Texas Supreme Court Holds That Plaintiffs Must Prove Defendant’s Negligence A Substantial Factor In Causing Injury

Client Alert  |  July 1, 2025


Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, No, 23-0493 – Decided June 27, 2025

In an opinion issued on June 27, the Texas Supreme Court explained that proximate cause requires proof that a defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury.

“[T]he substantial-factor requirement means that liability falls only on a party whose substantial role in bringing about the injury is such that he is ‘actually responsible for the ultimate harm.’”

Chief Justice Blacklock, writing for the Court

Background:

The driver of a pickup truck traveling in icy conditions lost control of his vehicle on the interstate, crossed the median, and crashed into an 18-wheeler driven by a trainee driver with Werner Enterprises.  One of the four passengers in the pickup truck—a child—was killed, and the other three passengers suffered serious injuries.  The 18-wheeler was traveling around 50 miles per hour just before the collision, and the pickup truck was going between 50 and 60 miles per hour before losing control.  The trainee driver pressed the brake as soon as he saw the pickup truck, but evidence at trial showed both vehicles were traveling too fast for the icy conditions.

After a passenger sued on behalf of herself and her children, a jury found Werner 70% responsible and the trainee driver 14% responsible for the crash.  The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed en banc over two dissents.

Issue:

Whether the trainee driver’s negligence, if any, proximately caused the accident such that he and Werner could be held responsible.

Court’s Holding:

No.  Plaintiffs failed to establish proximate cause because “the sole substantial factor in bringing about this accident . . . was [the pickup truck driver’s] losing control of his F-350 and crossing a 42-foot grassy median into oncoming highway traffic before” the trainee driver “had time to react.”

What It Means:

  • The Court explained that determining “[p]roximate cause” requires “application of ‘a practical test, the test of common experience, to human conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability.’”  Proximate cause is divided into two elements—“(1) cause in fact, and (2) foreseeability.”  In turn, cause in fact has two components—“but for” causation and ”substantial factor” causation.
  • The Court reaffirmed that “[w]here the initial act of negligence was not the active and efficient cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, but merely created the conditions by which the second act of negligence could occur, the resulting harm is too attenuated from the defendants’ conduct to constitute the cause in fact of plaintiffs’ injuries.”
  • The Court emphasized the trainee driver’s conduct wasn’t the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries because nothing he “did or didn’t do” contributed to the pickup truck “hitting ice, losing control, veering into the median, and entering oncoming traffic on an interstate highway.”  Instead, “the presence of his 18-wheeler in its proper lane of traffic on the other side of I-20 at the precise moment” the pickup truck driver “lost control” was “just the kind of ‘happenstance of place and time’ that cannot reasonably be considered a substantial factor in causing these injuries.”
  • The Court explained that while “similar considerations will often bear on” substantial-factor causation and foreseeability, the “two are nevertheless distinct.”  So cases addressing foreseeability may be “legally distinguishable” when addressing whether conduct was a substantial factor in causing an injury.
  • And the Court made clear that it has not “recognized negligent training or supervision as an independent theory of tort liability.”  Assuming that such claims have “independent viability,” the Court suggested they should be treated like “negligent hiring claims.”  Three justices suggested in a concurrence and a partial dissent that the Court should adopt the “admission rule” and treat employer liability claims as direct claims when an employer admits an employee was acting within the scope of his employment, as some courts of appeals have done.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Texas Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice group leaders:

Appellate and Constitutional Law

Thomas H. Dupree Jr.
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Allyson N. Ho
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Brad G. Hubbard

+1 214.698.3326
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Related Practice: Texas General Litigation

Trey Cox
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Collin Cox
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ccox@gibsondunn.com
Gregg Costa
+1 346.718.6649
gcosta@gibsondunn.com

This alert was prepared by Texas of counsel Ben Wilson and Texas associates Elizabeth Kiernan and Stephen Hammer.       

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