Yeh, No. CR 10-00231 (WHA) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016), ECF No. 36.

   [25]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.d.

   [26]   See Id.

   [27]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hitachi Chemical Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty for Fixing Price of Electrolytic Capacitors (Apr. 27, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hitachi-chemical-co-ltd-plead-guilty-fixing-price-electrolytic-capacitors.

   [28]   Id.

   [29]   Y. Peter Kang, DOJ Seeks $3.8M Fine for Hitachi Chemical Over Price-Fixing, Law 360 (May 17, 2016), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/797122/doj-seeks-3-8m-fine-for-hitachi-chemical-over-price-fixing; United States v. Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd., Case No. 16-cr-00180, (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2016), ECF No. 23.

   [30]   United States v. Takuro Isawa, Case No. 15-CR-0163 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016), ECF No. 9.

   [31]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Judge Orders New Jersey Investor to Serve a Year in Prison for Bid Rigging at Tax Lien Auctions (Mar. 29, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/judge-orders-new-jersey-investor-serve-year-prison-bid-rigging-tax-lien-auctions.

   [32]   Joint Declaration of Settlement Class and Liaison Counsel in Support of (1) Final Approval of Settlements with All Defendants; (2) Settlement Class and Liaison Counsel’s Application for Attorney’s Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, and Incentive Awards to Named Plaintiffs; and (3) the Plan of Allocation at 7, In re N.J. Tax Sales Certificates Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2016), ECF No. 480.

   [33]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Judge Orders New Jersey Investor to Serve a Year in Prison for Bid Rigging at Tax Lien Auctions (Mar. 29, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/judge-orders-new-jersey-investor-serve-year-prison-bid-rigging-tax-lien-auctions.

   [34]   Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. May, No. 2:11-cr-00562-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2016), ECF No. 19; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Butler, No. 2:12-cr-00273-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2016), ECF No. 22; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Hruby, No. 2:12-cr-00263-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2016), ECF No. 19; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Mastellone, No. 2:13-cr-00643-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2016), ECF No. 17; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Stein, No. 2:12-cr-00140-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2016), ECF No. 29; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Pisciotta, No. 2:11-cr-00561-SDW (D.N.J. May 6, 2016), ECF No. 19; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Farber, No. 2:12-cr-00139-SDW (D.N.J. May 9, 2016), ECF No. 23.

   [35]   Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Collins, No. 2:11-cr-00563-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 20; Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Jessani, No. 2:14-cr-00264-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 19.

   [36]   Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. DSBD, LLC, No. 2:12-cr-00274-SDW (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016), ECF No. 16.

   [37]   Joshua Sisco, Comment: Judges offer different takes on evidence suppression in California foreclosure cases, MLex (June 13, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=803134&siteid=191&rdir=1; Foreclosure auction defendants want suppression of non-consensual recordings, MLex (March 24, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=780399&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [38]   Joshua Sisco, Comment: Spotlight shines on antitrust investigative strategy in foreclosure auction case, MLex (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=781317&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [39]   Joshua Sisco, Comment: Judges offer different takes on evidence suppression in California foreclosure cases, MLex (June 13, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=803134&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [40]   Pretrial Order No. 2, United States v. Michael Marr, et al., No. 4:14-cr-00580 (June 21, 2016), ECF No. 135; see also Joshua Sisco, Judge declines to throw out mail fraud charges in Oakland foreclosure cases, MLex (June 22, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=805666&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [41]   Pretrial Order No. 2, United States v. Michael Marr, et al., No. 4:14-cr-00580 (June 21, 2016), ECF No. 135; see also Joshua Sisco, Judge in foreclosure auction case doubts rule of reason should govern bid-rigging trial, MLex (June 2, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=800441&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [42]   Joshua Sisco, Judge sets date for fourth trial in California foreclosure auction bid-rigging case, MLex (Mar. 9, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=776257&siteid=191&rdir=1.

   [43]   Joshua Sisco, Comment: Spotlight shines on antitrust investigative strategy in foreclosure auction case, MLex (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=781317&siteid=191&rdir=1; see Upcoming Public Hearings in Pending Cases, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/upcoming-public-hearings-pending-cases#details (last accessed July 8, 2016).

   [44]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Georgia Investors Plead Guilty to Rigging Bids at Public Home Foreclosure Auctions (Jan. 4, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-rigging-bids-public-home-foreclosure-auctions.

   [45]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging and Fraud at Public Home Foreclosure Auctions (June 29, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-bid-rigging-and-fraud-public-home-foreclosure.

   [46]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging and Bank Fraud at Public Foreclosure Auctions (July 1, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-bid-rigging-and-bank-fraud-public-home.

   [47]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Georgia Real Estate Investors Indicted for Bid Rigging and Bank Fraud at Public Home Foreclosure Auctions (Feb. 3, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-indicted-bid-rigging-and-bank-fraud-public-home-foreclosure.

   [48]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging and Bank Fraud at Public Foreclosure Auctions (July 1, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-bid-rigging-and-bank-fraud-public-home.

   [49]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alabama Real Estate Investor Pleads Guilty to Mail Fraud Conspiracy Involving Foreclosed Homes (June 16, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alabama-real-estate-investor-pleads-guilty-mail-fraud-conspiracy-involving-foreclosed-homes.

   [50]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President of Heir Location Services Provider to Plead Guilty for Agreement Not to Compete (Jan. 14, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/president-heir-location-services-provider-plead-guilty-agreement-not-compete.

   [51]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Executives Charged for Conspiracy to Eliminate Competition to Supply Water Treatment Chemicals (Feb. 19, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-executives-charged-conspiring-eliminate-competition-supply-water-treatment-chemicals.

   [52]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Water Treatment Chemicals Manufacturer Pleads Guilty in Conspiracy Aimed at Eliminating Competition (June 16, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/water-treatment-chemicals-manufacturer-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aimed-eliminating-competition.

   [53]   Press Release, Ohio Att’y Gen. Office, AG DeWine Investigating Possible Bid Rigging in Water-Treatment Chemical Sales (Apr. 20, 2016), available at http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/April-2016/AG-DeWine-Investigating-Possible-Bid-Rigging-in-Wa.

   [54]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.3.h.

   [55]   In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:15-md-2670 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 9, 2015); Order Granting United States’ Motion for Permissive Intervention, In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., 15-md-02670-JLS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2016).

   [56]   Joint Stipulation Re: Limited Stay on Discovery, In re Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 15-md-02670-JLS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016).

   [57]   See Pallavi Guniganti, DOJ agrees plea with UK online poster cartelist, Global Competition Review (July 5, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/usa/article/41387/doj-agrees-plea-uk-online-poster-cartelist/?utm_source=Law%20Business%20Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=7293259_GCR%20USA%20Briefing&dm_i=1KSF,4CBIJ,9GQ80Q,FX1TK,1.

   [58]   Stipulation to Continue Change-of-Plea Hearing, Request to Exclude Time, and Order, United States v. Trod Limited, No. 3:15-cr-00419 (July 6, 2016), ECF No. 33.

   [59]   Bill Baer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights (Mar. 9, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-antitrust-division-testifies-senate-judiciary.

   [60]   See, e.g., Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at Introduction & I.A.4.b.

   [61]   See id. at Introduction & I.A.4.b.

   [62]   Brent Snyder, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Individual Accountability for Antitrust Crimes: Remarks as Prepared for the Yale School of Management Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference (Feb. 19, 2016), at 4, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/826721/download.

   [63]   Ron Knox, Snyder: Yates memo could lead to pursuit of top executives, Global Competition Review (June 7, 2016), available at  http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41208/snyder-yates-memo-lead-pursuit-top-executives/?utm_source=Law%20Business%20Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=7189594_GCR%20Briefing&dm_i=1KSF,4A3IY,9GQ80Q,FNCPC,1.

   [64]   Bill Baer, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights (Mar. 9, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-antitrust-division-testifies-senate-judiciary.

   [65]   Renata B. Hesse, Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at Chatham House Conference on Globalization of Competition Policy (June 23, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-renata-b-hesse-delivers-remarks-chatham-house.

   [66]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Announces Bill Baer to Serve as Acting Associate Attorney General (Apr. 11, 2016) available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-announces-bill-baer-serve-acting-associate-attorney-general.

   [67]   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Announces Renata B. Hesse to Serve as Head of Antitrust Division (Apr. 15, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-announces-renata-b-hesse-serve-head-antitrust-division.

   [68]   Jeff Zalesin, Top DOJ Antitrust Litigator Stepping Down, Law360 (June 9, 2016), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/805467/top-doj-antitrust-litigator-stepping-down.

   [69]   Jeff Zalesin, New Top Antitrust Civil Enforcer Picked From DOJ Ranks, Law360 (June 22, 2016), available at http://www.law360.com/competition/articles/809712/new-top-antitrust-civil-enforcer-picked-from-doj-ranks.

   [70]   Press Release, Canadian Competition Bureau, Japanese auto parts company fined $13 million for participating in a bid‑rigging conspiracy (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04058.html; Tom Madge-Wyld, Canada imposes near-record fine on auto parts maker Showa, Global Competition Review (Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40814/canadaimposesnearrecordfineautopartsmakershowa/.

   [71]   Press Release, Canadian Competition Bureau, Quebec company fined $118,000 for participating in sewer services cartel (Feb. 8, 2016), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04028.html.

   [72]   Press Release, Canadian Competition Bureau, Bid-rigging scheme leads to $140,000 fines for Quebec company and its President (Mar. 14, 2016), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04042.html.

   [73]   Pallavi Guniganti, Australia and Canada still await jail for cartelists, Global Competition Review (Feb. 5, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40458/australiacanadaawaitjailcartelists/.

   [74]   Richard Vanderford, Canada’s Competition Bureau working to reshape relationship with prosecutors after upsets, mLex (Apr. 7, 2016).

   [75]   Richard Vanderford, Canada’s Competition Bureau working on ‘rocky’ relationship with country’s independent prosecutors, bureau head says, mLex, (May 19, 2016).

   [76]   Richard Vanderford, Canada’s Competition Bureau promises focus on bid-rigging, high-impact cases, mLex (May 18, 2016).

   [77]   Mark Briggs, New Canadian IP guidelines limit use of criminal charges, Global Competition Review (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40808/newcanadianipguidelineslimitusecriminalcharges/.

   [78]   Press Release, CADE, Cade publica balanço de suas atividades em 2015 (Jan. 20, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-publica-balanco-de-suas-atividades-em-2015.

   [79]   Press Release, CADE, Presidente do Cade conduz última sessão de julgamento de seu mandato (May 25, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/presidente-do-cade-conduz-ultima-sessao-de-julgamento-de-seu-mandato.

   [80]   Press Release, CADE, Cade condena cartel no mercado de insumos para medicamentos antirretrovirais (Jan. 20, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-condena-cartel-no-mercado-de-insumos-para-medicamentos-antirretrovirais.

   [81]   Press Release, CADE, Cade condena cartel de licitações de lavanderias hospitalares no Rio (Feb. 3, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-condena-cartel-de-licitacoes-de-lavanderias-hospitalares-no-rio.

   [82]   Press Release, CADE, Cade homologa dois acordos de cessação de conduta (Jan. 20, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-homologa-dois-acordos-de-cessacao-de-conduta.

   [83]   Press Release, CADE, CADE fines Solvay for sodium perborate cartel (Mar. 1, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-fines-solvay-for-sodium-perborate-cartel;  See also Sonya Lalli, Brazil fines Belgian chemical company for market swap, Global Competition Review (Feb. 25, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40573/brazil-fines-belgian-chemical-company-market-swap/.

   [84]   Press Release, CADE, CADE condemns cartel in the international market of refrigerator compressors (Mar. 18, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-condemns-cartel-in-the-international-market-of-refrigerator-compressors; see also Alex Wilts, Brazil fines compressor cartel, Global Competition Review (Mar. 18, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40729/brazil-fines-compressor-cartel/.

   [85]   Press Release, CADE, CADE condemns blood derivatives’ cartel (Apr. 15, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-condemns-blood-derivatives2019-cartel-1; see also Tom  Madge-Wyld, Operation Vampire draws Red Cross blood in Brazil, Global Competition Review (Apr. 14, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40885/operation-vampire-draws-red-cross-blood-brazil/.

   [86]   Press Release, CADE, CADE opens investigation on alleged wheat flour cartel (Jan. 26, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-opens-investigation-on-alleged-wheat-flour-cartel.

   [87]   Press Release, CADE, Superintendence investigates international cartel of maritime transportation of automobiles (Mar. 1, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/copy_of_superintendence-investigates-international-cartel-of-maritime-transportation-of-automobiles.

   [88]   Id.

   [89]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.e; 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.A.2.c.

   [90]   Press Release, CADE, Caso investigado pelo Cade é alvo de denúncia do MPF de São Paulo (Mar. 9, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/caso-investigado-pelo-cade-e-alvo-de-denuncia-do-mpf-de-sao-paulo.

   [91]   Press Release, CADE, CADE’s General Superintendence investigates cartel in electronic power steering systems for automobiles (Mar. 31, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade2019s-general-superintendence-investigates-cartel-in-electronic-power-steering-systems-for-automobiles.

   [92]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.C.8; Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.C.6.

   [93]   Press Release, CADE, CADE’s General Superintendence investigates two alleged cartels in the national market of pipes and fittings (May 12, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade2019s-general-superintendence-investigates-two-alleged-cartels-in-the-national-market-of-pipes-and-fittings; Tom Madge-Wyld, Brazilian enforcer investigates pipe market collusion, Global Competition Review (May 10, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41027/brazilian-enforcer-investigates-pipe-market-collusion/.

   [94]   Press Release, CADE, CADE opens Administrative Proceeding to investigate an alleged cartel in the market of resins (June 1, 2016), available at http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-opens-administrative-proceeding-to-investigate-an-alleged-cartel-in-the-market-of-resins.

   [95]   See Gibson Dunn, 2014 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.C.

   [96]   Press Release, CADE, Superintendência do Cade pede condenação de cartel internacional de placas de memória para computadores (Mar. 28, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/superintendencia-do-cade-pede-condenacao-de-cartel-internacional-de-placas-de-memoria-para-computadores.

   [97]   Press Release, CADE, Superintendência do Cade recomenda condenação de cartel de postos de combustíveis em São Luís (June 9, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/superintendencia-do-cade-recomenda-condenacao-de-cartel-de-postos-de-combustiveis-em-sao-luis.

   [98]   Press Release, CADE, Superintendência conclui investigação no mercado de serviços médico-hospitalares em Fortaleza (June 9, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/superintendencia-conclui-investigacao-no-mercado-de-servicos-medico-hospitalares-em-fortaleza.

   [99]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.C.6.

[100]   See Mark Briggs, Fresh raids in Brazil as Operation Dubai continues, Global Competition Review (May 6, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41011/fresh-raids-brazil-operation-dubai-continues/.

[101]   Press Release, CADE, Cade lança Guia sobre programa de leniência (May 25, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-lanca-guia-sobre-programa-de-leniencia.

[102]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.C.8.

[103]   See id.

[104]   Press Release, CADE, Cade lança Guia sobre Termos de Compromisso de Cessação (May 11, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-lanca-guia-sobre-termos-de-compromisso-de-cessacao.

[105]   Guidelines: Competition Compliance Programs, CADE (Feb. 18, 2016), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/publicacoes-institucionais/guias_do_Cade/compliance-guidelines-final-version.pdf.

[106]   Press Release, CADE, Cade publica versão em inglês do Guia de Compliance (Feb. 18, 2016), available (in Portuguese only) at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-publica-versao-em-ingles-do-guia-de-compliance; Guia: Programas de Compliance, CADE, available at (in Portoguese) http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/publicacoes-institucionais/guias_do_Cade/guia-compliance-versao-oficial.pdf.

[107]   See Tom Madge-Wyld, CADE hacked but material data not accessed, Global Competition Review (Jan. 25, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40381/cade-hacked-material-data-not-accessed/?utm_source=Law%20Business%20Research&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=6700267_GCR%20Briefing&dm_i=1KSF,3ZLYJ,9GQ80Q,EELA8,1.

[108]   Press Release, CADE, Membros do BRICS firmam memorando de cooperação na área de política de defesa da concorrência (May 19, 2016), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/membros-do-brics-firmam-memorando-de-cooperacao-na-area-de-politica-de-defesa-da-concorrencia.

[109]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.D.2; Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.D.

[110]   Press Release, Fiscalia Nacional Economica, FNE Accuses the Main Supermarket Chains in the Country of Colluding for the Purposes of Fixing a Minimum Retail Price on Chicken Meat (Jan. 7, 2016), available at http://www.fne.gob.cl/english/2016/01/07/fne-accuses-the-main-supermarket-chains-in-the-country-of-colluding-for-the-purposes-of-fixing-a-minimum-retail-price-on-chicken-meat/.

[111]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.D.

[112]   Sonya Lalli, Chilean Court Denies Criminal Prosecutor Tissue-Paper Evidence, Global Competition Review (Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40815/chilean-court-denies-criminal-prosecutor-tissue-paper-evidence/.

[113]   Yasmine Harik, Chile’s Cartel Conundrum, Global Competition Review (July 16, 2015), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/39085/chiles-cartel-conundrum/; see also Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.D.2.

[114]   Mark Briggs, Colombia Tissue Cartel Folds, Global Competition Review (June 1, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41163/colombia-tissue-cartel-folds/.

[115]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Notifies its Statement of Probable Responsibility for Possible Absolute Monopolistic Practices in the Automobile Air Conditioning Compressors Market (Feb. 4, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-011-2016.pdf.

[116]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Issues Cautionary Advice to the Tortilla Industry for Probable Absolute Monopolistic Practices (Feb. 16, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-012-2016.pdf.

[117]   Alex Wilts, Mexico Investigates Monitoring Services for Collusion, Global Competition Review (Mar. 16, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40707/mexicoinvestigatesmonitoringservicescollusion/.

[118]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Notifies its Statement of Probable Responsibility for Possible Absolute Monopolistic Practice in the Market of AFORES Administration Services (Apr. 5, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-016-2016.pdf.

[119]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Notifies its Statement of Probable Responsibility for Possible Absolute Monopolistic Practices in the cranes market in Guerrero (May 5, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-026-2016.pdf.

[120]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Investigates Live Performances Productions, Show-Centers Operation and Automated Ticketing (May 13, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-027-2016.pdf.

[121]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE Notifies Economic Agents of a Statement of Probable Responsibility for a Possible Collusion in the Taxi Transportation Service from and to Mexico City’s International Airport (May 2, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-024-2016.pdf.

[122]   Press Release, COFECE, COFECE’s Investigative Authority opens an investigation on the market of production, distribution and marketing of corn tortillas in the state of Jalisco (June 7, 2016), available at http://www.cofece.mx/cofece/ingles/images/Comunicados/Comunicados_ingles/COFECE-033-2016.pdf.

[123]   Sonya Lalli, Mexico fines sugar suppliers, Global Competition Review (June 22, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41318/mexicofinessugarsuppliers/.

[124]   Uruguay: Country Opens “New Front” in Tissue Cartel Case, Competition Pol’y Int’l (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/uruguay-country-opens-new-front-in-tissue-cartel-case/; see also Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at I.J.

[125]   Uruguay: Competition Commission Evidence-Gathering Powers Reinforced, Competition Pol’y Int’l (Mar. 15, 2016), available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/uruguay-competition-commission-evidence-gathering-powers-reinforced/.

[126]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines car parts producers €137 789 000 in cartel settlement (January 27, 2016), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-173_en.htm.

[127]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.A.1.b.i.; Gibson Dunn, 2014 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.A.1.b.

[128]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines Riberebro €5.2 million for participation in canned mushrooms cartel (Apr. 6, 2016), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1261_en.htm.

[129]   See Gibson Dunn, 2014 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.A.3.c.

[130]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.A.3.a.

[131]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines members of gas insulated switchgear cartel over 750 million euros (Jan. 24, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-80_en.htm.

[132]   Press Release, European Comm’n, The General Court annuls the fines imposed on Mitsubishi and Toshiba for their participation in the cartel on the gas insulated switchgear market (July 12, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-11-70_en.htm.

[133]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission re-imposes fines on Mitsubishi and Toshiba for gas insulated switchgear cartel following Court judgement (June 27, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-705_en.htm.

[134]   Case T-404/12, Toshiba v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:18 (Jan. 19, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d53cb19c2370484f28b5a694a1d1014825.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Pa30Me0?text=&docid=173585&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=518601; Case T-409/12, Mitsubishi v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:17 (Jan. 19, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173586&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=518601.

[135]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines producers of power transformers € 67.6 million for market sharing cartel (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1432_en.htm?locale=en .

[136]   Case C‑373/14 P, Toshiba v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:26 (Jan. 20, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173626&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=644735.

[137]   Case C‑154/14, SKW v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:445 (June 16, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=180323&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=872147.

[138]   Case C-155/14 P, Evonik Degussa & AlzChem v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:446 (June 16, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=180330&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=813342.

[139]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines suppliers of calcium carbide and magnesium based reagents over €61 million for price fixing and market sharing cartel (July 22, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1169_en.htm.

[140]   Case 97/08, Akzo Nobelv. European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2009:536 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf.

[141]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines 16 firms €290 million for industrial bags cartel (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-1508_en.htm.

[142]   Case T‑669/14P, Trioplast Industrier v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:285 (May 12, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5ae372f2549a441e0bec0ee91f4836846.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Pa30Me0?text=&docid=178125&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=792804.

[143]   Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission fines bitumen suppliers € 183 million for market sharing and price coordination in Spain (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1438_en.htm.

[144]   Case C‑617/13 P, Repsol v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:416 (June 9, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=179788&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1088568; Case C‑616/13 P, Productos Asfálticos (PROAS) v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:415 (June 9, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=179793&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1088648.

[145]   According to this rule, the maximum fine is capped at 10% of the overall annual turnover of a company and can be based on the turnover of the group to which the company belongs if the parent of that group exercised decisive influence over the operations of the subsidiary during the infringement period.  See Press Release, European Comm’n, Fines for breaking EU Competition Law (Nov. 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/factsheet_fines_en.pdf.

[146]   Case C-603/13 P, Galp Energía España SA, Petróleos de Portugal (Petrogal) SA, and Repsol Galp Energía SGPS SA v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:38 (Jan. 21, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173682&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=872685.

[147]   Case 162/15 P-R, Evonik Degussa GmbH v. European Commission, Order of the Vice-President of the Court (Mar. 2, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d59e24376c7dc44396bb128c3c6dffec03.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Pa30Me0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&docid=174948&cid=809745.

[148]   Case F/38.620, Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate (May 3, 2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32006D0903&from=EN.

[149]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.A.2.k.

[150]   Case C‑247/14 P, HeidelbergCement v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:149 (Mar. 10, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174928&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=672286; Case  C‑248/14 P, Schwenk Zement v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:150 (Mar. 10, 2016), available (in German and French only) at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174934&pageIndex=0&doclang=DE&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=672791; Case  C‑267/14 P, Buzzi Unicem v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:151 (Mar. 10, 2016), available (in French and Italian only) at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174932&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=673037; Case  C‑268/14 P, Italmobiliare v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:152 (Mar. 10, 2016), available (in French and Italian only) at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174931&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=673442.

[151]   See Gibson Dunn, 2012 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at 6.C.II.

[152]   Case T‑267/12, Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:110 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d554ec53db6ee4414184d9861f6ca3aa96.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuSbx90?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=174647&occ=first&dir=&cid=1411834; see also id. at n.150.

[153]   Case T‑251/12, EGL v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:114 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174645&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1015414; Case T‑270/12, Panalpina v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:109 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174644&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1019211; Case T-254/12,  Kühne + Nagel v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:113  (Feb. 29, 2016), available (only in German and French) at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174646&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1019211; Case T-265/12, Schenker v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:111 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174643&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1019211; Case T-264/12, UTi v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:112 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174642&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1019211; Case T-267/12, Deutsche Bahn / Schenker v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:110 (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174647&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1108971.

[154]   Case C‑428/14, DHL Express (Italy) Srl, DHL Global Forwarding (Italy) SpA v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, ECLI:EU:C:2016:27 (Jan. 20, 2016), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=173627&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=872571.

[155]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.B.1.

[156]   Press Release, Ct. of First Instance, Judgment in Joined Cases T-426/10, Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías, SA v. Commission, T-427/10, Trefilerías Quijano, SA v. Commission, T-428/10 Trenzas y Cables de Acero PSC, SL v. Commission, T-429/10, Global Steel Wire, SA v. Commission, and T-438/12, Global Steel Wire, SA v. Commission, T-439/12, Trefilerías Quijano, SA v. Commission, T-440/12, Moreda-Riviere Trefilerías, SA v. Commission, and T-441/12, Trenzas y Cables de Acero PSC, SL v. Commission, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-06/cp160057en.pdf.

[157]   Press Release, Fed. Competition Auth., BWB/K-290 Geldbußenentscheidung gegen vier Unternehmen der Schienengüterverkehrs- und Logistikdienstleistungsbranche (June 8, 2016), available at http://www.bwb.gv.at/Aktuell/Seiten/BWB-K-290-Geldbußenentscheidung-gegen-vier-Unternehmen-der-Schienengüterverkehrs–und-Logistikdienstleistungsbranche.aspx.

[158]   Press Release, Fed. Competition Auth., BWB/K-361 Geldbußentscheidung gegen RAUCH Fruchtsäfte GmbH & Co OG (June 8, 2016), available at http://www.bwb.gv.at/Aktuell/Seiten/BWB-K-361-Geldbußentscheidung-gegen-RAUCH-Fruchtsäfte-GmbH-Co-OG.aspx.

[159]   Press Release, Belg. Competition Auth., The Belgian Competition Authority imposes fines amounting to 3.857.00 EUR for price-fixing in the sector of industrial batteries (Feb. 23, 2016), available at http://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20160223_press_release_04_bca.pdf.

[160]   Press Release, Belg. Competition Auth., The Belgian Competition Authority adopts new leniency guidelines (Mar. 4, 2016), available at http://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20160304_press_release_05_bca.pdf.

[161]   Press Release, Belgian Competition Auth., The Belgian Competition Authority confirms inspections at several undertakings active in the sale of non-prescription products in pharmacies (May 27, 2016), available at http://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20160527_press_release_09_bca.pdf.

[162]   Press Release, Office for the Protection of Competition, Decision on Cartel of Construction Companies Confirmed: Sanctions Were Lowered (Feb. 8, 2016), available at http://www.uohs.cz/en/competition/news-competition/2086-decision-on-cartel-of-construction-companies-confirmed-sanctiones-were-lowered.html.

[163]   Press Release, Office for the Protection of Competition, More Fines Imposed for Prohibited Agreements of Construction Companies (May 6, 2016), available at http://www.uohs.cz/en/competition/news-competition/2128-more-fines-imposed-for-prohibited-agreements-of-construction-companies.html.

[164]   Décision no 16-D-09 du 12 mai 2016 relative à des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans les secteurs des armatures métalliques et des treillis soudés sur l’île de la Réunion (May 12, 2016), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/16d09.pdf; Press Release, Autorité de la Concurrence, The Autorité de la concurrence fines several companies for having reached anticompetitive practices in the sectors of welded mesh and metal frames used by construction and public works companies in La Réunion (May 12, 2016), available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=630&id_article=2776.

[165]   The BKartA concluded nearly all of its long-term proceedings against anti-competitive agreements concerning retail prices between manufacturers and retailers in the food retail sector, imposing additional fines on retailers totaling EUR 90.5 million (approximately $103 million) in 2016 so far.  Having begun in 2010, these proceedings amounted to some of the most time-consuming proceedings the BKartA ever conducted, with the fines imposed totaling (together with fines imposed previously) around EUR 242 million (approximately $275 million).  See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Resale price maintenance in food retail sector – Fine proceedings largely concluded in beer segment too (May 9, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/09_05_2016_Bier.html?nn=3591286).  Also in January, the BKartA fined Lego GmbH, a leading toy manufacturer, EUR 130,000 (approximately $147,000) for enforcing vertical resale price maintenance (RPM).  Lego GmbH sales representatives forced a number of retailers, mainly in northern and eastern Germany, to raise retail prices by threatening them with lowering or completely denying supply.  Lego’s cooperation with the BKartA was taken into account in calculating the fine.  See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt fines LEGO for vertical resale price maintenance (Jan. 12, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/12_01_2016_Lego.html?nn=3591568).

[166]   Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt concludes proceedings against manufacturers of railway sleepers (Feb. 25, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/25_02_2016_Bahnschwellen.html?nn=3591568.

[167]   Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt imposes fines in cartel in sanitary sector (Mar. 22, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/22_03_2016_SHK.html;jsessionid=FD0A37F14DADACCB086D0BD3A1501251.1_cid387?nn=3591286.

[168]   Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt concludes “rail case” with fine imposed on Vossloh Laeis (Mar. 10, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/10_03_2016_Schienenfall.html?nn=3591568.

[169]   Gibson Dunn, 2014 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.D.

[170]   Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, The French Autorité de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt publish joint paper on data and its implications for Competition Law (May 10, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/10_05_2016_Big%20Data%20Papier.html?nn=3591568.

[171]   Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Publishes Working Paper on “Market Power of Platforms and Networks” (June 9, 2016), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/09_06_2016_ThinkTank.html?nn=3591568.

[172]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.D.7; see also Aodhan O’Faolain, Seizure of CRH document comes before High Court, The Irish Times (Nov. 24, 2015), available at http://www.irishtimes.com/business/manufacturing/seizure-of-crh-document-comes-before-high-court-1.2442213.

[173]   See Press Release, Competition and Consumer Protection Comm’n, Statement from the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (May 20, 2016), available at http://ccpc.ie/news/2016-05-20-statement-competition-and-consumer-protection-commission.

[174]   See Press Release, Competition and Consumer Protection Comm’n, Commission warns trade associations not to issue minimum price recommendations (Jan. 8, 2016), available at http://www.ccpc.ie/news/2016-01-08-commission-warns-trade-associations-not-issue-minimum-price-recommendations.

[175]   Press Release, Dutch Competition Auth., 12.5 Million Euro Fine for Undertakings in Cooling- and Freezing Storage (Mar. 23, 2016), available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/15609/ACM-imposed-fines-of-EUR-125-million-on-cold-storage-firms/.

[176]   Press Release, Dutch Competition Auth., ACM Fines Cartel of Manufacturers of Concrete Garages (Apr. 18, 2016), available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/15710/ACM-fines-cartel-of-manufacturers-of-concrete-garages/.

[177]   Press Release, Dutch Competition Auth., Judgment of District Court Rotterdam in Foreclosure Auction Cartel – Tranche 2 and 2 (May 11, 2016), available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/15801/Uitspraak-rechtbank-Rotterdam-executieveilingen-tranche-2-en-3/; Press Release, Maverick Advocaten N.V., Maverick Advocaten wins court case on ACM fine for foreclosure auctions (Apr. 14, 2016), available at http://www.maverick-law.com/en/cases/maverick-advocaten-wins-court-case-on-acm-fine-for-foreclosure-auctions.html.

[178]   Press Release, Dutch Competition Auth., Judgment of District Court Rotterdam Regarding Fines Imposed on Laundry Service Cartel (May 13, 2016), available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/15806/Uitspraak-rechtbank-boete-wasserijenkartel/; Rotterdam District Court considered “franchise agreements” in breach of competition law in launderette cartel case, Lexology (June 1, 2016), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9122ad36-7195-4247-a4e4-863a15a14809.

[179]   Press Release, Dutch Competition Auth., Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal Upholds Fines Imposed on Silver Onions Cartel (Apr. 14, 2016), available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/15704/Uitspraken-CBb-boete-zilveruienkartel/; Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Confirmed That ACM Can Use EU-Wide Turnover in Calculating the Fines in Onion Cartel Case, Lexology (Apr. 1, 2016), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f21d5d0-3a13-4a26-96cd-d363fa1d8b75.

[180]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC desmanteló 14 cárteles e impuso multas por 549 millones de euros durante 2015 (Feb. 15, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1641/La-CNMC-desmantel243-14-c225rteles-e-impuso-multas-por-549-millones-de-euros-durante-2015.aspx.

[181]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC multa con 6,12 millones de euros a seis fabricantes de turrones (Apr. 20, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1729/La-CNMC-multa-con-612-millones-de-euros-a-seis-fabricantes-de-turrones.aspx.

[182]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC sanciona con 1,72 millones de euros a siete concesionarios de automóviles y una consultora por su participación en un cártel (May 12, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Notas%20de%20prensa/20160512_NP_Sancionador_Concesionarios_Chevrolet.pdf.

[183]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.B.9.

[184]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC multa con 128,8 millones de euros a ocho fabricantes de pañales para adultos, a su asociación y a cuatro directivos por formar un cártel (May 31, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1789/La-CNMC-multa-con-1288-millones-de-euros-a-ocho-fabricantes-de-pa241ales-para-adultos-a-su-asociaci243n-y-a-cuatro-directivos-por-formar-un-c225rtel.aspx.

[185]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC multa con 5,64 millones de euros a cuatro empresas y nueve de sus directivos por repartirse las adjudicaciones de los suministros de desvios ferroviariods de Adif (July 6, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/Portals/0/Ficheros/notasdeprensa/2016/Competencia/20160706_NP_Adif_Desviosferroviarios__.pdf.

[186]   Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC incoa un expediente sancionador en el mercado de la fabricación, distribución y comercialización de gases medicinales (Jan. 26, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1620/La-CNMC-incoa-un-expediente-sancionador-en-el-mercado-de-la-fabricaci243n-distribuci243n-y-comercializaci243n-de-gases-medicinales.aspx.

[187]   See Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC incoa un expediente sancionador en el mercado de fabricantes y/o distribuidoras de cables eléctricos de baja y media tensión (Mar. 7, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1678/La-CNMC-incoa-un-expediente-sancionador-en-el-mercado-de-fabricantes-yo-distribuidoras-de-cables-el233ctricos-de-baja-y-media-tensi243n.aspx.

[188]   See Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC inspecciona varias empresas fabricantes y/o distribuidoras de cables eléctricos de baja y media tensión(Feb. 17, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1646/La-CNMC-inspecciona-varias-empresas-fabricantes-yo-distribuidoras-de-cables-el233ctricos-de-baja-y-media-tensi243n.aspx.

[189]   See Press Release, CNMC, La CNMC incoa expediente sancionador a 11 empresas de servicios informáticos y aplicaciones(Apr. 25, 2016), available at https://www.cnmc.es/CNMC/Prensa/TabId/254/ArtMID/6629/ArticleID/1732/La-CNMC-incoa-expediente-sancionador-a-11-empresas-de-servicios-inform225ticos-y-aplicaciones.aspx.

[190]   Draft Damages Directive, Comisión General de Codificación, Exposición de Motivos, available at http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/1292427769696?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Conten.

[191]   See, e.g., Dow Benelux NV v. Commission, Case 85/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3137, ¶ 19; S.T.S., Apr. 6, 2016 (R.J., No. 1507) (Spain), available at http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=TS&reference=7643194&links=”113/2013″&optimize=20160418&publicinterface=true&utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss.

[192]   Swiss Piano Dealers Fined For Price Fixing, The Local (Jan. 7, 2016), available at http://www.thelocal.ch/20160107/swiss-piano-dealers-fined-for-price-fixing.

[193]   Press Release, CMA, Water Tank Firms Admit Cartel and Agree to Pay £2.6 Million Fines (Mar. 21, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/water-tank-firms-admit-cartel-and-agree-to-pay-26-million-fines.

[194]   Id.

[195]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at II.D.13.a.

[196]   Press Release, CMA, CMA Sets out Case against Water Tank Firms (May 26, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-sets-out-case-against-water-tank-firms.

[197]   Id.

[198]   Press Release, CMA, Man Charged in CMA Criminal Cartel Investigation (Mar. 7, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/man-charged-in-cma-criminal-cartel-investigation; see generally CMA, Supply of Precast Concrete Drainage Products: Civil Investigation Case Page, available at https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/supply-of-precast-concrete-drainage-products-civil-investigation.

[199]   Id.

[200]   Id.

[201]   See generally, CMA, Supply of Precast Concrete Drainage Products Civil Investigation Case Page (Apr. 18, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/supply-of-precast-concrete-drainage-products-civil-investigation.

[202]   Press Release, CMA, Model Agencies and Trade Association Alleged to Have Broken Competition Law (May 25, 2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/model-agencies-and-trade-association-alleged-to-have-broken-competition-law.

[203]   Press Release, SFO, LIBOR Defendants Acquitted (Update) (Jan 29, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/01/29/libor-defendants-acquitted-update/.

[204]   Press Release, SFO, LIBOR Traders and Submitters Found Guilty (July 4, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/04/libor-traders-submitters-found-guilty/.

[205]   Marot Patrick & Josie Cox, Three Former Barclays Traders Convicted in Libor-Rigging Case, Wall St. J. (July 4, 2016), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/three-former-barclays-traders-convicted-in-libor-rigging-case-1467640635.

[206]   Press Release, SFO, SFO to Seek Retrial of Two Former LIBOR Traders (July 6, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/06/sfo-seek-retrial-two-former-libor-traders/.

[207]   Press Release, SFO, Convicted LIBOR Manipulators Sentenced (July 7, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/07/convicted-libor-manipulators-sentenced/.

[208]   Case page, SFO, EURIBOR (Apr. 7, 2016), available at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/euribor/.

[209]   Kirstin Ridley, UPDATE 2-UK Prosecutors Granted Arrest Warrants for Euribor Five, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2016), available at http://in.reuters.com/article/britain-euribor-arrests-idINL5N16Q20D.

[210]   Gibson Dunn, 2014 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.A.1.c.

[211]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, ACCC appeal upheld in air cargo case (Mar. 21, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-appeal-upheld-in-air-cargo-case.

[212]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Woolworths ordered to pay $9 million in penalties in laundry detergent cartel proceedings (June 3, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/woolworths-ordered-to-pay-9-million-in-penalties-in-laundry-detergent-cartel-proceedings; Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Colgate ordered to pay $18 million penalty in laundry detergent cartel proceedings (Apr. 28, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/colgate-ordered-to-pay-18-million-penalty-in-laundry-detergent-cartel-proceedings.

[213]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Loyal Coal Pty Ltd admits breaching competition law in relation to Mount Penny coal exploration licence tender process (Apr. 5, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/loyal-coal-pty-ltd-admits-breaching-competition-law-in-relation-to-mount-penny-coal-exploration-licence-tender-process.

[214]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, ACCC granted special leave to appeal to the High Court from the Full Federal Court Flight Centre judgment (Mar. 11, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-granted-special-leave-to-appeal-to-the-high-court-from-the-full-federal-court-flight-centre-judgment.

[215]   Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.A.2.

[216]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Federal Court Finds Australian Egg Corporation and egg producers did not attempt to induce a cartel arrangement (Feb. 10, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/federal-court-finds-australian-egg-corporation-and-egg-producers-did-not-attempt-to-induce-a-cartel-arrangement.

[217]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Federal Court Orders Zelko Lendich to Pay $120,000 Penalty for Attempt to Induce Cartel Arrangement Between Egg Producers (May 2, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/federal-court-orders-zelko-lendich-to-pay-120000-penalty-for-attempt-to-induce-cartel-arrangement-between-egg-producers.

[218]   Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, ACCC appeals AECL Decision (Mar. 2, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-appeals-aecl-decision.

[219]   Rod Sims, Annual Address before the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (Feb. 23, 2016), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/speech/accc-compliance-and-enforcement-priorities-for-2016.

[220]   See Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Notice on the Release of the Draft Guidelines for Applying Leniency Program to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements for Public Comment (《横向垄断协议案件宽大制度适用指南》（征求意见稿）公开征求意见) (released Feb. 2, 2016), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201602/t20160203_774297.html.

[221]   Id. ¶ 10.

[222]   Id. ¶¶ 10, 12.

[223]   Id. ¶ 11.

[224]   Am. Bar Ass’n, Comments of the American Bar Association’s Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law Regarding the National Development and Reform Commission’s (“NDRC”) February 3, 2016 Draft Guidelines for Applying Leniency Program to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements (“ABA Comment”) (Mar. 15, 2016), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_201503_ndrc.authcheckdam.pdf.

[225]   See Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Notice on the Release of the Draft Guidelines for Applying Leniency Program to Horizontal Monopoly Agreements for Public Comment (《横向垄断协议案件宽大制度适用指南》（征求意见稿）公开征求意见) (Feb. 3, 2016), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201602/t20160203_774297.html.

[226]   Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on Determining the Illegal Gains Generated from Monopoly Conduct and on Setting Fines (draft for comments) (June 17, 2016), available in Chinese at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201606/t20160617_807545.html.

[227]   Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, NDRC Investigated One Allopurinol Cartel Case and Imposed Fines Accordingly (我委依法查处别嘌醇片垄断协议案), (Jan. 28, 2016), available at http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201601/t20160128_790484.html; China’s NDRC Fines Qingyang Pharmaceuticals, Related Companies over Anticompetitive Agreements (English Version) (Mar. 1, 2016), available at http://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/DetailView.aspx?cid=773014&siteid=192&rdir=1.

[228]   See Keynote Speech, Anna Wu, Fighting Cartels Under the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance: Lessons from the European Union (Mar. 27, 2015), available at http://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/speeches/files/Fighting_Cartels_20150327.pdf; see also Competition Commission, Enforcement Policy (Nov. 2015), http://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/Enforcement_Policy_Eng.pdf.

[229]   See Competition Commission, Leniency Policy for Undertakings Engaged in Cartel Conduct (Nov. 2015), available at https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Eng.pdf.

[230]   Indian Airlines Have Fines for Alleged Cargo Cartel Set Aside, AirCargoNews (Apr. 19, 2016), available at http://www.aircargonews.net/news/single-view/news/indian-airlines-have-cartel-fines-set-aside.html.

[231]   Deepak Patel, Five Tyre Companies Operated as a Cartel, Finds CCI Probe, Business Standard (Mar. 5, 2016), available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/five-tyre-firms-operated-as-cartel-finds-cci-probe-116030500042_1.html.

[232]   Srinivasa Prasad, Firstpost Ground Report: Tyre Mafia May be Punished for Its Greed, But Will It Help the Rubber Farmers?, First Post (Apr. 6, 2016), available at http://www.firstpost.com/india/firstpost-ground-report-tyre-mafia-may-be-punished-for-its-greed-but-will-it-help-the-rubber-farmers-2714738.html.

[233]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.D.

[234]   Press Information Bureau, Government of India Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Shri Devender Kumar Sikri Takes Oath as the Chairman of Competition Commission of India (Jan. 11, 2016), available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=134366.

[235]   Mark Briggs, Indonesia Sends Fines to Text Message Cartel, Global Competition Review (Mar. 8, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40646/indonesia-sends-fines-text-message-cartel/.

[236]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.E.

[237]   Avit Hidayat & Pingit Aria, KPPU Uncovers Chicken Cartel Practices, Tempo.co (Mar. 9, 2016), available at http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/03/09/056752215/KPPU-Uncovers-Chicken-Cartel-Practices.

[238]   Jewel Topsfield & Karuni Rompies, Indonesian Companies Importing Live Cattle From Australia Fined $10.5 Million, Sydney Morning Herald (Apr. 26, 2016), available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/indonesian-companies-importing-live-cattle-from-australia-fined-105-million-20160426-gof9to.html.

[239]   See, e.g., Presentation to AEGC Regional Workshop, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, JFTC’s Effort to Utilize Economic Analysis (June 1, 2016), available at  http://mycc.gov.my/sites/default/files/4%20-%20WS%20Economic%20Analysis%20MY%20-%20Effort%20to%20Utilize%20Economic%20Analysis%20%28JFTC%29%20-%2030May16.pdf

[240]   Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The JFTC Filed a Criminal Accusation on Bid-Rigging Concerning the Disaster Restoration Paving Works for the Great East Japan Earthquake Ordered by the Tohoku Branch of East Nippon Expressway Company Ltd. (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/February/160303.html.

[241]   Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The JFTC Issues Cease and Desist Orders and Surcharge Payment Orders to the Manufacturers Selling Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitor and Tantalum Electrolytic Capacitor (Mar. 29, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/March/160329.html.

[242]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Japan Breaks Up Capacitors Cartel, Global Competition Review (Mar. 30, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40789/japan-breaks-capacitors-cartel/.

[243]   Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The JFTC Issued Cease and Desist Orders and Surcharge Payment Orders to the Manufacturing Distributors Selling Poly Aluminum Chloride Ordered by the Local Governments in Tohoku District, Niigata District and Hokuriku District (Feb. 5, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/February/160205.html.

[244]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.F.

[245]   Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The JFTC Issued Cease and Desist Orders and Surcharge Payment Orders to the Participants in Bidding for the Country Elevator Works Ordered by the Agricultural Cooperatives, Etc., in Hokkaido (Feb. 10, 2016), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2016/February/160210.html.

[246]   Sonya Lalli, Malaysian Court Overturns First Penalties Issued by Authority, Global Competition Review (Feb. 9, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40484/malaysian-court-overturns-first-penalties-issued-authority/.

[247]   Nicole Leong, CAT Overturned MyCC’s Market Sharing Object Decision, Lexology (Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e32ca03e-693b-4d90-8f1b-59ee43167063.

[248]   Sonya Lalli, Malaysia Fines Container Shipping Operators, Global Competition Review (June 7, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41204/malaysia-fines-container-shipping-operators.

[249]   See New Zealand Bill No. 341-2, available at http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/legislation/bills/00DBHOH_BILL11153_1/commerce-cartels-and-other-matters-amendment-bill.

[250]   John Key, Prime Minister’s Statement to Parliament, Scoop Independent News (Feb. 9, 2016), available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1602/S00098/prime-ministers-statement-to-parliament.htm.

[251]   Pallavi Guniganti, Court Victory for NZCC in First of Real Estate Cartel Cases, Global Competition Review (May 23, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41114/court-victory-nzcc-first-real-estate-cartel-cases/.

[252]   Media Release, Commerce Comm’n of N.Z., Manawatu Agency to Pay $1.25m Penalty in Real Estate Price Fixing Case (May 20, 2016), available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/business-competition/business-competition-media-releases/detail/2016/manawatu-agency-to-pay-1.25m-penalty-in-real-estate-price-fixing-case.

[253]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Pakistan, Trade Associations Urged to Avoid Price Fixing (Jan. 5, 2016), available at http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=338&Itemid=137&lang=en.

[254]   In re Show Cause Notice Issued to Pakistan Poultry Ass’n, File No. 42/PPA/C&TA/CCP/2015, Competition Comm’n of Pakistan, (Feb. 29, 2016), available at http://www.cc.gov.pk/images/Downloads/ppa_order_2016.pdf.

[255]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.J.

[256]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Pakistan, CCP Concludes Enquiry into Alleged Exorbitant Increase in Airfares by Private Carriers (Feb. 22, 2016), available at http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=443&Itemid=137&lang=en.

[257]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.K.

[258]   Roices Naguit, Balisacan is 1st Chairman of Competition Commission; 4 Other Members Named by PNoy, InterAksyon (Jan. 25, 2016), available at http://www.interaksyon.com/business/123230/balisacan-chairs-competition-commission-4-other-members-named-by-pnoy.

[259]   Philip[p]ines:  New Commission Traveled to Australia for Antitrust Advice, Competition Policy International (Apr. 3, 2016), available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/philipines-new-commission-traveled-to-australia-for-antitrust-advice/.

[260]   Kristyn Nika M. Lazo, Competition Law Not a Burden to Businesses, The Manila Times (June 6, 2016), available at http://www.manilatimes.net/competition-law-not-a-burden-to-businesses/266349/.

[261]   Philippine Competition Act, Rep. Act No. 10667, § 50 (July 21, 2015), available at http://www.gov.ph/2015/07/21/republic-act-no-10667/.

[262]   PH Competition Commission:  Draft of Rules and Regulations Now Out, Rappler (May 12, 2016), available at http://www.rappler.com/business/211-governance/132852-philippine-competition-commission-irr-draft-release.

[263]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.K.

[264]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Singapore, Interim Findings from CCS’s Retail Petrol Study (Feb. 23, 2016), available at https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/interim-findings-from-ccs-retail-petrol-study.

[265]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Singapore, CCS Issues Proposed Infringement Decision against 13 Fresh Chicken Distributors for Price Fixing and Market Sharing (Mar. 8, 2016), available at https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/ccs-issues-pid-against-13-fresh-chicken-distributors-for-price-fixing-and-market-sharing.

[266]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Mid-Year Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.K.

[267]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Singapore, CCS Issues Proposed Infringement Decision against 13 Fresh Chicken Distributors for Price Fixing and Market Sharing (Mar. 8, 2016), available at https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/ccs-issues-pid-against-13-fresh-chicken-distributors-for-price-fixing-and-market-sharing.

[268]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Singapore, Financial Advisers Penalised by CCS for Pressuring a Competitor to Withdraw Offer from the Life Insurance Market (Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/id-against-10-financial-advisers.

[269]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Singapore Throws Book at Financial Advisers, Global Competition Review (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40715/singapore-throws-book-financial-advisers/.

[270]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of Singapore, CCS Consults on Proposed Changes to the Calculation of Financial Penalties (June 8, 2016), available at https://www.ccs.gov.sg/media-and-publications/media-releases/ccs-consults-on-proposed-changes-to-the-calculation-of-financial-penalties.

[271]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Singapore Looks to Mirror EU Fining Guidelines, Global Competition Review (June 8, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41214/singapore-looks-mirror-eu-fining-guidelines/.

[272]   Sonya Lalli, An Interview with Toh Han Li, Global Competition Review (Apr. 18, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/37941/an-interview-toh-han-li/.

[273]   Kim Sung-hoon, FTC penalized for questionable fining practice on antitrust activities, Pulse by Maeil Business News Korea (June 10, 2016), available at http://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2016&no=416935.

[274]   See Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.M.

[275]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Korea slaps second largest construction fine on cartel, Global Competition Review (Apr. 27, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40955/korea-slaps-second-largest-construction-fine-cartel/.

[276]   See Gibson Dunn, 2014 Year-End Criminal Antitrust and Competition Law Update at III.L.

[277]   Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Sanctioned Bid Riggings in Two Construction Projects for Waste Water Treatment Facilities (Jan. 4, 2016), available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pageId=0305.

[278]   Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Sanctioned Bid Riggings in Two Waste Water Treatment Facilities Projects (May 9, 2016), available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pageId=0305.

[279]   Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Sanctions the Hardtack Bid Rrigging (Jan. 15, 2016), available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pageId=0305.

[280]   Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Sanctions Biochemical Analyzer Companies for Bid Rigging (May 3, 2016), available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pageId=0305.

[281]   Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, KFTC Sanctions Two Japanese Auto Parts Makers for Bid Rigging (Feb. 24, 2016), available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pageId=0305.

[282]   Min Seok-gi & Na Hyun-joon, S. Korea’s antitrust watchdog fines 45 paper firms for price fixing, Pulse by Maeil Business News Korea (June 14, 2016), available at http://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2016&no=426001.

[283]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Korea exempts duty free cartel from fines, Global Competition Review (May 13, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41047/korea-exempts-duty-free-cartel-fines/.

[284]   News: April 2016 Decisions, FTC, available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=179&docid=14696 (last updated June 6, 2016).

[285]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Egyptian Enforcer Intervenes in Healthcare Insurance Market, Global Competition Review (June 7, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41205/egyptian-enforcer-intervenes-healthcare-insurance-market/.

[286]   Dror Halavi, Two Sentenced to Prison in ‘Breadgate’ Scandal, Hamodia (Jan. 14, 2016), available at http://hamodia.com/2016/01/14/two-sentenced-to-prison-in-breadgate-scandal/.

[287]   Press Release, Israeli Antitrust Auth., Suspected Cartel Among Organizers of Flights and Services for Youth Delegations to Poland (Jan. 18, 2016), available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/33918/Cartel%20delegations%20to%20Poland_012016.pdf.

[288]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Israeli Court Blows Down Weather Station Bid-Riggers, Global Competition Review (Feb. 17, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40526/israeli-court-blows-down-weather-station-bid-riggers/.

[289]   Press Release, Israeli Antitrust Auth., Three companies and their CEOs are convicted of collusion in a tender by the Meteorological Services (Feb. 10, 2016), available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/33956/Meteoroligical%20service_0216.pdf.

[290]   Press Release, Israeli Antitrust Auth., The Computer Cartel: a hearing prior to indictment for price coordination in computer tenders (May 9, 2016), available at http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/34090/Computer%20cartel%200516.pdf.

[291]   Sonya Lalli, Saudi Court Approves Sanctions Against Regional Pepsi Bottler, Global Competition Review (Feb. 24, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40564/saudi-court-approves-sanctions-against-regional-pepsi-bottler/.

[292]   Mark Briggs, Rice Cartel Fined in Saudi Arabia, Global Competition Review (Feb. 11, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40498/rice-cartel-fined-saudi-arabia/.

[293]   Tom Madge-Wyld, Turkey cracks down on cement cartel, Global Competition Review (Jan. 15, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40326/turkey-cracks-down-cement-cartel/.

[294]   Sonya Lalli, Turkey launches new probe into ready-mix concrete, Global Competition Review (May 19, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41088/turkey-launches-new-probe-ready-mix-concrete/.

[295]   Press Release, Turkish Competition Auth., Investigation Launched Concerning 33 Companies Operating in the Market for Traffic Insurance (Mar. 2, 2016), available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/en-US/News/Investigation-Launched-Concerning-33-Companies-Operating-in-the-Market-for-Traffic-Insurance.

[296]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of S. Afr., Competition Commission raids offices of Shatterprufe, PG Glass, Glasfit and Digicall (Mar. 23, 2016), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Competition-Commission-raids-offices-of-Shatterprufe-PG-Glass-Glasfit-and-Digicall-1.pdf.

[297]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of S. Afr., Competition Commission raids premises of PG Bison and Sonae (Mar. 31, 2016), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Competition-Commission-raids-premises-of-PG-Bison-and-Sonae.pdf.

[298]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of S. Afr., Competition Commission raise offices of suppliers of packaging paper (May 26, 2016), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Competition-Commission-raids-offices-of-suppliers-of-paper-packaging-products.pdf.

[299]   Press Release, Competition Comm’n of S. Afr., Commission refers cartel complaint against ZTE SA and ZTE Mzanzi (Apr. 28, 2016), available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Commission-refers-cartel-complaint-against-ZTE-SA-and-ZTE-Mnzazi.pdf.

[300]   Tom Webb, South Africa tribunal denies request to quash maize cartel leniency, Global Competition Review (June 15, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41255/south-africa-tribunal-denies-request-quash-maize-cartel-leniency/.

[301]   Apply for leniency, Competition Comm’n of S. Afr., http://www.compcom.co.za/apply-for-leniency/  (last visited July 7, 2016).

[302]   Sonya Lalli, South Africa criminalises cartels, Global Competition Review (Apr. 22, 2016), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/40933/south-africa-criminalises-cartels/.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in the preparation of this client update:  Olivia Adendorff, Rachel Brass, Joshua Dick, Rupal Doshi, Sebastien Evrard, Pablo Figueroa, Kai Gesing, Alejandro Guerrero Perez, Scott Hammond, Sarretta McDonough, Jens-Olrik Murach, Trey Nicoud, Matthew Parrott, Sloane Rosenthal, Deirdre Taylor, Michael Walther, and Kevin Yeh, with additional contributions from Dan Bruggebrew, Liang Cai, Sara Carlisle, Courtney Chin, Jim Doody, John Dwyer, Justin Epner, Hanae Fujinami, Helen Galloway, Ilias Georgiopoulos, Shannon Han, Joe Hansen, Priyah Kaul, Elissavet Kazili, Christina Kogan, Steven McCarty, John McKellar, Jason McKenney, Dylan Mefford, Bob Nichols, Zia Oatley, Charles Proctor, Zach Ritz, Joe Rose, Blake Shinoda, Indraneel Sur, Katherine Warren, Jessica Wright, and Tim Zimmerman.   

Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any of the following, or any member of the firm’s Antitrust and Competition Practice Group:

Washington, D.C.
Scott D. Hammond (+1 202-887-3684, [email protected])
F. Joseph Warin (+1 202-887-3609, [email protected])
D. Jarrett Arp (+1 202-955-8678, [email protected])
David P. Burns (+1 202-887-3786, [email protected])
Cynthia Richman (+1 202-955-8234, [email protected])
David Debold (+1 202-955-8551, [email protected])

New York
Randy M. Mastro (+1 212-351-3825, [email protected])
Eric J. Stock (+1 212-351-2301, [email protected])
Peter Sullivan (+1 212-351-5370, [email protected])
Lawrence J. Zweifach (+1 212-351-2625, [email protected])

Denver
Robert C. Blume (+1 303-298-5758, [email protected])

Dallas
Veronica S. Lewis (+1 214-698-3320, [email protected])
Brian Robison (+1 214-698-3370, [email protected])
Robert C. Walters (+1 214-698-3114, [email protected])

San Francisco
Gary R. Spratling (+1 415-393-8222, [email protected])
Joel S. Sanders (+1 415-393-8268, [email protected])
Trey Nicoud (+1 415-393-8308, [email protected])
Rachel S. Brass (+1 415-393-8293, [email protected])

Los Angeles
Daniel G. Swanson (+1 213-229-7430, [email protected])
Samuel G. Liversidge (+1 213-229-7420, [email protected])
Rod J. Stone (+1 213-229-7256, [email protected])
Steven E. Sletten (+1 213-229-7505, [email protected])
Jay P. Srinivasan (+1 213-229-7296, [email protected])
Sarretta C. McDonough (+1 213-229-7227, [email protected])

Brussels
David Wood (+32 2 554 72 10, [email protected])
Peter Alexiadis (+32 2 554 72 00, [email protected])
Andrés Font Galarza (+32 2 554 72 30, [email protected])
Jens-Olrik Murach (+32 2 554 72 40, [email protected])

London
Ali Nikpay (+44 20 7071 4273, [email protected])
Philip Rocher (+44 20 7071 4202, [email protected])
Charles Falconer (+44 20 7071 4270, [email protected])
Patrick Doris (+44 20 7071 4276, [email protected])
Deirdre Taylor (+44 20 7071 4274, [email protected])

Munich
Michael Walther (+49 89 189 33-180, [email protected])
Benno Schwarz (+49 89 189 33 110, [email protected])
Kai Gesing (+49 89 189 33 180, [email protected])

Hong Kong
Sébastien Evrard (+852 2214 3798, [email protected])
Kelly Austin (+852 2214 3788, [email protected])

© 2016 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.