Orange County partner John M. Williams III and associate Theodore Kim are the authors of "Where Have All the Deals Gone?" [PDF] published in the March 2009 issue of the Orange County Business Journal.
Orange County partner John M. Williams III and associate Theodore Kim are the authors of "Where Have All the Deals Gone?" [PDF] published in the March 2009 issue of the Orange County Business Journal.
On November 14, 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, issued final regulations governing CFIUS. This follows Treasury's issuance of proposed regulations on April 21, 2008. The period for public comment ended on June 9, 2008.
Background
The final regulations implement Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ("FINSA"). Section 721, as amended by FINSA, authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit transactions, by or with any foreign person, that may result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person ("covered transactions") and that threaten to impair national security. Covered transactions are reviewed by CFIUS, an interagency body created by executive order and chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. CFIUS includes representatives from a number of U.S. Government departments and agencies, including, but not limited to, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, Defense, Commerce, Justice, Energy, Labor, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and intelligence agencies under the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence.
FINSA anticipates that, for each transaction before CFIUS, the Department of the Treasury will appoint a lead agency. The lead agency, acting on CFIUS's behalf, may negotiate, enter into, and enforce mitigation agreements or conditions with parties to covered transactions that pose a threat to national security.
The Final Regulations
The final regulations, which make some significant changes to the proposed and current regulations, retain many of the basic features of the current regulations, which have been in effect since 1991. The final regulations continue to be based on voluntary notices to CFIUS by parties to covered transactions, although CFIUS is authorized to review transactions that have not been voluntarily notified. One of the principal new developments regarding the procedures for filing notices with CFIUS is that the final regulations make explicit CFIUS's current practice of encouraging parties to contact and engage with CFIUS prior to making a formal filing. Pre-filing consultations are important because they provide CFIUS an opportunity to aid parties in preparing notices and to ensure efficient reviews.
The information required in a voluntary notice has been formally expanded to incorporate requirements to provide information that CFIUS now routinely seeks from notifying parties. For instance, the final regulations require parties submitting a voluntary notice to provide personal identifier information, which CFIUS uses to examine the backgrounds of members of the boards of directors and senior company officials of entities in the ownership chain of foreign acquirers. The final regulations also require a notifying party to provide information regarding the ultimate and intermediate parents of the foreign person making the acquisition and other persons with a role in the transaction. Under the final regulations, each party to a notified transaction must certify the accuracy and completeness of its voluntary notice as to information about the party making the certification, the transaction, and all follow-up information. A voluntary notice will not be deemed complete without this certification from the notifying party.
The procedure for CFIUS reviews and investigations remains similar to those that were in place under the old regulatory scheme. Many changes are definitional. The impact of these changes, however, cannot be understated. For example, the final regulations authorize CFIUS to review any "merger, acquisition, or takeover," § 800.224, "by or with any foreign person, which could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person," § 800.207, to determine its potential impact on national security. "Control" is defined as the "power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity[.]" § 800.204(a). This broad definition, which eschews any bright-line test, has the potential to encompass a wide-range of transactions and creates potential unpredictability for foreign entities interested in investing in U.S. companies.
The final regulations also provide new definitions for the parties to covered transactions. For instance, a "foreign person" is "[a]ny foreign national, foreign government, or foreign entity" or "[a]ny entity over which control is exercised or exercisable by a foreign national, foreign government, or foreign entity." § 800.216. A "U.S. business" is defined as "any entity, irrespective of the nationality of the person that controls it, engaged in interstate commerce in the United States, but only to the extent of its activities in interstate commerce." § 800.226. Under the new definitions, it is possible for a party to be both a "foreign person" and a "U.S. business."
The final regulations amend the proposed text of § 800.601 to delete the description of circumstances in which CFIUS may reopen a review of a covered transaction on which CFIUS previously had concluded all action. Pursuant to Executive Order 11858 of May 7, 1975, which was amended by Executive Order 13456 on January 23, 2008, CFIUS may reopen a review of a covered transaction on which CFIUS previously had concluded all action only in the extraordinary circumstances authorized under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. These circumstances include when a party has submitted false or misleading material information to CFIUS, omitted material information from CFIUS, or intentionally materially breached a mitigation agreement.
FINSA continues to govern CFIUS's reporting to Congress. FINSA requires that a senior-level official of the Department of the Treasury and of the lead agency certify to Congress, for all covered transactions on which CFIUS has concluded action under Section 721, that CFIUS has concluded that there are no unresolved national security concerns. FINSA also requires that CFIUS provide Congress with annual reports on its work, including a list of the transactions it has reviewed or investigated in the preceding year, analysis related to foreign direct investment and critical technologies, and a report on foreign direct investment from certain countries.
The finalized regulations will become effective thirty days after their publication in the Federal Register. § 800.210. Guidance regarding the types of transactions that CFIUS has reviewed and that have presented national security concerns will be published soon in the Federal Register.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. Please contact the Gibson Dunn attorney with whom you work, or any of the following:
International Trade Regulation and Compliance Practice Group
Daniel J. Plaine (202-955-8286, dplaine@gibsondunn.com)
Judith A. Lee (202-887-3591, jalee@gibsondunn.com)
Jim Slear (202-955-8578, jslear@gibsondunn.com)
Andrea Farr (202-955-8680, afarr@gibsondunn.com)
Patrick F. Speice, Jr. (202-887-3776, pspeicejr@gibsondunn.com)
Dave M.Wharwood (202-887-3579, dwharwood@gibsondunn.com)
Public Policy Practice Group
Mel Levine (310-557-8098, mlevine@gibsondunn.com)
Alan Platt (202-887-3660, aplatt@gibsondunn.com)
Government and Commercial Contracts Practice Group
Joseph D. West (202-955-8658, jwest@gibsondunn.com)
Christyne K. Brennan (202-955-8685, cbrennan@gibsondunn.com)
© 2008 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
Washington, D.C. partner Stephanie Tsacoumis was featured in "Top Washington Lawyers - Corporate M&A" [PDF] published in the September 19-25, 2008 issue of Washington Business Journal.
A few days ago, the German legislature adopted the Risk Limitation Act (Risikobegrenzungsgesetz, the "Act") aimed at the limitation of perceived risks deriving from financial investors. Following the notorious "locust debate" in Germany, the new law is the result of the still ongoing discussions about the impact of foreign hedge funds and private equity investors. It provides for a number of amendments to securities law and corporate law applicable to domestic and international investors in public companies. The Act is scheduled to be formally announced later this summer or fall.
Acting in Concert
The Act will modify the existing rules on "acting in concert", i.e., the rules under which the shareholdings of investors forming a "group" must be aggregated. This is relevant in two areas, namely (i) the reporting thresholds for shareholdings in German listed companies and (ii) the rules on public offers:
When several shareholders are found to be "acting in concert", their shareholdings are mutually attributed; therefore, each of them is subject to notification and offer duties if the aggregate of their shareholdings reaches, exceeds or falls short of one of the above thresholds. Until now, the Federal Supreme Court held that only investors who coordinate their voting within the general meetings of the company were acting in concert.
The Act will broaden the scope of the rules on acting in concert. The new rules will also apply to cooperating in a way that aims at a steady and substantial change of the strategic orientation (unternehmerische Ausrichtung) of the company. Thus, the scope of application will no longer be limited to coordination with regard to the exercise of voting rights, but will also include cooperation on the level of the supervisory board or even outside any corporate bodies, provided that the investors concerned intend to steadily and substantially change the business of the company. Fortunately, the German legislature abstained from further extensions of the rules: Pursuant to initial draft bills of the Act, the mere cooperation of investors with respect to the acquisition of shares would have been considered acting in concert, too. What is more, it would have been sufficient if the coordination referred to an individual case or had an either steady or substantial influence on the business of the company. The German legislature changed its opinion after harsh criticism from legal scholars and international investors.
As a result, the impact of the changes will be limited. For example, investors will generally still be able to initiate public takeovers by agreeing on standstill agreements with shareholders or accepting irrevocable undertakings from them. Until German courts begin to interpret the new rules, however, there will be legal uncertainty for some time about what shareholders may agree on regarding the business and strategy of the company without triggering a mutual attribution of voting rights.
Aggregation of Voting Shares and other Securities giving the Right to Acquire Shares
Holders of marketable securities giving the right to acquire voting shares (e.g., marketable call options) have similar notification duties if their securities refer to a shareholding which reaches, exceeds or falls short of the above thresholds (except for the 3% threshold). Under the current rules, the positions in voting shares and other financial instruments are not aggregated. Presently, an investor who acquires (i) up to 2.99% of voting shares of the company and (ii) other securities giving the right to acquire up to 4.99% of the voting shares does not need to make any notification.
The Act provides for the aggregation of these two positions with the effect that in the above example, the investor will be obligated to report the excess of the 3% and the 5% threshold. Nonetheless, the 3% threshold will still be irrelevant for an investor who only holds marketable securities other than voting shares.
Extension of Sanctions in Case of Violation of Notification Duties
In the past, non-compliance with the aforementioned notification requirements, apart from the risk of administrative fines, has only led to a suspension of the shareholder rights (in particular, voting rights and rights to dividends) until the missing or wrongful notification was made or corrected. Hence, verifying compliance with the notification duties immediately prior to a general meeting was sufficient to avoid any impact on these rights. Under the Act, the suspension of shareholder rights would only be lifted six months after the late or corrected notification, provided the violation (i) was due to gross negligence or intent and (ii) reached a certain degree of non-compliance: If the investor did not completely fail to make a required notification and the deviation of the notified shareholding from the actual shareholding was less than 10% of the actual shareholding, the six months period will not apply.
New Disclosure Duties Relating to Significant Shareholdings
Further, the Act will implement new disclosure duties for investors holding at least 10% of the voting rights in a German listed company. Such significant shareholders will be required to disclose to the company their intentions with respect to the shares and the origin of the funds used to purchase the shares. These duties (as well as the existing notification duties) will not only apply to direct shareholders but also to investors to which the shares of third parties are attributed due to certain circumstances. Examples of such attribution are: (i) controlling influence over the direct shareholder, (ii) holding shares of a third party in trust without further instructions of the third party with regard to the exercise of voting rights, and (iii) acting in concert (see above). The new disclosure duties also apply to investors who already hold 10% or more of the voting rights in a German listed company once they reach or exceed another threshold.
These significant shareholders will be required to disclose their intentions with respect to the shares and the origin of the funds within 20 trading days unless the articles of association of the company waive such duty. Significant shareholders must also disclose all changes to their intentions.
With regard to its intentions each requested investor will be required to disclose whether:
When disclosing the origin of the funds, the investor will be obliged to indicate whether and to what extent it has used equity or debt.
The company will be required to publish (i) the information received from the investor or (ii), if applicable, non-compliance of the investor with the disclosure duties. The Act does not provide for any additional consequences in case of non-compliance and the above mentioned suspension of shareholder rights will not apply. Please note, however, that non-compliance with these duties may, under certain circumstances, violate the prohibitions on market manipulation and insider trading.
Further Amendments by the Act
The Act also stipulates that under certain circumstances, the shareholder rights attached to registered shares (Namensaktien) - irrespective of any listing - will be suspended as long as the shareholder has not yet effected its registration in the share register of the company. The registration of an agent or street holder instead of the shareholder will be subject to restrictions in the company's articles of association. Up to now, the registration of the actual shareholder has not been enforceable and the registration of an agent has not had any adverse consequences.
Moreover, pursuant to the Act, German companies - irrespective of any listing - with more than 100 employees will be obligated to notify the employees' representation (either the works council (Betriebsrat) or the economic committee (Wirtschaftsausschuss)) of a contemplated takeover offer by a third party.
Finally, the Act will increase the rights of borrowers with respect to the sale and assignment of credit portfolios by banks to investors. The German parliament included these changes following complaints from home owners who were confronted with (mostly Anglo-Saxon) distressed debt investors.
Transitional Provisions
Most provisions of the Act will enter into force immediately following the formal announcement in the Federal Gazette; the remaining provisions will become effective approximately six months after the announcement.
Contrary to initial draft bills, the Act now contains transitional provisions. Investors who would become subject to notification duties only because of the change in the law on the effective date of the Act will not need to make any notifications. The new, tightened sanctions will apply, however, if such investors have not complied with their notification duties as in effect prior to the Act becoming effective.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. Please contact the Gibson Dunn attorney with whom you work or Philip Martinius (+49 89 189 33-121, pmartinius@gibsondunn.com), Jan Querfurth (+49 89 189 33-121, jquerfurth@gibsondunn.com) or Markus Nauheim (+49 89 189 33-122, mnauheim@gibsondunn.com) in the firm's Munich office.
© 2008 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
In the past two months, the Delaware courts have decided two cases addressing the scope of advance notice bylaws, in both cases holding that stockholders did not have to comply with the companies’ advance notice provisions in order to nominate directors. Advance notice bylaw provisions require a stockholder who wants to propose nominations or have other business considered at a meeting of stockholders to submit information to the company about the nominations or business by a specified date prior to the meeting. These provisions implicate the complex interaction of state corporate law and federal securities laws, serving the important objective of providing adequate notice of matters that a stockholder intends to present at a meeting so that a company and its other stockholders have a fair opportunity to evaluate all the matters to be voted upon and the company can address those matters in its own proxy statement.
In addition to the recent Delaware court decisions, a number of other significant developments highlight the need for companies to review their advance notice bylaws to assess whether they are appropriately drafted to minimize any potential ambiguity and clearly outline the processes that stockholders must follow and the information they must provide when proposing director nominations or other business.
Recent Case Law Developments Affecting Advance Notice Bylaws
On March 13, 2008, in JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc.,[1] the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the advance notice provision in the bylaws of CNET Networks, Inc. applied only to matters that stockholders seek to include in company proxy statements pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 14a-8 stockholder proposal process. The bylaw at issue contained the same timing and stock ownership requirements as Rule 14a-8, and stated that proposals had to comply with the federal securities laws establishing the requirements for proposals required to be included in the company’s proxy statement, but the bylaw was not expressly limited to proposals submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Instead of addressing whether the ownership, timing and other conditions set forth in the bylaw were enforceable, the court held that the bylaw did not apply to nominations or other business that stockholders might seek to put forth in their own proxy materials. As a result, the Court further held that the plaintiff stockholder did not need to comply with the requirements of the advance notice bylaw in order to nominate directors or propose other business at CNET’s annual meeting. On May 13, 2008, in a one-page memorandum decision, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decision.[2]
In April 2008, in Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc.,[3] the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled that a stockholder of Office Depot, Inc. who failed to comply with the company’s advance notice bylaw nevertheless could nominate a short slate of two directors at the annual meeting. Office Depot’s bylaws contained a provision stating that to be properly brought before an annual meeting, business must be specified in the company’s notice of meeting, otherwise properly brought before the meeting by or at the direction of the Board, or properly brought before the meeting by a stockholder who complied with the advance notice provisions in the bylaws. The bylaw did not otherwise expressly address director nominations. The Court first rejected the argument that the advance notice bylaw did not apply to director nominations because the bylaw referred only to “business” and concluded that the term “business” was sufficiently broad to encompass director nominations. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied in part on the language of Section 211(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which states that “an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors” and that “[a]ny other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting.” However, the Court then ruled that the plaintiff stockholder did not need to comply with the advance notice bylaw because the company’s notice of meeting included with its proxy statement indicated that director elections would be an item of business at the annual meeting.
Other Recent Developments Affecting Advance Notice Bylaws
The CNET and Office Depot decisions are but two recent developments affecting advance notice bylaw provisions. Other recent developments include:
In considering the appropriate time frames for inclusion in an advance notice bylaw, companies should bear in mind that Delaware courts generally have upheld the validity of advance notice bylaws, except in egregious circumstances (for example, in situations where a company provides notice of a meeting after the advance notice deadline has already passed). Typically, time frames range from 45 to 120 days.[4] A different deadline, tied to the public announcement of the meeting, generally applies when a company moves its annual meeting date more than a certain number of days (typically, more than 30 days) from the anniversary of the prior year’s meeting. In CNET, the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that the fact that CNET’s advance notice bylaw provision tied the deadlines to the mailing date of the company’s prior-year proxy statement suggested that the bylaw was designed to govern stockholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 rather than to operate as an advance notice bylaw. In light of this, it may be preferable for advance notice bylaws to require notice to the company by a specified deadline before the anniversary date of the prior year’s annual meeting.
In addition, many companies over the past several years have adopted bylaw provisions that provide for majority voting in uncontested elections of directors, while plurality voting continues to apply in contested elections. Majority voting bylaw provisions typically have a cut-off date for determining whether an election is contested or not. Cut-off dates vary, with many companies using the record date or a specified number of days before the filing or printing of the proxy statement. A company’s advance notice bylaw should include deadlines that precede, or fall on the same date as, the deadline for determining whether an election will be contested or uncontested. That way, the company will have notice of any nominations that stockholders timely submitted through the advance notice process before the company must determine whether or not an election will be contested.
What Companies Should Do Now
Both the CNET and Office Depot cases illustrate that Delaware courts will construe ambiguous advance notice bylaws in a manner favoring stockholders’ ability to make nominations and introduce matters at an annual meeting. Accordingly, companies should review their bylaws in light of the considerations outlined below. Specifically, companies should:
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[4] According to sharkrepellent.net, as of April 30, 2008, approximately 60% of S&P 500 companies and approximately 47% of S&P 1500 companies used deadlines of at least 90 days.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance Practice Group and its Mergers and Acquisitions Practice Group are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. Please contact the Gibson Dunn attorney with whom you work, or any of the following:
John F. Olson (202-955-8522, jolson@gibsondunn.com),
Brian J. Lane (202-887-3646, blane@gibsondunn.com),
Ronald O. Mueller (202-955-8671, rmueller@gibsondunn.com),
Amy L. Goodman (202-955-8653, agoodman@gibsondunn.com),
Dennis J. Friedman (212-351-3900, dfriedman@gibsondunn.com),
Jonathan K. Layne (310-552-8641, jlayne@gibsondunn.com),
David M. Hernand (310-552-8559, dhernand@gibsondunn.com),
Eduardo Gallardo (212-351-3847, egallardo@gibsondunn.com) or
Gillian McPhee (202-955-8230, gmcphee@gibsondunn.com).
© 2008 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.
Munich office lawyers Birgit Friedl and Marcus Geiss are the authors of "German Aspects of Acquisition Financing" [PDF] which appears in Financial Yearbook Germany 2008. Reprinted by permission.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP's Health Care and Life Sciences Group is pleased to announce its representation of Apria Healthcare Group Inc. in connection with its acquisition of Coram, Inc., a provider of home infusion and specialty pharmaceutical services. The cash transaction is valued at $350 million. The combined infusion division, to be headquartered in Denver, Colorado, will provide care for more than 100,000 patients annually in all 50 states. Gibson Dunn's team is led by Andrew Bogen, a partner in the firm's Corporate Transactions Practice Group, and Jeffrey Le Sage, a partner in the firm's Corporate Transactions and Health Care and Life Sciences Practice Groups, and includes Scott Davies, Candice Choh, Robyn Zolman, Kristin Blazewicz and Hari Raman on corporate, Jeff Hudson and Scott Jacobs on finance, Dora Arash on tax, Sean Feller on benefits, Sam Newman on bankruptcy and Sean Royall, Sandy Pfunder and Adam Di Vincenzo on antitrust. Details of this transaction are available on the Apria Healthcare website.
Gibson Dunn's Health Care and Life Sciences Group represents a broad array of companies involved in health care and the life sciences, including hospital and nursing home operators, pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers, payors, and biotechnology companies, as well as investors in and advisors to such companies. Our corporate and transactional lawyers assist clients in connection with domestic and international public and private mergers and acquisitions, financings, securities offerings, corporate governance, licensing, development and distributorship arrangements, among other transactions.
For additional information on this matter, please contact the Gibson Dunn attorney with whom you work, Jeffrey Le Sage (213-229-7504, jlesage@gibsondunn.com) in Gibson Dunn's Los Angeles office, or any member of the firm's Health Care and Life Sciences Practice Group.
© 2007 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP's Media & Entertainment Group is pleased to announce its representation of Vivendi in connection with the proposed combination of the businesses of Vivendi Games and Activision which will create Activision Blizzard, which will be the largest pure-play video game publisher. The transaction is valued at $18.9 billion. Upon consummation of the transaction, Vivendi will hold a 52% ownership interest in the combined business, which percentage could increase to as much as 68% depending on the results of a post-closing self-tender offer by Activision Blizzard.
The management of both companies hosted a joint conference call and live webcast on Monday, December 3, 2007. An audio replay of the call will be available through December 17, 2007 by calling (888) 203-1112 in the U.S. or (719) 457-0820 outside the U.S. and entering the pass-code: 5648597. In addition, a webcast replay also will be archived on the Investor Relations section of each company's website. Gibson Dunn's team is led by Ruth Fisher, Co-Chair of the firm's Media & Entertainment Practice Group, and includes Mark Lahive, Mary Ruth Hughes, Kristin Blazewicz and Ciara Stephens for corporate, Hatef Behnia and Afshin Beyzaee for tax, Ron Ben-Yehuda for intellectual property, Sean Feller for employment and employee benefits, and Sandy Pfunder, Joel Sanders and Rebecca Justice Lazarus for antitrust. Details of this transaction are available on the Vivendi website.Gibson Dunn's Media & Entertainment Group comprises talented lawyers across our firm and practice areas who are among the most highly regarded in the converging media, entertainment and technology industries, offering a single "new media" platform that is unmatched in depth and scope among large law firms.
For additional information on this matter, please contact the Gibson Dunn attorney with whom you work, Ruth Fisher (310-557-8057, rfisher@gibsondunn.com) or Mark Lahive (310-552-8580, mlahive@gibsondunn.com) in Gibson Dunn's Century City office, or any member of the firm's Media & Entertainment Practice Group.
© 2007 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.Century City Partner Jonathan K. Layne and Associate Ari B. Lanin are authors of "Cashing out company stock options in M&A transactions" [PDF] in the December 2007 issue of Financier Worldwide.
Brussels Partner Peter Alexiadis & Associate Vassili Moussis, are authors of "Studying Schneider," [PDF] published in the October 2007 issue of the European Lawyer.
This article appeared in issue 72 of the European Lawyer magazine www.europeanlawyer.co.uk.
Paris Partner Sophie Resplandy-Bernard is the author of "LBO - Le Leveraged Buy Out, une pratique en constante évolution" [PDF--the article is in French, the title roughly translates as: "Leveraged Buy-Outs, A Practice in Constant Evolution"] published in Target Carrières Juridiques 2008.
Reprinted with permission of Target Carrières Juridiques 2008. These articles are also available on www.target-carrieres.fr
The Ritz-Carlton, McLean, VA OVERVIEW: This briefing included a comprehensive review of pressing market, diligence and tactical decisions required to complete a transaction. Topics discussed include:
Munich Partner Michael Walther and Associate Ulrich Baumgartner are authors of "Joint venture review under the new EC Merger Regulation" [PDF] published in the The European Antitrust Review 2007.
Munich Partner Philip Martinius is the author of "Stapled Financing - Ein US-Import mit Zukunft?" [PDF in German] in the February 2006 issue of Going Public on the possibility of stapled financing becoming the new trend in M&A and private equity activities in Germany, pointing out strength and weaknesses, opportunities and threats for sellers, buyers and banks.