GIBSON DUNN



Supreme Court Holds All Plaintiffs Suing Under Section 11 Of The Securities Act Of 1933 Must Show They Bought Registered Shares

Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani, No. 21-200

Decided June 1, 2023

Today, the Supreme Court unanimously held that in a direct listing (just as in traditional IPOs), plaintiffs who claim that a company's registration statement is misleading and who sue under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under that registration statement.

Background:

The Securities Act of 1933 requires companies to file a registration statement with a prospectus before certain shares can trade on an exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. The Act exempts some shares and transactions from that requirement, *id.* §§ 77c-77d, and provides that a registration statement is "effective only as to the securities specified therein," *id.* § 77f(a). Section 11 enforces the registration requirement: if a registration statement is misleading, any person acquiring "such security" may sue. *Id.* § 77k(a).

In 2019, Slack went public through a direct listing in which both registered and exempt shares could be traded immediately. Pirani bought Slack shares after they were listed and later sued, claiming that the registration statement and prospectus Slack filed were misleading. Pirani conceded he could not show which (if any) of the shares he bought were registered as opposed to exempt. Slack moved to dismiss, invoking the longstanding rule that '33 Act plaintiffs must show they bought shares registered under the challenged registration statement. The district court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Pirani had to show only that he bought shares that could not have traded on an exchange but for the registration statement—for instance, because the New York Stock Exchange's rules for direct listings require a registration statement before exempt shares can trade.

"[W]e think the better reading of [Section 11] requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that he purchased shares traceable to the allegedly defective registration statement."

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court

Gibson Dunn represented the winning party:

Slack Technologies, LLC

Gibson Dunn

Appellate Honors







Issue:

Whether Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.

Court's Holding:

Plaintiffs suing under Section 11 of the '33 Act must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.

What It Means:

- The Court's opinion adopts the longstanding "tracing" requirement—that plaintiffs suing under Section 11 of the '33 Act must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they are challenging. That requirement had been recognized as a core feature of Section 11 by lower courts, the SEC, and scholars dating back to the 1960s.
- Plaintiffs who challenge statements in a company's '33 Act registration statement, but who cannot trace their shares to that statement, cannot sue under Section 11's specialized liability provision. But they may have other remedies, such as a securities-fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
- In rejecting Pirani's view of Section 11, the Court avoided an interpretation that could have unsettled the scope of liability under that section in cases beyond direct listings, including traditional IPOs and follow-on offerings. The Court's holding protects reasonable expectations and avoids a massive increase in potential liability for companies that recently went public.
- The Court declined to resolve whether Section 12 of the '33 Act, which enforces the Act's prospectus requirement and permits anyone who buys "such security" from the defendant to sue, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(1), likewise requires proof of purchase of registered shares. It "express[ed] no views" about that question and remanded the matter to the lower courts to decide that question in the first instance.

The Court's opinion is available <u>here</u>.

Gibson Dunn's lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

tdupree@gibsondunn.com

aho@gibsondunn.com

jpoon@gibsondunn.com

Thomas G. Hungar +1 202.887.3784 Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658

thungar@gibsondunn.com

Itownsend@gibsondunn.com

bhamburger@gibsondunn.com

Jacob T. Spencer +1 202.887.3792

jspencer@gibsondunn.com

Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326

bhubbard@gibsondunn.com

Related Practice: Litigation

Reed Brodsky +1 212.351.5334 Theane Evangelis +1 213.229.7726 Veronica S. Moyé +1 214.698.3320

rbrodsky@gibsondunn.com

tevangelis@gibsondunn.com

vmoye@gibsondunn.com

Helgi C. Walker +1 202.887.3599

Matthew S. Kahn +1 415.393.8212

hwalker@gibsondunn.com

mkahn@gibsondunn.com

Related Practice: Securities Litigation

Monica K. Loseman

Brian M. Lutz +1 415.393.8379 Craig Varnen +1 213.229.7922

+1 303.298.5784 mloseman@gibsondunn.com

blutz@gibsondunn.com

cvarnen@gibsondunn.com

Michael D. Celio +1 650.849.5326

mcelio@gibsondunn.com

© 2023 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071

Attorney Advertising: The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

Please note, prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

If you would prefer NOT to receive future e-mail alerts from the firm, please reply to this email with the word "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. Thank you.

Please visit our website at www.gibsondunn.com. | Legal Notice, Please Read.