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November 26, 2019 |
U.S. Congress Passes The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019; Awaiting Presidential Signature

Click for PDF On November 21, 2019, amid mounting tensions between China and Hong Kong, the U.S. Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (the “Bill”)[1] and sent it to the President for his signature.  The Bill, which aims to protect civil rights in Hong Kong and to deter human rights violations in the territory (including by punishing those who commit them), was passed by supermajorities in both houses of Congress—the House of Representatives approved the Bill by a 417-1 margin, while the Bill received unanimous support in the Senate.[2]  As of this writing, the President has not signed the legislation. On November 22, 2019, President Trump suggested that he might veto the Bill in order to prioritize a trade deal with China, despite the fact that the President’s ability to exercise such authority will be limited because the Bill passed both houses of Congress with rare veto-proof majorities.  Although the U.S. Congress has the power to create the law, the U.S. President has sole enforcement authority, and President Trump may still be able to express his displeasure with the Bill by narrowly interpreting the law’s provisions.  We would expect that the President could announce his desire to narrowly interpret the law in a signing statement made simultaneous with his signing of the Bill. The Bill has received widespread support from the Hong Kong protestors, whose activities over the past several months have often included calls on Washington to show its support for their movement. On the other hand, the Bill has been met with strong opposition in Hong Kong and China due to concerns that the legislation could disrupt economic stability in Hong Kong, as well as worsen the existing trade relationship between Hong Kong and the United States.[3] In Hong Kong, Chief Executive Carrie Lam has said that foreign interference in Hong Kong’s internal affairs is “totally unacceptable” and that any sanctions imposed by Washington would only serve to complicate matters further.[4] Beijing has also characterized the Bill as an interference in China’s domestic affairs and has threatened to take “strong countermeasures” against the United States if the Bill is implemented.[5] Overview of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act 2019 If enacted, the Bill would amend the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “1992 HK Act”), the primary legislation that governs the United States’ relationship with Hong Kong. The 1992 HK Act statute allows Hong Kong to be treated separately from mainland China on various economic matters such as trade. An earlier version of the Bill had been introduced in 2014 in response to the “Umbrella Revolution” that took place in Hong Kong that year;[6] and an updated version was again introduced in 2017. However, the Bill only gained legislative traction this year as violence in Hong Kong escalated. The protests, which have spanned more than 22 weeks, originally began in June. They were spurred by a now-withdrawn bill that would have allowed extraditions from Hong Kong to mainland China, among other jurisdictions, a move that many Hong Kongers viewed as an attempt to circumvent the “one country, two systems” rule and erode human rights in the territory.[7] The protests have since grown into a bigger movement, including broader demands for democracy, such as universal suffrage and the ability for Hong Kongers to elect its own leaders, as set out under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the “Basic Law”).[8] Other demands that the protestors have made also include calls to establish an independent commission of inquiry to look into alleged police brutality against protestors. The Bill, if signed into law, will increase the United States’ scrutiny over the situation in Hong Kong. According to the Bill, the objective of the legislation is to “reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in the [1992 HK Act]”.[9] The Bill also calls for Hong Kong to remain “sufficiently autonomous from the People’s Republic of China to ‘justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or any provision thereof, different from that accorded to the People’s Republic of China.’”[10] Similar to the 1992 HK Act, the Bill requires an annual assessment of Hong Kong’s autonomy to determine whether it should continue to be treated differently from mainland China. Additionally, the Bill introduces the potential imposition of U.S. sanctions in response to human rights violations in Hong Kong. The following is a summary of the key provisions of the Bill: Annual Certification of Hong Kong Under the provisions of the Bill, on an annual basis the U.S. Secretary of State will be required to report to the Congress the U.S. Government’s view as to whether Hong Kong retains sufficient autonomy to merit its continued enjoyment of economic treatment by the United States distinct from (and in almost all cases more favorable than) the treatment provided to the mainland.[11] Furthermore, the report must include “an assessment of the degree of any erosions to Hong Kong’s autonomy” that have an impact on a number of matters such as commercial agreements, sanctions enforcement, export controls, and any other agreements and forms of exchange involving dual-use, critical, or other sensitive technologies as a result of any action taken by the Chinese government that is inconsistent with its commitments under the Basic Law or the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.[12] Importantly, under the Bill a positive assessment that allows the continued differentiated treatment between Hong Kong and mainland China does not require that Beijing allow for further democratization in Hong Kong. Annual Report on Violations of U.S. Export Control Laws and UN Sanctions in Hong Kong The Bill also requires the U.S. Secretaries of the Treasury and State to submit a separate joint report to Congress that includes: an assessment of the nature and extent of violations of U.S. export control and sanctions laws occurring in Hong Kong; an identification of items reexported from Hong Kong in violation of U.S. export control and sanctions laws, including the countries and persons to which the items were reexported to, and how such items were used; an assessment of whether sensitive dual-use items subject to U.S. export control laws are being transhipped through Hong Kong and used to develop mass surveillance programs in China; an assessment of whether China has been using Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory to import goods into China from Hong Kong in contravention of U.S. export control laws through certain schemes or programs that may exploit Hong Kong as a conduit for controlled sensitive technology; an assessment of whether Hong Kong has adequately enforced sanctions imposed by the United Nations (“UN”); a description of the types of goods and services transhipped or reexported through Hong Kong in violation of UN sanctions to North Korea, Iran, or other high risk jurisdictions or entities; and an assessment of whether any shortcomings in Hong Kong’s enforcement of sanctions and export controls necessitates the assignment of additional personnel to the U.S. Consulate of Hong Kong.[13] Promulgation of U.S. Sanctions in Response to Human Rights Violations in Hong Kong The Bill empowers the President to impose sanctions on individuals deemed responsible for “the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong” or “other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong.”[14] The potential sanctions that could be imposed are varied, and could include asset blocking which would effectively blacklist any identified party from participating in transactions with U.S. persons. This would be akin to adding such a party to the U.S. Specially Designated Persons and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”), freezing any property owned by such a party in the United States, and prohibiting any transactions involving such a party that has a U.S. nexus.[15] This would also greatly limit the designated party’s ability to engage in U.S. Dollar trade (which almost always requires clearing through a bank under U.S. jurisdiction). Other types of sanctions that could be imposed include the revocation or denial of U.S. visas currently issued or to be issued to identified individuals.[16] On the other hand, the Bill provides that visa applications from Hong Kong applicants will not be denied on the basis of “politically motivated arrest, detention, or other adverse government action.”[17] Implications of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act 2019 Potential Impact on Hong Kong Companies Under the 1992 HK Act, Hong Kong’s distinct trading status from China has meant that it enjoys protection from punitive tariffs that the United States has imposed on China, including the tariffs that are currently in force as a result of continuing U.S.-China trade disagreements. If the Bill becomes law and Hong Kong’s protected status is eroded or removed, the impact could be significant for both Hong Kong and U.S. companies. As discussed, the Bill requires the U.S. Secretary of State to assess and certify on an annual basis, whether Hong Kong should continue to enjoy its special trade benefits vis-à-vis the United States. An adverse assessment could potentially threaten this status. Hong Kong is currently the United States’ 21st largest trading partner, with goods and services trade with Hong Kong amounting to nearly $70 billion in 2018.[18] Any limitations on trade imposed on Hong Kong could also threaten its reputation as a global financial hub – which has relied, at least in part, on its preferential trading relationship with counterparties including the United States. More than 1,300 U.S. firms currently operate in Hong Kong, and nearly every major U.S. financial firm maintains a presence in the territory, with billions of dollars of assets under management.[19] Hong Kong also risks losing ready access to U.S. technologies that are more tightly controlled when exported to China as the Bill could result in the United States imposing the same export controls on Hong Kong as it places on China. Potential Impact on U.S. Companies The impact of the Bill on the United States could be broader than trade-related losses with respect to Hong Kong. The Bill could stall trade talks between the United States and China and derail plans between the two nations to complete a “phase one” trade deal that had been announced earlier in November.[20] Even more significantly, the Bill may invite China to impose its long-threatened countersanctions against U.S. companies. Following its recent favourable World Trade Organization decision against the United States, China may find justification to impose $3.6 billion in tariffs against the United States.[21] The Bill could spur China to place additional sanctions on key U.S. imports such as aircraft, services, and wider manufacturing. Earlier in June 2019, aerospace manufacturer Boeing was reportedly in talks with Chinese air carriers for a potential $30 billion deal for the sale of wide-body aircraft, which would be one of the largest orders ever placed.[22] The deal has been threatened by the ongoing trade war, and may be subject to further delay or even cancellation if the Bill becomes law and dealings with U.S. firms become more sensitive for major Chinese entities.[23] Perhaps most aggressively, China could go as far as to proscribe some U.S. companies from doing business in China – effectively placing U.S. firms on a Chinese blacklist. Beijing has threatened such a response in the past but has yet to fully enact such a consequence. China announced the beginnings of such a list earlier in 2019 in response to the U.S. restrictions placed on Huawei Technologies Co.[24] At that time, China announced plans to establish an “unreliable entity” list that targets foreign companies or persons who China deems as severely damaging the legitimate interests of Chinese companies by, amongst others, blocking or cutting off supply chains for “non-commercial reasons.”[25] _________________________ [1]   Summary of 116thCongress (2019-2020) (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1838/summary/55 [2]   See Jacob Pramuk, Congress passes Hong Kong rights bill as Trump tries to strike China trade deal, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/20/house-passes-hong-kong-rights-bill-amid-trump-china-trade-talks.html [3]   See Tobias Hoonhout, China Calls Senate’s Passing of Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act ‘Very Disappointing’, National Review (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/china-calls-senates-passing-of-hong-kong-human-rights-and-democracy-act-very-disappointing/ [4]   See Iain Marlow and Daniel Flatley, What the U.S. Congress Is and Isn’t Doing About Hong Kong, Washington Post (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-the-us-congress-is-and-isnt-doing-about-hong-kong/2019/11/18/d51ab226-0a19-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html [5]   See China warns U.S. of “strong countermeasures” to looming legislation on Hong Kong, CBS News (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-hong-kong-human-rights-and-democracy-act-2019-strong-countermeasures-beijing-today-2019-11-21/ [6]   Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, S. 2922 [7]   See Senate Passes Bill Supporting Human Rights in Hong Kong as Protests Show No Sign of Abating, Associated Press (Nov. 20, 2019), https://time.com/5733673/senate-human-rights-democracy-act-hong-kong/ [8]   See Hong Kong’s Protests Explained, Amnesty International (undated), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/ [9]   Section 3 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, S. 1838 [10]   Id. [11]   Id at Section 4 [12]   Id. [13]   Id at Section 5. [14]   Id at Section 7. [15]   Id. [16]   Id. [17]   Id at Section 4. [18]   Office of the United States Trade Representative Hong Kong Report. [19]   United States Department of State 2019 Hong Kong Policy Act Report. [20]   See US and China ‘getting close’ to trade deal, White House economic advisor Kudlow says, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/15/us-china-getting-close-to-trade-deal-white-house-advisor-kudlow.html [21]   See Robert Delaney, China wins WTO case to sanction US$3.6 billion in US products following anti-dumping dispute, South China Morning Post (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3036010/china-wins-wto-case-sanction-us36-billion-us-trade [22]   See Boeing and Chinese airlines in talks for US$30 billion mega-deal that trade war could derail, South China Morning Post (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3013289/boeing-and-chinese-airlines-talks-us30-billion-mega-deal-trade-war-could [23]   See Explainer: U.S.-China trade war – the levers they can pull, Reuters (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-levers-explainer/explainer-u-s-china-trade-war-the-levers-they-can-pull-idUSKCN1T62KY [24]   Gibson Dunn Client Alert (May 20, 2019), Citing a National Emergency, the Trump Administration Moves to Secure U.S. Information and Communications Technology and Service Infrastructure, https://www.gibsondunn.com/?search=news&article-type=publications&s=huawei&year=&practice%5B%5D=1680 [25]   See What We Know About China’s ‘Unreliable Entities’ Blacklist, Bloomberg News (Jun. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-04/understanding-china-s-unreliable-entities-blacklist-quicktake The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this client update: Adam Smith, Grace Chow, Stephanie Connor, Chris Timura, Judith Alison Lee, David Lee, Brian Schwarzwalder, Scott Jalowayski, Kelly Austin, John Fadely, Fang Xue, Paul Boltz, and Yi Zhang. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the above developments.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s International Trade practice group, or the authors: United States: Judith Alison Lee – Co-Chair, International Trade Practice, Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3591, jalee@gibsondunn.com) Adam M. Smith – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3547, asmith@gibsondunn.com) David C. Lee – Orange County, CA (+1 949-451-3842, dlee@gibsondunn.com) Christopher T. Timura – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3690, ctimura@gibsondunn.com) Stephanie L. Connor – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8586, sconnor@gibsondunn.com) Asia: Kelly Austin – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3788, kaustin@gibsondunn.com) Paul Boltz – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3723, pboltz@gibsondunn.com) Grace Chow – Singapore (+65 6507 3632, gchow@gibsondunn.com) John Fadely – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3810, jfadely@gibsondunn.com) Scott Jalowayski – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3727, sjalowayski@gibsondunn.com) Brian Schwarzwalder – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3712, bschwarzwalder@gibsondunn.com) Fang Xue – Beijing (+86 10 6502 8687, fxue@gibsondunn.com) Yi Zhang – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3988, yzhang@gibsondunn.com) © 2019 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.

May 20, 2019 |
Citing a National Emergency, the Trump Administration Moves to Secure U.S. Information and Communications Technology and Service Infrastructure

Click for PDF On Wednesday, May 15, 2019, the Trump Administration took two separate, but related moves toward securing the information and communications technology and services (ICT) infrastructure of the United States.[1]  The first was the issuance of an executive order (“ICT EO”), declaring a national emergency with respect to the ICT supply chain.  The second was the imposition by the Secretary of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) of new restrictions on the exports of technology, software, and hardware to Chinese multinational telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics manufacturer Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (“Huawei”) and its affiliates worldwide.  While the first action establishes only a general framework for implementing regulations designed to end what the EO calls “foreign adversary” involvement in ICT networks in and linked to the United States, the second action has known, immediate, and significant impacts on those doing business with Huawei and any of its 68 named affiliates in 26 countries.  And while only the second move explicitly impacts a Chinese company, both moves are significant escalations in the current U.S.-China trade war. Less than two business days after the effective date of its export ban on Huawei, the Trump Administration took an action that illustrates just how far reaching its export ban will be. BIS issued a Temporary General License, issued on May 20, 2019, to allow exports to continue that support Huawei and its listed affiliates in four categories of transactions. ICT EO – Securing the ICT Supply Chain The ICT EO gives the Secretary of Commerce the power to prohibit U.S. persons from acquiring, importing, transferring, installing, dealing in, or using any ICT when the transaction involves any foreign person property or interest in property, and the Secretary of Commerce determines that (1)     the ICT is designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and (2)     the transaction (a)   poses an undue threat of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of ICT in the United States, (b)   poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency of the U.S. critical infrastructure or digital economy, or (c)   otherwise poses a risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. These broad criteria lay the groundwork for U.S. agencies to regulate transactions both inside and outside of the United States, especially considering the cybersecurity threats involving ICT infrastructure outside of the United States.  The ICT EO defines “foreign adversary” as “any foreign government or foreign non-government person engaged in a long‑term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.”[2] The ICT EO diverges from past practice involving trade in two significant ways.  First, rather than imposing sanctions on U.S. persons conducting business in particular countries or with particular persons, the ICT EO focuses on a wide range of transaction types, regardless of location, that could impact the ICT infrastructure of the U.S. whenever U.S. persons and foreign person property or property interests are involved.  Second, and in contrast with typical U.S. sanctions executive orders, the long list of agencies referenced in the ICT EO suggests that whatever regulatory framework is developed to implement the order will involve significant interagency collaboration and cross-agency functions.  The ICT EO specifically foresees the involvement of nine named agencies and offices including the Treasury, State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security Departments, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Federal Communications Commission.[3] Many of these departments and agencies already exercise authorities that safeguard aspects of the U.S. ICT infrastructure.  For example, Treasury’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States already has authority to block controlling and certain non-controlling investments by foreign persons in the U.S. companies that supply, build, service and manage the ICT infrastructure.[4]  Similarly, the GSA and DoD already have authority under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019 to prohibit procurement from a list of ICT companies Congress has deemed threats to U.S. national security and from contractors that rely on them for their ICT infrastructure.[5]  Notwithstanding this, the EO’s language gives broad authority to the Secretary of Commerce to create an entirely new regulatory framework that could impose new import, export, use, and other transaction-based licensing requirements. Under the ICT EO, potential prohibitions can be imposed on transactions involving “any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use of any [ICT] . . . by any person, or with respect to any property, . . . in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest” that is initiated, pending or will be completed as of and after May 15, 2019.[6]  Given this broad remit, the new transaction-based licensing requirements may take many forms, including the blocking and forced unwinding of ongoing transactions, bans on the import of ICT items from particular countries and persons, and controls on U.S. person involvement (including both natural and legal persons) in ICT transactions abroad that involve foreign adversary ICT and that could impact U.S. ICT infrastructure, U.S. critical technology or digital economy, or U.S. national security. Entity List Designation Alongside the ICT EO, the Secretary of Commerce announced a more specific action targeting Huawei and 68 non-U.S. affiliates.  Specifically, the Secretary announced the decision of the End-User Review Committee (“ERC”)[7], which is chaired by BIS, to add Huawei and its named affiliates to the Entity List.[8]  Entities are added to the Entity List if and when the ERC deems them to pose a significant risk of involvement in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.  The principal consequence of being added to the Entity List is the imposition of export licensing requirements for shipments to that foreign company. The impact of this new end-user licensing requirement can vary depending on the more specific lines BIS draws around the items to which the licensing requirement will apply.  For example, some Entity List entries only prohibit the unlicensed export of items described on the Commerce Control List or under specific Export Control Classification Numbers to those identified.  In the Huawei case, however, BIS took the most extreme position.  Under the terms of an official draft of the Federal Register Notice for the EL listing made public on May 16, 2019, BIS announced its plan to require a license for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), even “EAR 99” commodities, software and technology, to Huawei and that it would review license applications for all such exports with a policy presumption of denial.[9] The ERC’s cited basis for its finding that Huawei and its affiliates have been or could be involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the U.S. is a Superseding Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York of Huawei which includes among its 13 counts two charges that Huawei knowingly and willfully conspired and caused the export, reexport, sale and supply, directly and indirectly, of goods, technology and services from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).[10]  BIS also noted that Huawei’s Iran-based affiliate is alleged to have conspired with others “to impair, impede, obstruct, and defeat, through deceitful and dishonest means, the lawful government operations of OFAC.”[11] The issuance of the ICT EO and Huawei’s EL listing coincide with a stall in the U.S.-China trade talks, and some may view these actions as creating leverage for the conclusion of a trade agreement between the countries.  Regardless, the EL listing, in particular, will have immediate and significantly disruptive effects on Huawei’s supply chain.  Any Huawei supplier or vendor, including several major U.S. companies, is now required to apply for BIS licenses to transfer any item subject to the EAR to Huawei and its affiliates, and many of Huawei’s customers are likely to experience associated repair and support disruption in their ICT infrastructure and services. Just how disruptive these new export licensing requirements will be became immediately clear in a subsequent action by BIS on May 20, 2019.[12]  Less two full business days after the effective date of its EL listing, BIS granted a 90-day temporary license (through August 19, 2019) that partially suspends the effects of the EL listing.  The general license will allow Huawei and its listed affiliated to continue receiving exports—subject  to any prior applicable licensing requirements—associated with four categories of transactions.  These include: (1)     exports necessary to maintain and support existing and fully operational networks and equipment, including software updates and patches, provided they are made pursuant to legally-binding contracts and agreements entered into on or before May 16, 2019; (2)     exports necessary to provide service and support, including software updates or patches, to existing Huawei handsets that were available to the public on or before May 16, 2019; (3)     disclosure to Huawei and the listed affiliates, of information regarding security vulnerabilities in items owned, possessed, or controlled by them when related to the process of providing ongoing security research critical to maintaining the integrity and reliability of existing and currently fully operational networks and equipment, as well as handsets; and (4)     exports incident to the engagement with Huawei and the listed affiliates necessary for the development of 5G standards by duly recognized standards bodies. Exporters that make use of the general license to export, reexport, or transfer items to Huawei must prepare a certification statement explaining how the export, reexport, or transfer fits within the scope of the general license and maintain that certification as a record for five years. [1]   President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, May 15, 2019 (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/). [2]   ICT EO, § 3(b). [3]   ICT EO, § 1(a). [4]   31 C.F.R. Parts 800 and 801. [5]   John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, § 889 (2018). [6]   ICT EO, § 1(a). [7]   The ERC is composed of representatives from the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, Energy, and Treasury. [8]   15 C.F.R. § 744.16. [9]   Department of Commerce, BIS, Addition of Entities to the Entity List, May 16, 2019, (available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2019-10616.pdf).  Note that this is an unpublished version that is not scheduled to be published in the Federal Register until May 21, 2019. [10]   Id. at 3–4. [11]   Id. at 4. [12]   Department of Commerce, BIS, Temporary General License, May 20, 2019, (available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2019-10829.pdf).  Note that this is an unpublished version that is not scheduled to be published in the Federal Register until May 22, 2019. The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this client update: Judith Alison Lee, Adam M. Smith, Christopher Timura, and Laura Cole. Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the above developments.  Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any of the following leaders and members of the firm’s International Trade practice group: United States: Judith Alison Lee – Co-Chair, International Trade Practice, Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3591, jalee@gibsondunn.com) Ronald Kirk – Co-Chair, International Trade Practice, Dallas (+1 214-698-3295, rkirk@gibsondunn.com) M. Kendall Day – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8220, kday@gibsondunn.com) Jose W. Fernandez – New York (+1 212-351-2376, jfernandez@gibsondunn.com) Marcellus A. McRae – Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7675, mmcrae@gibsondunn.com) Adam M. Smith – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3547, asmith@gibsondunn.com) Christopher T. Timura – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3690, ctimura@gibsondunn.com) Ben K. Belair – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3743, bbelair@gibsondunn.com) Courtney M. Brown – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8685, cmbrown@gibsondunn.com) Laura R. Cole – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3787, lcole@gibsondunn.com) Stephanie L. Connor – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8586, sconnor@gibsondunn.com) Henry C. Phillips – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8535, hphillips@gibsondunn.com) R.L. Pratt – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-887-3785, rpratt@gibsondunn.com) Audi K. Syarief – Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8266, asyarief@gibsondunn.com) Scott R. Toussaint – Palo Alto (+1 650-849-5320, stoussaint@gibsondunn.com) Europe: Peter Alexiadis – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 00, palexiadis@gibsondunn.com) Attila Borsos – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 10, aborsos@gibsondunn.com) Patrick Doris – London (+44 (0)207 071 4276, pdoris@gibsondunn.com) Sacha Harber-Kelly – London (+44 20 7071 4205, sharber-kelly@gibsondunn.com) Penny Madden – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4226, pmadden@gibsondunn.com) Steve Melrose – London (+44 (0)20 7071 4219, smelrose@gibsondunn.com) Benno Schwarz – Munich (+49 89 189 33 110, bschwarz@gibsondunn.com) Michael Walther – Munich (+49 89 189 33-180, mwalther@gibsondunn.com) Richard W. Roeder – Munich (+49 89 189 33-160, rroeder@gibsondunn.com) © 2019 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP Attorney Advertising:  The enclosed materials have been prepared for general informational purposes only and are not intended as legal advice.