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June 14, 2018 |
Revisions to the FFIEC BSA/AML Manual to Include the New CDD Regulation

Click for PDF On May 11, 2018, the federal bank regulators and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published two new chapters of the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual (“BSA/AML Manual”) to reflect changes made by FinCEN to the CDD regulation.[1]  One of the chapters replaces the current chapter “Customer Due Diligence – Overview and Examination Procedures” (“CDD Chapter”), and the other chapter is entirely new and contains an overview of and examination procedures for “Beneficial Ownership for Legal Entity Customers” to reflect the beneficial ownership requirements of the CDD regulation (“Beneficial Ownership Chapter”).[2] The new CDD Chapter builds upon the previous chapter, adds the requirements of the CDD regulation, and otherwise updates the chapter, which had not been revised since 2007.  The Beneficial Ownership Chapter largely repeats what is in the CDD Rule.  Both new chapters reference the regulatory guidance and clarifications from the Frequently Asked Questions issued by FinCEN on April 3, 2018 (the “FAQs”).[3]   Other Refinements to the CDD Regulation May Impact the BSA/AML Manual Implementation of the CDD regulation is a dynamic process and may require further refinement of these chapters as FinCEN issues further guidance.  For instance, in response to concerns of the banking industry, on May 16, 2018, FinCEN issued an administrative ruling imposing a 90-day moratorium on the requirement to recertify CDD information when certificates of deposit (“CDs”) are rolled over or loans renewed (if the CDs or loans were opened before May 11, 2018).  FinCEN will have further discussions with the banking industry and will make a decision whether to make this temporary exception permanent within this 90-day period (before August 9, 2018).[4] In his May 16, 2018, testimony at a House Financial Services Committee hearing on “Implementation of FinCEN’s Customer Due Diligence Rule,” FinCEN Director Kenneth Blanco suggested that FinCEN may be receptive to refinements as compliance experience is gained with the regulation.  Director Blanco also indicated that there will be a period of adjustment for compliance with the regulation and that FinCEN and the regulators will not engage in “gotcha” enforcement, but are seeking “good faith compliance.” Highlights from the New Chapters Periodic Reviews:  The BSA/AML Manual no longer expressly requires periodic CDD reviews, but suggests that regulators may still expect periodic reviews for higher risk customers.  The language in the previous CDD Chapter requiring periodic CDD refresh reviews has been eliminated.[5]Consistent with FAQ 14, the new CDD Chapter states that updating CDD information will be event driven and provides a list of possible event triggers, such as red flags identified through suspicious activity monitoring or receipt of a criminal subpoena.  Nevertheless, the CDD Chapter does not completely eliminate the expectation of periodic reviews for higher risk clients, stating:  “Information provided by higher profile customers and their transactions should be reviewed . . . more frequently throughout the term of the relationship with the bank.”Although this appears to be a relaxation of the expectation to conduct periodic reviews, we expect many banks will not change their current practices.  For a number of years, in addition to event driven reviews, many banks have conducted periodic CDD reviews at risk based intervals because they have understood periodic reviews to be a regulatory expectation. Lower Beneficial Ownership Thresholds:  Somewhat surprisingly, there is no expression in the new chapters that consideration should be given to obtaining beneficial ownership at a lower threshold than 25% for certain high risk business lines or customer types.  The new Beneficial Ownership Chapter simply repeats the regulatory requirement stating that:  “The beneficial ownership rule requires banks to collect beneficial ownership information at the 25 percent ownership threshold regardless of the customer’s risk profile.”  The FAQs (FAQ 6 and 7) refer to the fact that a financial institution may “choose” to apply a lower threshold and “there may be circumstances where a financial institution may determine a lower threshold may be warranted.”  We understand that specifying an expectation that there should be lower beneficial thresholds for certain higher risk customers was an issue that was debated among FinCEN and the bank regulators.For a number of years, many banks have obtained beneficial ownership at lower than 25% thresholds for high risk business lines and customers (e.g., private banking for non-resident aliens).  Banks that have previously applied a lower threshold, however, should carefully evaluate any decision to raise thresholds to the 25% level in the regulation.  If a bank currently applies a lower threshold, raising the threshold may attract regulatory scrutiny about whether the move was justified from a risk standpoint.  Moreover, a risk-based program should address not only regulatory risk, but also money laundering risk.  Therefore, banks should consider reviewing beneficial ownership at lower thresholds for certain customers and business lines and when a legal entity customer has an unusually complex or opaque ownership structure for the type of customer regardless of the business line or risk rating of the customer. New Accounts:  The new chapters do not discuss one of the most controversial and challenging requirements of the CDD rule, the requirement to verify CDD information when a customer previously subject to CDD opens a new account, including when CDs are rolled over or loans renewed.  This most likely may be because application of the requirement to CD rollovers and loan renewals is still under consideration by FinCEN, as discussed above. Enhanced Due Diligence:  The requirement to maintain enhanced due diligence (“EDD”) policies, procedures, and processes for higher risk customers remains with no new suggested categories of customers that should be subject to EDD. Risk Rating:  The new CDD Chapter seems to articulate an expectation to risk rate customers:  “The bank should have an understanding of the money laundering and terrorist financing risk of its customers, referred to in the rule as the customer risk profile.  This concept is also commonly referred to as the customer risk rating.”  The CDD Chapter, therefore, could be read as expressing for banks an expectation that goes beyond FinCEN’s expectation for all covered financial institutions in FAQ 35, which states that a customer profile “may, but need not, include a system of risk ratings or categories of customers.”  It appears that banks that do not currently risk rate customers should consider doing so.  Since the CDD section was first drafted in 2006 and amended in 2007, customer risk rating based on an established method with weighted risk factors has become a best and almost universal practice for banks to facilitate the AML risk assessment, CDD/EDD, and the identification of suspicious activity. Enterprise-Wide CDD:  The new CDD Chapter recognizes the CDD approach of many complex organizations that have CDD requirements and functions that cross financial institution legal entities and the general enterprise-wide approach to BSA/AML long referenced in the BSA/AML Manual.  See BSA/AML Manual, BSA/AML Compliance Program Structures Overview, at p. 155.  The CDD Chapter states that a bank “may choose to implement CDD policies, procedures and processes on an enterprise-wide basis to the extent permitted by law sharing across business lines, legal entities, and with affiliate support units.” Conclusion Despite the CDD regulation, at its core CDD compliance is still risk based and regulatory risk remains a concern.  Every bank must carefully and continually review its CDD program against the regulatory requirements and expectations articulated in the BSA/AML Manual, as well as recent regulatory enforcement actions, the institution’s past examination and independent and compliance testing issues, and best practices of peer institutions.  This review will help anticipate whether there are aspects of its CDD/EDD program that could be subject to criticism in the examination process.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently recognized, detailed manuals issued by agencies with enforcement authority like the BSA/AML Manual “can put regulated banks on notice of expected conduct.”  California Pacific Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 885 F.3d 560, 572 (9th Cir. 2018).  The BSA/AML Manual is an important and welcome roadmap although not always as up to date, clear or detailed as banks would like it to be. These were the first revisions to the BSA/AML Manual since 2014.  We understand that additional revisions to other chapters are under consideration.    [1]   May 11, 2018 also was the compliance date for the CDD regulations.  The Notice of Final Rulemaking for the CDD regulation, which was published on May 11, 2016, provided a two-year implementation period.  81 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016).  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf. For banks, the new regulation is set forth in the BSA regulations at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230 (beneficial ownership requirements) and 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210(a)(5).    [2]   The new chapters can be found at: https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pdf/Customer%20Due%20Diligence%20-%20Overview%20and%20Exam%20Procedures-FINAL.pdfw  (CDD Chapter) and https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pdf/Beneficial%20Ownership%20Requirements%20for %20Legal%20Entity%20CustomersOverview-FINAL.pdf (Beneficial Ownership Chapter).    [3]   Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, FIN-2018-G001.  https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-customer-due-0.  On April 23, 2018, Gibson Dunn published a client alert on these FAQs.  FinCEN Issues FAQs on Customer Due Diligence Regulation.  https://www.gibsondunn.com/fincen-issues-faqs-on-customer-due-diligence-regulation/. FinCEN also issued FAQs on the regulation on September 29, 2017. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2016-09/FAQs_for_CDD_Final_Rule_%287_15_16%29.pdf.    [4]   Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity Customers of Certain Financial Products and Services with Automatic Rollovers or Renewals, FIN-2018-R002.  https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2018-05/FinCEN%20Ruling%20CD%20and%20Loan%20Rollover%20Relief_FINAL%20508-revised.pdf    [5]   The BSA/AML Manual previously stated at p. 57:  “CDD processes should include periodic risk-based monitoring of the customer relationship to determine if there are substantive changes to the original CDD information. . . .” Gibson Dunn’s lawyers  are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments.  Please contact any member of the Gibson Dunn team, the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work in the firm’s Financial Institutions practice group, or the authors: Stephanie L. Brooker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3502, sbrooker@gibsondunn.com) M. Kendall Day – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8220, kday@gibsondunn.com) Arthur S. Long – New York (+1 212-351-2426, along@gibsondunn.com) Linda Noonan – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3595, lnoonan@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

June 11, 2018 |
Supreme Court Rejects Tolling Of Statute Of Limitations For Successive Class Actions

Click for PDF China Agritech Inc. v. Resh, No. 17-432 Decided June 11, 2018 Today, the Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action does not toll the statute of limitations for putative class members to file their own class actions. That means that if class certification is denied, putative class members cannot file successive class actions after the statute of limitations has expired. Background: Stockholders filed two timely class actions against China Agritech, Inc. alleging that the company violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  After class certification was denied in both actions, stockholders filed a third class action, well outside the two-year limitations period.  They argued that their claims were timely because the limitations period was tolled while the earlier class actions were pending. Issue: Whether previously absent class members may bring a class action outside the applicable limitations period on the theory that the pendency of a previous class action (in which the court ultimately denied class certification) tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of earlier class actions. Court’s Holding: No. Previously absent class members may not bring successive (also called “stacked”) class actions outside the limitations period. “The ‘efficiency and economy of litigation’ that support tolling individual claims, . . . do not support maintenance of untimely successive class actions; any additional class filings should be made early on, soon after the commencement of the first action seeking class certification.” Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court Gibson Dunn filed amicus briefs arguing against tolling for successive class actions for the Chamber of Commerce, Retail Litigation Center, and the American Tort Reform Association What It Means: The Court declined to extend the equitable tolling rule established in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), which permits putative class members to wait for a decision on class certification before filing an individual claim or intervening in the original lawsuit.  The Court held that the American Pipe rule does not toll the statute of limitations for putative class members to file class actions, so all class claims must be filed within the limitations period. The ruling ensures that when class certification is denied, a new plaintiff cannot revive otherwise expired claims by filing the case as a class action.  The Court explained that the decision about whether to certify a class should be made at the outset of the case for all would-be class representatives, and class members should not be able to extend the statute of limitations indefinitely by filing successive class actions each time class certification is denied. The Court made clear that its ruling applies regardless of the reason the court denied class certification in the first case. The Court stated that its ruling is not likely to lead to a dramatic increase in the number of protective class actions filed during the limitations period.  The majority of courts of appeals had already adopted the same rule, and those courts did not experience an increase in protective class action filings. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com Related Practice: Class Actions Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. +1 213.229.7804 tboutrous@gibsondunn.com Christopher Chorba +1 213.229.7396 cchorba@gibsondunn.com Theane Evangelis +1 213.229.7726 tevangelis@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

June 4, 2018 |
Supreme Court Holds That The Colorado Civil Rights Commission Violated Cake Baker’s Religious Freedom Rights

Click for PDF Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111 Decided June 4, 2018 The Supreme Court held 7-2 that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause when it rejected a baker’s religious justification for refusing to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. Background: Jack Phillips, a Christian baker, refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.  The couple then filed a discrimination complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  After investigating, the Commission concluded that Phillips had violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act and rejected his argument that providing the cake would violate his First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.  The Commission held formal public hearings about the case, during which some commissioners disparaged Phillips’ religious beliefs and suggested they were insincere. Issue: Whether the Commission’s decision violated the Free Speech Clause or Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Court’s Holding: Yes.  The Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause because it did not give “neutral and respectful consideration” to the sincere religious beliefs that motivated Phillips’ objection. What It Means: The Court resolved the case on narrow grounds, focusing on the Commission’s animus toward Phillips’ religious beliefs and avoiding broader questions regarding the scope of religious exemptions to facially neutral laws of general applicability. The Court articulated principles that should guide the resolution of similar cases in the future, recognizing that “religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression,” yet cautioning that “such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services.”  The Court emphasized that “gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.” State agencies, courts, and other tribunals responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination statutes must consider sincere religious beliefs in a tolerant, neutral, and respectful way, consistent with “the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.” Any future decision in favor of a business owner who refuses goods or services to a same-sex couple based on sincere religious beliefs must be “sufficiently constrained” to avoid imposing a “serious stigma on gay persons.” “[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

June 4, 2018 |
Gibson Dunn Adds Appellate Partner Allyson Ho to Dallas Office

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is pleased to announce that Allyson N. Ho has joined the firm in Dallas as a partner.  Formerly a partner with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, she will continue her appellate practice at Gibson Dunn. “We are delighted to have Allyson as our partner,” said Ken Doran, Chairman and Managing Partner of Gibson Dunn.  “We have one of the top appellate practices in the country.  Allyson is a nationally renowned appellate advocate.  She will add depth and versatility to our exceptional appellate bench, both in Texas and nationwide.  Moreover, she is a wonderful person and will be a fabulous culture fit.” “Allyson is a splendid addition to our Dallas office,” said Rob Walters, Partner in Charge of the Dallas office.  “We have known Allyson for years, and we can attest to her superb advocacy and professionalism.  With her successful track record before the U.S. Supreme Court and other tribunals, we know she’ll quickly step in to handle the high-stakes appellate cases that our clients entrust to us.  Allyson is the perfect lawyer to lead this essential practice.” “Gibson Dunn has long been the home of the most distinguished appellate practice in the nation,” said Ho.  “I am thrilled to join the firm and to continue my appellate practice with the finest lawyers in Texas and across the country.” About Allyson Ho Ho has presented over 50 oral arguments in federal and state appellate courts nationwide – including more arguments and wins in business cases before the U.S. Supreme Court than any Texas lawyer.  She has also appeared and prevailed in every federal court of appeals in the country, as well as in various state appellate courts nationwide.  In addition, Ho advises clients in high-stakes matters before government officials and agencies, including the U.S. Senate, the Texas Attorney General’s Office and other Texas state agencies. She joins the firm from Morgan Lewis where she served as co-chair of its appellate practice group.  During her career, she served as Special Assistant to President George W. Bush from 2005 to 2006, and as Counselor to the Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice from 2004 to 2005.  She is among the top ranked appellate lawyers in Texas in Chambers USA from 2015 to 2018. Ho received her law degree in 2000 from Chicago Law School, with high honors and as member of the Law Review and Order of the Coif.  She served as a clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Judge Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

June 1, 2018 |
Supreme Court Round-Up (June 1, 2018)

As the Supreme Court continues its 2017 Term, Gibson Dunn’s Supreme Court Round-Up is summarizing the issues presented in the cases on the Court’s docket and the opinions in the cases the Court has already decided.  The Court has finished hearing arguments this Term, and we are awaiting decisions in 29 cases.  Gibson Dunn presented 3 oral arguments this Term, in addition to being involved in 11 cases as counsel for amici curiae.  Additionally, to date, the Court has granted certiorari in 18 cases for the 2018 Term, and Gibson Dunn is counsel for the petitioner in one of those cases. Spearheaded by former Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson, the Supreme Court Round-Up keeps clients apprised of the Court’s most recent actions.  The Round-Up previews cases scheduled for argument, tracks the actions of the Office of the Solicitor General, and recaps recent opinions.  The Round-Up provides a concise, substantive analysis of the Court’s actions.  Its easy-to-use format allows the reader to identify what is on the Court’s docket at any given time, and to see what issues the Court will be taking up next.  The Round-Up is the ideal resource for busy practitioners seeking an in-depth, timely, and objective report on the Court’s actions. To view the Round-Up, click here. Gibson Dunn has a longstanding, high-profile presence before the Supreme Court of the United States, appearing numerous times in the past decade in a variety of cases. During the Supreme Court’s 5 most recent Terms, 9 different Gibson Dunn partners have presented oral argument; the firm has argued a total of 21 cases in the Supreme Court during that period, including closely watched cases with far-reaching significance in the class action, intellectual property, separation of powers, and First Amendment fields. Moreover, while the grant rate for certiorari petitions is below 1%, Gibson Dunn’s certiorari petitions have captured the Court’s attention: Gibson Dunn has persuaded the Court to grant 23 certiorari petitions since 2006. *   *   *  * Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following attorneys in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office, or any member of the Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group. Theodore B. Olson (+1 202.955.8500, tolson@gibsondunn.com) Amir C. Tayrani (+1 202.887.3692, atayrani@gibsondunn.com) Brandon L. Boxler (+1 202.955.8575, bboxler@gibsondunn.com) Rajiv Mohan (+1 202.955.8507, rmohan@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071 Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 31, 2018 |
California Supreme Court Spring 2018 Round-Up

Click for PDF Spearheaded by Daniel M. Kolkey, a former Associate Justice on the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, and former Counsel to the Governor of California, Gibson Dunn’s California Appellate Practice Group has prepared the attached California Supreme Court Spring 2018 Round-Up, which previews upcoming cases and summarizes select opinions issued by the Court.  This edition includes opinions handed down from September 2017 through April 2018, organized by subject.  Each entry contains a description of the case, as well as a substantive analysis of the Court’s decision.  The Round-Up provides a resource for busy practitioners seeking an in-depth, timely, and objective report on the California Supreme Court’s actions. To view the Round-Up, click here. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the California Supreme Court, or in state or federal appellate courts in California.  Please feel free to contact the following lawyers in California, or any member of the Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7000, tboutrous@gibsondunn.com) Daniel M. Kolkey – San Francisco (+1 415-393-8420, dkolkey@gibsondunn.com) Julian W. Poon – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7758, jpoon@gibsondunn.com) Theane Evangelis – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7726, tevangelis@gibsondunn.com) Kirsten Galler – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7681, kgaller@gibsondunn.com) Jennafer M. Tryck – Orange County (+1 949-451-4089, jtryck@gibsondunn.com) Michael Holecek – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7018, mholecek@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071 Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 30, 2018 |
Recent Developments Related to Regulation and Litigation Involving the Education Sector (May 2018)

Click for PDF This is the latest update of significant developments relating to regulatory, administrative, and legal actions involving schools.  This quarter saw the reinstatement of the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS), as well as three for-profit law schools turning the tables on their schools’ accreditor, the American Bar Association.  There were also significant developments on the political and regulatory fronts, not to mention a shifting landscape in federal enforcement.  Let’s jump into it. A.   ACICS Ruling and Reinstatement On March 23, 2018, a federal district court ordered the Department of Education (ED) to reconsider its decision terminating recognition of ACICS.  ACICS had submitted a petition for continued recognition to ED in January 2016.  In December 2016, President Obama’s ED Secretary terminated ACICS’s recognition, and ACICS challenged the decision in court.  In an April 29, 2017 filing, the Trump Administration supported the previous Administration’s termination decision. However, on March 23, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that ED failed to consider supplemental responses and additional evidence ACICS provided to ED in May 2016 at ED’s request.  The court held that in doing so, ED violated the Higher Education Act and its implementing regulations’ requirement that the ED Secretary consider all available relevant information, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that an agency must examine all relevant data.  ACICS v. DeVos, No. 16-2448 (RBW), 2018 WL 1461958, at *13, 17 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2018).  The court concluded that ED acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider this information.  Id. at *17. On remand, ED must reconsider the recognition petition ACICS submitted in January 2016 and must consider in the first instance the supplemental materials ACICS submitted in May 2016.  In the interim, Secretary DeVos restored ACICS’s status as a federally recognized accrediting agency effective December 12, 2016.  ACICS may file a written submission explaining the relevance of the May 2016 materials and include additional relevant evidence.  Secretary DeVos ordered that any written submission and exhibits should be filed with ED no later than May 30, 2018.  Because the court did not reach the merits of ACICS’s case, it is hard to know how ACICS will fare under this new review.  But it is fair to say that just the opportunity for a new review shows a seismic shift in the landscape from one Administration to the next. B.    Change in Enforcement Focus, Per the New York Times Two recent New York Times articles further highlight the differences in approach between the current and previous Administrations when it comes to enforcement relating to the sector.  In an article dated May 9, 2018, the Times reports that Mick Mulvaney, the interim director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), will move the agency’s student loan division into its consumer information unit.  A CFPB spokesman described the change as a “very modest organizational chart change,” but some officials believe it may dampen the agency’s zeal for an enforcement case it has been pursuing against the nation’s largest student loan collector, Navient.  Further signaling its desire to move away from examining student-lending issues, the CFPB also removed the topic “student loan servicing” from its bi-annual long-term regulatory agenda. In the second article dated May 13, 2018, the Times reports that a unit within ED that was tasked with investigating for-profit colleges, which previously included a dozen or so lawyers and investigators at the end of the Obama Administration, is now made up of three employees.  Its mandate has also shrunk.  Whereas the unit used to investigate such issues as advertising, recruitment practices, and job placement claims, the three-person team now focuses on processing student loan forgiveness applications and smaller compliance cases. C.    Litigation Outside of the political arena, there was activity this past quarter in both federal and state courts. 1.    InfiLaw Scores a Win in Florida and Sets Its Sights on the ABA InfiLaw was involved in a variety of litigation this past quarter, fighting back a False Claims Act case and filing multiple suits against the American Bar Association. First, on April 23, 2018, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed for a second time a False Claims Act lawsuit filed against InfiLaw Corp. and its now-closed law school, Charlotte School of Law.  U.S. ex rel. Bernier v. Infilaw Corp., No. 6:16-cv-970-Orl-37TBS, 2018 WL 1905342, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2018).  A former law professor turned qui tam relator, Barbara Bernier, “adopted the kitchen-sink approach” to pleading after the United States declined to intervene, according to the court.  She alleged the school had made improper “incentive payments to recruitment staff,” “admitted academically unqualified students,” “altered students grades,” “juked its employment stats” and “failed to implement a written plan to combat misuse of copyrighted works,” among other allegations.  Id. at *6, *8. The court held that the majority of these claims had been “publicly disclosed” online and elsewhere and therefore the relator could not proceed because she was not an “original source” of the allegations—i.e., she didn’t voluntary disclose this information to the Government before the public disclosures or demonstrate knowledge that materially adds to the public disclosures.  Id. at *7-8.  On the remaining claims, the court held that the relator had not provided sufficient specificity; she provided “just vague allegations that these incidents occurred and Defendants were responsible.”  Id. at *8. However, the court did give the relator leave to amend, and she filed an amended complaint on May 7, 2018.  We would not be surprised to see InfiLaw move to dismiss the complaint again. Second, Charlotte School of Law and its two sister schools, Florida Coastal School of Law and Arizona Summit Law School, turned to offense and filed three separate suits against their accreditor, the American Bar Association, alleging that the ABA’s findings of noncompliance with its accreditation standards “were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, [and] an abuse of discretion.”  In the accompanying press release for the Florida Coastal lawsuit, the school highlighted its diverse student body, and the president of Florida Coastal lamented that “[t]he ABA’s decisions in regard to accreditation seem to be calculated efforts to win political points, without regard for due process, or how students will be adversely affected.”  The ABA is yet to respond to these complaints. 2.    Two Lawsuits Relating to For-Profit Schools Two additional lawsuits were unsealed or filed this past quarter relating to for-profit schools.  First, in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, an ex-employee of lead generator EduTrek filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act against his former employer and a host of schools.  At its core, the lawsuit alleges that EduTrek and its clients violated ED’s incentive compensation ban.  The United States declined to intervene on February 16, 2018. Second, two former students filed a purported class action lawsuit against Capella University in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging the school “misled prospective and current students … about the time to completion and cost of their mostly student-loan financed doctoral degrees.”  Compl. ¶ 2, Wright v. Capella Education Co., No. 18-cv-1062 (D. Min. April 20, 2018).  The school has until July 9, 2018 to respond to the allegations. 3.    Don’t Forget About the Non-Profit Schools As has been the case for a while, and particularly this past quarter, there were a number of prominent investigations opened and lawsuits filed against traditional non-profit schools.  The Department of Justice (DOJ) garnered national news coverage of its decision to investigate at least seven elite colleges—Amherst College, Grinnell College, Middlebury College, Pomona College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, and Williams College—for possible antitrust issues.  The investigation reportedly seems to center on whether the schools improperly shared information among them to enforce the terms of their early-admissions programs. There was also a notable False Claims Act settlement with the University of North Texas.  According to DOJ’s press release, the school “agreed to pay the United States $13,073,000.00 to settle claims that it inaccurately measured, tracked and paid researchers for effort spent on certain NIH-sponsored research grants.” On top of those announcements, DOJ also announced on March 2, 2018 that it had indicted six former employees of the Chicago campus of the Center for Employment Training, a non-profit school, for an alleged “scheme[] to enroll fake students in classes as part of a conspiracy to swindle federal financial aid programs out of millions of dollars.” Twelve graduates of the landscape architecture program at Colorado State University have also sued their alma mater, alleging that the university should refund their tuition because the school failed to secure proper accreditation for the master’s degree program. Finally, Howard University confirmed on March 29, 2018 that the school had conducted an internal investigation and discovered that several employees of the university’s financial aid department awarded themselves grants, even though they had tuition remission, and thus received more money than “the total cost of attendance.” As we have been saying for some time, traditional schools are just as susceptible to the claims that have been made, particularly by the prior Administration, against the for-profit education sector.  We are continuing to see that proven true. 4.    Federal Actions Against Individuals The past quarter also saw two notable developments in cases brought by the federal government against individuals involved in the sector.  First, on April 16, 2018, DOJ announced that the owner of “a privately owned, non-accredited school” called Atius Technology Institute, which specialized “in information technology courses, pleaded guilty … to bribing a public official at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in exchange for the public official’s facilitation of over $2 million in payments that were supposed to be dedicated to providing vocational training for military veterans with service-connected disabilities.” Second, the case brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission against two executives of ITT Educational Services, Inc., appears headed to trial.  On March 23, 2018, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana largely denied the dueling summary judgment motions filed by the executives and the SEC.  The court set trial for July 9, 2018. 5.    State Level Litigation and Disputes On the state level, there continue to be battles about the proper scope of state authority.  On March 12, 2018, Secretary DeVos set forth the Trump Administration’s stance in an interpretive guidance, stating that the federal government has the exclusive power to regulate and oversee federal student loan servicers, and therefore any state regulations on the topic are preempted. Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, a superior court judge rejected a motion to dismiss filed by the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), one of the nation’s largest student loan servicers, in a case brought by the Massachusetts Attorney General, on the grounds that PHEAA is not protected by sovereign immunity, even though formed under the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  In that same case, DOJ had filed a statement of interest arguing that the Massachusetts Attorney General is precluded from suing PHEAA on preemption grounds.  Although this argument was not addressed in the court’s decision, the court stated during oral argument on the motion:  “[T]he preemption issue is not going to make the whole case go away.”  This stands seemingly in contrast to the guidance from Secretary DeVos. In California, Corinthian College students have seemingly taken the baton previously held by state attorneys general and filed a class action lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Secretary DeVos and ED.  The students filed suit in the Northern District of California in December 2017 and filed a first amended complaint on March 17, 2018.  The students allege that after Corinthian closed, ED promised the students complete loan forgiveness but then in December 2017 announced a plan to award only partial relief of student loan debt to borrowers using a formula based on students’ earnings.  The students argue that ED’s use of an earnings formula is “arbitrary and capricious” rulemaking that violates the Administrative Procedure Act.  On May 25, 2018, a magistrate judge issued a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of ED’s partial loan relief program, finding that by using records from the Social Security Administration to obtain students’ earnings, ED violated the federal Privacy Act.  A hearing to consider next steps, including the process for loan forgiveness, is scheduled for June 4. Finally, Ashford University and its holding company, Bridgepoint Education, scored a victory in Iowa.  The state’s approval agency had attempted to strike Ashford’s eligibility to receive post-9/11 GI Bill benefits after Ashford closed its physical location in Iowa.  Ashford sued to block the loss of eligibility, and the state court dismissed Ashford’s suit.  However, on April 26, 2018, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s decision, holding that the lower court judge should have disclosed that she has family ties to the state office of the attorney general.  Ashford can now resume its legal challenge to Iowa’s attempt to withdraw Ashford’s GI Bill eligibility. D.    Regulatory Activity There has been a lot of activity on the regulatory front.  On May 9, 2018, ED published its Spring 2018 Agency Rule List, including the following in its list of topics in the “Prerule” and “Proposed Rule” stages:  state authorization of distance education providers, accreditation, borrower defense, gainful employment, and eligibility of faith-based entities and activities. Rules related to state authorization that had been published in December 2016 were scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2018, but ED has published a notice of proposed rulemaking that proposes a two-year delay in the effective date.  The public has 15 days to comment on the proposed delay.  The regulations would have required institutions that offer distance education to students in states where the institution is not physically located to either meet those states’ requirements for offering postsecondary education or to participate in a state authorization reciprocity agreement, and then document that there is a state process for review and action on student complaints. ED previously sent two other Obama-era consumer protection regulations to negotiated rulemaking sessions.  After three months of negotiations, the sessions regarding borrower defense to repayment concluded in February without consensus.  Sticking points included which evidentiary standard should be used and whether to include or how long a statute of limitations should be.  The sessions regarding gainful employment similarly ended without consensus in April after four days of negotiations.  Since no consensus was reached in either session, ED can draft its own language, presumably keeping in mind the information gathered during the negotiated rulemaking sessions.  ED will need to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for each rule, which will be followed by a period of public comment.  Final regulations will be published by November 1, 2018, to take effect on July 1, 2019. E.    Corporate Activity Finally, there were some notable developments in the trend of schools seeking nonprofit status, as well as a noteworthy sale.  First, the Higher Learning Commission approved Purdue University’s acquisition of Kaplan University.  This was the final hurdle for the deal.  Second, Grand Canyon University also received good news from the Higher Learning Commission.  The accreditor approved its request to revert back to nonprofit status.  Third, Ashford University announced it is joining the trend, too, and is seeking to become a nonprofit.  It is expected to seek approval from its accreditor, the WASC Senior College and University Commission.  Finally, Laureate Education Inc. announced a deal to sell the University of St. Augustine for Health Sciences to a private equity firm, Altas Partners, for $400 million. *    *    * As always, we will continue to monitor all of these developments, and you can look forward to updates in our next report.     Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the issues discussed above.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following: Los Angeles Timothy Hatch (+1 213-229-7368, thatch@gibsondunn.com) Marcellus McRae (+1 213-229-7675, mmcrae@gibsondunn.com) Julian W. Poon (+1 213-229-7758, jpoon@gibsondunn.com) Eric D. Vandevelde (+1 213-229-7186, evandevelde@gibsondunn.com) James Zelenay (+1 213-229-7449, jzelenay@gibsondunn.com) Jeremy S. Smith (+1 213-229-7973, jssmith@gibsondunn.com) Denver Jeremy S. Ochsenbein (+1 303-298-5773, jochsenbein@gibsondunn.com) San Francisco Charles J. Stevens (+1 415-393-8391, cstevens@gibsondunn.com) Washington, D.C. Douglas Cox (+1 202-887-3531, dcox@gibsondunn.com) Michael Bopp (+1 202-955-8256, mbopp@gibsondunn.com) Jason J. Mendro (+1 202-887-3726, jmendro@gibsondunn.com) Amir C. Tayrani (+1 202-887-3692, atayrani@gibsondunn.com) Lucas C. Townsend (+1 202-887-3731, ltownsend@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 30, 2018 |
Federal Circuit Update (May 2018)

Click for PDF This May 2018 edition of Gibson Dunn’s Federal Circuit Update discusses the proposed elimination of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard during post-issuance proceedings before the PTAB, provides a summary of the pending WesternGeco case before the Supreme Court regarding extraterritorial damages, and briefly summarizes the differences between precedential and non-precedential opinions. This Update also provides a summary of the pending en banc case involving the PTO’s ability to recover attorneys’ fees.  Also included are summaries of recent decisions regarding the burden in venue disputes, the pleading standard for patent infringement following the abrogation of Form 18, and whether equitable estoppel applies after substantial claim amendments. Federal Circuit News On May 8, 2018, the PTO announced proposed rulemaking that would change its prior policy of using the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard for construing unexpired and proposed amended patent claims in post-issuance proceedings before the PTAB.  Instead, the PTAB would use the Phillips standard applied in district courts and ITC proceedings.  The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking states:  “The Office’s goal is to implement a fair and balanced approach, providing greater predictability and certainty in the patent system.” Judges Prost, Moore, O’Malley and Reyna, who dissented from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, and Judge Newman, who dissented in the panel opinion and from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, have historically supported the use of the Phillips standard in post-issuance proceedings.  The notice of proposed rulemaking is available here. On April 26, 2018, the PTO also released guidance on the impact of SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, where the Supreme Court mandated that “the Board [] address every claim the petition has challenged.  138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1358 (2018).  In light of this decision, the PTO announced that the Board will now “institute as to all claims or none” and, in addition, if the Board institutes, it “will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.”  Furthermore, “[t]he final written decision will address, to the extent claims are still pending at the time of decision, all patent claims challenged by the petitioner and all new claims added through the amendment process.”  For pending trials that had only been partially instituted, the panels may “issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute on all challenges raised in the petition” and “may take further action to manage the trial proceeding, including, for example, permitting additional time, briefing, discovery, and/or oral argument, depending on various circumstances and the stage of the proceeding” and even, in some cases, extend the statutory 12-month deadline.  The PTO’s guidance is available here. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court has decided two cases from the Federal Circuit this Term (Oil States v. Greene’s Energy and SAS v. Iancu); we are awaiting the Court’s decision on a third case: Case Status Issue WesternGeco LLC (Schlumberger) v. ION Geophysical Corp., No. 16-1011 Argued on Apr. 16, 2018 Recoverability of lost profits for foreign use in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) Upcoming En Banc Federal Circuit Cases NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, No. 16-1794 (Fed. Cir.):  Whether the PTO can recover attorneys’ fees in litigation under 35 U.S.C. § 145. After the PTAB affirmed the examiner’s rejection of NantKwest’s patent application, NantKwest appealed to the district court.  The PTO prevailed on the merits of the appeal and moved to recover both attorneys’ fees and expert fees.  Section 145 provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”  Applying this provision, the district court granted the PTO’s request for expert fees, but rejected the PTO’s request for attorneys’ fees.  A panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s holding as to attorneys’ fees, holding that the “[a]ll expenses of the proceedings” provision under § 145 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees.  (Decision available here.) The Federal Circuit sua sponte ordered that the panel decision be vacated and that the case be reheard en banc.  Seven amicus briefs were filed, five in support of NantKwest (the International Trademark Association, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago, the Association of Amicus Counsel, and the American Bar Association) and two in support of neither party (Federal Circuit Bar Association and American Intellectual Property Law Association).  Oral argument was held on March 8, 2018.  (Audio recording is available here.) Question presented: Did the panel in NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) correctly determine that 35 U.S.C. § 145’s “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” provision authorizes an award of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s attorneys’ fees? Federal Circuit Practice Update Precedential vs. Non-Precedential Opinions. Internal Operating Procedure (“IOP”) No. 10 governs the use of precedential opinions vs. non-precedential opinions and Rule 36 affirmances.  IOP No. 10 provides that “the purpose of a precedential disposition is to inform the bar and interested persons other than the parties.”  IOP No. 10 at ¶ 2.  Precedential opinions should not be used merely to explain the reasons for the disposition to the parties; that can be conveyed through the use of a non-precedential opinion.  Id. The IOP identifies fourteen situations in which a precedential opinion is appropriate.  See id. at ¶ 4.  Reasons include:  resolution of an issue of first impression; the criticism, clarification, alteration, or modification of an existing rule of law; an actual or apparent conflict in or with past holdings of the court or other courts that is created, resolved or continued; the correction of procedural errors; or the case has been returned by the Supreme Court for disposition, requiring more than mere ministerial obedience to directions of the Supreme Court.  Id. The decision to make an opinion non-precedential is generally governed by a majority vote of the panel.  But, if the decision includes a dissenting opinion, the judge authoring the dissenting opinion may elect to have the entire opinion issue as precedential, regardless of the preferences of the majority judges.  Id. at ¶ 6.  All three judges must agree to use a Rule 36 judgment in order to do so.  Id. Key Case Summaries (April – May 2018) In re ZTE (USA) Inc., No. 18-113 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2018) (Motion Panel Order):  Burden of persuasion for venue for foreign defendants. American GNC filed a complaint against ZTE in the Eastern District of Texas, and ZTE moved to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.  While that motion was pending, ZTE moved to transfer to the Northern District of Texas or the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  The first magistrate judge denied ZTE’s motion to transfer.  A second magistrate judge denied ZTE’s motion to dismiss for improper venue after finding that ZTE failed to show it did not have a regular and established place of business in the Eastern District of Texas.  The magistrate judge noted the lack of uniformity among courts in who bears the burden of proof with respect to venue but determined that, under Fifth Circuit law, the burden lies with the objecting defendant.  Over ZTE’s objections regarding the burden of proof, the district court denied ZTE’s motion to dismiss. ZTE petitioned for a writ of mandamus, which the Federal Circuit granted.  The Court first determined that Federal Circuit—not regional circuit—law governs the placement of the burden of persuasion on the propriety of venue under § 1400(b).  It then held as a matter of Federal Circuit law that, upon motion by the Defendant challenging venue in a patent case, the Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper venue and that this holding  “best aligns with the weight of historical authority among the circuits and best furthers public policy.”  The Court remanded to the district court to consider whether venue was proper in light of its holding that the plaintiff, American GNC, bears the burden. Disc Disease Solutions Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc., No. 2017-1483 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2018):  Pleading standard for patent infringement following the abrogation of Form 18. In December 2015, certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.  Among them was the abrogation of Rule 84 (stating that the “Forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules”) and Form 18 (a form adequate to plead a direct patent infringement claim).  Absent Form 18, complaints now must meet the Iqbal/Twombly standard for pleading to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Disc Disease filed its complaint the day before the 2015 amendments became effective.  The district court determined that Iqbal/Twombly—not Form 18—applied to Disc Disease’s complaint and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.  The district court later denied reconsideration because it did not view the 2015 amendments to be an intervening change in the law. The Federal Circuit reversed.  The Federal Circuit did not address whether Form 18 or Iqbal/Twombly governed because, it held, the district court erred in dismissing Disc Disease’s complaint even under Iqbal/Twombly‘s pleading standard.  The Court noted that the case “involves simple technology” with only four independent claims in the asserted patents.  Disc Disease’s complaint “specifically identified the three accused products—by name and by attaching photos of the product packaging as exhibits—and alleged that the accused products meet each and every element of at least one claim” of the asserted patents.  This was sufficient to state a claim for patent infringement in these circumstances. John Bean Technologies Corp. v. Morris & Associates, Inc., No. 17-1502 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2018):  Equitable estoppel when claims are substantively amended or added following ex parte reexamination. John Bean (and its predecessor) and Morris are competitors in the poultry chiller market.  After the patent-in-suit issued to John Bean, Morris sent John Bean’s counsel a demand letter on June 27, 2002, informing him that John Bean had been contacting Morris’s customers and asserting that Morris’s equipment infringes the recently issued patent.  The letter demanded that John Bean stop telling Morris’s customers that Morris’s products infringe John Bean’s patent and advised John Bean that the patent was invalid over a specific prior art reference.  John Bean did not respond, and Morris continued to develop and sell its product. Eleven years later, on December 18, 2013, John Bean filed a request for ex parte reexamination of the patent-in-suit.  During reexamination, John Bean amended the two original claims and added six additional claims in response to a rejection by the PTO.  Shortly after the reexamination certificate issued, John Bean filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against Morris for patent infringement.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Morris that John Bean’s infringement action was barred by equitable estoppel given John Bean’s silence after the demand letter. The Federal Circuit (Reyna, J.) reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in applying equitable estoppel to bar John Bean’s infringement action without considering how the ex parte reexamination affected the patent claims.  The Court explained that the amendments made during reexamination in this case were both substantial and substantive, including by adding new limitations.  As a result, the asserted claims did not exist at the time of Morris’s demand letter.  But the Court recognized that there may be other cases where the asserted claims may be considered identical for the purposes of infringement and also for applying equitable estoppel.  The Court also acknowledged that Morris may have recourse under the affirmative defenses of absolute and intervening rights. Upcoming Oral Argument Calendar For a list of upcoming arguments at the Federal Circuit, please click here. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Federal Circuit.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work or the authors of this alert: Blaine H. Evanson – Orange County (+1 949-451-3805, bevanson@gibsondunn.com) Blair A. Silver – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8690, bsilver@gibsondunn.com) Please also feel free to contact any of the following practice group co-chairs or any member of the firm’s Appellate and Constitutional Law or Intellectual Property practice groups: Appellate and Constitutional Law Group: Mark A. Perry – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3667, mperry@gibsondunn.com) Caitlin J. Halligan – New York (+1 212-351-4000, challigan@gibsondunn.com) Nicole A. Saharsky – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3669, nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com) Intellectual Property Group: Josh Krevitt – New York (+1 212-351-4000, jkrevitt@gibsondunn.com) Wayne Barsky – Los Angeles (+1 310-552-8500, wbarsky@gibsondunn.com)Mark Reiter – Dallas (+1 214-698-3100, mreiter@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 21, 2018 |
Supreme Court Upholds Agreements To Individually Arbitrate Employment-Related Disputes

Click for PDF Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285; Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, No. 16-300; National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 16-307 Decided May 21, 2018 Today, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes with his employer through individual arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court rejected the argument that enforcing the arbitration agreement’s class action waiver would violate employees’ right to engage in collective action under the National Labor Relations Act. Background: The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that agreements to arbitrate transactions involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  In these consolidated cases, the employees agreed to arbitrate work-related disputes through individual arbitration, but later sued their employers in federal courts, arguing that the arbitration agreements were invalid because they violated employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities” under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  29 U.S.C. § 157. Issue: Whether an agreement that requires an employer and an employee to resolve work-related disputes through individual arbitration, and waive class proceedings, is enforceable under the FAA, notwithstanding the employee’s NLRA right to engage in concerted activities.Court’s Holding: Yes.  Arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration of employment disputes are enforceable notwithstanding the NLRA collective-action right. What It Means: The Supreme Court ruling confirms that courts will continue to enforce agreements between employers and employees to arbitrate their disputes on an individual basis, rather than in class action litigation. This case continues the Supreme Court’s trend of enforcing the FAA’s strong policy favoring arbitration. The Court held that under the FAA’s saving clause, litigants only can challenge an arbitration agreement on grounds that would apply to “any” contract—not on grounds specific to arbitration. The Court’s reasoning suggests that state laws restricting arbitration are not likely to withstand challenge under the FAA. Clients should consult a Gibson Dunn attorney regarding the nuances created by different jurisdictions. The Court determined that the NLRA’s “concerted activities” provision was intended to protect organizing and collective bargaining in the workplace, not the treatment of class actions or class arbitration. Interestingly, the Solicitor General said the arbitration agreements are enforceable, but the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) said they are not enforceable – and both argued their positions before the Supreme Court. For this reason (and others), the Court declined to afford Chevron deference to the NLRB’s view. “It is this Court’s duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion.” Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com   Gibson Dunn’s Labor and Employment lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding arbitration programs. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders or the attorneys with whom you work: Labor and Employment Practice Catherine A. Conway +1 213.229.7822 cconway@gibsondunn.com) Eugene Scalia +1 202.955.8206 escalia@gibsondunn.com Jason C. Schwartz +1 202.955.8242 jschwartz@gibsondunn.com   Related Practice: Class Actions Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. +1 213.229.7804 tboutrous@gibsondunn.comm Christopher Chorba +1 213.229.7396 cchorba@gibsondunn.com Theane Evangelis +1 213.229.7726 tevangelis@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 17, 2018 |
Webcast: Supreme Court Strikes Down Federal Limits On Sports Gambling

“A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.” — Justice Alito, writing for the majority On May 14, 2018, the United States Supreme Court held 7-2 striking down a federal law which prohibited States from authorizing sports betting. Gibson Dunn attorneys Theodore B. Olson and Matthew D. McGill led the successful team representing the Governor of New Jersey in this landmark case. In this webcast Mr. Olson and Mr. McGill will discuss the case, the oral argument, and the impacts of this Supreme Court decision. They will also be joined by Gibson Dunn partner Debra Wong Yang to discuss the regulatory and commercial opportunities following this decision. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-476 New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-477 View Slides [PDF] PANELISTS Theodore B. Olson is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson Dunn, a longtime member of the firm’s Executive Committee, and Founder of the firm’s Crisis Management, Sports Law, and Appellate and Constitutional Law practice groups. Selected by Time magazine in 2010 as one of the 100 most influential people in the world, Mr. Olson is one of the nation’s premier appellate and United States Supreme Court advocates. He has argued 63 cases in the Supreme Court and has prevailed in over 75% of those arguments. These cases include the two Bush v. Gore cases arising out of the 2000 presidential election; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; Hollingsworth v. Perry, the case upholding the overturning of California’s Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriages and Murphy v. NCAA, repealing PASPA. Mr. Olson’s practice is concentrated on appellate and constitutional law, federal legislation, media and commercial disputes, and assisting clients with strategies for the containment, management and resolution of major legal crises occurring at the federal/state, criminal/civil and domestic/international levels. He has handled cases at all levels of state and federal court systems throughout the United States. Matthew D. McGill is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson Dunn.  He practices in the firm’s Litigation Department and its Appellate and Constitutional Law and Intellectual Property practice groups. Mr. McGill is a Chambers-ranked appellate litigator, and previously was named a national Rising Star by Law360, which identified him as one of ten appellate lawyers under 40 to watch. He has participated in 20 cases before the United States Supreme Court, prevailing in 15.  Spanning a wide range of substantive areas, those representations have included several high-profile triumphs over foreign and domestic sovereigns. Debra Wong Yang This webcast will be moderated by Debra Wong Yang, a partner in the Los Angeles office of Gibson Dunn. Drawing on her depth of experience and record of success, Ms. Yang focuses part of her practice on strategic counseling. She leads critical representations, both high-profile and highly confidential, involving a wide variety of industries, economic sectors, regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, global jurisdictions and all types of proceedings. She guides teams of attorneys and outside consultants in the development and implementation of strategies to achieve the most favorable outcomes, greatest protection of reputational interests and minimalizing of harm to the business assets. Ms. Yang also has a strong background in addressing and resolving problems across the white collar litigation spectrum, including through corporate and individual representations, internal investigations, crisis management and compliance. MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION: This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.50 credit hours, of which 1.50 credit hours may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement.  This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit. Attorneys seeking New York credit must obtain an Affirmation Form prior to watching the archived version of this webcast.  Please contact Jeanine McKeown (National Training Administrator), at 213-229-7140 or jmckeown@gibsondunn.com to request the MCLE form. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.50 hours. California attorneys may claim “self-study” credit for viewing the archived version of this webcast.  No certificate of attendance is required for California “self-study” credit.

May 14, 2018 |
Supreme Court Strikes Down Federal Limits On Sports Gambling

Click for PDF Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-476 New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-477 Decided May 14, 2018 The Supreme Court held 7-2 that a federal law prohibiting States from authorizing sports betting violates the Tenth Amendment because it impermissibly commandeers state legislatures. Background: A federal law – the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA) – prohibits States from authorizing or licensing sports gambling.  In 2014, the New Jersey legislature repealed existing prohibitions on sports gambling at casinos and racetracks.  The NCAA and the four major professional sports leagues sued the State, arguing that the decision to allow sports gambling violated PASPA. Issue: Whether PASPA’s federal prohibition on state authorization of sports gambling violates the Tenth Amendment because it commandeers state legislatures. Court’s Holding: Yes.  PASPA unconstitutionally commandeers state legislatures by dictating the content of state law regarding sports gambling (i.e., preventing States from legalizing sports gambling). “A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.” Justice Alito, writing for the majority What It Means: In a significant victory for States’ rights, the Court’s decision makes clear that the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule has teeth.  Under that rule, Congress can neither affirmatively direct the States to enact a certain law nor prohibit them from repealing an existing law.  As a result, States are now free to choose whether or not to legalize sports gambling. The Court also struck down the additional federal prohibitions on state-run lotteries, private operation of sports gambling schemes, and advertising of sports gambling. The ruling likely will lead to the legalization of sports gambling in many States.  In advance of the Court’s ruling, bills authorizing sports gambling had been introduced in approximately 15 States, and they have already been enacted in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Connecticut, and West Virginia. Gibson Dunn represented the winning party:  Petitioners Philip D. Murphy, as Governor of the State of New Jersey, et. al. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 4, 2018 |
First Quarter 2018 Update on Class Actions

Click for PDF This update provides an overview and summary of significant class action developments during the first quarter of 2018 (January through March), as well as a brief look ahead to some of the key class action issues anticipated later this year. Part I addresses developments at the United States Supreme Court, including the oral arguments in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, the decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez and its implications for Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, and three grants of certiorari in cases relating to class actions (including in two important arbitration cases, and in another that will address the use of cy pres in class action settlements). Part II covers the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, which may have significant consequences for plaintiffs attempting to certify nationwide class actions, as well as parties attempting to settle such actions. Part III describes several rulings addressing important issues regarding class settlements, including recent activity by the U.S. Department of Justice in scrutinizing these settlements. Part IV discusses a series of decisions from the federal courts of appeals, involving (among other things) what it takes to establish standing under Article III in data breach class actions. Part V addresses a new California Court of Appeal decision regarding the standards applicable to the use of experts at class certification. I.   The U.S. Supreme Court Hears Argument on the Tolling Effect of Putative Class Actions, Issues Guidance on Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, and Grants Certiorari in Three Important Cases As previewed in our fourth quarter 2017 update, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 26, 2018, in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh (No. 17-432).  The case concerns the scope of the equitable tolling rule of American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), which held that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for absent class members and permits them to bring subsequent individual suits after the original class action has been dismissed.  China Agritech asks whether the American Pipe rule should be extended to permit absent class members to bring successive class action lawsuits—a question that has divided the courts of appeals. The oral argument did not suggest a clear answer.  While some justices seemed skeptical of barring individuals who relied on their membership in a class action (as a reason not to sue within the limitations period) from then using Rule 23 in a subsequent suit, others expressed concern that applying the American Pipe rule to subsequent class actions would encourage “stacked” successive class actions that would undermine the efficiency rationales underlying the class action device.  (Gibson Dunn filed an amicus brief in this case on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., and the American Tort Reform Association in support of the petitioner.) The Court also provided guidance regarding Rule 23(b)(2) classes in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), a case involving the government’s detention of aliens without bond hearings.  The Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to “consider whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class action continues to be the appropriate vehicle for respondents’ [due process] claims in light of” its holding in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), that “‘Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.'”  Id. at 851–52 (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360).  Writing for the majority, Justice Alito explained that Rule 23(b)(2) may no longer permit class treatment because some class members may not be entitled to bond hearings as a matter of constitutional due process.  Id. at 852.  The Court also instructed the Ninth Circuit to consider whether the “flexible” due process inquiry, which “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” can be adjudicated in a class action.  Id. (quotations omitted). Looking ahead, there are several significant class action issues on the Court’s docket.  As noted in our fourth quarter 2017 update, by June 2018, the Court is expected to decide whether the National Labor Relations Act precludes enforcement of class action waivers in mandatory employment arbitration agreements, which is the question presented in a consolidated trio of cases, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (No. 16-285), National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. (No. 16-307), and Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris (No. 16-300). In the past three months, the Court granted certiorari in three more cases that will address issues relevant to class actions. First, on February 26, 2018, the Court granted certiorari in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira (No. 17‑340) to resolve two important issues concerning the interpretation and scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”):  (a) whether a dispute regarding the applicability of the FAA must be resolved by an arbitrator under a valid delegation clause, and (b) whether an exemption for contracts of employment for transportation workers in Section 1 of the FAA applies to independent contractors.  Both questions have divided the federal courts of appeals.  The case presents an opportunity for the Court to establish uniform, national rules concerning the interpretation of the FAA, including the ability of parties to incorporate enforceable arbitration provisions in agreements governing independent contractors.  (Gibson Dunn represents the petitioner, New Prime Inc.) Second, on April 30, 2018, the Court granted certiorari in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (No. 17‑988), which presents the question whether the FAA forecloses a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements.  Lamps Plus presents the Court with an opportunity to again wrestle with the propriety of class arbitration, an issue that the Court previously addressed in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). Finally, on April 30, 2018, the Court granted certiorari in Frank v. Gaos (No. 17-961), which we discussed in our third quarter 2017 update and our fourth quarter 2017 update.  Frank, which involved a class action settlement of claims against Google, concerns the validity of cy pres-only settlements that provide no direct compensation to class members.  Frank presents an opportunity to address the “fundamental concerns” with cy pres-only settlements that Chief Justice Roberts previously identified, “including when, if ever, such relief should be considered; how to assess its fairness as a general matter; whether new entities may be established as part of such relief; if not, how existing entities should be selected; what the respective roles of the judge and parties are in shaping a cy pres remedy,” among other issues.  Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting denial of certiorari). II.   Ninth Circuit Vacates Certification of Nationwide Settlement Class This past quarter, the Ninth Circuit likely increased the scrutiny that district courts must now apply to the certification of nationwide class actions asserting state-law claims.  In In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, 881 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2018), a divided panel vacated a nationwide class action settlement because the district court failed to properly analyze whether California law could be applied to all class members. This action arose out of alleged misstatements concerning the fuel efficiency of certain Hyundai and Kia vehicles.  In re Hyundai, 881 F.3d at 694-95.  The district court certified a nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) class for settlement purposes and granted preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement.  Id. at 700-01.  The district court ruled that it was not required to analyze whether there were significant differences between California law and the laws of the other states at issue because differences in state law could be addressed during a hearing on the fairness of the settlement.  Id. at 700.  The district court approved the settlement without conducting a choice-of-law analysis.  See id. at 701. The Ninth Circuit vacated the class certification order.  It emphasized that, under Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), “the district court was required to apply California’s choice of law rules to determine whether California law could apply to all plaintiffs in the nationwide class, or whether the court had to apply the law of each state, and if so, whether variations in state law defeated predominance.”  In re Hyundai, 881 F.3d at 702.  The Ninth Circuit agreed that district courts need not consider “litigation management issues” in deciding whether to certify a settlement class, but they were still obligated to ensure that the class “meets all of the prerequisites of Rule 23,” including its predominance requirement.  Id.  Punting the decision about choice-of-law issues to a “fairness hearing” was not a viable option, as a “fairness hearing under Rule 23(e) is no substitute for rigorous adherence to those provisions of the Rule designed to protect absentees[.]”  Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 849 (1999)). The Ninth Circuit also took steps to limit the perception that nationwide or mass advertising campaigns can produce a “common” question of whether the class relied on certain misrepresentations by the defendants.  The court reasoned that even though there was some evidence of nationwide advertising, there was no evidence of uniform representations to used car purchasers, and no evidence of the sort of “massive advertising campaign” that could give rise to a presumption of reliance as to such purchasers.  In re Hyundai, 881 F.3d at 704.  It also rejected the argument that individualized questions regarding exposure to the advertising could simply be ignored in the settlement context. Judge Nguyen’s dissent claimed, among other things, that the majority improperly shifted the burden from the objectors to the district court or class counsel to decide whether other states’ laws apply and argued that the majority’s decision had created a circuit split and ran afoul of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The settling parties filed petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc in March.  The objectors were ordered to file their response and did so on March 28.  The petitions are currently pending. III.   Notable Decisions Involving Objections to Class Action Settlements There were two other notable decisions regarding class action settlements this quarter. First, the United States Department of Justice signaled a renewed interest in policing class action settlements.  According to reports, the DOJ receives more than 700 notices of class action settlements each year as required by the Class Actions Fairness Act (“CAFA”), but it had only participated in two cases.  Dep’t of Justice, Associate Attorney General Brand Delivers Remarks to the Washington, D.C. Lawyers Chapter of the Federalist Society (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/associate-attorney-general-brand-delivers-remarks-washington-dc-lawyers-chapter.  At a conference on February 15, however, Associate Attorney General Rachel L. Brand warned that “If a settlement isn’t fair or reasonable under CAFA, DOJ may file a statement of interest saying so.  Be on the lookout in the coming days for the first example.”  Id. The DOJ followed through on this promise in Cannon v. Ashburn Corp., No. 16-cv-1452, 2018 WL 1806046 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2018), where the district court denied a motion for final settlement approval based in part on the concerns raised by the DOJ.  The DOJ had filed a “statement of interest” objecting to the class settlement of claims involving alleged false advertising in connection with the sale of wines.  Id. at *12.  The proposed settlement offered class members coupons worth between $0.20 to $2.25 per bottle of wine purchased, with a total settlement value estimated at $10.8 million.  Id. at *3.  Class counsel were to receive $1.7 million in fees.  Id.  In its “statement of interest,” the DOJ argued that class counsel should not receive a “windfall” of $1.7 million, given the minimal benefit to class members and the apparent lack of merit of the claims.  Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Cannon v. Ashburn Corp., No. 16‑cv‑1452 (Feb. 16, 2018), ECF No. 58.  Arguing that the settlement was “a textbook coupon settlement” that would force class members to engage in future business with the defendant if they wanted to receive any benefit, the DOJ urged the court, should it grant approval, to defer payment of fees to class counsel until the total value of redeemed coupons is known.  Id. at 9–11, 16.  The Arizona Attorney General also weighed in on behalf of 19 states’ Attorneys General, as did ten objectors.  2018 WL 1806046, at *4.  This case may be the first example of what appears to be a new trend of heightened scrutiny of class action settlements by both state and federal law enforcement officials. Second, in Low v. Trump University, LLC, 881 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order approving a class settlement between Trump University and its former students.  Id. at 1113.  A lone objector sought to opt out of the class after receiving a court-approved settlement notice and submitting her claim.  Id. at 1115-16.  The district court approved the settlement and the objector appealed.  Id. at 1116.  The objector argued that a single sentence in the long-form notice stating that class members would “be notified about how to obtain a share (or how to ask to be excluded from any settlement)” led her to believe that there would be a second opportunity to opt out.  Id. at 1117.  The Ninth Circuit found that, “reading the notice as a whole and in context,” it “promised only one opportunity to opt out,” and observed that there is “‘no authority of any kind suggesting that due process requires that members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class be given a second chance to opt out.'”  Id. at 1121 (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 635 (9th Cir. 1982)). IV.   In re Zappos.com and Other Notable Opinions from the Federal Courts of Appeals Addressing Article III Standing The issue of Article III standing in putative class actions, and in data privacy class actions in particular, continues to be a hotly litigated issue. The most significant decision this quarter came from the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the dismissal of a putative class action relating to the breach of Zappos.com’s data systems that had allegedly exposed the “names, account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card information” of 24 million customers.  In re Zappos.com, Inc., — F.3d —, No. 16-16860, 2018 WL 1883212, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2018).  The district court ruled that those plaintiffs who alleged “actual fraud occurred as a direct result of the breach” had Article III standing, but that those plaintiffs who “failed to allege . . . actual identity theft or fraud” based on the breach did not.  Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the dismissed plaintiffs had “sufficiently alleged standing based on the risk of identity theft.”  Zappos, 2018 WL 1883212, at *2.  The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its previous decision in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), which had addressed “the Article III standing of victims of data theft.”  Zappos, 2018 WL 1883212, at *3.  The court considered whether Krottner was still good law following the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), but ultimately concluded that “Krottner is not clearly irreconcilable with Clapper” and thus “control[led] the results here.”  Zappos, 2018 WL 1883212, at *5–*6. Applying Krottner, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the sensitivity of the personal information, combined with its theft,” meant that “the plaintiffs had adequately alleged an injury in fact” for standing purposes.  Zappos, 2018 WL 1883212, at *6.  Because the hackers had allegedly accessed full credit card numbers, the stolen information “gave hackers the means to commit fraud or identity theft,” as underscored by those “plaintiffs who alleged that the hackers had already commandeered their accounts or identities using information taken from Zappos.”  Id.  Finding the other elements of Article III standing satisfied, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. While In re Zappos.com held that Article III was satisfied based on the facts alleged there, three other decisions issued this past quarter came to the opposite conclusion and thus affirmed the dismissal of putative class actions: In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 879 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018), the D.C. Circuit held that commercial truck drivers lacked Article III standing to sue the Department of Transportation for inaccuracies in its database of driver-safety information.  Five commercial truck drivers sued the Department because their records contained inaccuracies, but only two of the drivers ever had the inaccurate information shared with future employers.  Id. at 340.  On these facts, the court determined that “the mere existence of inaccurate database information is not sufficient to confer Article III standing” because there was no concrete or de facto harm.  Id. at 345.  Nevertheless, the court found the actual dissemination of inaccurate information was sufficient to confer standing for the two truck drivers whose information had in fact been shared.  Id. In Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc., 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second and Seventh Circuits that alleging “a statutory violation,” without more, was “too speculative” a “theory of exposure to identity theft” to confer Article III standing on a plaintiff to litigate claims under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Id. at 777, 783; see also Crupar–Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016).  The court determined that this bare procedural violation failed to establish a concrete harm and that plaintiff’s “theory of ‘exposure’ to identity theft”—premised on the printing of a few digits of his credit card on a parking receipt—”[was] . . . ‘too speculative for Article III purposes.'”  Bassett, 883 F.3d at 783 (quoting Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2017)). In Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2018), the Sixth Circuit ruled that alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is not enough to confer Article III standing.  The defendant’s attorney sent plaintiffs a debt-collection letter stating there would be no more “attempt[s] to collect any deficiency balance.”  Id. at 619.  This letter failed to disclose that it was a “communication . . . from a debt collector” in violation of the FDCPA.  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)).  The court determined that “[f]ar from causing . . . any injury, tangible or intangible, the . . . letter gave [plaintiffs] peace of mind.” Id. at 621.  It accordingly declined to elevate a “bare violation” of the statute to an injury sufficient for Article III standing, as “there must be some limits on Congress’s power to create injuries in fact suitable for judicial resolution.” Id. at 622-23. V.   California Court of Appeal Adopts Majority Position of Federal Courts of Appeals in Holding that the State’s Daubert Equivalent Applies at Class Certification In an important new decision, Apple Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 19 Cal. App. 5th 1101 (2018), the Court of Appeal held that Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, 55 Cal. 4th 747 (2012), which adopts a standard comparable to that by which federal courts evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), “applies to expert opinion evidence submitted in connection with a motion for class certification.”  Apple, 19 Cal. App. 5th at 1106.  The ruling aligns California law with the majority of federal courts of appeals. A proposed class of consumers sought certification of their putative class claims that a purportedly defective power button on older iPhone models decreased the phones’ value.  The plaintiffs relied on expert declarations to support their certification motion, and the trial court held that it did not need to apply the Sargon standard until evidentiary hearings later in the proceedings.  The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that certifying the class based on inadmissible evidence “would merely lead to its exclusion at trial, imperiling continued certification of the class and wasting the time and resources of the parties and the court.”  Apple, 19 Cal. App. 5th at 1117.  The court was careful to clarify, however, that the scope of Sargon‘s applicability at class certification was “limited . . . compared with the inquiry at trial” because the court “need not rule on the admissibility of certain expert opinion evidence” that is “irrelevant or unnecessary for [the class certification] decision.”  Id. at 1120. The ruling rested in part on the recognition that “[a]lthough some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a ‘full’ or ‘focused’ Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same,” and these decisions show that applying the standard is both feasible and desirable.  Apple, 19 Cal. App. 5th at 1119-20.  Four circuits endorse a “full” Daubert analysis at class certification, see In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Carpenter Co., No. 14-0302, 2014 WL 12809636 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014); Sher v. Raytheon Co., 419 F. App’x 887 (11th Cir. 2011); American Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2010), while the Eighth Circuit, and more recently, the Ninth Circuit, have adopted a more “focused” approach, see In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2011); Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Ctr., No. 15-56460 (9th Cir. May 3, 2018).  Although the Supreme Court has suggested that Daubert should apply to expert evidence at class certification, it has yet to squarely resolve the issue.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354 (2011) (“The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings. . . . We doubt that is so. . . .”) (internal citation omitted). Apple v. Superior Court joins a growing body of case law recognizing that the “corrosive effects of improper expert opinion testimony may be felt with substantial force at class certification,” so courts must scrutinize such testimony at that stage.  19 Cal. App. 5th at 1119. The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this client update: Christopher Chorba, Theane Evangelis, Kahn Scolnick, Bradley J. Hamburger, Lauren M. Blas, Gregory Bok, Jessica Culpepper, Wesley Sze, and Josh Burk. Gibson Dunn are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work in the firm’s Class Actions or Appellate and Constitutional Law practice groups, or any of the following lawyers: Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. – Co-Chair, Litigation Practice Group – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7000, tboutrous@gibsondunn.com) Christopher Chorba – Co-Chair, Class Actions Practice Group – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7396, cchorba@gibsondunn.com) Theane Evangelis – Co-Chair, Class Actions Practice Group – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7726, tevangelis@gibsondunn.com) Kahn A. Scolnick – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7656, kscolnick@gibsondunn.com) Bradley J. Hamburger – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7658, bhamburger@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 3, 2018 |
Webcast: Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Enforcement and Compliance in 2018 and Beyond

Gibson Dunn partners provide an overview of significant trends and key issues in Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and sanctions enforcement and compliance. Topics covered: BSA/AML Overview Recent trends in BSA/AML enforcement Recent trends in BSA/AML compliance BSA/AML Reform Efforts Sanctions Overview Key OFAC sanctions program developments Recent trends in sanctions enforcement The future of sanctions under the Trump Administration (and beyond) View Slides [PDF] PANELISTS M. Kendall Day was a white collar prosecutor for 15 years, serving most recently as an Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, where he supervised Bank Secrecy Act investigations, enforcement of anti-money laundering and sanctions laws, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements involving all types of financial institutions. He previously served in a variety of leadership and line attorney roles, including as Chief of the DOJ Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section. Mr. Day will join Gibson Dunn’s Washington, D.C. office as a partner effective May 1, 2018. Stephanie L. Brooker is co-chair of Gibson Dunn’s Financial Institutions Practice Group. She is former Director of the Enforcement Division at the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and previously served as the Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and as a trial attorney for several years. Stephanie represents financial institutions, multi-national companies, and individuals in connection with criminal, regulatory, and civil enforcement actions involving BSA/AML, sanctions, anti-corruption, securities, tax, wire fraud, and sensitive employee matters. Her practice also includes BSA/AML compliance counseling and due diligence and significant criminal and civil asset forfeiture matters. Adam M. Smith is an experienced international trade lawyer who previously served in the Obama Administration as the Senior Advisor to the Director of OFAC and as the Director for Multilateral Affairs on the National Security Council. Adam focuses on international trade compliance and white collar investigations, including with respect to federal and state economic sanctions enforcement, the FCPA, embargoes, and export controls. F. Joseph Warin is co-chair of Gibson Dunn’s White Collar Defense and Investigations Practice Group, and chair of the Washington, D.C. office’s Litigation Department.  He is a former Assistant United States Attorney in Washington, D.C., one of only ten lawyers in the United States with Chambers rankings in five categories, was named by Best Lawyers® as 2016 Lawyer of the Year for White Collar Criminal Defense in the District of Columbia, and recognized by Benchmark Litigation as a U.S. White Collar Crime Litigator Star for seven consecutive years (2011–2017). In 2017, Chambers honored Mr. Warin with the Outstanding Contribution to the Legal Profession Award. MCLE CREDIT INFORMATION: This program has been approved for credit in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 1.50 credit hours, of which 1.50 credit hours may be applied toward the areas of professional practice requirement.  This course is approved for transitional/non-transitional credit. Attorneys seeking New York credit must obtain an Affirmation Form prior to watching the archived version of this webcast.  Please contact Jeanine McKeown (National Training Administrator), at 213-229-7140 or jmckeown@gibsondunn.com to request the MCLE form. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP certifies that this activity has been approved for MCLE credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1.50 hours. California attorneys may claim “self-study” credit for viewing the archived version of this webcast.  No certificate of attendance is required for California “self-study” credit.

May 1, 2018 |
ATS Ruling Narrows the Judicial Role in International Law

San Francisco partner Kristin Linsley is the author of “ATS Ruling Narrows the Judicial Role in International Law,” [PDF] published in the Daily Journal on May 1, 2018.

May 1, 2018 |
Federal District Court Enjoins Philadelphia Ordinance Prohibiting Employers from Asking Applicants About Their Wage History

Click for PDF On April 30, 2018, a federal judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania preliminarily enjoined enforcement of a Philadelphia Ordinance prohibiting employers from asking applicants about their wage history.[1]  Although over a dozen states and localities have recently enacted similar wage-history laws, this is the first court decision to rule on whether such laws violate employers’ First Amendment rights. Aimed at reducing the wage gap between men and women, the Ordinance imposes two prohibitions on Philadelphia employers:  It prohibits employers from inquiring about an applicant’s wage history and from relying on wage history to make a salary determination unless that history was knowingly and willingly disclosed by the applicant.[2] In a 59-page opinion, the District Court concluded that the plaintiff—the Chamber of Commerce for Greater Philadelphia, represented by Gibson Dunn—was entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Ordinance’s inquiry provision.  The Court determined that the Chamber was likely to prevail on the merits of its First Amendment challenge for two reasons.  First, the Court held that wage-history inquiries do not concern unlawful activity under the first prong of the Central Hudson test for restrictions of commercial speech.[3]  “[W]hile using wage history to formulate salaries is made illegal” by the Ordinance, the Court reasoned, “other uses of wage history are not illegal.”[4]  The Court concluded that the City’s contrary position “would stand Central Hudson on its head.”[5] Second, the District Court held that the City had failed to show that the Ordinance “directly advances” a substantial government interest, as required under the third Central Hudson prong.[6]  Although the City had asserted a substantial interest in reducing discriminatory wage disparities, the Court ruled that the City’s evidence was “riddled with conclusory statements, amounting to ‘various tidbits’ and ‘educated guesses.'”[7]  “[M]ore is needed,” the Court emphasized.[8]  Without substantial evidence “that inquiry into salary history results in lower salaries for women and minorities,” it is “impossible to know whether the Inquiry Provision will directly advance the [City’s] substantial interests.”[9] The District Court also concluded that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction had been met.  The Court explained that the Chamber had demonstrated irreparable harm by “alleg[ing] a real and actual deprivation of its and its members’ First Amendment rights through declarations,” and that “the City cannot claim a legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.”[10] The District Court did uphold the Ordinance’s provision prohibiting employers from relying on an applicant’s salary history in making a salary determination unless that history is knowingly and willingly disclosed.[11]  The Court reasoned that reliance on wage history is not speech for First Amendment purposes.[12]  Nonetheless, the Court’s decision preliminarily enjoining the Ordinance’s inquiry provision will enable employers to use wage-history information to ascertain prevailing market wages and to identify potentially unaffordable applicants at the outset of the hiring process.  The decision may also prompt employers to mount a First Amendment challenge to similar wage-history laws in other jurisdictions.    [1]   Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 17-1548, slip op. at 54 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2018).    [2]   Phila. Code §§ 9-1131(2)(a)(i)–(ii).    [3]   Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila., No. 17-1548, slip op. at 12 (discussing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).    [4]   Id. at 14.    [5]   Id. at 15.    [6]   Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.    [7]   Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila., No. 17-1548, slip op. at 30.    [8]   Id.    [9]   Id. at 30, 33–34. [10]   Id. at 46. [11]   See Phila. Code § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii). [12]   Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila., No. 17-1548, slip op. at 40.   Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, or the authors: Miguel A. Estrada – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8500, mestrada@gibsondunn.com) Amir C. Tayrani – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3692, atayrani@gibsondunn.com) Kellam M. Conover – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3755, kconover@gibsondunn.com) © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 1, 2018 |
Stephanie Brooker Named a White Collar Trailblazer

The National Law Journal named Washington, D.C. partner Stephanie Brooker a 2018 White Collar Trailblazer.  Brooker is recognized for her career in government service as former Director of the Enforcement Division at the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and former Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section and trial attorney at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.  Brooker represents financial institutions, multi-national companies, and individuals in connection with criminal, regulatory, and civil enforcement actions involving anti-money laundering (AML)/Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), sanctions, anti-corruption, securities, tax, wire fraud, and sensitive employee matters.  Brooker’s practice also includes BSA/AML compliance counseling and due diligence and significant criminal and civil asset forfeiture matters.  The list ran on May 1, 2018.

April 30, 2018 |
Reining In Abusive Alien Tort Statute Cases

Los Angeles partner Perlette Jura, Orange County partner Blaine Evanson and Washington, D.C. associate Christopher Leach are the authors of “Reining In Abusive Alien Tort Statute Cases,” [PDF] published by Law360 on April 30, 2018.

April 24, 2018 |
Supreme Court Clarifies That Inter Partes Review Must Decide All Challenged Claims

Click for PDF SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, No. 16-969 Decided April 24, 2018 Today, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) exercises its discretion to institute inter partes review, it must issue an opinion on all challenged claims. Background: Inter partes review is an administrative process in which the PTAB revisits the patentability of claims in existing patents. The PTAB may institute that review if the petitioner shows a “reasonable likelihood” of success on at least one claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). If the PTAB institutes inter partes review, it “shall issue” a written decision as to the patentability of “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). In this case, SAS Institute petitioned the PTAB for inter partes review of a certain patent. The PTAB reviewed only some of the claims, as U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) regulations permit. SAS Institute argues that the PTAB was required to issue a final decision on all of the claims. Issue: Whether the PTAB must issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner when it institutes an inter partes review. Court’s Holding: Yes, if the PTAB institutes inter partes review, it must rule on all challenged claims. “Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of statutory construction,’ we find ourselves unable to discern Congress’s. meaning.” Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority What It Means: The Court determined that the statute’s plain text does not permit the PTAB to decide which claims to review when it grants inter partes review. Instead, if the PTAB decides that the petitioner is reasonably likely to succeed on at least one claim, the statute requires the PTAB to review all of the claims in the petition. The Court rejected SAS Institute’s invitation to overrule Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), under which courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of an ambiguous statute. Here, the Court held that the PTO is not entitled to deference because the statute is not ambiguous. The majority left open the possibility that the PTAB could deny a petition while noting that one or more claims merit reexamination and permitting the petitioners to file a new petition limited to those claims. The America Invents Act’s estoppel provisions prevent a petitioner from arguing that a claim is invalid, in a district court or before the International Trade Commission, on any ground raised or that reasonably could have been raised on inter partes review if the PTAB issues a final written decision on the claim. As a result of today’s decision, if the PTAB institutes review, every claim raised must be addressed—and so likely will trigger the estoppel provisions. The Supreme Court’s ruling may lead the PTAB to grant fewer petitions—meaning more patent litigation in the district courts. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com Related Practice: Intellectual Property Wayne Barsky +1 310.552.8500 wbarsky@gibsondunn.com Josh Krevitt +1 212.351.4000 jkrevitt@gibsondunn.com Mark Reiter +1 214.698.3100 mreiter@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

April 24, 2018 |
Supreme Court Upholds PTO Inter Partes Review of Patent Validity

Click for PDF Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, No. 16-712 Decided April 24, 2018 The Supreme Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s inter partes review process does not violate the Constitution. Background: In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act, which created a new adversarial process within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), known as inter partes review. This process allows anyone to challenge the validity of an existing patent on the grounds that the patent was anticipated by is or obvious in light of the prior art. Under that process, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) – rather than a federal court – decides whether to cancel or confirm a challenged patent, subject to deferential review by the Federal Circuit. Issue: Whether inter partes review violates Article III’s grant of judicial power to the federal courts and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial. Court’s Holding: No, patents are public rights, and not purely private rights, so Congress may allow non-Article III tribunals (like the PTAB) to adjudicate those rights. “[T]he decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration.” Justice Thomas, writing for the majority Gibson Dunn filed an amicus brief defending inter partes review for Dell, Facebook, Hewlett Packard, Twitter and others. What It Means: The Court held that patents are public rights that may be granted, abridged, or withdrawn without adjudication by an Article III court or factfinding by a jury. The Court explained that a patent owner’s property rights in an issued patent are subject to PTO’s authority to reexamine or cancel the patent. Although inter partes review resembles adversarial litigation, it determines a party’s patent right against the government – not liability between private parties. The Court rejected the argument that, historically, the validity of a patent could only be challenged in court. Instead, drawing on the argument that Gibson Dunn made in its amicus brief, the Court concluded that inter partes review is consistent with historical practice under the English patent system. The Court emphasized that its holding is narrow and that it did not decide whether infringement actions or other patent matters could be heard outside of an Article III court or whether the retroactive application of inter partes review is constitutional. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com   Related Practice: Intellectual Property Wayne Barsky +1 310.552.8500 wbarsky@gibsondunn.com Josh Krevitt +1 212.351.4000 jkrevitt@gibsondunn.com Mark Reiter +1 214.698.3100 mreiter@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

April 24, 2018 |
Supreme Court Holds That Foreign Corporations Cannot Be Sued Under The Alien Tort Statute

Click for PDF Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499 Decided April 24, 2018 Today, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that a foreign corporation may not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. Background: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS) provides that foreign nationals may sue in federal court “for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. In recent years, plaintiffs increasingly have relied on the ATS to sue multinational corporations and banks in federal courts for alleged terrorist activities and human rights violations abroad. In this case, the plaintiffs sued Arab Bank, PLC—a Jordanian financial institution with a branch in New York—alleging that the bank helped finance terrorist attacks in the Middle East. Issue: Whether foreign corporations can be sued in federal court in the United States under the ATS. Court’s Holding: No. Neither the language of the ATS nor the Court’s precedents interpreting it supports extending the statute to reach suits against foreign corporations. The political branches, rather than the courts, are responsible for weighing foreign-policy concerns and deciding whether foreign corporations should face liability for acts like those at issue in this case. The Judiciary is “not well suited to make the required policy judgments that are implicated by corporate liability in cases like this one.” “[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority What It Means: Although the decision does not resolve whether plaintiffs may sue U.S. corporations under the ATS, it does stop the recent trend of plaintiffs using the ATS to sue foreign corporations and foreign financial institutions in the United States. Jesner joins a line of recent precedents refusing to create new private rights of action and reiterating that the decision to attach liability to certain conduct is best left to Congress. By clearly prohibiting ATS liability against foreign corporations, the decision may strengthen the arguments of U.S. corporations seeking to dismiss an ATS suit when the underlying claim is based on the conduct of a foreign affiliate. The decision may place greater pressure on Congress to legislate in this area. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court.  Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders: Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Caitlin J. Halligan +1 212.351.3909 challigan@gibsondunn.com Mark A. Perry +1 202.887.3667 mperry@gibsondunn.com Nicole A. Saharsky +1 202.887.3669 nsaharsky@gibsondunn.com Related Practice: Transnational Litigation William E. Thomson +1 213.229.7891 wthomson@gibsondunn.com Andrea E. Neuman +1 212.351.3883 aneuman@gibsondunn.com Perlette Michèle Jura +1 213.229.7121 pjura@gibsondunn.com   © 2018 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.