June 6, 2014
Gibson Dunn associate Eric Lorber and Peter D. Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University, are co-authors of the following article which appears in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. It argues that the attributes that make economic sanctions effective can also make them difficult to unwind, which poses a problem: If Washington can’t ease the pressure when states comply with its demands, it can’t expect to achieve its most important goals.
Penalty Box – How Sanctions Trap Policymakers
Mr. Lorber is a member of Gibson Dunn’s International Trade Practice Group based in Washington, D.C. He previously served at the U.S. Department of Treasury on the Iran sanctions desk in the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, as well as in the Chief Counsel’s Office at OFAC. Mr. Lorber is not yet admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, and currently practices under the supervision of the Principals of the Firm.
© 2014, Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2014. Reprinted with permission from the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.