FinCEN Issues Orders Declaring Three Mexican Financial Institutions of “Primary Money Laundering Concern” Related to Fentanyl and Opioid Trafficking
Client Alert | July 2, 2025
Gibson Dunn is monitoring regulatory developments and executive orders closely. Our attorneys are available to assist clients as they navigate the challenges and opportunities posed by the current, evolving legal landscape.
Overview
On June 25, 2025, the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued three orders identifying three Mexico-based financial institutions—CIBanco S.A., Insitución de Banca Multiple (CIBanco), Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple (Intercam), and Vector Casa de Bolsa S.A. de C.V. (Vector)—as being of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking. The three orders (the “2313a Orders”) prohibit U.S. financial institutions from engaging in financial transactions with CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector.[1]
As a result of the 2313a Orders, domestic financial institutions will need to update their compliance programs and controls to ensure they do not engage in transmittals of funds involving CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector. U.S. financial institutions will be well-served by reviewing their compliance programs, calibrating their compliance-related risk assessments, and ensuring they implement controls to prevent doing business with the designated financial institutions. Non-financial institutions should be aware of these orders; though the 2313a Orders do not apply to them, the orders will affect their banking and other financial institution partners.
This alert begins with an overview of the relevant statutory background to provide insight into 21 U.S.C. § 2313a, the recently passed statute that FinCEN employed to issue these first-of-their-kind orders. It then summarizes the substance of the 2313a Orders, and concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of the 2313a Orders for domestic financial institutions.
Statutory Background
In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act as part of Public Law 118-50, which, inter alia, created 21 U.S.C. § 2313a to provide the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to designate certain foreign financial institutions, classes of foreign transactions, and types of foreign accounts as of “primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking.”[2]
Similar to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act,[3] Section 2313a empowers Treasury to sanction foreign financial institutions which the Secretary believes to be facilitating money laundering.[4] However, Section 2313a is focused on illicit opioid trafficking,[5] which is defined in federal law as “any illicit activity…to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly finance or transport synthetic opioids, including controlled substances that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are synthetic opioids, or active pharmaceutical ingredients or chemicals that are used in the production of controlled substances that are synthetic opioids,” or any attempt, conspiracy or aiding and abetting, other persons to do the same.[6] Under Section 2313a, upon determining that there are “reasonable grounds” for concluding that any foreign financial institution, class of transactions, or accounts have been involved in money laundering in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, the Secretary of the Treasury may require domestic financial institutions, as defined by the Bank Secrecy Act, to take certain special measures as described in Section 311, or to entirely prohibit or otherwise condition transmission of funds by domestic financial institutions involving the designated institutions, classes, or accounts.[7]
While Sections 2313a and 311 provide the Secretary of the Treasury authority to combat money laundering by designating institutions of primary money laundering concern, there are notable differences. First, Section 2313a is limited to money laundering concerns connected specifically to opioid trafficking. Second, Section 2313a provides more expansive authority, because in addition to authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to implement any of the special measures provided for in Section 311, it also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to entirely prohibit or condition certain transmittals of funds by domestic financial institutions if they involve a designated institution. Third, Section 2313a permits special measures to be imposed by an agency order alone and does not require notice and comment rulemaking.
Summary of the 2313a Orders
The 2313a Orders entirely prohibit U.S. financial institutions from engaging in certain transmittals of funds with CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector. Transmittals of funds is defined by the Orders “as the sending and receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.” According to Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector “are enabling the poisoning of countless Americans by moving money on behalf of cartels, making them vital cogs in the fentanyl supply chain.”[8] The three institutions allegedly “played a longstanding and vital role in laundering millions of dollars on behalf of Mexico-based cartels” and “facilitat[ed] payments for the procurement of precusor chemicals needed to produce fentanyl.”[9]
Secretary Bessent delegated authority to administer Section 2313a to the Director of FinCEN, Andrea Gacki.[10] The Director of FinCEN stated that while she was under “no obligation” “to consider any particular factor or set of factors” to determine that a financial institution was of primary money laundering concern, she stated that she considered the factors listed in Section 311 as “instructive.”[11] As to each of CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector, the Director announced there was evidence that the institutions played vital roles in facilitating money laundering activities of Mexico-based cartels engaging in illicit opioid trafficking, including facilitating payments for the procurement of precursor chemicals essential for the production of illicit opioids by drug trafficking. The Director then determined that the appropriate sanction was a total prohibition by U.S. financial institutions, citing the effect on U.S. national security and foreign policy, the minimal burdens on legitimate activities, and the fact that the other potential special measures under Section 311 were inadequate.[12]
The 2313a Orders prohibit domestic financial institutions and agencies from engaging in transmittals of funds to or from CIBanco’s, Intercam’s, and Vector’s Mexican entities, including their Mexico-based branches, subsidiaries, and offices.[13] As noted above, “transmittals of funds” is defined by the 2313a Orders as “as the sending and receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.” The 2313a Orders will go into effect on September 4, 2025.[14] If a U.S. financial institution continues to transact with CIBanco, Intercam, or Vector, after that date, the financial institution could face civil monetary penalties[15] or, in the event of willful violations, criminal penalties, under the Bank Secrecy Act.[16]
Implications of the 2313a Orders
The 2313a Orders are the first time FinCEN has employed Section 2313a to sanction foreign financial institutions for opioid trafficking-related money laundering.[17]
In addition to demonstrating that FinCEN will continue to aggressively designate primary money laundering concerns,[18] the 2313a Orders demonstrate that the Trump Administration will use many different tools to attack what the Attorney General has stated is the goal of the “Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations.”[19]
Finally, as stated at the outset of this Client Alert, as a result of the prohibitions promulgated in the 2313a Orders, domestic financial institutions will need to update their compliance programs and controls to ensure they do not engage in transmittals of funds involving the designated financial institutions. U.S. financial institutions therefore will be well-served by reviewing their compliance programs and calibrating their compliance-related risk assessments to mitigate against changing risk and enforcement realities reflected in the 2313a Orders, as well as to ensure they implement controls to prevent doing business with the designated financial institutions.
While the 2313 Orders only apply to domestic financial institutions, other types of companies should also be aware of these orders. Compliance by domestic financial institutions will likely affect banking and other relationships connected to the sanctioned Mexican institutions.
On July 9, 2025, FinCEN issued updated guidance extending the effective date for the 2313a Orders from July 21 for 45 additional days. The 2313a Orders will thus go into effect on September 4, 2025.
[1] See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Issues Historic Order Under Powerful New Authority to Counter Fentanyl (June 25, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0179.
[2] See 21 U.S.C. § 2313a(a).
[3] See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5318A. Section 311 confers Treasury with the authority to “require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take 1 or more of the special measures described [in Section 311] if the Secretary finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding” that foreign financial institutions, transactions, or accounts are “of primarily money laundering concern.” Id. § 5318A(a)(1). These “special measures” are restrictions that require U.S. financial institutions take certain cautionary measures with respect to the restricted foreign financial institutions, to protect the United States from foreign money laundering efforts. See id. §§ 5318A(b)(1)-(5).
[4] See 21 U.S.C. § 2313a.
[5] 21 U.S.C. § 2313a(a).
[6] 21 U.S.C. § 2302(8).
[7] 21 U.S.C. § 2313a(1)
[8] See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 1.
[9] Id.
[10] See Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving CIBanco S.A., Institución De Banca Multiple, 90 Fed. Reg. 27770, 27770 n.4 (June 30, 2025) (hereinafter “CIBanco Order”).
[11] Id. at 27772 & n.17. Section 311 lists potentially relevant factors as: (1) the extent to which such financial institutions, transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through the jurisdiction, including any money laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles; (2) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, or types of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction; and (3) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure, with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of this subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(c)(2)(B).
[12] See CIBanco Order at 27772-76; Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving Intercam Banco S.A., Institución de Banca Multiple, 90 Fed. Reg. 27777, 27778-83 (June 30, 2025); Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., 90 Fed. Reg. 27764, 27765-70 (June 30, 2025).
[13] The orders do not apply to these companies’ branches, subsidiaries, or offices located outside of Mexico.
[14] See https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/treasury-extends-effective-dates-orders-issued-under-new-authority-counter.
[15] 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(7).
[16] 31 U.S.C. § 5322(d).
[17] See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FinCEN, Treasury Issues Unprecedented Orders under Powerful New Authority to Counter Fentanyl, https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/treasury-issues-unprecedented-orders-under-powerful-new-authority-counter.
[18] Under a different statute, in 2023 and 2024 FinCEN designated two alleged Russian cybercrime services as of primary money laundering concern. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2616; https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-identifies-virtual-currency-exchange-bitzlato-primary-money-laundering.
[19] https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1388546/dl.
Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. For additional information about how we may assist you, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or the following leaders and members of the firm’s Anti-Money Laundering/Financial Institutions, International Trade Advisory & Enforcement, National Security, Sanctions & Export Enforcement, or White Collar Defense & Investigations practice groups.
Anti-Money Laundering / Financial Institutions:
Stephanie Brooker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3502, [email protected])
M. Kendall Day – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8220, [email protected])
Amy Feagles – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3699, [email protected])
Ella Alves Capone – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3511, [email protected])
Sam Raymond – New York (+1 212.351.2499, [email protected])
International Trade Advisory & Enforcement:
Ronald Kirk – Dallas (+1 214.698.3295, [email protected])
Adam M. Smith – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3547, [email protected])
National Security:
Zainab N. Ahmad – New York (+1 212.351.2609, [email protected])
David P. Burns – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3786, [email protected])
Sanctions & Export Enforcement:
Matthew S. Axelrod – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8517, [email protected])
Adam M. Smith – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3547, [email protected])
White Collar Defense & Investigations:
Stephanie Brooker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3502, [email protected])
Winston Y. Chan – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8362, [email protected])
Nicola T. Hanna – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7269, [email protected])
F. Joseph Warin – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3609, [email protected])
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