Supreme Court Holds That Title VII Imposes No Additional Evidentiary Requirements On Majority-Group Plaintiffs
Diversity | June 5, 2025
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, No. 23-1039 – Decided June 5, 2025
Today, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not impose an additional requirement on majority-group plaintiffs to show “background circumstances” suggesting that their employer discriminates against the majority group.
“We hold that this additional ‘background circumstances’ requirement is not consistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the statute.”
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court
Background:
Title VII makes it unlawful for any “employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . , because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Those protections cover adverse employment actions based on sexual orientation. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 649-52 (2020).
Marlean Ames, a straight woman, sued her employer under Title VII, claiming she was denied a promotion and later demoted based on her sexual orientation. In support, she pointed out that her employer hired a gay woman for the position to which she had applied and a gay man to fill her previous position after the demotion. The district court granted summary judgment for her employer, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying circuit precedent, the court of appeals held that Ames had failed to show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is th[e] unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Title VII imposes that background-circumstances requirement.
Issue:
Whether a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group must show “background circumstances” suggesting the defendant is the “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Court’s Holding:
No: Title VII imposes the same evidentiary requirements on majority-as on minority-group plaintiffs.
What It Means:
- Today’s decision confirms that courts assessing Title VII claims need not divide plaintiffs into majority and minority groups. The burdens of proof are identical for all Title VII plaintiffs, regardless of whether the plaintiffs are in the majority or minority with respect to their protected characteristics.
- The Court’s opinion lowers the barrier for majority-group plaintiffs to bring (and increases the burden on employers to defend against) so-called reverse-discrimination claims, particularly in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, all of which had adopted the background-circumstances requirement.
- The Court’s opinion emphasizes that Title VII prohibits covered discrimination of any kind, not merely discrimination against a limited set of historically disadvantaged groups, which comports with the Court’s modern approach to most anti-discrimination statutes.
- Given the narrowness of the question presented, the opinion leaves a number of related Title VII issues unaddressed. For example, the Court assumed without deciding that McDonnell Douglas—the traditional framework for evaluating Title VII claims based on circumstantial evidence—applies in the summary-judgment context. The Court also declined to address whether McDonnell Douglas requires specific evidence of pretext or only a showing that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. And Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, in a separate concurrence, questioned whether McDonnell Douglas “is a workable and useful evidentiary tool” at all.
The Court’s opinion is available here.
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This alert was prepared by associates Matt Aidan Getz and Bryston C. Gallegos.
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