April 6, 2022
On March 30, 2022, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”), by a three-to-one vote, issued a press release announcing proposed new rules (the “Proposal”) intended to enhance disclosure and investor protections in initial public offerings (“IPO”) by special purpose acquisition companies (“SPACs”) and in subsequent business combinations between SPACs and private operating companies (“de-SPAC transaction”).
The Proposal provides a lengthy and comprehensive discussion that builds upon the Commission’s prior statements and actions regarding SPAC IPOs and de-SPAC transactions. As noted by the Commission’s Chair, Gary Gensler, in the press release, the Proposal is intended to “help ensure” that “disclosure[,] standards for marketing practices[,] and gatekeeper and issuer obligations,” as applied in the traditional IPO context, also apply to SPACs. Chair Gensler further noted that “[f]unctionally, the SPAC target IPO is being used as an alternative means to conduct an IPO.”
There are four key components of the Proposed Rules:
We provide below our key takeaways, a summary of the Proposal, links to Commissioner statements regarding the Proposal, and a note regarding the comment period and process.
Below are the key takeaways from the Proposal:
New Subpart 1600 of Regulation S-K
The Proposal would create a new Subpart 1600 of Regulation S-K solely related to SPAC IPOs and de-SPAC transactions. Among other things, this new Subpart 1600 would prescribe specific disclosure about the sponsor, potential conflicts of interest, and dilution.
Sponsor, Affiliates, and Promoters
To provide investors with a more complete understanding of the role of SPAC sponsors, affiliates, and promoters, the Commission is proposing a new Item 1603(a) of Regulation S-K, to require:
Potential Conflicts of Interest
To provide investors with a more complete understanding of the potential conflicts of interest between (i) the sponsor or its affiliates or the SPAC’s officers, directors, or promoters, and (ii) unaffiliated security holders, the Commission is proposing a new Item 1603(b) of Regulation S-K. This would include a discussion of conflicts arising as a result of a determination to proceed with a de-SPAC transaction and from the manner in which a SPAC compensates the sponsor or the SPAC’s executive officers and directors, or the manner in which the sponsor compensates its own executive officers and directors.
Relatedly, proposed Item 1603(c) of Regulation S-K would require disclosure of the fiduciary duties that each officer and director of a SPAC owes to other companies.
Sources of Dilution
In an effort to conform and enhance disclosure relating to dilution in SPAC IPOs and de-SPAC transactions, the Commission is proposing proposed Items 1602 and 1604 of Regulation S-K, respectively.
Fairness of the De-SPAC Transaction and Related Financings
SPACs would be required to disclose whether their board of directors reasonably believes that the de-SPAC transaction and any related financing transaction are fair or unfair to the SPAC’s unaffiliated security holders, as well as a discussion of the bases for this statement. Proposed Item 1606 of Regulation S-K would require a discussion, “in reasonable detail,” of the material factors upon which a reasonable belief regarding the fairness of a de-SPAC transaction and any related financing transaction is based, and, to the extent practicable, the weight assigned to each factor. As noted by Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, “[w]hile this disclosure requirement technically does not require a SPAC board to hire third parties to conduct analyses and prepare a fairness opinion, the proposed rules clearly contemplate that this is the likely outcome of the new requirement. For example, [proposed Item 1606] would require disclosure of whether ‘an unaffiliated representative’ has been retained to either negotiate the de-SPAC transaction or prepare a fairness opinion and [proposed Item 1607] would elicit disclosures about ‘any report, opinion, or appraisal from an outside party relating to . . . the fairness of the de-SPAC transaction.’”
Relatedly, if any director voted against, or abstained from voting on, approval of the de-SPAC transaction or any related financing transaction, SPACs would be required to identify the director, and indicate, if known, after making reasonable inquiry, the reasons for the vote against the transaction or abstention.
Aligning De-SPAC Transactions with IPOs
Target Company as Co-Registrant
Under the current rules, only the SPAC and its officers and directors are required to sign the registration statement and are liable for material misstatements or omissions. The Proposal would require the target company to be treated as a co-registrant with the SPAC when a Form S‑4 or Form F‑4 registration statement is filed by the SPAC in connection with a de-SPAC transaction. Registrant status for a target company and its officers and directors would result in such parties being liable for material misstatements or omissions pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act. Under the Proposal, target companies and their officers and directors would be liable with respect to their own material misstatements or omissions, as well as any material misstatements or omissions made by the SPAC or its officers and directors. As a result, the Proposal seeks to further incentivize target companies and SPACs to be diligent in monitoring each other’s disclosure.
Smaller Reporting Company Status
Currently, de-SPAC companies are able to avail themselves – as almost all SPACs have done since 2016 – of the smaller reporting company rules for at least a year following the de-SPAC transaction (and most SPACs would still retain this status at the time of the de-SPAC transaction when the SPAC is the legal acquirer of the target company). The “smaller reporting company” status benefits the combined company after the de-SPAC transaction by availing it of scaled disclosure and other accommodations as it adjusts to being a public company.
Citing the disparate treatment between traditional IPO companies and de-SPAC companies (the former having to determine smaller reporting company status at the time it files its initial registration statement and the latter retaining the SPAC’s smaller reporting company status until the next annual determination date), the Proposal would require de-SPAC companies to determine compliance with the public float threshold (i.e., public float of (i) less than $250 million, or (ii) in addition to annual revenues less than $100 million, less than $700 million or no public float) within four business days after the consummation of the de-SPAC transaction.
The revenue threshold would be determined by using the annual revenues of the target company as of the most recently completed fiscal year for which audited financial statements are available, and the de-SPAC company would then reflect this re-determination in its first periodic report following the closing of the de-SPAC transaction.
The Commission estimates that an average of 50 post-business combination companies following a de-SPAC transaction will no longer qualify as smaller reporting companies, when compared to current rules. Studies have indicated that the average size of a de-SPAC company has consistently remained north of $1 billion in 2021. Assuming this trend continues, there is an expectation that an increasing number of target companies will no longer qualify as smaller reporting companies after the de-SPAC transaction, and will need to adapt toward the enhanced public disclosure requirements. This would include faster additional board and management training to prepare the post-de-SPAC company for additional disclosure requirements.
PSLRA Safe Harbor
The PSLRA provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), under which a company is protected from liability for forward-looking statements in any private right of action under the Securities Act or Exchange Act when, among other things, the forward-looking statement is identified as such and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.
The safe harbor, however, is not available when the forward looking statement is made in connection with an offering by a “blank check company,” a company that is (i) a development stage company with no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or other entity or person, and (ii) is issuing “penny stock.”
Because of the penny stock requirement, many practitioners have considered SPACs to be excluded from the definition of blank check company for purposes of the PSLRA safe harbor. The Proposal seeks to amend the current definition of “blank check company” to remove the penny stock requirement, thus effectively removing a SPAC’s ability to qualify for the PSLRA safe harbor provision for the de-SPAC transaction.
This inability to rely on the PSLRA is coupled with the Proposal’s addition of new and modified projections disclosure requirements (as further discussed below). If the Proposal is adopted, it remains unclear whether that will lead to changes in projections and assumptions (especially considering the current environment where market participants, investors, and financiers have come to expect detailed projections disclosure, similar to what is used in public merger and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions), or the abandonment of projections. The latter could effectively eliminate the de-SPAC transaction as an alternative for target companies that do not have a lengthy operating history.
Underwriter Status and Liability
Historically, Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act have imposed underwriter liability on underwriters of a SPAC’s IPO. The Proposal takes a novel approach in arriving at the conclusion that a de-SPAC transaction would constitute a “distribution” under applicable underwriter regulations and seeks to extend such underwriter liability to a de-SPAC transaction. Proposed Rule 140a would deem a SPAC IPO underwriter to be an underwriter in the de-SPAC transaction, provided that such party is engaged in certain de-SPAC activities or compensation arrangements.
Specifically, an underwriter in a SPAC’s IPO would be deemed an underwriter for purposes of a de-SPAC transaction if such person “takes steps to facilitate the de-SPAC transaction, or any related financing transaction, or otherwise participates (directly or indirectly) in the de-SPAC transaction,” including if such entities are (i) serving as financial advisor, (ii) identifying potential target companies, (iii) negotiating merger terms, or (iv) serving as a placement agent in private investments in public equity (“PIPE”) or other alternative financing transactions.
While Proposed Rule 140a only addresses “underwriter” status in de-SPAC transactions with respect to those serving as underwriters to the SPAC’s IPO, the Commission leaves open the door for subsequent determinations for finding additional “statutory underwriters” in a de-SPAC transaction, suggesting that “financial advisors, PIPE investors, or other advisors, depending on the circumstances, may be deemed statutory underwriters in connection with a de-SPAC transaction if they are purchasing from an issuer ‘with a view to’ distribution, are selling ‘for an issuer,’ and/or are ‘participating’ in a distribution.”
In addition to the potential chilling effect that underwriter status may have on financial institutions’ participation in a de-SPAC transaction, the Commission’s statement that other “statutory underwriters” may be designated in the future, coupled with the traditional “due diligence” defenses of underwriters, suggests that SPACs and target companies should expect extensive diligence requests from financial institutions, advisors, and their counsel in connection with a de-SPAC transaction and other related changes to the de-SPAC transaction process that add complexity, time, and cost.
Business Combinations Involving Shell Companies
The Commission’s concern related to private companies becoming U.S. public companies via de-SPAC transactions is substantially related to the opportunity for such private companies “to avoid the disclosure, liability, and other provisions applicable to traditional registered offerings.”
Proposed Rule 145a
Based on the structure of certain de-SPAC transactions, the Commission expressed concern that, unlike investors in transaction structures in which the Securities Act applies (and a registration statement would be filed, absent an exemption), investors in reporting shell companies may not always receive the disclosures and other protection afforded by the Securities Act at the time the change in the nature of their investment occurs, due to the business combination involving another entity that is not a shell company.
Proposed Rule 145a intends to address the issue by deeming any direct or indirect business combination of a reporting shell company involving another entity that is not a shell company to involve “an offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sale within the meaning of section 2(a)(2) of the [Securities] Act.” By deeming such transaction to be a “sale” of securities for the purposes of the Securities Act, the Proposal is intended to address potential disparities in the disclosure and liability protections available to shareholders of reporting shell companies, depending on the transaction structure deployed.
Proposed Rule 145a defines a reporting shell company as a company (other than an asset-backed issuer as defined in Item 1101(b) of Regulation AB) that has:
The Proposal notes that the sales covered by Proposed Rule 145a would not be covered by the exemption provided under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act, because the exchange of securities would not be exclusively with the reporting shell company’s existing security holders, but also would include the private company’s existing security holders.
Financial Statement Requirements in Business Combination Transactions Involving Shell Companies
The Proposal amends the financial statements required to be provided in a business combination with an intention to bridge the gap between such financial statements and the financial statements required to be provided in an IPO. The Commission views such Proposal as simply codifying “current staff guidance for transactions involving shell companies.”
Number of Years of Financial Statements
Proposed Rule 15-01(b) would require a registration statement for a de-SPAC transaction where the target business will be a predecessor to the SPAC registrant to include the same financial statements for that business as would be required in a Securities Act registration statement for an IPO of that business.
Audit Requirements of Predecessor
Proposed Rule 15-01(a) would require the examination of the financial statements of a business that will be a predecessor to a shell company to be audited by an independent accountant in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) for the purpose of expressing an opinion, to the same extent as a registrant would be audited for an IPO, effectively codifying the staff’s existing guidance.
Age of Financial Statements of the Predecessor
Proposed Rule 15-01(c) would provide for the age of the financial statements of a private operating company as predecessor to be based on whether such private company would qualify as a smaller reporting company in a traditional IPO process, ultimately aligning with the financial statement requirements in a traditional IPO.
Acquisitions of Businesses by a Shell Company Registrant or Its Predecessor That Are Not or Will Not Be the Predecessor
The Commission is proposing a series of rules intended to clarify when companies should disclose financial statements of businesses acquired by SPAC targets or where such business are probable of being acquired by SPAC targets. Proposed Rule 15-01(d) would address situations where financial statements of other businesses (other than the predecessor) that have been acquired or are probable to be acquired should be included in a registration statement or proxy/information statement for a de-SPAC transaction. The Proposal would require application of Rule 3-05, Rule 8-04 or Rule 3-14 (with respect to real estate operation) of Regulation S-X to acquisitions by the private target in the context of a de-SPAC transaction, which the staff views as codifying its existing guidance.
Proposed amendments to the significance tests in Rule 1-02(w) of Regulation S-X will require the significance of the acquisition target of the private target in a de-SPAC transaction to be calculated using the SPAC’s target’s financial information, rather than the SPAC’s financial information.
In addition, Proposed Rule 15-01(d)(2) would require the de-SPAC company to file the financial statements of a recently acquired business, that is not or will not be its predecessor pursuant to Rule 3-05(b)(4)(i) in an Item 2.01(f) of Form 8-K filed in connection with the closing of the de-SPAC transaction where such financial statements were omitted from the registration statement for the de-SPAC transaction, to the extent the significance of the acquisition is greater than 20% but less than 50%.
Financial Statements of a Shell Company Registrant after the Combination with Predecessor
Proposed Rule 15-01(e) allows a registrant to exclude the financial statements of a SPAC for the period prior to the de-SPAC transaction if (i) all financial statements of the SPAC have been filed for all required periods through the de-SPAC transaction, and (ii) the financial statements of the registrant include the period on which the de-SPAC transaction was consummated. The Proposal eliminates any distinction between a de-SPAC structured as a forward acquisition or a reverse recapitalization.
In addition, the Proposal is also addressing the following related amendments:
Enhanced Projections Disclosure
Disclosure of financial projections is not expressly required by the U.S. federal securities laws; however, it has been common practice for SPACs to use projections of the target company and post-de-SPAC company in its assessment of a proposed de-SPAC transaction, its investor presentations, and soliciting material once a definitive agreement is executed. The Proposal seeks to amend existing regulations regarding the use of projections as well as add new, supplemental disclosure requirements.
Amended Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K
Under Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K, management may present projections regarding a registrant’s future performance, provided that (i) there is a reasonable and good faith basis for such projections, and (ii) they include disclosure of the assumptions underlying the projections and the limitations of such projections, and the presentation and format of such projections. Citing concerns of instances where target companies have disclosed projections that lack a reasonable basis, the Proposal seeks to amend Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K as follows:
Proposed Item 1609 of Regulation S-K
In light of the traditional SPAC sponsor compensation structure (i.e., compensation in the form of post-closing equity) and the potential incentives and overall dynamics of a de-SPAC transaction, the Commission has proposed a new rule specific to SPACs that would supplement the proposed amendments to Item 10(b) of Regulation S-K (as discussed above). Specifically, the Commission is proposing a new Item 1609 of Regulation S-K that would require SPACs to provide the accompanying disclosures to financial projections:
Like the proposed amendments to Item 10(b), the first two requirements summarized above should not come as a particular surprise to existing SPACs and their counsel as projections disclosure has been a significant area of scrutiny by the Commission in the registration statement and proxy statement review process.
We note, however, that the requirement under Item 1609 to add disclosure as to management’s and/or the board’s current views may obligate additional disclosure beyond what has been typical market practice. In particular, projections disclosure in a registration statement or proxy statement is often made in the context of a historical lookback to the projections in place at the time the board of directors of the SPAC assessed whether to enter into a de-SPAC transaction with the target company. These projections typically are not updated with newer data during the pendency of the transaction since the purpose of such disclosure is to inform investors of the board’s rationale for approving the transaction. Proposed Item 1609 does not explicitly require the updating of projections, but it does require the parties to disclose whether the included projections reflect the view of the SPAC and the target company as of the date of filing. Moreover, the potential to provide revised projections, coupled with obligations to disclose management’s and board’s continuing views, may prove challenging disclosure to be made between the signing of a business combination agreement and the filing of a registration statement or proxy statement and during the review period for such registration statement or proxy statement.
Status of SPACs under the Investment Company Act of 1940
Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines an “investment company” as any issuer that is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities. Given that SPACs, prior to a de-SPAC transaction, are not engaged in any meaningful business other than investing its IPO proceeds held in trust, there is a potential for SPACs to be treated as an “investment company.”
In recognition of the fact that SPACs are generally formed to identify, acquire, and operate a target company through a business combination and not with a stated purpose of being an investment company, the Proposal seeks to clarify SPAC status by providing a safe harbor under Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act (the “Subjective Test Safe Harbor”). To qualify under the Subjective Test Safe Harbor:
While most SPACs should not have an issue with qualifying for the Subjective Test Safe Harbor, the proposed time limits may prove problematic for existing SPACs seeking amendments to their governing documents to extend the time necessary to complete a de-SPAC transaction. Typically, these amendments are either sought when (i) a SPAC has a definitive transaction agreement entered into and needs some time to consummate the transaction, and/or (ii) a sponsor is willing to compensate existing securities holders by contributing additional amounts into a trust that is disbursable to shareholders upon lapse of the extension. Moreover, stock exchange rules require a SPAC to complete a de-SPAC transaction within 36 months from its IPO, and with its truncated time periods, the Proposal would significantly constrain some of this timing flexibility for SPACs that would like to comply with the Subjective Test Safe Harbor.
Admittedly, a SPAC does not need to comply with the Subjective Test Safe Harbor, but the alternative would be to make an assessment that the SPAC does not qualify as an investment company, notwithstanding its non-compliance with the time limits in the Subjective Test Safe Harbor, or to register as an “investment company,” and with it, comply with the regulatory regime of the Investment Company Act on top of seeking the consummation of a de-SPAC transaction.
As noted by Chair Gensler, much of the Proposal seeks to impose traditional IPO concepts and regulations on the SPAC IPO and de-SPAC transaction process, as well as codify existing Commission guidance and practice.
That said, there are some notable deviations and provisions in the Proposal that, if implemented, could significantly impact the SPAC marketplace. We note that certain provisions in the Proposal may have consequences for the future of SPACs as an alternative vehicle to traditional IPOs.
In particular, proposals regarding underwriter liability in the de-SPAC transaction context, unavailability of the PSLRA, and liquidation timeframes contemplated by the proposed new Investment Company Act safe harbor, all would curtail SPAC flexibility and/or increase the complexity and cost of completing a de-SPAC transaction.
We continue to monitor further developments and will keep you apprised of the latest news regarding this Proposal.
For the published statements of the Commissioners, please see the following links:
The comment period ends on the later of 30 days after publication in the Federal Register or May 31, 2022 (which is 60 days from the date of the Proposal). Comments may be submitted: (1) using the Commission’s comment form at https://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm; (2) via e-mail to firstname.lastname@example.org (with “File Number S7‑13‑22” on the subject line); or (3) via mail to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090. All submissions should refer to File Number S7‑13‑22.
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposed Rule (RIN 3235-AM90), Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections (March 30, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2022/33-11048.pdf (hereinafter, the “Proposed Rule”).
 See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, SEC Staff Issues Cautionary Guidance Related to Business Combinations with SPACs (April 7, 2021), available at https://www.gibsondunn.com/sec-staff-issues-cautionary-guidance-related-to-business-combinations-with-spacs/ (addressing the statement of the staff of the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance about certain accounting, financial reporting, and governance issues related to SPACs and the combined company following a de-SPAC transaction (see Division of Corporation Finance, Announcement: Staff Statement on Select Issues Pertaining to Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (March 31, 2021), available at https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/staff-statement-spac-2021-03-31), see also Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Back to the Future: SEC Chair Announces Spring 2021 Reg Flex Agenda (June 21, 2021), available at https://www.gibsondunn.com/back-to-the-future-sec-chair-announces-spring-2021-reg-flex-agenda/ (discussing the inclusion of SPACs in Chair Gensler’s Spring 2021 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions announced on June 11, 2021 (see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release (2021-99), SEC Announces Annual Regulatory Agenda (June 11, 2021), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-99), and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, SEC Fires Shot Across the Bow of SPACs (July 14, 2021), available at https://www.gibsondunn.com/sec-fires-shot-across-the-bow-of-spacs/ (discussing a partially settled Commission enforcement action against a SPAC related to purported misstatements on the registration statement concerning the target’s technology and business risks).
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release (2022-56), SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance Disclosure and Investor Protection Relating to Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections (March 30, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-56.
 Proposed Rule, p. 195 (citing on fn. 432 Michael Levitt, Valerie Jacob, Sebastian Fain, Pamela Marcogliese, Paul Tiger, & Andrea Basham, 2021 De-SPAC Debrief, FRESHFIELDS (Jan. 24, 2022), available at https://blog.freshfields.us/post/102hgzy/2021-de-spacdebrief, and on fn. 433 Tingting Liu, The Wealth Effects of Fairness Opinions in Takeovers, 53 FIN. REV. 533 (2018)).
 Proposed Item 1604(c)(1) suggests the following potential sources: “the amount of compensation paid or to be paid to the SPAC sponsor, the terms of outstanding warrants and convertible securities, and underwriting and other fees.” Proposed Rule, p. 336.
 Commission Hester M. Peirce, Statement: Damning and Deeming: Dissenting Statement on Shell Companies, Projections, and SPACs Proposal (March 30, 2022), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-statement-spac-proposal-033022.
 Under Section 6(a) of the Securities Act, each “issuer” must sign a Securities Act registration statement. The Securities Act broadly defines the term “issuer” to include every person who issues or proposes to issue any securities.
 17 CFR 229.10(f)(1).
 Proposed Rule, p. 302 and fn. 575 (explaining that the “estimate is based, in part, on [the Commission’s] estimate of the number of de-SPAC transactions in which the SPAC is the legal acquirer”).
 See Jamie Payne, Market Trends: De-SPAC Transactions, LexisNexis (March 5, 2022), available at https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/practical-guidance-journal/b/pa/posts/market-trends-de-spac-transactions (“The average size of de-SPAC transactions remained consistent between $2.2 billion and $2.8 billion in 2021 until a significant decline to $1.4 billion in the fourth quarter. The largest SPAC merger announced and closed in 2021, between Altimeter Growth Corp. and Grab Holdings Inc., was valued at $39.6 billion.”).
 The term “penny stock” is defined in 17 CFR 240.3a51-1.
 Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes on underwriters, among other parties identified in Section 11(a), civil liability for any part of the registration statement, at effectiveness, which contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, to any person acquiring such security. Further, Section 12(a)(2) imposes liability upon anyone, including underwriters, who offers or sells a security, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, to any person purchasing such security from them.
 The Proposal further notes that “Federal courts and the Commission may find that other parties involved in securities distributions, including other parties that perform activities necessary to the successful completion of de-SPAC transactions, are ‘statutory underwriters’ within the definition of underwriter in Section 2(a)(11).” Proposed Rule, p. 98.
 Although the Securities Act does not expressly require an underwriter to conduct a due diligence investigation, the Proposal reiterates the Commission’s long-standing view that underwriters nonetheless have an affirmative obligation to conduct reasonable due diligence. Proposed Rule, fn. 184 (citing In re Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33, at 41 (Mar. 25, 1953) (“[An underwriter] owe[s] a duty to the investing public to exercise a degree of care reasonable under the circumstances of th[e] offering to assure the substantial accuracy of representations made in the prospectus and other sales literature.”); In re Brown, Barton & Engel, 41 SEC 59, at 64 (June 8, 1962) (“[I]n undertaking a distribution . . . [the underwriter] had a responsibility to make a reasonable investigation to assure [itself] that there was a basis for the representations they made and that a fair picture, including adverse as well as favorable factors, was presented to investors.”); In the Matter of the Richmond Corp., infra note 185 (“It is a well-established practice, and a standard of the business, for underwriters to exercise diligence and care in examining into an issuer’s business and the accuracy and adequacy of the information contained in the registration statement . . . The underwriter who does not make a reasonable investigation is derelict in his responsibilities to deal fairly with the investing public.”)).
 Proposed Rule, p. 104, citing SEC v. M & A W., Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are informed by the purpose of registration, which is ‘to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.’ The express purpose of the reverse mergers at issue in this case was to transform a private corporation into a corporation selling stock shares to the public, without making the extensive public disclosures required in an initial offering. Thus, the investing public had relatively little information about the former private corporation. In such transactions, the investor protections provided by registration requirements are especially important.”).
 For example, the Commission cites to recent enforcement actions against SPACs, alleging the use of baseless or unsupported projections about future revenues and the use of materially misleading underlying financial projections. See, e.g., In the Matter of Momentus, Inc., et al., Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-92391 (July 13, 2021); SEC vs. Hurgin, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv05705 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 18, 2019); In the Matter of Benjamin H. Gordon, Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-86164 (June 20, 2019); and SEC vs. Milton, Case No. 1:21-cv-6445 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 29, 2021).
 Proposed Rule 3a-10. The Proposal does not provide a safe harbor under Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Investment Company Act, with respect to issuers engaged or proposing to engage in certain securities activities.
 The de-SPAC transaction may involve the combination of multiple target companies, so long as intentions of the SPAC are disclosed and so long as closing with respect to all target companies occurs contemporaneously and within the required time limits (as described below). Proposed Rule, p. 145.
 “Primary Control Company” means an issuer that (i) “[i]s controlled within the meaning of Section 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company Act by the surviving company following a de-SPAC transaction with a degree of control that is greater than that of any other person” and (ii) “is not an investment company.” Proposed Rule 3a-10(b)(2).
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