Supreme Court Holds That U.S. Preventive Task Force Members Are Inferior Officers Who May Be Appointed By The HHS Secretary
Client Alert | June 27, 2025
Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc., No. 24-316 – Decided June 27, 2025
Today, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that the members of the U.S. Preventive Task Force are inferior officers whose appointment by the HHS Secretary is consistent with the Appointments Clause.
“Task Force members remain subject to the Secretary of HHS’s supervision and direction, and the Secretary remains subject to the President’s supervision and direction. So under Article II and this Court’s precedents, Task Force members are inferior officers, and Congress may vest the power to appoint them in the Secretary of HHS.’”
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court
Background:
The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force is a 16-member volunteer body within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Task Force members are experts in prevention, evidence-based medicine, and primary care who develop recommendations about preventive health services. They serve four-year terms, and there are no statutory restrictions on their removal. The current Task Force members were appointed by the Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; their appointments were later ratified by the HHS Secretary in June 2023.
In codifying the Task Force, Congress directed that “[a]ll members of the Task Force . . . and any recommendations made by such members, shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U.S.C. § 299b-4(a)(6). Although the Task Force originally made only voluntary recommendations, in the Affordable Care Act of 2010, Congress determined that some of the Task Force’s recommendations would create binding obligations for health-insurance issuers and group health plans to cover certain preventive health services, unless rejected by the HHS Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)-(b).
Several small businesses and individuals objected to the requirement—recommended by the Task Force—that health-insurance issuers and group plans cover certain HIV-prevention medications. Plaintiffs argued that the structure of the Task Force violated the Appointments Clause because Task Force members are “principal officers” and must therefore be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The HHS Secretary disagreed, arguing that Task Force members are “inferior officers” who may be appointed by the HHS Secretary.
The district court ruled for Plaintiffs, agreeing that the Task Force members’ appointments violated the Constitution because they were principal officers. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the ground that “the Task Force cannot be ‘independent’ and free from ‘political pressure’ on the one hand, and at the same time be supervised by the HHS Secretary, a political appointee, on the other.”
Issue:
Whether appointment of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force members by the HHS Secretary is consistent with the Appointments Clause.
Court’s Holding:
Yes. Task Force members are inferior officers: they are removable at will by the HHS Secretary and their recommendations can be rejected by the HHS Secretary before having any legal effect.
What It Means:
- Today’s decision reiterates the Court’s commitment to enforcing the Appointments Clause and the chain of political accountability that is central to its design. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237 (2018).
- In making the principal versus inferior officer determination, the Court emphasized that at-will removal by a principal officer is strong evidence of inferiority. At-will removal is a “powerful tool for control” and historical practice supports treating officers who can be removed at will by principal officers as inferior.
- The Court also emphasized that the default presumption is that all officers are removable at will, and unless Congress clearly and explicitly states otherwise, the Court will not presume or imply restrictions on officers’ removal.
- The Court clarified that the inability of a principal officer to compel a subordinate officer’s actions does not mean the subordinate officer is not inferior. The superior officer’s ability to overrule or reject a subordinate’s decision is sufficient supervisory authority.
- The Court’s decision provides guidance to the potential avenues available to businesses seeking to challenge actions by federal government actors who may not have been validly appointed. Important considerations include assessing whether the actors’ decision may be overruled or rejected by senior government personnel and whether statutory language about independence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of at-will removal.
The Court’s opinion is available here.
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This alert was prepared by associates Salah Hawkins and Aly Cox.
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