Supreme Court Holds That District Courts Are Not Bound By Agency Interpretations In Enforcement Proceedings

Client Alert  |  June 20, 2025


McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation, No. 23-1226 – Decided June 20, 2025

Today, the Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act’s exclusive review provision for administrative orders does not prevent district courts from interpreting a statutory provision in civil enforcement proceedings.

“The Hobbs Act does not preclude district courts in enforcement proceedings from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is correct.”

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court

Background:

The Hobbs Act provides that for certain pre-enforcement challenges to agency orders, “[t]he court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission” (FCC) and other agencies.  28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).  Circuit courts were divided as to whether this channeled review provision required district courts to defer to the FCC’s interpretation in any subsequent civil enforcement actions after the period for court of appeals review had passed.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) creates a private right of action against companies that “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).  McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates brought a class action lawsuit against McKesson Corporation alleging that the company sent unsolicited messages using online fax services to market its medical software products.  While the lawsuit was ongoing, the FCC issued an order determining that the TCPA did not apply to an online fax service because it was not a “telephone facsimile machine.”  The district court followed the interpretation set forth in the FCC’s order and entered summary judgment for McKesson, reasoning that the Hobbs Act precluded the court from considering whether the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA was correct.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Issue:

Whether the Hobbs Act binds district courts presiding over civil enforcement suits to an agency’s interpretation of a statute.

Court’s Holding:

No.  The Hobbs Act channels pre-enforcement challenges of agency orders to the courts of appeals.  But the availability of pre-enforcement review does not mean that district courts are bound by the agency’s interpretation in civil enforcement proceedings.

What It Means:

  • Today’s decision continues a trend of the Court limiting the deference federal courts must give to an agency’s legal interpretations, following on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), and other cases.  The decision strengthens parties’ ability to request that a court issue a decision contrary to an agency’s interpretation, including in litigation between private parties.
  • The Court emphasized that Congress can restrict judicial review in an enforcement proceeding, provided Congress does so clearly.  Absent such a clear statement by Congress, courts presume judicial review is permitted and may independently assess the meaning of a statute in the context of an enforcement proceeding.  Because the Hobbs Act is silent as to whether a party may contest the agency’s legal interpretation in subsequent enforcement proceedings, it does not preclude judicial review or bind district courts to the agency’s interpretation.
  • The Court’s decision suggests that potential defendants might not be able to rely solely on agency determinations to provide a safe harbor, since a court may not be bound by the agency’s interpretation.  However, defendants may still argue that the safe harbor correctly interprets the statute and is entitled to weight under Skidmore.  They may also raise other arguments, including that principles of fair notice preclude liability or that other elements of the applicable statute are not satisfied.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

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This alert was prepared by associate Salah Hawkins.

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