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This edition of Gibson Dunn’s Federal Circuit Update for June 2024 summarizes the current status of a couple petitions pending before the Supreme Court and recent Federal Circuit decisions concerning damages, trade secret misappropriation, patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and induced infringement.

Federal Circuit News

Noteworthy Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari:

There was a new potentially impactful petition filed before the Supreme Court in June 2024:

United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Technologies, Inc. (US No. 23-1298): “1. Whether the IPR statute and SAS require the Federal Circuit to review de novo, or only for an abuse of discretion, the PTO’s reliance on new grounds and new printed publications—not raised in the initial petition—when deciding to cancel patent claims. 2. Whether, if § 312 is deemed ambiguous, the Court should overrule Chevron.” The respondent waived its right to respond, the Court requested a response, which is due August 12, 2024.

We also provide an update below of the petitions pending before the Supreme Court that were summarized in our May 2024 update:

In Chestek PLLC v. Vidal (US No. 23-1217), the response brief is due August 14, 2024. Five amicus curiae briefs have been filed. In Cellect LLC v. Vidal (US No. 23-1231), the response brief is due August 21, 2024, and seven amicus curiae briefs have been filed.

Upcoming Oral Argument Calendar

The list of upcoming arguments at the Federal Circuit is available on the court’s website.

Key Case Summaries (June 2024)

EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 23-1101 (Fed. Cir. June 3, 2024): EcoFactor sued Google alleging infringement of patents directed to smart thermostats in computer-networked heating and cooling systems, which adjusts the user’s thermostat settings to reduce strain on the electricity grid during periods of high demand. Following a jury trial, the jury found infringement and awarded damages to EcoFactor. Google moved for a new trial on damages, which the district court denied.

The majority (Reyna, J., joined by Lourie, J.) affirmed. The majority reasoned that EcoFactor’s damages expert based his royalty rate on comparable license agreements and the testimony of EcoFactor’s CEO, and thus, the royalty rate was sufficiently reliable. The majority therefore concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

Judge Prost dissented-in-part. Judge Prost reasoned that the royalty rate from EcoFactor’s damages expert “rests on EcoFactor’s self-serving, unilateral recitals of its beliefs in the license agreements,” which were “directly refuted” by two of the license agreements and “have no other support . . . to back them up.” Judge Prost concluded that the “law does not allow damages to be so easily manufactured.” Judge Prost then noted that the royalty rate suffered from another problem in that it included the value of non-asserted patents, which EcoFactor’s damages expert did not properly apportion. Judge Prost therefore determined that the analysis performed by EcoFactor’s damages expert was unreliable, and the district court abused its discretion by not granting a new trial on damages.

Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow, Co. Ltd., No. 24-1137 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 2024): Insulet and EOFlow manufacture insulin pump patches. Starting in the early 2000s, Insulet developed the wearable insulin pump OmniPod® followed by next generation products in 2007 and 2012. EOFlow began developing its own product in 2011, the EOPatch®, followed by its next generation product in 2017. Around that time, four former Insulet employees were hired by EOFlow, and allegedly passed confidential information to EOFlow. Insulet sued EOFlow for misappropriation of trade secrets. Insulet moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing it was likely to be irreparably harmed by the misappropriation, particularly in light of news that Medtronic would imminently acquire EOFlow, which would provide a source of capital for EOFlow and increase competition with Insulet. The district court granted the preliminary injunction.

The Federal Circuit (Lourie, J., joined by Prost and Stark, JJ.) reversed. Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), the statute of limitations to bring a trade secret misappropriation claim is three years. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d). EOFlow had raised a statute of limitations challenge; however, the district court expressed no opinion on the matter. The Federal Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion to ignore this argument, which was a material factor in evaluating a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court further held that, even if the statute of limitations argument had been addressed, Insulet had not established a likelihood of success on the merits because it had not alleged a trade secret with particularity, as required by the DTSA. Specifically, Insulet “advanced a hazy grouping of information that the court did not probe with particularity to determine what, if anything, was deserving of trade secret protection.” Instead, the district court should have determined what “specific information” was alleged to be the trade secret, such as “particular design drawings and specifications for each physical component and subassembly.” The Court also determined that the district court failed to assess whether the information was generally known or reasonably ascertainable through proper means, such as reverse engineering, particularly in light of tear-down videos and Insulet’s own publications that were available on the internet. And finally, the Court determined that the district court failed to consider the disclosures in Insulet’s own patents related to the OmniPod. If certain components of the OmniPod were known to the public through patent disclosures, then those components would unlikely merit trade secret protection.

Beteiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc., No. 22-2275 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2024): Beteiro owns four patents directed to methods that enable users to participate in online gambling using a user communication device by first determining whether the user is physically located in a state that allows gambling by using the GPS on the mobile device. DraftKings filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the patents were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and the district court granted the motion.

The Federal Circuit (Stark, J., joined by Dyk and Prost, JJ.) affirmed. At step one, the Court stated that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “exchanging information concerning a bet and allowing or disallowing the bet based on where the user is located.” In doing so, the Court specifically found that Beteiro’s patent claims “exhibit several features that are well-settled indicators of abstractness,” such as detecting information, generating and sending notifications, receiving messages (bets), determining legality (GPS location), and processing information (allowing/disallowing bets). The Court also determined that the claims were drafted in a result-oriented, functional manner, using language that described the desired outcomes without explaining how to achieve them. The Court further determined that the claims did not recite any improvement in the way computers operate, and thus, the claims were directed to an abstract idea. As to step two, the Court determined that the use of GPS on a mobile phone was conventional, contrary to Beteiro’s contentions.

Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., No. 23-1169 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2024): Amarin sells icosapent ethyl (an omega-3 fatty acid commonly found in fish oils) under the brand name Vascepa® for the treatment of patients with high triglyceride levels. In 2012, Amarin received FDA approval for treatment of severe hypertriglyceridemia, a condition where a patient’s blood triglyceride is at least 500 mg/dL (“the SH indication”), and later in 2019, for treatment to reduce cardiovascular risk in patients having blood triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (“the CV indication”). Hikma submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for approval of its generic icosapent ethyl in 2016 when Vascepa® was only approved for the SH indication, and in 2019, opted to carve out the additional CV indication by seeking FDA approval only for uses not covered by Amarin’s newly listed CV indication patents. However, around the same time, Hikma also removed the CV limitation of use from its product label, which had originally been included when it initially filed its ANDA. Hikma then issued several press releases advertising its product as a generic version of Vascepa®, referencing Vascepa®’s $1.1 billion in sales, which included sales for all uses of Vascepa® including the CV indication that made up 75% of the sales.

Amarin sued Hikma for inducing infringement of two of its patents directed to uses of icosapent ethyl based on (1) Hikma’s public statements in press releases and on its website, and (2) the product label for its generic icosapent ethyl product. Hikma moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court granted the motion. The district court found that the removal of the CV limitation of use from the product label would not be understood by physicians as suggesting that Hikma’s product had been approved for the CV indication. The district court also found that while Hikma’s press releases and website were relevant to an intent to induce, it did not rise to the level of encouraging, recommending, or promoting Hikma’s generic for the CV indication.

The Federal Circuit (Lourie, J., joined by Moore, C.J., and Albright, J. (sitting by designation)) reversed, holding that the district court had to examine the label and public statements in its totality to determine what they “would communicate to physicians and the marketplace.” In so holding, the Court noted that while the underlying case was a traditional Hatch-Waxman case, the issue on appeal was nothing more than “a run-of-the-mill induced infringement case.” The Court concluded that while the label alone would not recommend, encourage, or promote infringement, a physician would read Hikma’s press releases as an instruction or encouragement to prescribe Hikma’s product for any FDA-approved use, which included the CV indication that Hikma carved out from its ANDA. The Court concluded that these allegations, taken together, plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this update: Blaine Evanson, Audrey Yang, Al Suarez, Evan Kratzer, and Julia Tabat.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Federal Circuit. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Appellate and Constitutional Law or Intellectual Property practice groups, or the following authors:

Blaine H. Evanson – Orange County (+1 949.451.3805, [email protected])
Audrey Yang – Dallas (+1 214.698.3215, [email protected])

Appellate and Constitutional Law:
Thomas H. Dupree Jr. – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8547, [email protected])
Allyson N. Ho – Dallas (+1 214.698.3233, [email protected])
Julian W. Poon – Los Angeles (+ 213.229.7758, [email protected])

Intellectual Property:
Kate Dominguez – New York (+1 212.351.2338, [email protected])
Y. Ernest Hsin – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8224, [email protected])
Josh Krevitt – New York (+1 212.351.4000, [email protected])
Jane M. Love, Ph.D. – New York (+1 212.351.3922, [email protected])

Attorney Advertising: These materials were prepared for general informational purposes only based on information available at the time of publication and are not intended as, do not constitute, and should not be relied upon as, legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Gibson Dunn (and its affiliates, attorneys, and employees) shall not have any liability in connection with any use of these materials. The sharing of these materials does not establish an attorney-client relationship with the recipient and should not be relied upon as an alternative for advice from qualified counsel. Please note that facts and circumstances may vary, and prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

A proposed rule from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States would substantially expand the scope of covered real estate transactions subject to national security review during a time of growing concern around foreign acquisitions of U.S. land.

Over the past year, national security risks associated with foreign acquisitions of certain real estate, including agricultural land, have been an issue of growing concern. This increasing national security concern has manifested in several key developments: (i) a rise in efforts by state and local governments to implement their own real-estate focused national security reviews, which we described in a previous client alert, (ii) a notable and recent presidential block of a major real estate transaction,[1] and (iii) bipartisan federal legislative support for stronger restrictions on acquisitions of U.S. land by foreign adversaries.[2]

Most recently, on July 8, 2024, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM” or the “proposed rule”) to expand its jurisdiction to review and potentially block certain real estate transactions involving foreign persons. The scope of the update is noteworthy. The proposed rule would add nearly 60 locations to CFIUS’s existing list of military installations whose proximity to a potential real estate purchase could create CFIUS jurisdiction, bringing the total list to over 250 installations—and representing a roughly 30% increase in a single update.[3]

This alert provides: (i) a brief refresher on CFIUS’s jurisdiction over real estate transactions, (ii) a summary of the proposed rule, (iii) a discussion of historical trends and projections regarding CFIUS’s review of real estate transactions, and (iv) key takeaways for dealmakers.

I. Refresher on CFIUS’s Jurisdiction Over Real Estate Transactions.

The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”) provided CFIUS with expanded jurisdiction over (among other things) certain real estate transactions. Using that new jurisdiction, CFIUS drafted rules for “certain transactions by foreign persons involving real estate in the United States” (the “real estate rules”), which became effective in February 2020. The real estate rules provided the process for CFIUS to review acquisitions involving a foreign person purchasing, leasing, or gaining certain other land rights in property close to military installations and other sensitive areas. Specifically, the real estate rules set out four categories of locations that could subject a real estate transaction to CFIUS’s jurisdiction and listed each of these sets of locations in an Appendix to the rules (“Appendix A”).

Part 1 of Appendix A provides locations for which a property may be subject to review based on being in “close proximity” to (i.e., within one mile of) a listed military installation.
Part 2 of Appendix A provides locations for which a property may be subject to review based on being within the “extended range” (i.e., between one and one hundred miles from) a listed military installation.
Part 3 of Appendix A lists missile launch ranges (i.e., geographic areas) for which a property being in the extended area of that range may subject it to CFIUS review.
Part 4 of Appendix A lists offshore training areas where a property being in the extended range of that area may subject it to CFIUS review.

Congress’s policy rationale for providing CFIUS with authority over real estate transactions was—and remains—driven by intelligence collection risks. As CFIUS’s press release for the NPRM noted, FIRRMA allows CFIUS to review transactions that could “reasonably provide the foreign person the ability to collect intelligence on activities being conducted at such an installation, facility, or property; or could otherwise expose national security activities at such an installation, facility, or property to the risk of foreign surveillance.”

There are limited exceptions to CFIUS jurisdiction over “covered real estate”; most notably, if such real estate falls within an “urbanized area” or “urban cluster.” Yet, there is a meaningful limitation to this exception, as it does not apply where such real estate is (1) located within, or will function as part of, a covered port or (2) is within “close proximity” to certain military installations or other sensitive government sites.

II. Updates to CFIUS’s List of Sensitive U.S. Military Installations.

The proposed rule seeks to expand the list of covered military installations, the second such expansion of covered real estate installations since the real estate rules were promulgated under FIRRMA. The real estate rules themselves note that the Department of Defense (“DoD”) will continue “on an ongoing basis” to assess and update Appendix A.[4]

A noteworthy transaction served as the precursor to the first update to Appendix A. In January 2023, CFIUS determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review an acquisition of land by Chinese food manufacturer Fufeng Group Ltd. That land was near Grand Forks Air Force Base, which was not among the military installations listed in Appendix A. Ostensibly in response to public outcry around CFIUS’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over this acquisition, in August 2023, DoD issued a final rule adding eight military installations to Appendix A, including Grand Forks Air Force Base.

This NPRM, coming nearly a year after the prior Appendix A expansion, would add a substantially increased number of military installations, with 59 proposed additions. The proposed rule is not immediately effective. CFIUS provided for a 30-day public comment period, following which CFIUS is expected to promptly publish a final rule. Once implemented, and assuming no changes are made to the proposed list of new military installations, the NPRM will bring the total number of military installations listed in Part 1 of Appendix A to 162 and Part 2 to 65, while making the following updates:

Expand CFIUS’s jurisdiction over real estate transactions to include 40 new military installations in Part 1 of the list (“close proximity,” i.e., within a one-mile radius);
Expand CFIUS’s jurisdiction over real estate transactions to include 19 new military installations in Part 2 of the list (“extended range,” i.e., within a 100-mile radius);
Move eight military installations from part 1 to part 2;
Remove one installation from part 1 and two installations from part 2;
Revise the definition of the term “military installation,” including to expand the definition of an installation to encompass “Army depots, arsenals, and military terminals,” “Marine Corps installations, logistic battalions and support facilities,” and Space Force bases, and expand other parts of the definition to encompass each of the Armed Forces; and
Update the names of 14 installations and the location of seven others.

III. Trends and Projections for CFIUS Review of Real Estate Transactions.

Since the CFIUS real estate rules became effective in 2020, there have been very few reviews of “covered real estate transactions.” CFIUS’s annual report to Congress for 2021 provided data showing that zero of the 272 notices and only one of the 164 short-form declarations filed with the Committee were for a covered real estate transaction. In 2022, only one of the 286 notices and five of the 154 short-form declarations were for covered real estate transactions.

There are likely several reasons why there have been so few covered real estate CFIUS filings in the past years. One possible reason is that many transactions that involved covered real estate also implicate a U.S. target’s broader assets and operations, governance rights, or access to technical information or personal data, resulting in CFIUS jurisdiction based on its authority to review “control” transactions and “non-controlling” covered investments.

Another reason is that, following FIRRMA, some transactions require mandatory filings with CFIUS, but covered real estate transactions are subject only to voluntary filings. In fact, a covered real estate transaction for which the parties did not file a voluntary CFIUS notice was the subject of a recent presidential order. In May 2024, following a CFIUS-initiated review that identified a risk to national security arising from the potential for foreign surveillance and intelligence collection activities, President Biden issued a presidential decision requiring Chinese cryptocurrency mining company MineOne to divest an acquisition of Wyoming real estate located in “close proximity” to a U.S. Air Force base with strategic missile silos.[5]

We do not expect the overall number of real estate reviews to rise substantially because of the additions in the NPRM, but we do expect CFIUS to closely scrutinize the more limited universe of transactions that implicate covered real estate—whether or not those transactions result in voluntary filings with the Committee—and to take bold action with respect to those transactions when warranted.

CFIUS is likely to consider possibilities to further expand or enhance its jurisdiction over real estate transactions owing, in part, to bipartisan support from U.S. legislators. As is often the case for national security initiatives, there exists bipartisan federal legislative support for tougher scrutiny on foreign acquisitions of U.S. land. In response to the NPRM, Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party John Moolenaar (R-MI) made a statement in support of the proposed rule calling for even tougher measures to restrict “foreign adversaries” from purchasing land that would “leave our military facilities susceptible to surveillance.” U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) also issued a statement in support, noting the importance of protecting agricultural land near military bases. As the presidential election draws near, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle are likely to maintain focus on national security issues. This continued support paves the way for CFIUS to continue updating its rulemaking around real estate, echoed in Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Investment Security Paul Rosen’s comments in the NPRM press release that CFIUS “will remain responsive to the evolving nature of the risks we face to ensure we are protecting our military installations and related defense assets.”

IV. Key Takeaways and Next Steps for Dealmakers.

The proposed rule is likely to be finalized and implemented by fall of this year. Considering this timeline, transaction parties should act now to update their approach to potentially implicated transactions. We recommend taking note of the following:

CFIUS will continue its efforts to identify and review non-notified real estate transactions. Especially given the intense scrutiny of foreign investments in U.S. real estate by U.S. federal, state, and local government authorities, as well as certain segments of the private sector and U.S. media, CFIUS will continue its efforts to identify and review covered real estate transactions. Some reviews could result in CFIUS identifying a threat to national security posed by a prior investment and the need for mitigation measures up to and including divestment.

The expanded list of installations should inform current deal diligence. Because transactions under consideration or negotiation today may not sign until after a final rule is published later this year, transaction parties should immediately begin considering the NPRM when conducting due diligence of real estate investments and acquisitions. Moreover, for transactions subject to CFIUS’s “control” or “covered investment” jurisdiction, the NPRM provides important insight into the locations that CFIUS considers most sensitive and likely to raise national security considerations.

Foreign parties can still acquire rights in covered real estate. Although the proposed rule does not distinguish between investors of different jurisdictions,[6] CFIUS will continue to evaluate transactions using a case-by-case, transaction-specific approach that accounts for the risk profile of the investors. CFIUS filings for covered real estate transactions remain voluntary, and foreign investors will continue to be able to receive CFIUS approvals for these transactions. Of note, the blocked acquisition we discussed in this alert involved a Chinese-backed acquirer and indications that the real estate could be used for surveillance. Not every covered real estate transaction poses a risk to U.S. national security and, even when CFIUS does identify a threat, in many cases the threat can be mitigated through manageable conditions on the foreign investor’s physical access to, and use of, the land. Moreover, the “urbanized area” and “urban cluster” exceptions discussed above continue to apply.

In addition to conducting CFIUS-focused risk analysis, transaction parties must consider state and local foreign investment reviews—at least for now. Currently, approximately twenty states have implemented some form of restriction on foreign investment in real estate, and over a dozen states are currently considering bills that would establish similar restrictions.[7] As described in a previous client alert, these state-level restrictions may not ultimately survive legal challenges on the grounds of the U.S. Constitution’s “supremacy clause” —the legal argument being that Congress has already reserved the power to regulate foreign investment in real estate with FIRRMA. However, until successfully challenged, these state and local rules also merit consideration for parties undergoing real estate transactions near U.S. military installations.

[1] See Order of May 13, 2024, Regarding the Acquisition of Certain Real Property of Cheyenne Leads by MineOne Cloud Computing Investment I L.P., 89 Fed. Reg. 43,301 (May 16, 2024).

[2] See, e.g., Protecting America’s Agricultural Land from Foreign Harm Act of 2023, S. 926, 118th Cong. (2023); Countering Communist China Act, H.R. 7476, 118th Cong. (2024).

[3] Note that the proposed rule would not amend the lists of three missile launch areas and twenty-three offshore training “geographic areas” also enumerated in the CFIUS rules, and discussed herein in Section I.

[4] “The Department of Defense will continue on an ongoing basis to assess its military installations and the geographic scope set under the rule to ensure appropriate application in light of national security considerations.” Provisions Pertaining to Certain Transactions by Foreign Persons Involving Real Estate in the United States, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,158, 3,160 (Jan. 17, 2020)

[5] Order of May 13, 2024, Regarding the Acquisition of Certain Real Property of Cheyenne Leads by MineOne Cloud Computing Investment I L.P., 89 Fed. Reg at 43,301

[6] Note that CFIUS’s real estate rules do provide for certain “excepted investors” from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

[7] See Micah Brown & Nick Spellman, “Statutes Regulating Ownership of Agricultural Land,” The Nat’l Agric. L. Center, https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/aglandownership (last updated Nov. 30, 2023); April J. Anderson et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB11013, State Regulation of Foreign Ownership of U.S. Land: January to June 2023 (2023).

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Michelle Weinbaum, Chris Mullen, Mason Gauch, Stephenie Gosnell Handler, and David Wolber.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these issues. For additional information about how we may assist you, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or the following leaders and members of the firm’s International Trade practice group:

United States:
Ronald Kirk – Co-Chair, Dallas (+1 214.698.3295, [email protected])
Adam M. Smith – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3547, [email protected])
Stephenie Gosnell Handler – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8510, [email protected])
Christopher T. Timura – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3690, [email protected])
David P. Burns – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3786, [email protected])
Nicola T. Hanna – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7269, [email protected])
Courtney M. Brown – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8685, [email protected])
Samantha Sewall – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3509, [email protected])
Michelle A. Weinbaum – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8274, [email protected])
Mason Gauch – Houston (+1 346.718.6723, [email protected])
Chris R. Mullen – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8250, [email protected])
Sarah L. Pongrace – New York (+1 212.351.3972, [email protected])
Anna Searcey – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3655, [email protected])
Audi K. Syarief – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8266, [email protected])
Scott R. Toussaint – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3588, [email protected])
Claire Yi – New York (+1 212.351.2603, [email protected])
Shuo (Josh) Zhang – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8270, [email protected])

Asia:
Kelly Austin – Hong Kong/Denver (+1 303.298.5980, [email protected])
David A. Wolber – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3764, [email protected])
Fang Xue – Beijing (+86 10 6502 8687, [email protected])
Qi Yue – Beijing (+86 10 6502 8534, [email protected])
Dharak Bhavsar – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3755, [email protected])
Felicia Chen – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3728, [email protected])
Arnold Pun – Hong Kong (+852 2214 3838, [email protected])

Europe:
Attila Borsos – Brussels (+32 2 554 72 10, [email protected])
Patrick Doris – London (+44 207 071 4276, [email protected])
Michelle M. Kirschner – London (+44 20 7071 4212, [email protected])
Penny Madden KC – London (+44 20 7071 4226, [email protected])
Irene Polieri – London (+44 20 7071 4199, [email protected])
Benno Schwarz – Munich (+49 89 189 33 110, [email protected])
Nikita Malevanny – Munich (+49 89 189 33 224, [email protected])
Melina Kronester – Munich (+49 89 189 33 225, [email protected])
Vanessa Ludwig – Frankfurt (+49 69 247 411 531, [email protected])

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP announces release of Edition 14 of Lexology In-Depth: International Investigations.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP is pleased to announce with Lexology the release of International Investigations. Gibson Dunn partner Stephanie L. Brooker was the Contributing Editor of the publication, which explores the scope of corporate and individual liability and the regulatory and criminal investigations process in the United States and abroad. The Treatise is FREE for a limited time to access HERE.

Ms. Brooker, partners M. Kendall Day and David C. Ware, of counsel Bryan H. Parr, and associate Jack Strachan jointly authored the United States chapter.

You can view this informative and comprehensive treatise via the links below:

CLICK HERE to view Lexology In-Depth: International Investigations

CLICK HERE to view the United States chapter

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers contributed to this publication: Stephanie L. Brooker, M. Kendall Day, David C. Ware, Bryan H. Parr, Jack Strachan.

Gibson Dunn has deep experience with investigations, corporate compliance, and white collar defense.

About the Authors:

Stephanie Brooker, a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson Dunn, is Co-Chair of the firm’s Global White Collar Defense and Investigations, Anti-Money Laundering, and Financial Institutions Practice Groups. Stephanie served as a prosecutor at DOJ, including serving as Chief of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, investigating a broad range of white-collar and other federal criminal matters, and trying 32 criminal trials. She also served as the Director of the Enforcement Division and Chief of Staff at FinCEN, the lead U.S. anti-money laundering regulator and enforcement agency. Stephanie has been consistently recognized by Chambers USA for enforcement defense and BSA/AML compliance as an “excellent attorney,” who clients rely on for “important and complex” matters, and for providing “excellent service and terrific lawyering.” She has also been named a National Law Journal White Collar Trailblazer and a Global Investigations Review Top 100 Women in Investigations.

Kendall Day is a nationally recognized white-collar partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson Dunn, where he is Co-Chair of Gibson Dunn’s Global Fintech and Digital Assets Practice Group, Co-Chair of the firm’s Financial Institutions Practice Group, co-leads the firm’s Anti-Money Laundering practice, and is a member of the White Collar Defense and Investigations and Crisis Management Practice Groups. Kendall is recognized as a leading White Collar Attorney in the District of Columbia by Chambers USA – America’s Leading Business Lawyers. Most recently, Kendall was recognized in Best Lawyers 2024 for white-collar criminal defense. Prior to joining Gibson Dunn, Kendall had a distinguished 15-year career as a white-collar prosecutor with DOJ, rising to the highest career position in DOJ’s Criminal Division as an Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General (“DAAG”). As a DAAG, Kendall had responsibility for approximately 200 prosecutors and other professionals. Kendall also previously served as Chief and Principal Deputy Chief of the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section. In these various leadership positions, from 2013 until 2018, Kendall supervised investigations and prosecutions of many of the country’s most significant and high-profile cases involving allegations of corporate and financial misconduct. He also exercised nationwide supervisory authority over DOJ’s money laundering program, particularly any BSA and money-laundering charges, DPAs and non-prosecution agreements involving financial institutions.

David C. Ware is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He is a member of the firm’s Securities Enforcement, Securities Litigation, Accounting Firm Advisory and Defense, and White Collar Defense and Investigations Practice Groups. David’s practice focuses on government investigations and enforcement actions, internal investigations, and litigation in the areas of auditing and accounting, securities fraud, and related aspects of federal regulatory and criminal law. He also counsels clients concerning compliance with SEC and PCAOB rules and standards. Prior to joining Gibson Dunn, Mr. Ware spent nearly six years at the PCAOB’s Division of Enforcement and Investigations, rising to the position of Associate Director. While at the PCAOB, David was responsible for numerous complex and high-profile investigations, including acting as the lead attorney in some of the PCAOB’s most significant enforcement actions.

Bryan H. Parr is of counsel in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and a member of the White Collar Defense and Investigations, Anti-Corruption & FCPA, and Litigation Practice Groups. His practice focuses on white-collar defense and regulatory compliance matters around the world. Bryan has extensive expertise in government and corporate investigations, including those involving the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and anticorruption. He has defended a range of companies and individuals in U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), SEC, and CFTC enforcement actions, as well as in litigation in federal courts and in commercial arbitrations. In his FCPA practice, Bryan regularly guides companies on creating and implementing effective compliance programs, successfully navigating compliance monitorships, and conducting appropriate M&A-related FCPA diligence and integration. He is recognized as a leading corporate crime and investigations lawyer by Chambers & Partners Latin America for his significant activity and experience in the region. He is proficient in Portuguese, French, and Spanish, and works professionally in all three languages.

Jack Strachan is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He is a member of the firm’s Corporate Department. Jack earned his law degree from the University of Michigan Law School, as well as a B.A. in Economics and Philosophy from the University of Michigan.

Contact Information:

For assistance navigating these issues, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the leaders or members of the firm’s White Collar Defense and Investigations practice group, or the authors:

Stephanie L. Brooker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3502, [email protected])
M. Kendall Day – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8220, [email protected])
David C. Ware – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3652, [email protected])
Bryan H. Parr – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.777.9560, [email protected])
Jack Strachan – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.777.9445, [email protected])

From the Derivatives Practice Group: This week, the CFTC released a report detailing the results of its fourth Supervisory Stress Test of derivatives clearing organization resources. The report concluded the derivatives clearing organization hold sufficient resources to withstand extreme price shocks.

New Developments

Supreme Court Overrules Chevron, Sharply Limiting Judicial Deference To Agencies’ Statutory Interpretation. Last week, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, a landmark decision that had required courts to defer to agencies’, including the CFTC’s, reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms. For a more detailed analysis of the ruling please refer to Gibson Dunn’s client alert, available here. [NEW]
CFTC Announces Supervisory Stress Test Results. On July 1, the CFTC issued Supervisory Stress Test of Derivatives Clearing Organizations: Reverse Stress Test Analysis and Results, a report detailing the results of its fourth Supervisory Stress Test (“SST”) of derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) resources. Among other findings, the 2024 report concluded the DCOs studied hold sufficient financial resources to withstand many extreme and often implausible price shocks. The purpose of the analysis was twofold: (1) to identify hypothetical combinations of extreme market shocks, concurrent with varying numbers of clearing member (“CM”) defaults, that would exhaust prefunded resources (DCO committed capital, and default fund), and unfunded resources available to the DCOs (this represents the reverse stress test component), and (2) to analyze the impacts of DCO use of mutualized resources on non-defaulted CMs. [NEW]
CFTC Staff Issues a No-Action Letter Regarding Certain Reporting Requirements for Swaps Transitioning from CDOR to CORRA. On June 27, the CFTC Division of Market Oversight (“DMO”) and Division of Data (“DOD”) issued a staff no-action letter regarding certain Part 43 and Part 45 swap reporting obligations for swaps transitioning under the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions from referencing the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (“CDOR”), to referencing the risk-free Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (“CORRA”) following the cessation of CDOR after June 28, 2024. The letter states DMO and DOD will not recommend the CFTC take enforcement action against an entity for failure to timely report under Part 45 the change in a swap’s floating rate. This letter covers those floating rate changes that are made under the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions from CDOR to CORRA, but only in the event the entity uses its best efforts to report the change by the applicable deadline in Part 45 and in no case reports the required information later than five business days from, but excluding, July 2, 2024. The letter also states DMO and DOD will not recommend the CFTC take enforcement action against an entity for failure to report under Part 43 the change in the floating rate for a swap modified after execution to incorporate the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions to transition from referencing CDOR to referencing CORRA.
CFTC Extends Public Comment Period for Proposed Amendments to Event Contracts Rules. On June 27, the CFTC announced it is extending the deadline for public comment on a proposal to amend its event contract rules. The extended comment period will close on August 8, 2024. The CFTC is providing an extension to allow interested persons additional time to analyze the proposal and prepare their comments. The proposal would amend CFTC Regulation 40.11 to further specify types of event contracts that fall within the scope of Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) Section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest, such that they may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing on or through a CFTC-registered entity.
CFTC Grants ForecastEx, LLC DCO Registration and DCM Designation. On June 25, the CFTC announced that it has issued ForecastEx, LLC an Order of Registration as a DCO and an Order of Designation as a designated contract market (“DCM”) under the CEA. DCO registration was granted under Section 5b of the CEA. DCM designation was granted under Section 5a of the CEA. ForecastEx is a limited liability company registered in Delaware and headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.
CFTC Approves Final Capital Comparability Determinations for Certain Non-U.S. Nonbank Swap Dealers. On June 25, the CFTC announced it has approved four comparability determinations and related comparability orders granting conditional substituted compliance in connection with the CFTC’s capital and financial reporting requirements to certain CFTC-registered nonbank swap dealers organized and domiciled in Japan, Mexico, the European Union (France and Germany), or the United Kingdom. Pursuant to the orders, non-U.S. nonbank swap dealers subject to prudential regulation by the Financial Services Agency of Japan, the National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico and the Mexican Central Bank, the European Central Bank, or the United Kingdom Prudential Regulation Authority may satisfy certain CEA capital and financial reporting requirements by being subject to, and complying with, comparable capital and financial reporting requirements under the respective foreign jurisdiction’s laws and regulations, subject to specified conditions.

New Developments Outside the U.S.

ESMA Puts Forward Measures to Support Corporate Sustainability Reporting. On July 5, ESMA published a Final Report on the Guidelines on Enforcement of Sustainability Information (“GLESI”) and a Public Statement on the first application of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (“ESRS”). ESMA reports that these documents will support the consistent application and supervision of sustainability reporting requirements. [NEW]
New MiCA Rules Increase Transparency for Retail Investors. On July 4, ESMA published the second Final Report under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) covering eight draft technical standards that aim to provide more transparency for retail investors, clarity for providers on the technical aspects of disclosure and record-keeping requirements, and data standards to facilitate supervision by National Competent Authorities (“NCAs”). The report covers public disclosures, as well as descriptions on how issuers should disclose price-sensitive information to the public to prevent market abuses, such as insider dealing. [NEW]
ESMA Reappoints Three Members to its Management Board. On July 4, ESMA announced that it has reappointed three current members to its Management Board. The appointments took place at the Board of Supervisors meeting on July 3. The Management Board, chaired by Verena Ross, Chair of ESMA, is responsible for ensuring that the Authority carries out its mission and performs the tasks assigned to it under its founding Regulation. [NEW]
EBA and ESMA Publish Guidelines on Suitability of Management Body Members and Shareholders for Entities Under MiCA. On June 27, EBA and ESMA published joint guidelines on the suitability of members of the management body, and on the assessment of shareholders and members with qualifying holdings for issuers of asset reference tokens (“ARTs”) and crypto-asset service providers (“CASPs”), under the MiCA. The first set of guidelines covers the presence of suitable management bodies within issuers of ARTs and CASPs. The second set of guidelines concerns the assessment of the suitability of shareholders or members with direct or indirect qualifying holdings in a supervised entity.
ESAs Propose Improvements to the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation. On June 18, the EBA, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), and ESMA (the three European Supervisory Authorities , i.e., “ESAs”)
published a Joint Opinion on the assessment of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (“SFDR”). In the joint opinion, the ESAs call for a coherent sustainable finance framework that caters for both the green transition and enhanced consumer protection, considering the lessons learned from the functioning of the SFDR.

New Industry-Led Developments

ISDA Proceeds with Development of an Industry Notices Hub. On July 1, ISDA announced it will proceed with the development of an industry-wide notices hub, following strong support from buy- and sell-side institutions globally. The new online platform will allow instantaneous delivery and receipt of critical termination-related notices and help to ensure address details for physical delivery are up to date, reducing the risk of uncertainty and potential losses for senders and recipients of these notices. [NEW]
ISDA Publishes Framework to Prepare for Close Out of Derivatives Contracts. On June 27, ISDA published the ISDA Close-out Framework that market participants can use to help prepare for potential terminations of collateralized derivatives contracts. ISDA stated that the launch of the ISDA Close-out Framework is in response to the March 2023 failure of Signature Bank and SVB in the US, which, according to ISDA, highlighted the complexities of potentially terminating over-the-counter derivatives trading relationships following various post-crisis regulatory reforms. Specifically, the reforms require that in-scope entities post margin for non-cleared derivatives transactions, while various jurisdictions have introduced mandatory stays on termination rights and remedies as part of bank resolution regimes. ISDA stated that the ISDA Close-out Framework is intended to be used as a preparatory resource to help firms coordinate internal business functions and stakeholders and internal and external legal, operational, risk management, infrastructure and other relevant service providers to ensure they are adequately prepared for any potential future stress events.
ISDA Responds to CCIL on Proposal for USD/INR FX Options. On June 21, ISDA submitted a response to a consultation paper from the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (“CCIL”) on a proposal to introduce an electronic trading platform and clearing and settlement services for USD/INR FX options of up to one year maturity initially. The response sets out the features of the trading platform, the risk management framework and a questionnaire on the parameters of the product. ISDA’s response focuses mainly on the risk management framework aspect, including the margin models and default management framework. It asks for more clarity and transparency on the choice of margin models and encourages the implementation of scheduled variation margin calls and stress-based anti-procyclicality measures.
ISDA Responds to FSB Consultation on Liquidity Preparedness for Margin and Collateral Calls. On June 18, ISDA submitted a response to the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) consultation on liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls. The response notes that the recommendations are generally sensible and seek to incorporate a proportionate and risk-based approach. It also highlights a number of considerations relevant to the non-bank financial intermediation (“NBFI”) sector’s liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Jeffrey Steiner, Adam Lapidus, Marc Aaron Takagaki, Hayden McGovern, and Karin Thrasher.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Derivatives practice group, or the following practice leaders and authors:

Jeffrey L. Steiner, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3632, [email protected])

Michael D. Bopp, Washington, D.C. (202.955.8256, [email protected])

Michelle M. Kirschner, London (+44 (0)20 7071.4212, [email protected])

Darius Mehraban, New York (212.351.2428, [email protected])

Jason J. Cabral, New York (212.351.6267, [email protected])

Adam Lapidus – New York (212.351.3869, [email protected] )

Stephanie L. Brooker, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3502, [email protected])

William R. Hallatt , Hong Kong (+852 2214 3836, [email protected] )

David P. Burns, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3786, [email protected])

Marc Aaron Takagaki , New York (212.351.4028, [email protected] )

Hayden K. McGovern, Dallas (214.698.3142, [email protected])

Karin Thrasher, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3712, [email protected])

In Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, the Northern District of Texas concluded “The role of an administrative agency is to do as told by Congress, not to do what the agency think[s] it should do.”

On July 3, 2024, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas concluded that the Federal Trade Commission’s Non-Compete Rule, which would retroactively invalidate over 30 million employment contracts and preempt the laws of 46 states, exceeds the FTC’s statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Rule and stayed its effective date, but limited the scope of relief to the parties to the case. The court did not issue a nationwide preliminary injunction.

Background

Section 5 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC “to prevent” the use of “unfair methods of competition” through case-by-case adjudication. Section 6(g) of the Act grants the FTC ancillary powers to support administrative adjudication, including the powers to make recommendations, publish reports, classify corporations, and “make rules and regulations for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this subchapter.”

On April 23, the FTC promulgated the Non-Compete Rule by a 3-2 vote. The Rule invokes the FTC’s purported authority under Sections 5 and 6 and declares that nearly all non-compete agreements between employers and employees are “unfair methods of competition.” The Rule accordingly prohibits businesses from entering into new non-competes except for those associated with the sale of certain business interests and bans the enforcement of nearly all non-competes (with narrow exceptions for the sale of certain business interests and for agreements with certain senior executives). The Rule also expressly preempted the laws of the 46 states that allow non-compete agreements.

Ryan, LLC, is a global tax-consulting firm headquartered in Dallas. Its principals and other workers are sought-after tax experts, many of whom agree to temporally limited non-compete agreements.

Represented by Gibson Dunn, Ryan filed suit against the FTC in the Northern District of Texas, alleging that the Non-Compete Rule exceeds the FTC’s statutory authority, violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and defies the major questions doctrine, which instructs that federal agencies cannot regulate questions of deep economic and political significance absent clear authority from Congress. A group of trade associations led by the United States Chamber of Commerce intervened in the case to challenge the Rule as well.

The Court’s Opinion

The court determined that the Non-Compete Rule exceeds the scope of the FTC’s statutory authority. “By a plain reading, Section 6(g) of the Act does not expressly grant the Commission authority to promulgate substantive rules regarding unfair methods of competition.” The court emphasized that, unlike Section 5, Section 6(g) “contains no penalty provision—which indicates a lack of substantive force.” Further, the court noted that “the location of the alleged substantive rulemaking authority is suspect . . . . Section 6(g) is the seventh in a list of twelve almost entirely investigative powers.”
The court further concluded that the Non-Compete Rule is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. First, the Rule “is unreasonably overbroad without a reasonable explanation.” The FTC “lack[ed] . . . evidence as to why they chose to impose such a sweeping prohibition—that prohibits entering or enforcing virtually all non-competes—instead of targeting specific, harmful non-competes.” Second, “the FTC insufficiently addressed alternatives to issuing the Rule.” It “dismissed any possible alternatives, merely concluding that either the pro-competitive justifications outweighed the harms, or that employers had other avenues to protect their interests.”
The court did not address the major questions doctrine.
The court determined that Ryan and the intervenors would suffer irreparable harm if the Rule takes effect because they would face “financial injury” and expend “nonrecoverable costs [when] complying with the Rule.”
The court declined to enter a nationwide preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction and stay are limited to Ryan and the intervenors, and do not extend to intervenors’ member companies or other nonparties.

What It Means:

The Non-Compete Rule was scheduled to take effect on September 4. As long as the preliminary injunction and stay are in place, the FTC cannot enforce the Rule against Ryan or the intervenors. Their existing non-compete agreements remain enforceable under federal law, and they are free to enter into new non-compete agreements.
In the absence of nationwide relief, the Rule will go into effect on September 4 as to all other employers, meaning that state non-compete laws will be preempted, existing non-compete agreements will be retroactively invalidated, and businesses will be unable to enter into new non-compete agreements unrelated to certain sales of businesses.
The decision is not binding precedent on other courts.
Proceedings before the district court will continue. The court indicated that it would enter a final ruling on the merits by August 30.

Gibson Dunn attorneys Eugene Scalia, Allyson N. Ho, Amir C. Tayrani, Andrew Kilberg, Elizabeth A. Kiernan, Aaron Hauptman, and Josh Zuckerman represent Ryan, LLC.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Eugene Scalia, Allyson N. Ho, Amir C. Tayrani, Andrew Kilberg, Elizabeth A. Kiernan, Aaron Hauptman, and Josh Zuckerman.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding the issues discussed in this update. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, the authors, or any leader or member of the firm’s Appellate & Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment, Administrative Law & Regulatory, or Antitrust & Competition practice groups:

Labor and Employment:
Andrew G.I. Kilberg – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3759, [email protected])
Karl G. Nelson – Dallas (+1 214.698.3203, [email protected])
Jason C. Schwartz – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8242, [email protected])
Katherine V.A. Smith – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7107, [email protected])

Administrative Law and Regulatory:
Eugene Scalia – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8673, [email protected])
Helgi C. Walker – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3599, [email protected])

Antitrust and Competition:
Rachel S. Brass – San Francisco (+1 415.393.8293, [email protected])
Svetlana S. Gans – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8657, [email protected])
Cynthia Richman – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8234, [email protected])
Stephen Weissman – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8678, [email protected])

In the lead up to the election, the Labour Party proposed extensive reforms to UK employment law as part of “Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay: Delivering A New Deal for Working People.” Legislation is expected to be put before Parliament within the first 100 days of the Labour Party’s entry into government.

On July 5, 2024, the Labour Party was announced to have won a substantial majority in the UK General Election that was held on July 4, 2024, marking an end to the Conservative Party’s 14 years in power. In the lead up to the election, the Labour Party proposed extensive reforms to UK employment law as part of “Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay: Delivering A New Deal for Working People” (the “New Deal”), and legislation is expected to be put before Parliament within the first 100 days of the Labour Party’s entry into government. In this update, we outline these anticipated developments in UK employment law.

A brief overview of the potential developments which we believe will be of interest to our clients is provided below, with more detailed information on each topic available by clicking on the links.

1. Implementing Workforce Changes(view details)

We summarise changes proposed to an employer’s ability to terminate employees who have acquired less than two years of service, as well as the impact on employers of proposed changes: (i) to the controversial practice of dismissing and re-hiring employees as a means of changing terms of employment; and (ii) designed to strengthen employee rights and protections in connection with both collective redundancy situations (lay-offs) and business transfers, strategic sourcing transactions, and other transfers subject to the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) (“TUPE”).

2. Enforcement of UK Employment Law (view details)

We summarise proposed reforms to the practice of enforcing UK employment laws, including the establishment of a single enforcement body and the extension of the time limit for bringing the majority of employment claims before the Employment Tribunal. We also consider the potential new ability for employees to collectively raise grievances about their workplace with Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (“ACAS”).

3. Discrimination, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (view details)

We summarise the proposed new obligations on employers to address the gender pay gap, reduce workplace harassment, strengthen whistleblower rights, extend the gender pay gap regime to include race and disability, and carry out ethnicity and disability pay gap reporting. We also consider potential changes to family-friendly rights.

4. Working Arrangements (view details)

We consider the proposed changes to an employer’s ability to engage workers on “zero hour” contracts, changes to national minimum wage (“NMW”) rates, and the introduction of fair pay agreements to the adult social care sector. We also summarise the potential new right for employees to disconnect from work outside of working hours, enhancements to the right to flexible working, and the strengthening of trade unions.

5. Employment Status (view details)

We consider the possible move away from the three-tier system of employee, worker and self-employed contractor that currently exists in the UK towards a simpler two-part framework of employment status, and the proposal to strengthen the rights and protections of the self-employed.

We will provide a further update once the Labour government publishes draft legislation implementing these changes. In the meantime, we will continue to work with our clients to navigate the changing employment landscape in the UK.

APPENDIX

Implementing Workforce Changes

Unfair Dismissal

UK employees with less than two years of continuous service do not currently benefit from protection against unfair dismissal, except in certain limited circumstances. Unfair dismissal protection restricts an employer’s ability to terminate their employment other than for reasons of: (i) capability; (ii) conduct; (iii) redundancy; or (iii) some other substantial reason, while also requiring employers to follow a fair dismissal process.

The Labour government has indicated that a form of unfair dismissal protection will be extended to employees from day one of their employment to ensure that new hires are not terminated without cause. In response to protests from employer organisations, the Labour government has suggested that employers will still be able to operate probationary periods to assess new hires, although for how long such probation periods may last remains to be seen.

Dismissal and Re-engagement

The Labour government has also committed to ending the practice known as “fire and rehire” as a lawful means of imposing unilateral changes to an employee’s contractual terms of employment. This was an area that the previous government attempted to reform by implementing a Statutory Code of Practice on Dismissal and Re-engagement (the “Code”) which employers should follow when seeking to change employment terms and conditions using the method of dismissal and re-engagement. This Code was expected to come into force on July 18, 2024, although it is yet to be seen whether the new Labour government will implement it in its current form.

Instead, it is anticipated that the Code will be replaced by new laws designed to regulate the practice of firing and rehiring employees in order to change their terms of employment.

Redundancy and TUPE

Currently, UK employers are required to follow a collective consultation process when proposing to make at least 20 redundancies in a single establishment (often interpreted as one workplace) within a 90-day period. The Labour government has committed to strengthening employee redundancy rights and protections, which includes making the right to redundancy consultation determined by the number of people impacted across the business rather than in one workplace.

Employees who are subject to TUPE processes also currently enjoy protection from termination of employment and/or changes to their contractual terms that are imposed by reason of a TUPE transfer. The Labour government has stated that they will strengthen existing rights and protections under TUPE, although it is not clear in what way these rights would be strengthened.

Enforcement of UK Employment Law

Establishing a Single Enforcement Body

Save in relation to equality and human rights, the current enforcement of UK employment rights relies on individual employees or trade unions bringing a claim before the Employment Tribunal. The Labour government plans to establish a single enforcement body to enforce workers’ rights going forward, to include not only equality and human rights but other areas of employment law such as health and safety, minimum wage, and worker exploitation. This body will have strong powers to undertake targeted and proactive enforcement work, such as carrying out unannounced inspections, following up on anonymous tip-offs, and bringing civil proceedings to uphold employment rights.

Employment Tribunal Claims

The time limit for bringing many types of UK employment claims in an employment tribunal currently expires three months from the date the claim arises, subject to an extension of up to six weeks for pre-claim conciliation. The Labour government plans to extend the time limit to bring all UK employment claims to six months.

Collective Grievances

UK employees can currently formally raise individual grievances about conduct in the workplace with their employer through ACAS. The Labour government has stated that it will provide employees with the ability to raise collective grievances about conduct in their place of work directly to ACAS.

Discrimination, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion

Pay Gap Reporting and Action Plans

UK employers with more than 250 staff are currently required to report their gender pay gap data by April 4 of each year. There is currently no mandatory requirement for employers to report on their ethnicity or disability pay gap.

The Labour government has stated that the publication of ethnicity and disability pay gaps will become mandatory for employers with more than 250 employees, mirroring gender pay gap reporting. Although not mentioned in the New Deal, the Labour government has indicated that it would implement new legislation to tackle structural racism, including the issue of low pay for ethnic minorities, with fines for employers not taking appropriate action on their pay gap data.

Large employers are expected to be required to develop, publish, and implement action plans to close their gender pay gaps, and to include outsourced workers in their gender pay gap and pay ratio reporting. Similarly, employers with more than 250 employees are expected to be required to produce Menopause Action Plans, setting out how they will support employees going through the menopause at work.

Another proposed policy, not mentioned in the New Deal but included in the Labour manifesto, is to extend the current gender equal pay regime to include race and disability. This will be enforced by a new regulatory unit with trade union backing.

Workplace Harassment and Whistleblowing

The Labour government has stated that it will “require employers to create and maintain workplaces and working conditions free from harassment, including third parties”, and will also strengthen the legal duty for employers to take all reasonable steps to stop harassment, including sexual harassment, before it starts. Although not mentioned in the New Deal, the Labour government also previously indicated that women who report sexual harassment at work would be provided with the same protections from dismissal and detriment as other whistleblowers.

The previous government also sought to implement a new mandatory duty to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, which had been expected to come into force in October 2024, however this duty does not currently cover harassment by third parties. It remains to be seen if the new mandatory duty will be implemented in its current form.

The Labour government has committed to strengthening whistleblowers’ rights, and we await details of this new policy.

Family Leave Rights

Whilst UK employment law already provides for extensive family leave rights, the Labour government has stated it would make various enhancements:

parental leave, which entitles parents with at least one years’ service to take up to 18 weeks of unpaid leave for each child until the child is 18, will become available to employees from day one of their employment;

it will be unlawful to dismiss a woman during pregnancy or within six months of her return to work following maternity leave, other than in specified circumstances. This is expected to build on the existing protections afforded to pregnant women or women on maternity leave; and

entitlement to bereavement leave will be clarified and extended to all employees. Currently, employees do not have a statutory right to paid time off when someone dies, unless they are entitled to parental bereavement leave.

The Labour government has also stated that the system of parental leave will be reviewed within its first year and that the implementation of the legislation for unpaid carers’ leave, which entitles employees to take up to one week every 12 months to help a dependent who needs long-term care and was introduced in April 2024, will be reviewed. The Labour government also plans to examine the potential benefits of introducing paid carers’ leave.

Working Arrangements

Engagement of Casual and/or Low Paid Workers

The Labour government has committed to:

banning contracts that provide no guarantee of work, known as “zero hour” contracts, although it has been reported that this would not be a total ban and would allow workers to remain on zero hour contracts in certain circumstances; and

ensuring that workers have the right to: (i) a contract that reflects the number of hours they regularly work based on a twelve-week reference period; and (ii) reasonable notice of any change in shifts or working time, with compensation that is proportionate to the notice given for any shifts cancelled or curtailed.

The previous government had attempted to regularise the engagement of casual workers in the UK by implementing a statutory right to a predictable working pattern, which is expected to come into force in September 2024; it is currently unclear if the new Labour government will implement this provision.

The Labour government also announced various proposed enhancements to the NMW rate, which is currently split into age bands and is reviewed and updated each year. The Labour government plans to: (i) remove the age bands, which it considers discriminatory; and (ii) expand the remit of the Low Pay Commission, which currently reviews and makes recommendations on the NMW rate, to ensure that the rate considers increases in cost of living.

The Labour government has pledged to introduce a “Fair Pay Agreement” to the adult social care sector. This will offer social care workers stronger collective bargaining rights in pay negotiations.

Right to Disconnect and Work Autonomously

The Labour government has stated a new “right to switch off” would be introduced, which would give UK employees the right to disconnect from outside of working hours and not be contacted by their employers. This would follow models already in place in Ireland and Belgium, which give employers and employees the opportunity to work together on bespoke workplace policies or contractual terms that benefit both parties in this respect.

The Labour government has also stated that they will ensure that proposals by employers to use surveillance technologies will be subject to consultation and negotiation, with a view to agreement of trade unions or staff representatives.

Right to Flexible Working

The right to request flexible working recently became a day one right in the UK on April 6, 2024. The Labour government has stated that flexible working would be made the default for all workers from the first day of employment, except where not reasonably feasible, although it is currently unclear what this will involve.

Trade Unions

The Labour government plans to update trade union legislation so that, among other things, employers will be required to inform workers of their right to join a trade union. Additionally, recent legislation introduced by the previous government to restrict trade union activity, such as the minimum service level requirement in essential services, is likely to be repealed. Industrial action ballot requirements will also be eased, and limitations on union workplace access will be lifted.

Employment Status

UK employment law currently recognises three types of employment status: (i) employees; (ii) workers (which is inclusive of employees); and (iii) self-employed contractors. An individual’s employment status determines the statutory employment rights to which they are entitled to (if any), and employment status has become a hot topic before the Employment Tribunal in recent years.

The Labour government has committed to carrying out a consultation on employment status as part of a move towards a single status of ‘worker’ and a simplified two-part framework for employment status. The Labour government has also stated that they will strengthen the rights and protections of the self-employed, including the right to a written contract, action to tackle late payments, and extending health and safety and blacklisting protections to the self-employed, along with strengthening trade union rights.

Further updates

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: James A. Cox, Georgia Derbyshire, Olivia Sadler, and Finley Willits*.

Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have about these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Labor and Employment practice group, or the following authors in London:

James A. Cox (+44 20 7071 4250, [email protected])

Georgia Derbyshire (+44 20 7071 4013, [email protected])

Olivia Sadler (+44 20 7071 4950, [email protected])

*Finley Willits, a trainee solicitor in the London office, is not admitted to practice law.

Gibson Dunn’s Workplace DEI Task Force aims to help our clients develop creative, practical, and lawful approaches to accomplish their DEI objectives following the Supreme Court’s decision in SFFA v. Harvard. Prior issues of our DEI Task Force Update can be found in our DEI Resource Center. Should you have questions about developments in this space or about your own DEI programs, please do not hesitate to reach out to any member of our DEI Task Force or the authors of this Update (listed below).

Key Developments

On June 27, Tractor Supply issued a statement saying that it would “[e]liminate DEI roles and retire [its] current DEI goals,” along with ceasing support for Pride festivals and withdrawing its carbon emission goals. The statement came in response to a public pressure campaign waged against Tractor Supply by Robby Starbuck, a conservative activist and social media personality, who criticized Tractor Supply for its DEI commitments, support for Pride Month celebrations, contributions to the Democratic Party, and carbon emission goals, among other things. Starbuck urged his followers to boycott Tractor Supply and to send complaints to Tractor Supply’s corporate offices. After three weeks of public pressure, and a reduction in its stock price, Tractor Supply acceded to Starbuck’s demands. Starbuck immediately claimed victory following Tractor Supply’s announcement, saying that it “was the start of something big” and threatening to “expose a new company next week.” In response to Tractor Supply’s announcement, the National Black Farmers Association called on Tractor Supply’s president and CEO to step down, and threatened a boycott of its own.

On June 20, the State of Missouri filed a complaint against IBM in state court, alleging that the company is violating the Missouri Human Rights Act by using race and gender quotas in its hiring and basing employee compensation on participation in allegedly discriminatory DEI practices. See Missouri v. IBM, No. 24SL–CC02837 (Cir. Ct. of St. Louis Cty.). The complaint cites a leaked video in which IBM’s Chief Executive Officer and Board Chairman, Arvind Krishna, allegedly stated that all executives must increase representation of ethnic minorities in their teams by 1% each year in order to receive a “plus” on their bonus. The complaint also alleges that employees at IBM have been fired or suffered adverse employment actions because they failed to meet or exceed these targets. The Missouri Attorney General is seeking to permanently enjoin IBM and its officers from utilizing quotas in hiring and compensation decisions.

On July 1, a suit was filed against CBS Broadcasting by former Los Angeles news anchor Jeff Vaughn, alleging that CBS terminated his employment because he is “an older, white, heterosexual male.” See Vaughn v. CBS Broadcasting, No. 2:24-cv-05570 (C.D. Cal. 2024). Vaughn claims that CBS replaced him with a “younger minority news anchor” in violation of Section 1981, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The complaint points to public statements by CBS expressing its commitment to diversity, including statements discussing various representation goals. Vaughn, who is represented by America First Legal, is seeking over $5,000,000 in damages.

In a statement issued on June 28, the U.S. Department of Commerce said that it would not appeal the district court’s ruling in Nuziard v. Minority Business Development Agency, No. 4:23-cv-00278 (N.D. Tex. 2024). The court held that the racial presumption used by the Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) in apportioning federal funds for minority business assistance violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The decision extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in SFFA to federal agencies administering grant programs, holding that “[t]hough SFFA concerned college admissions, nothing in the decision indicates that the Court’s holding should be constrained to that context.” For a more detailed discussion of the Nuziard decision, see our prior update here. The Commerce Department’s statement said that while the Department “strongly disagree[s]” with the court’s ruling, its “primary goal is to ensure MBDA can continue to meet its mission to promote the growth and global competitiveness of minority business enterprises,” and it believes that the injunction imposed by the district court “does not currently prevent MBDA from continuing to fulfill its mission.”

On June 27, EEOC Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal encouraged workers’ rights attorneys to continue advocating for lawful DEI initiatives, including data collection aimed at ensuring equal employment opportunities. Kotagal’s address took place at the National Employment Lawyers Association’s annual conference in Philadelphia and followed panel discussions of conservative legal activists’ anti-DEI efforts. Kotagal commented on the “bleak” landscape but urged the audience not to give up, emphasizing that Title VII standards have not changed and citing “misinformation” and “scare tactics” as having blurred employers’ understanding of the legality of DEI programming. Kotagal acknowledged the litany of reverse-discrimination suits being brought by white employees in the wake of SFFA but insisted that “there’s a huge difference” between quotas, on the one hand, and “measuring and understanding the demographics of your workforce with an eye to breaking down barriers and equal opportunity,” on the other. She stated that employers can legally engage in “remedial and temporary affirmative action plans” and the key is ensuring that “individual decisions are not based on race.”

On June 27, a split Ninth Circuit panel reinstated a proposed class action in which the plaintiffs allege that Meta unlawfully favors visa holders over citizens when making hiring decisions in Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 22-16870 (9th Cir. 2024). The plaintiff alleged that, despite being qualified, he was discriminatorily rejected by Meta for several jobs because he is as U.S. citizen and Meta prefers to hire noncitizens holding H1B visas because it can pay them lower wages. U.S. Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler in the Northern District of California had dismissed the complaint, finding that U.S. citizens are not a protected class under Section 1981. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The majority noted that while race discrimination is different from citizenship discrimination, “it is not different in any way that is relevant to the text of 1981.” Judge VanDyke dissented, writing that “discrimination because of citizenship is not covered by Section 1981 because citizens inherently possess the rights enjoyed by citizens, even when noncitizens are preferenced over them.”

On June 24, the Equal Protection Project (EPP) filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) against Indiana University Columbus (IUC). The complaint alleges that IUC partners with the African American Fund Bartholomew County (AAFBC) to administer a scholarship that is restricted to African American students in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. EPP contends that because IUC is a public institution receiving federal financial assistance, it cannot intentionally discriminate on the basis of race in any “program or activity,” regardless of any good intention. EPP requests that OCR initiate a formal investigation into IUC’s role in creating and promoting the scholarship and asks that it impose appropriate remedial relief.

On June 20, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul and 18 other Democrat state attorneys general issued a public letter to the American Bar Association (ABA) defending the current criteria used in ABA accreditation, in response to a June 3 letter from Republican state AGs urging the ABA to remove this criteria from its accreditation process. The letter from the Democrat AGs argues that SFFA does not bar higher education institutions from encouraging a diverse applicant pool or creating non-hostile educational environments for underrepresented groups. The ABA is currently considering revisions to Standard 206 for accreditation, which governs diversity and inclusion within law schools. The letter was also addressed to “Fortune 100 CEOs and other organizations unfairly targeted for their commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion,” noting that SFFA’s “narrow holding did not change the law for private businesses.”

On June 20, Do No Harm filed a complaint against the American Association of University Women (AAUW), alleging that the organization is violating Section 1981 by providing Focus Group Professions Fellowships only to “women from ethnic minority groups historically underrepresented in certain fields within the United States: Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino/a, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.” See Do No Harm v. American Association of University Women, No. 1:24-cv-01782 (D.D.C. 2024). Do No Harm is proceeding on behalf of its medical student-members, who allegedly meet all of the other application requirements for the AAUW fellowship but “are ineligible to apply to the fellowship because of their race.” Do No Harm is seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting AAUW from closing the application window, and a permanent injunction prohibiting AAUW from considering race when selecting grant recipients.

On June 20, a three-judge panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an unpublished per curiam decision dismissing the appeal of two former General Motors employees who contended that they faced discrimination and were terminated because they are white. See Bittner v. General Motors, LLC, No. 366160 (Mich. Ct. App. 2024). As noted in the court’s opinion, GM terminated the plaintiffs’ employment after corroborating complaints from other employees claiming that the plaintiffs routinely used sexually derogatory, homophobic, and transphobic language. The plaintiffs asserted state-law claims of disparate treatment, disparate impact, hostile work environment, and civil conspiracy, but the trial court granted GM’s motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ assertion that a supervisor’s request that they remain respectful during a Juneteenth moment of silence was “direct evidence” of discrimination. Nor was the Court convinced by the plaintiffs’ purported circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment.

Media Coverage and Commentary:

Below is a selection of recent media coverage and commentary on these issues:

The Washington Post, “DEI Programs toppled amid a surge of conservative lawsuits” (June 27): The Washington Post’s Peter Whoriskey and Julian Mark report that right-leaning legal groups filed more than 100 lawsuits challenging racial preferences and other efforts by corporations and the government to “address demographic disparities in business, government and education.” Following SFFA, according to Jason Schwartz, Gibson Dunn partner and co-chair of the firm’s Labor & Employment group, “[t]he cases are going pretty quickly and decisively against the government programs” because “[government] cases are harder to defend.” Whoriskey and Mark say that private companies have “more legal leeway to implement diversity programs,” but that recent litigation also has had a chilling effect on private companies, with many reconsidering their own diversity programs as a defensive measure to reduce litigation risk.
The Wall Street Journal, “Tractor Supply Retreats from DEI Amid Conservative Backlash” (June 27): Sarah Nassauer and Sabela Ojea of The Wall Street Journal report that Tractor Supply Company, a rural retailer best known for its animal feed and workwear sales, is abandoning its DEI and environmental initiatives in response to weeks of social media criticism from Robby Starbuck, a prominent conservative political commentator. Starbuck encouraged his followers to boycott Tractor Supply because of its stated political, diversity, and environmental goals. Nassauer and Ojea report that the company announced it would eliminative jobs focused on DEI, stop sponsoring LGBTQ+ pride festivals, and no longer submit data to LGBTQ+ advocacy group the Human Rights Campaign. Nassauer and Ojea note that “Tractor Supply’s core customer base is more rural and male than general big-box retailers,” with “customers in regions that tend to vote for more conservative political candidates.” In a statement, Tractor Supply said that it had “heard from customers that we have disappointed them,” and it had “taken this feedback to heart.”

The Associated Press, “Black farmers’ association calls for Tractor Supply CEO’s resignation after company cuts DEI efforts” (July 2): Wyatte Grantham-Philips and Haleluya Hadero of the Associated Press report on calls from the National Black Farmers Association (NBFA) for Tractor Supply’s CEO Hal Lawton to step down. Grantham-Philips and Hadero say that the calls for Lawton’s resignation come in response to Tractor Supply’s recent announcement that it would stop most of its corporate diversity and climate advocacy efforts. Tractor Supply announced the changes following a pressure campaign from conservative activists who took issue with what Grantham-Philips and Hadero call “the company’s work to be more socially inclusive and to curb climate change.” John Boyd Jr., president and founder of the NBFA, said that he was “appalled” by Tractor Supply’s decision, and warned that “Black farmers are going to start fighting back,” including by considering calling for a boycott of Tractor Supply. Indeed, Grantham-Philips and Hadero report that some customers have “already decided to take their business elsewhere,” deciding that they can “no longer support Tractor Supply if its announcement reflected its beliefs.”
The Wall Street Journal, “Banks, Law and Consulting Firms are Watering Down Their Diversity Recruiting Programs” (June 20): The Wall Street Journal’s Kailyn Rhone reports that “white-collar companies,” once champions of programs to recruit diverse employees, are now quietly downplaying these programs. Rhone says that these changes include minimizing use of terminology like “DEI,” opening diversity programs to all applicants, and omitting references to DEI programs from annual reports. Rhone cites accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers as an example, noting that it recently altered the eligibility criteria for its Start internship, shifting the focus from “traditionally underrepresented” minority applicants to students of “diverse backgrounds” generally. Similarly, Rhone notes that JPMorgan Chase clarified that its Black and Hispanic & Latino fellowship programs are available to all students, regardless of race. And, Rhone says, consulting firm McKinsey & Co. also recently removed the requirement that candidates for its summer business analyst program “self-identify as a member of a historically underrepresented group.” According to Rhone, some minority job seekers worry that the changes “could erode a path for diverse candidates to find internships and entry-level roles.”

The Dallas Morning News, “131 college scholarships put on hold or modified due to Texas DEI ban, documents show” (June 17): Marcela Rodrigues and Philip Jankowski of The Dallas Morning News report that a new Texas law banning DEI programs at public universities has frozen or modified over 130 college scholarships state-wide. Known as SB 17, the law prohibits Texas public colleges from administering programs designed for students of specific races or genders. Many of the scholarships affected are administered by the schools but funded through private donations. According to officials at public universities across Texas, SB 17 has triggered review of thousands of scholarships, in some cases leading to the alteration or elimination of gender and racial eligibility requirements.
The Washington Post, “Most Americans approve of DEI, according to Post-Ipsos poll” (June 18): The Washington Post’s Taylor Telford, Emmanuel Felton, and Emily Guskin report on a recent poll finding that the majority of Americans believe DEI programs are “a good thing.” The poll indicated that support is even higher for certain types of programming, like internships for underrepresented groups and anti-bias trainings, and that respondents expressed greater support for DEI programs after they were given a detailed description of them. The authors note that “one effort was universally unpopular: financial incentives for managers who achieve diversity goals.” Joelle Emerson, chief executive of Paradigm, a DEI consultancy, said that she believes “that the vast majority of peoples’ values align with what this work actually entails,” but that the concept of DEI might need some rebranding.
Law360 Employment Authority, “A Year After Justices Scrap Affirmative Action, DEI Rebounds” (June 28): Law360’s Anne Cullen reports that DEI consultants are seeing a gradual resurgence in corporate interest regarding DEI initiatives. Cullen acknowledges that, although DEI advocates have had some notable wins in the courts, lawsuits filed by conservative groups have had a dramatic chilling effect on corporate programs—including an outsized effect on small businesses and organizations without the financial capacity to mount a defense. But experts in the field say that the tide may be turning, with some noticing “a bottoming out, and some new entrants” to the corporate diversity field. Other consultants report observing “resurging interest” from corporate clients who “want to roll their sleeves up and do the work.” Experts recommend that companies be willing “to adapt and pivot,” including rebranding their programs to move away from the “DEI” label.

Case Updates:

Below is a list of updates in new and pending cases:

1. Contracting claims under Section 1981, the U.S. Constitution, and other statutes:

Californians for Equal Rights Foundation v. City of San Diego, No. 3:24-cv-00484 (S.D. Cal. 2024): On March 12, 2024, the Californians for Equal Rights Foundation filed a complaint on behalf of members who are “ready, willing and able” to purchase a home in San Diego, but are ineligible for a grant or loan under the City’s BIPOC First-Time Homebuyer Program. Plaintiffs allege that the program discriminates on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
- Latest update: On June 18, 2024, the City of San Diego filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The City argued that the complaint does not include any allegations against the City, and instead alleges a “fictitious [agency] relationship” with the other defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of San Diego and the San Diego Housing Commission. The City also argued that even if the Plaintiff’s agency allegations were accepted as true, its claim against the Housing Authority and City still fails because “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”
Valencia AG, LLC v. New York State Off. of Cannabis Mgmt. et al., No. 5:24-cv-116-GTS (N.D.N.Y. 2024): On January 24, 2024, Valencia AG, a cannabis company owned by white men, sued the New York State Office of Cannabis Management for discrimination, alleging that New York’s Cannabis Law and regulations favored minority-owned and women-owned businesses. The regulations include goals to promote “social & economic equity” (SEE) applicants, which the plaintiff claims violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Section 1983. On March 13, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming only two New York state officials as defendants in their official capacity. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against the regulations and a declaration that the use of race and sex in the New York Cannabis Law violates the Fourteenth Amendment. On April 24, 2024, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of standing and failure to state an Equal Protection Clause claim, arguing that even without the contested policy the plaintiff would not have received the license due to their low “position in the queue.”
- Latest update: On June 20, 2024, the defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacks standing because its microbusiness license will be reviewed in the November queue under a recently adopted board resolution. Moreover, the defendants asserted that there is no risk of injury because “the Board and Office have interpreted the Cannabis Law and implementing regulations to be satisfied by front-end measures to aid [minority] SEE applicants such as community outreach, low-burden applications, and assistance if an application is found to be defective,” and that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the defendants will deviate from this interpretation. The defendants also noted that they have submitted affidavits indicating that “applications are being reviewed solely for completeness and correctness, and thus that the race and gender of an applicant will play no role in whether an application is approved.”

2. Employment discrimination and related claims:

Sullivan v. Howard Univ., No. 1:24-cv-01924 (D.D.C. 2024): On July 1, 2024, a male administrator at Howard University filed suit against the university, claiming that he experienced sex discrimination and retaliation when he was transferred to another department.
- Latest Update: The docket does not reflect that Howard University has been served.
Gerber v. Ohio Northern Univ., No. 2023-1107-CVH (Ohio. Ct. Common Pleas Hardin Cty. 2024): On June 30, 2023, a law professor sued his former employer, Ohio Northern University, for terminating his employment after an internal investigation determined that he bullied and harassed other faculty members. On January 23, 2024, the plaintiff, now represented by America First Legal, filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff claims that his firing was actually in retaliation for his vocal and public opposition to the university’s stated DEI principles and race-conscious hiring, which he believed were illegal. The plaintiff alleged that the investigation and his termination breached his employment contract, violated Ohio civil rights statutes, and constituted various torts, including defamation, false light, conversion, infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
- Latest update: On June 17, 2024, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the court should grant summary judgment because plaintiff’s claims of retaliation for expressing his views on DEI policies are not backed by evidence, including because he “advanced through the ranks at ONU” while making prolific remarks against DEI and affirmative action since at least 2005. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and defamation claims.
Weitzman v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, No. 2:24-cv-00071-TLF (W.D. Wash. 2024): On January 16, 2024, a white Jewish female former employee sued the medical center where she used to work, alleging that she was terminated for expressing her discomfort with DEI-related content shared in the workplace by coworkers, objecting to DEI-related training, and expressing her political opposition to DEI-aligned ideologies. She also claimed that her employer failed to act when she was allegedly discriminated against because of her religion and race by other coworkers. The plaintiff alleged that her employer’s conduct constituted racial discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination and Section 1981; discrimination and retaliation on the basis of political ideology in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code; and intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful termination in violation of public policy under common law.
- Latest update: On June 25, the court granted the parties’ joint stipulation for dismissal and the claim was dismissed with prejudice.
DiBenedetto v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 21-cv-4527 (N.D. Ga. 2021): On November 2, 2021, the plaintiff, a white male former executive, brought claims against AT&T under Title VII, Section 1981, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that he was wrongfully terminated due to his race, gender, and age.
- Latest update: On June 26, the parties jointly stipulated and agreed to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims in this action.
Newman v. Elk Grove Educ. Ass’n., No. 2:24-cv-01487-DB (E.D. Cal. 2024): On May 24, 2024, a white teacher at the Elk Grove Unified School District in Sacramento, California, sued the teachers’ union after it created an executive board position called the “BIPOC At-Large Director” open only to those who “self-identify” as “African American (Black), Native American, Alaska Native, Native Hawai’ian, Pacific Islander, Latino (including Puerto Rican), Asian, Arab, and Middle Eastern.” The plaintiff alleges that he is a union member who “wants to run for union office to address the District’s recent adoption of what he believes to be aggressive and unnecessary Diversity, Equity & Inclusion (‘DEI’) policies,” but is ineligible for this board seat because of his race. The plaintiff alleges that he therefore has fewer opportunities to obtain a board seat than non-white union members. He has brought claims against the union under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.
- Latest update: The defendant’s response to the complaint is due on August 26, 2024.
Faculty, Alumni, and Students Opposed to Racial Preferences (FASORP) v. Northwestern University, No. 1:24-cv-05558 (N.D. Ill. 2024): A nonprofit advocacy group filed suit against Northwestern University, alleging that Northwestern University is violating Title VI, Title IX, and Section 1981 by considering race and sex in law school faculty hiring decisions. The suit also claims that student editors of the Northwestern University Law Review give discriminatory preferences to “women, racial minorities, homosexuals, and transgender people when selecting their members and edits,” as well as when choosing articles to include in the Law Review. The plaintiff is seeking to enjoin Northwestern from (1) considering race, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity in the appointment, promotion, retention, or compensation of its faculty or the selection of articles, editors, and members of the Northwestern University Law Review, and (2) soliciting any information about the race, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity of faculty candidates or applicants for the Law Review. The plaintiff is also asking the court to order Northwestern to establish a new policy for selecting faculty and Law Review articles, editors, and members, and to appoint a court monitor to oversee all related decisions.
- Latest update: The docket does not reflect that the defendant has been served.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this client update: Jason Schwartz, Mylan Denerstein, Blaine Evanson, Molly Senger, Zakiyyah Salim-Williams, Matt Gregory, Zoë Klein, Mollie Reiss, Jenna Voronov, Alana Bevan, Marquan Robertson, Janice Jiang, Elizabeth Penava, Skylar Drefcinski, Mary Lindsay Krebs, David Offit, Lauren Meyer, Kameron Mitchell, Maura Carey, and Jayee Malwankar.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Labor and Employment practice group, or the following practice leaders and authors:

Jason C. Schwartz – Partner & Co-Chair, Labor & Employment Group
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8242, [email protected])

Katherine V.A. Smith – Partner & Co-Chair, Labor & Employment Group
Los Angeles (+1 213-229-7107, [email protected])

Mylan L. Denerstein – Partner & Co-Chair, Public Policy Group
New York (+1 212-351-3850, [email protected])

Zakiyyah T. Salim-Williams – Partner & Chief Diversity Officer
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8503, [email protected])

Molly T. Senger – Partner, Labor & Employment Group
Washington, D.C. (+1 202-955-8571, [email protected])

Blaine H. Evanson – Partner, Appellate & Constitutional Law Group
Orange County (+1 949-451-3805, [email protected])

Many multinational companies based in or operating in the European Union will need to restructure their sanctions compliance programs to avoid potential sanctions violations and enforcement risks going forward.

Amidst a plethora of new restrictions on specific goods, vessels and parties, the EU’s 14th package against Russia (June 24, 2024) and latest Belarus sanctions (June 29, 2024) include a few fundamental changes in the territorial reach and substantive design of EU sanctions bolstering the EU’s anti-circumvention toolbox. Many multinational companies based in or operating in the European Union will need to restructure their sanctions compliance programs to avoid potential sanctions violations and enforcement risks going forward.

1. New Provision Changes the Reach of Russia Sectoral Sanctions as regards Non-EU Subsidiaries of EU Entities

According to the new Article 8a of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 (“Reg 833/2014”), EU companies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any non-EU company they own or control (“Non-EU Subsidiary”) does not participate in activities that undermine EU sectoral sanctions against Russia under Reg 833/2014.

This provision changes the treatment of Non-EU Subsidiaries under EU sanctions. To date, companies have been relying on general jurisdictional provisions laid down in each EU sanctions regulation (such as Article 13 of Reg 833/2014), according to which non-EU companies shall comply with EU sanctions only “in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the EU.” If a non-EU company maintained no nexus to the EU territory in its operations, it would not be obliged to comply with EU sanctions, even if it was a subsidiary of an EU company. In turn, as per Consolidated FAQs of the European Commission, the EU parent company was bound only in respect of its own actions, for example if clearing/green-lighting decisions taken by the Non-EU Subsidiary. It was understood that the EU parent company would not incur any liability for an independent conduct of a Non-EU Subsidiary it did not have any impact on. A similar understanding of who can be liable for sanctions violations is in fact common to many Western sanctions jurisdictions.

The new provision of Article 8a of Reg 833/2014 changes these dynamics. Remarkably, the jurisdictional provisions of Article 13 remain intact despite the amendment, so that non-EU companies doing business entirely outside the EU continue to be not subject to EU jurisdiction – this allows the EU legislator to uphold its regular claim that EU sanctions are never extraterritorial. However, the new provision of Article 8a forces EU parent companies, in order to avoid direct liability risks for themselves, to ensure that their Non-EU Subsidiaries practically comply with EU sanctions.

The new provision already instilled a debate of its enforceability as the “best efforts” requirement is seen to be too vague. Criminal liability will ultimately be defined by the interplay of Member State criminal laws and EU sanctions regulations, and in this respect, Article 8a might open the door for criminal enforcement agencies to prosecute EU companies in connection with the conduct of Non-EU Subsidiaries. One liability option seems to be that sanctions-undermining activities of a Non-EU Subsidiary would be attributed to the EU parent company as its own sanctions violation, if such an attribution is possible under criminal or administrative laws of the respective Member State. Alternatively, the executives of the EU parent company could be exposed to the criminal liability “by omission,” as for example practiced in German or Dutch legal systems. The respective offense would be a sanctions violation by virtue of failure to undertake necessary measures within the meaning of Article 8a of Reg 833/2014. In this regard, the widespread understanding that EU companies and their executives are not obliged (in a sense of a “guarantor’s duty” or “duty to care”) to ensure EU sanctions compliance in Non-EU Subsidiaries can no longer be upheld, at least in the context of sectoral sanctions against Russia. Instead, diligent and robust policies, procedures and systems should be put in place to avoid to the extent possible conduct by the Non-EU-Subsidiary that could be considered “undermining” EU sanctions.

With regard to the application of the new provision, Recitals 27-30 to Amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 provide for helpful clarifications:

“Ownership” and “control” of a non-EU company are defined in the same way as they are for party-based restrictions under financial sanctions; i.e., 50% or more of the proprietary rights for “ownership” and certain rights to exercise decisive influence for “control.”
Activities that undermine EU sanctions under Reg 833/2014 are those resulting in an effect that those restrictive measures seek to prevent. The Recitals use the example that a recipient in Russia obtains goods, technology, financing, or services of a type that is subject to prohibitions under Reg 833/2014, indicating that the prevention of such an outcome is at the core of the new provision of Article 8a.
With regard to the term “best efforts,” the Recitals clarify that:
- “Best efforts” comprise all actions suitable and necessary to achieve the result of preventing the undermining of EU sanctions under Reg 833/2014.
- Those actions can include, for example, the implementation of appropriate policies, controls, and procedures to mitigate and manage risk effectively, considering factors such as the country of establishment, the business sector, and the type of activity of the non-EU company owned or controlled by the EU company.
- At the same time, best efforts should be understood as comprising only actions that are feasible for the EU company in view of its nature, its size, and the relevant factual circumstances, particularly the degree of effective control over the non-EU company. In this context, the situation where the EU company is not able to exercise control over a non-EU company due to the legislation of a third country should be taken into account.

The placement of these clarifications in the Recitals indicates the challenges to find unanimity in introducing unequivocal requirements into the binding provisions of Reg 833/2014, so that they rather provide interpretative aid.

Notably, the new provision was adopted only within sectoral (Reg 833/2014) but not within party-based financial sanctions against Russia (Regulation (EU) 269/2014). However, within the new package of sanctions against Belarus adopted a few days later, the new provision with the same wording was added to the Belarus Sanctions Regulation (new Article 8h of Regulation (EU) 765/2006), which covers both sectoral and party-based financial measures.

It remains to be seen whether the new provision becomes a standard for EU sanctions in general. However, at least with respect the EU’s sectoral sanctions on Russia and for the EU’s Belarus sanctions, companies need to act now to extend their EU sanctions compliance programs to cover Non-EU Subsidiaries of EU parent companies.

2. Mandatory Sanctions Risk Assessment for Companies Trading with Common High Priority Items

Starting from the 12th sanctions package against Russia, the EU has begun to introduce novel obligations for companies trading with so called “common high priority items” (“CHPI”), i.e. items used in Russian military systems found on the battlefield in Ukraine or critical to the development, production or use of Russian military systems. In particular, the so called “No Russia Clause” of Article 12g of Reg 833/2014 obliged EU companies trading with CHPI in third countries (except a few partner countries) to contractually prohibit re-exportation to Russia or for use in Russia, and to provide for adequate remedies in the event of a breach of this contractual obligation.

The 14th sanctions package establishes further obligations for such companies. In particular, the new Article 12ga of Reg 833/2014 introduces a so called “No Russia IP Clause” obliging companies to contractually prohibit their third-country counterparts to use or sublicense IP rights and trade secrets in connection with CHPI being delivered to Russia or for use in Russia, and to provide for adequate remedies in the event of a breach of this contractual obligation.

Furthermore, the new Article 12gb of Reg 833/2014 obliges companies in CHPI industries, as of December 26, 2024, to conduct risk assessments as regards exportation to/for use in Russia, to ensure that those risk assessments are documented and kept up-to-date, and to implement appropriate policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and effectively manage such risks. EU persons must further ensure that non-EU companies owned or controlled by them are equally implementing these requirements. The same obligations apply within the framework of EU sanctions against Belarus by virtue of new Article 8ga of Regulation (EU) 765/2006.

This is not the first call for companies to implement such enhanced due diligence procedures at the EU level. On September 7, 2023, the European Commission provided its Guidance on Enhanced Due Diligence to shield against Russia sanctions circumvention, whereas the less detailed Notice 2022/C 145 I/01 called for due diligence measures as early as on April 1, 2022. Article 12gb of Reg 833/2014 is the first provision which transposes these calls into a binding obligation, albeit only for CHPI industries and in respect of CHPI items.

At the same time, Recital 36 to Amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 makes it clear that, if an EU operator in any industry failed to carry out appropriate due diligence, in particular on the basis of publicly or readily available information, it may not invoke the protection against liability granted under EU sanctions regulations to those who did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe EU sanctions. Therefore, while companies in CHPI industries have no choice but to implement required due diligence mechanisms due to the new provision, companies in other industries can likewise be advised to do so in order to shield against substantial liability risks.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Nikita Malevanny, Benno Schwarz, Christopher Timura, Melina Kronester, Vanessa Ludwig, Irene Polieri, and Adam Smith.

United States:
Ronald Kirk – Co-Chair, Dallas (+1 214.698.3295, [email protected])
Adam M. Smith – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3547, [email protected])
Stephenie Gosnell Handler – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8510, [email protected])
Christopher T. Timura – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3690, [email protected])
David P. Burns – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3786, [email protected])
Nicola T. Hanna – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7269, [email protected])
Courtney M. Brown – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8685, [email protected])
Amanda H. Neely – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.777.9566, [email protected])
Samantha Sewall – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3509, [email protected])
Michelle A. Weinbaum – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8274, [email protected])
Chris R. Mullen – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8250, [email protected])
Sarah L. Pongrace – New York (+1 212.351.3972, [email protected])
Anna Searcey – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3655, [email protected])
Audi K. Syarief – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8266, [email protected])
Scott R. Toussaint – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3588, [email protected])
Claire Yi – New York (+1 212.351.2603, [email protected])
Shuo (Josh) Zhang – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8270, [email protected])

The Final Regulations generally apply to qualified facilities placed in service in tax years ending after June 25, 2024.

On June 25, 2024, the IRS and Treasury published final Treasury regulations (the “Final Regulations”) on the prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements (the “PWA Requirements”) that taxpayers must[1] satisfy to receive the full amount[2] of certain tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (the “IRA”).[3] The Final Regulations build upon the proposed Treasury regulations (the “Proposed Regulations”) issued on August 30, 2023 (our earlier alert on the Proposed Regulations is available here)

The Final Regulations generally apply to qualified facilities placed in service in tax years ending after June 25, 2024. For facilities that either (1) began construction on or after January 29, 2023 and before June 25, 2024 or (2) were placed in service in taxable years ending on or before June 25, 2024, taxpayers may choose to apply either the Final Regulations or the Proposed Regulations, as long as the chosen guidance is applied consistently.[4]

Background

At a high level, the “prevailing wage requirement” requires that all laborers and mechanics employed by a taxpayer (or a contractor or subcontractor) claiming an applicable credit[5] be paid wages for construction, alteration, or repair of the applicable facility that are not less than the “prevailing” wage for the type of work performed. The “apprenticeship requirement” generally requires a certain percentage of labor hours be performed by apprentices working under the supervision of experienced laborers. Our prior alert (which is available here) summarizes these requirements in greater detail.

Key Changes to Prevailing Wage Requirements

The Final Regulations provide several crucial clarifications to earlier guidance (including the Proposed Regulations) relating to the prevailing wage requirement.

Timing of Wage Determination

Taxpayers generally must consult guidance published by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor to determine prevailing wages. Unlike the Proposed Regulations, which would have set the applicable wage rate as the one in effect at the beginning of construction, the Final Regulations stipulate that the applicable wage rate is the one in effect when a contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of a facility is executed. Only if there is no contract is the timing of the wage determination determined on when construction begins. If a taxpayer enters into a generalized contract for alteration or repair work (i.e., a contract that does not call for any specific work) for an indefinite period of time, the applicable wage rates must be refreshed on an annual basis, so taxpayers cannot lock in lower wages (or be locked into higher wages) through vague, long-term contracts.

Curing Failures to Pay Appropriate Wages

In some instances, taxpayers seeking to fix failures to pay appropriate wages can avoid penalties if they self-correct. The Final Regulations modify the Proposed Regulations by specifying that self-correction must be made by the last day of the first month following the end of the calendar quarter in which the failure occurred (as opposed to the Proposed Regulations, which would have required the correction payment to be made within 30 days after the taxpayer became aware of the error or the date on which the increased credit was claimed).

Additionally, the Final Regulations add a further clarification to these correction payments rules: if a former worker cannot be found, a taxpayer will be deemed to make a correction payment if it complies with state unclaimed property laws and all federal and state withholding information reporting requirements. This provision addresses the concern of some taxpayers, expressed after the issuance of the Proposed Regulations, that correction payments might not be possible if an underpaid worker could not be found.[6]

Key Changes to Apprenticeship Requirements

The Final Regulations also include important clarifications related to the apprenticeship requirements, including those highlighted below.

Applicability After Facility is Placed in Service

Under the Proposed Regulations, it was unclear whether the apprenticeship requirements continued to apply after a particular facility was placed in service. The Final Regulations make clear that the apprenticeship requirements cease to apply to alteration or repair work once a facility is placed in service.

Threshold Number of Construction Employees

The Final Regulations confirm that the apprenticeship requirements apply only to taxpayers, contractors, or subcontractors who employ four or more individuals to perform construction, alteration, or repair work in connection with the construction of a qualified facility. The Final Regulations clarify that the four-employee threshold applies over the course of the construction, regardless of whether the employees are employed at the same location or at the same time, increasing the likelihood that the apprenticeship requirements will apply to small contractors or subcontractors.[7]

Requests to Registered Apprenticeship Programs

The Proposed Regulations provided that if a taxpayer made a request for apprentices to a registered apprenticeship program and received a denial or nonresponse, the taxpayer must submit additional requests every 120 days in order to meet the good faith effort exception (to the extent applicable, this exception excuses a taxpayer from complying with the apprenticeship requirements). In response to comments, the Final Regulations relaxed this requirement to provide that the taxpayer only needs to submit additional requests 365 days (or, if applicable, 366 days) after the denial of a previous request to continue to satisfy the good faith effort exception.

Key Changes to Recordkeeping Requirements

The Final Regulations include some important adjustments to the recordkeeping requirements for the PWA Requirements.

Personal Identifying Information

The Proposed Regulations would have required the collection of sensitive personal identifying information, including social security numbers, with respect to the employees of the taxpayer and the employees of contractors or subcontractors. The Final Regulations alter this requirement to provide that only the last four digits of an employee’s social security number must be collected.

Options for Compliance

The Final Regulations provide three ways to comply with the recordkeeping requirements:

Taxpayers may collect and physically retain relevant records from contractors and subcontractors, with certain personally identifiable information redacted so long as unredacted information is made available to the IRS upon request.
Contractors and subcontractors may provide relevant records to a third-party vendor to physically retain on behalf of the taxpayer, with certain sensitive information redacted so long as unredacted information is made available to the IRS upon request.
Taxpayers, contractors, and subcontractors may each physically retain the relevant unredacted records for their own employees, and those unredacted records must be made available to the IRS upon request.

[1] Compliance with the PWA Requirements is not required for facilities (i) that have a maximum net output or storage capacity of less than one megawatt or (ii) the construction of which began before January 29, 2023.

[2] Technically, the baseline tax credit is multiplied by five if the PWA Requirements are met, resulting in a tax credit amount that traditionally has been considered the full amount of the federal income tax credits that may be claimed in respect of clean energy technologies. This full credit amount also can be increased by so-called adders, such as the domestic content adder and the energy community adder. Please see our prior alerts on these adders, which can be found here, here, and here, respectively.

[3] As was the case with the so-called Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the Senate’s reconciliation rules prevented Senators from changing the Act’s name, and the formal name of the so-called Inflation Reduction Act is actually “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to title II of S. Con. Res. 14.” In addition to tax credit guidance, the Final Regulations also include guidance regarding the PWA Requirements under section 179D, which provides a deduction for the cost of energy efficient commercial building property placed in service during the taxable year.

[4] Unless indicated otherwise, all “section” references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

[5] Tax credits with a prevailing wage or apprenticeship requirement include those credits provided for under sections 30C, 45, 45L, 45Q, 45U, 45V, 45Y, 45Z, 48, 48C, and 48E.

[6] The preamble to the Proposed Regulations stated, “[t]he Treasury Department and the IRS expect that taxpayers will be able to establish correction payments even when a former laborer or mechanic cannot be located.”

[7] The Final Regulations clarify that the hours devoted to the performance of construction, alteration, or repair work by any qualified apprentice in excess of the applicable ratio requirement will be counted towards the total labor hours but will not be counted as hours performed by qualified apprentices for purposes of the labor hours requirement applicable to qualified apprentices.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Mike Cannon, Matt Donnelly, Josiah Bethards, Duncan Hamilton, Blake Hoerster, and Nathan Sauers.

Gibson Dunn lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have about these developments. To learn more about these issues, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any member of the firm’s Tax, Cleantech, or Power and Renewables practice groups, or the following authors:

Tax:
Michael Q. Cannon – Dallas (+1 214.698.3232, [email protected])
Matt Donnelly – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3567, [email protected])
Josiah Bethards – Dallas (+1 214.698.3354, [email protected])
Blake Hoerster– Dallas (+1 214.698.3180, [email protected])
Duncan Hamilton– Dallas (+1 214.698.3135, [email protected])
Nathan Sauers – Houston (+1 346.718.6715, [email protected])

Cleantech:
John T. Gaffney – New York (+1 212.351.2626, [email protected])
Daniel S. Alterbaum – New York (+1 212.351.4084, [email protected])
Adam Whitehouse – Houston (+1 346.718.6696, [email protected])

Power and Renewables:
Peter J. Hanlon – New York (+1 212.351.2425, [email protected])
Nicholas H. Politan, Jr. – New York (+1 212.351.2616, [email protected])

National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, No. 22-51069 – Decided June 26, 2024

A unanimous Fifth Circuit panel vacated the SEC’s 2022 rescission of its 2020 proxy firm disclosure rule because the SEC failed to explain why the factual findings that supported the 2020 Rule were incorrect.

“[T]he SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in two ways. First, the agency failed adequately to explain its decision to disregard its prior factual finding that the notice-and-awareness conditions posed little or no risk to the timeliness and independence of proxy voting advice. Second, the agency failed to provide a reasonable explanation why these risks were so significant under the 2020 Rule as to justify its rescission.”

JUDGE JONES, writing for the Court

Background:

Shareholders of public companies are generally permitted under state law and SEC rules to vote on a variety of corporate-governance issues during shareholder meetings. Most shareholders do not attend these meetings in person, so they cast their votes by proxy. Institutional investors, who own a sizeable percentage of public company stock, vote in thousands of these meetings. They often retain proxy firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, to provide research and to advise them on how to vote.

SEC rules relating to proxy regulations, among other things, prohibit persons who solicit proxies from making misstatements or omissions of material fact in their solicitations and require such persons to furnish the targets of their solicitations with proxy statements containing certain disclosures. But proxy firms are also eligible for exemptions from these rules if they comply with certain conditions, and the business models of proxy firms rely on the availability of such exemptions.

Over the years, as proxy advisors grew in influence, however, concerns emerged about their practices. The proxy advisor market is “effectively a duopoly, because two firms . . . control roughly 97% of the market,” and “[i]nvestors, registrants, and others” began questioning the “accuracy of the information and the soundness of the advice that proxy firms provide” to shareholders and complaining about potential conflicts of interest and “the proxy firms’ unwillingness to engage with issuers to correct errors.” Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, No. 22-51069, 2024 WL 3175755, at *1 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024).

To address these and other concerns, the SEC undertook “nearly ten years of study and collaboration with all interested parties spanning two presidential administrations.” Id. at *2. This effort culminated in 2019, with the SEC’s proposal of a new rule that imposed additional conditions on the availability of exemptions for proxy firms. Importantly, amongst other requirements, the proposal required that proxy firms “provide registrants”—including public companies—“time to review and provide feedback on the advice before it is disseminated to the proxy firm’s clients.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). The rule’s purpose was to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the proxy firms’ advice by allowing a registrant an opportunity to correct any inaccuracies before dissemination. During the SEC’s 60-day comment period, however, some commentators expressed concern that the rule would delay and undermine the independence of the proxy firms’ advice.

When it adopted the rule in 2020 (the “2020 Rule”), the SEC addressed those concerns by requiring proxy firms (1) to provide their advice to registrants “at or prior to” the time they give their advice to their clients and (2) to allow their clients to see any written statements the registrant provided about the advice before the shareholder meeting. Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). Between the time the SEC finalized the rule and the date that proxy firms were required to comply with the new conditions, there entered a new SEC administration.

In November 2021, after all the SEC’s collaboration and deliberation, and just days before proxy firms were required to comply with the 2020 Rule, the new administration of the SEC published its proposal to rescind the 2020 Rule. It did so only after the new SEC chairman took office, held a closed-door meeting with the opponents of the 2020 Rule, suspended its enforcement, and directed his staff to reconsider the regulation in full. In July 2022, over the dissent of two commissioners, the SEC formally rescinded the 2020 Rule, citing the same “timeliness” and “independence” concerns that the agency previously concluded the 2020 Rule was designed to address—all without explaining its change in position. Id. at *4.

Issue:

Is it arbitrary and capricious for an agency to reject its previous factual findings without explaining why those findings were incorrect?

Court’s Holding:

Yes. An agency must provide a detailed explanation when rejecting prior factual findings.

What It Means:

The Fifth Circuit’s decision makes clear that, although a new administration may rescind prior rules, the agency must adequately explain any departure from its prior factual findings. Litigants seeking to challenge an agency’s flip-flop should pay careful attention to the agency’s justification for the change—particularly when it involves contradicting prior agency fact finding.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision also underscores courts’ refusal to credit agency litigation positions or other post hoc rationalizations for an agency’s change in position: “[I]n reviewing an agency’s action, we may consider only the reasoning articulated by the agency itself; we cannot consider post hoc rationalizations.” Id. at *8 (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit also confirmed that the “default” remedy when “an agency rule violates the APA” is “vacatur”—indeed, a court “shall—not may—hold unlawful and set aside [such] agency action.” Id. at *9 (cleaned up). Accordingly, successful challenges to any agency’s rule will generally result in the rule being set aside.
This case was one of many challenges relating to SEC rulemaking regarding the regulation of proxy advisory firms. For instance, the D.C. District Court recently held, regarding another part of the 2020 Rule defining “solicit,” that “the SEC acted contrary to law and in excess of statutory authority when it amended the proxy rules’ definition of ‘solicit’ and ‘solicitation’ to include proxy voting advice for a fee.” ISS Inc. v. SEC, No. 19-CV-3275, 2024 WL 756783, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2024), notices of appeal filed, Nos. 24-5105, 24-5112 (D.C. Cir.). And the Western District of Texas previously held that the SEC’s suspension of the 2020 Rule was unlawful because it was done without notice and comment. NAM v. SEC, 631 F. Supp. 3d 423 (W.D. Tex. 2022).
Future SEC rules directed at proxy firms will likely continue to face challenges in court. The proxy advisor industry is also likely to continue to face challenges over the issues that led to the 2020 Rule. Moreover, corporations, investors, and proxy advisors will need to work to address these concerns in an often politicized corporate governance environment.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the U.S. Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact the following practice group leaders:

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Brian M. Lutz
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Craig Varnen
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Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Brian Richman, Elizabeth A. Kiernan, and Brian Sanders.

Corner Post v. Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, No. 22-1008 – Decided July 1, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6–3 that the six-year clock to bring a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act starts when an agency rule injures the plaintiff, not when the agency issues the rule.

“An APA plaintiff does not have a complete and present cause of action until she suffers an injury from final agency action, so the statute of limitations does not begin to run until she is injured.”

JUSTICE BARRETT, writing for the Court

Background:

In 2011, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation II, which caps interchange fees payment networks can charge merchants on debit-card transactions. The D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to Regulation II in 2014, holding that the rule “generally rest[s] on reasonable constructions of the statute.” NACS v. Board of Governors of FRS, 746 F.3d 474, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In 2018, a convenience store called Corner Post opened its doors and first paid fees under Regulation II. Three years later, Corner Post filed an APA claim challenging Regulation II.

The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post’s suit was untimely. The APA allows suit by any person who has suffered a “legal wrong” or been “adversely affected” by an agency rule. 5 U.S.C. § 702. An APA challenge to an agency rule must be “filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Aligning itself with eight other circuits, the Eighth Circuit ruled that APA claims must be brought within six years of the rule’s promulgation, even if the plaintiff could not have filed its own claim within that initial six-year period. That decision split with the Sixth Circuit, which had held that an APA claim accrues (and the six-year limitations period thus starts) only once the agency rule injures the particular plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict.

Issue:

Whether a plaintiff’s APA claim first accrues when an agency issues a rule—regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date—or when the rule first adversely affects the plaintiff.

Court’s Holding:

An APA claim accrues, and the six-year statute of limitations begins to run, only when an agency rule injures the plaintiff.

What It Means:

Today’s decision means that the timeliness of an APA claim does not turn on when the agency rule was promulgated or when someone else could have challenged it. Instead, it turns on when the particular plaintiff challenging the agency rule was first injured by the rule. The Court relied on the APA’s “basic presumption” of judicial review and the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Op. 21–22. As a result, an APA claim challenging an agency rule is timely when the plaintiff was first injured by the rule within six years of filing suit—even if the rule was promulgated more than six years ago.
The Court’s decision also amplifies the impact of its decision in Loper Bright to overrule Chevron v. NRDC. As the Court explained, the D.C. Circuit relied on Chevron in its 2014 decision rejecting an APA challenge to Regulation II, holding that the regulation “rest[ed] on reasonable constructions of the statute.” Op. 2. On remand, the district court and Eighth Circuit will address Regulation II’s validity without deferring to the Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of the relevant federal statutes.
In dissent, Justice Jackson predicted that the Court’s adoption of a plaintiff-specific accrual rule for APA claims could clear the way to new challenges to decades-old regulations.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice

Eugene Scalia
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Helgi C. Walker
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Stuart F. Delery
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This alert was prepared by associates Grace Hart and Patrick Fuster.

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, No. 23-175 – Decided June 28, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6–3 that the constitutional prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” does not forbid low-level fines and jail terms for camping on public property.

“At bottom, the question this case presents is whether the Eighth Amendment grants federal judges primary responsibility for assessing th[e] causes [of homelessness] and devising those responses. It does not.”

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court

Background:

The Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and unusual punishments” shall not be “inflicted.” In Martin v. Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that it would be cruel and unusual to impose any punishment, no matter how small, for sleeping on public property if a person has “no access to alternative shelter.” Id. at 615. Punishing a person for such “‘an involuntary act or condition,’” the Ninth Circuit reasoned, would be tantamount to punishing the “status” of homelessness. Id. at 616-617.

Shortly after Martin, plaintiffs sued Grants Pass, a small city in Oregon. The plaintiffs claimed that Grants Pass’s prohibitions against camping on public property violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because the number of homeless people in the jurisdiction exceeds the number of shelter beds. Applying Martin,the district court certified a class of “involuntarily homeless” people in Grants Pass and granted the plaintiffs summary judgment. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Grants Pass’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied by a 14-to-13 margin, with the dissenters joining five opinions criticizing Martin and its extension in this case. The Supreme Court then granted a cert petition to decide whether the Ninth Circuit has correctly interpreted the Eighth Amendment.

Issue:

Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Court’s Holding:

Low-level fines and jail terms are not cruel and unusual punishments for public camping, even as applied to someone who is involuntarily homeless.

What It Means:

The Supreme Court began with a discussion of the practical implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Martin rule. Although the Court recognized that “the Ninth Circuit’s intervention in Martin was well-intended,” the Court emphasized that many cities use public-camping ordinances “as one important tool among others to encourage individuals experiencing homelessness to accept services and to help ensure safe and accessible sidewalks and public spaces.” The Court noted evidence that acceptance of service decreased under Martin—for example, shelter utilization had dropped by 40% in Grants Pass since the classwide injunction.
The Supreme Court held that low-level fines and jail terms are ordinary punishments that are neither cruel nor unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the government from making the “status” of being an addict a crime, regardless of the punishment. As the Court explained, public camping, even when purportedly compelled by one’s circumstances, is conduct rather than status under Robinson and therefore subject to the standard Eighth Amendment analysis.
The Supreme Court also reasoned that the Eighth Amendment should not be distorted to address questions that other constitutional provisions and common-law doctrines address. For example, the Court identified the Due Process Clause as the traditional basis for constitutional arguments about criminal responsibility and the defense of “necessity” as the traditional state-law doctrine potentially available to those jailed or fined for doing something (like public camping) that they had no choice but to do. The Eighth Amendment, the Court explained, simply does not provide any guideposts to decide when cities can regulate public camping.
The Court highlighted the broad coalition of hundreds of amici that supported review of Grants Pass’s case. As the Court observed, almost half the States, California Governor Newsom, San Francisco Mayor London Breed, and the cities of Anchorage, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Portland, and Seattle, among many others, criticized the Ninth Circuit for tying governments’ hands in responding to the urgent homelessness crisis. The Court’s decision returns the “full panoply of tools in the policy toolbox” to “the people and their elected representatives.”

Gibson Dunn represented the City of Grants Pass as Petitioner.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

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Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
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Theane Evangelis
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Related Practice: Real Estate

Eric M. Feuerstein
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Jesse Sharf
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Related Practice: Land Use and Development

Mary G. Murphy
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Benjamin Saltsman
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This alert was prepared by associates Patrick Fuster, Daniel Adler, Lefteri Christos, and Karl Kaellenius.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451
Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, No. 22-1219 – Decided June 28, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, a landmark decision that had required courts to defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms.

“Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.”

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court

Background:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), instructed courts to apply a two-step framework when reviewing administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes that they administer. At step one, courts determined whether the statute had an unambiguous meaning using the traditional tools of statutory construction. If not, then courts proceeded to step two, at which they deferred to the agency’s interpretation as long as it was reasonable. This meant that an agency’s reading of the law could control even if it was not the view that a court would otherwise adopt using its independent judgment (and even if the agency’s view had changed over time).

Loper Bright Enterprises and Relentless, Inc. are small businesses engaged in herring fishing off the Atlantic coast. They brought two lawsuits challenging a rule promulgated by the Department of Commerce that required them to pay for government-approved fishing monitors, which can reduce fishers’ returns by up to 20%. The challengers argued that this rule was unauthorized by the governing statute, which did not expressly say who should pay for these monitors. The district courts in both cases granted summary judgment to the Department, and the D.C. Circuit and First Circuit affirmed. Applying Chevron, these courts both held that the agency had reasonably interpreted the statute.

Issue:

Whether the Court should overrule or clarify the Chevron doctrine.

Court’s Holding:

Chevron is overruled. Judicial deference to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretation is contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and traditional principles of judicial review. Judges must independently interpret statutes without deference to an agency’s reading of the law.

What It Means:

Overruling Chevron will make it more difficult for government agencies to win cases turning on statutory-interpretation questions. Today’s decision continues a trend of Supreme Court decisions reining in administrative agency action, including recent cases curbing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to bring enforcement actions in administrative tribunals rather than federal courts (SEC v. Jarkesy) and granting a stay of the Environmental Protection Agency’s “Good Neighbor” emissions-regulation plan for failing to comply with the APA’s requirement of reasoned decisionmaking (Ohio v. EPA). Altogether, this case law signals the Justices’ skepticism of expansive claims of regulatory power by federal agencies, and today’s action is a major resetting of the balance of power between courts and agencies, as well as between agencies and challengers of agency action.
Notably, the Court rested its decision on the plain language of the APA, which provides that a court reviewing agency action “shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence to explain his view that Chevron also violates the Constitution’s separation of powers by abdicating judges’ duty to exercise independent judgment and impermissibly conferring that judicial power on the Executive Branch.
The effects of Chevron’s demise will likely be most dramatic in the lower federal courts, some of which have continued to apply Chevron in recent years even as the Supreme Court has rarely invoked the doctrine over the past decade. Today’s decision instructs these circuit and district judges to change their practices and abandon deference. Instead, they “must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”
Going forward, agencies’ interpretation of statutes will still be entitled to a lesser degree of “respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., insofar as the agencies’ views are persuasive. This may depend on factors such as whether the agency adopted the interpretation close in time to the statute’s enactment and how consistently the agency has adhered to that interpretation since.
Today’s decision does not necessarily unsettle prior cases relying on Chevron to interpret statutes. The Court stated that a prior case’s reliance on Chevron to conclude that an agency’s action was lawful is not, standing alone, justification to overrule it.
Even after today’s decision, agencies will likely continue to issue regulations largely as before the overruling of Chevron, particularly in certain areas, though the scope of such regulations may change. For example, taxpayers will continue to seek rules regarding how to report routine business transactions and will want to participate in the rulemaking process through the notice and comment procedure. While today’s decision will have a significant impact on the litigation landscape regarding such tax and other regulations, many of those regulations faced strong judicial headwinds when challenged even under Chevron.

Gibson Dunn represented the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Supporting Petitioners in Loper Bright.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice

Eugene Scalia +1 202.955.8210 [email protected]	Helgi C. Walker +1 202.887.3599 [email protected]	Stuart F. Delery +1 202.955.8515 [email protected]
Russell Balikian +1 202.955.8535 [email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Max E. Schulman and Nicholas B. Venable.

From the Derivatives Practice Group: The CFTC had an active week with various approvals and no-action relief.

New Developments

CFTC Staff Issues a No-Action Letter Regarding Certain Reporting Requirements for Swaps Transitioning from CDOR to CORRA. On June 27, the CFTC Division of Market Oversight (“DMO”) and Division of Data (“DOD”) issued a staff no-action letter regarding certain Part 43 and Part 45 swap reporting obligations for swaps transitioning under the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions from referencing the Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (“CDOR”), to referencing the risk-free Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (“CORRA”) following the cessation of CDOR after June 28, 2024. The letter states DMO and DOD will not recommend the CFTC take enforcement action against an entity for failure to timely report under Part 45 the change in a swap’s floating rate. This letter covers those floating rate changes that are made under the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions from CDOR to CORRA, but only in the event the entity uses its best efforts to report the change by the applicable deadline in Part 45 and in no case reports the required information later than five business days from, but excluding, July 2, 2024. The letter also states DMO and DOD will not recommend the CFTC take enforcement action against an entity for failure to report under Part 43 the change in the floating rate for a swap modified after execution to incorporate the ISDA LIBOR fallback provisions to transition from referencing CDOR to referencing CORRA. [NEW]
CFTC Extends Public Comment Period for Proposed Amendments to Event Contracts Rules. On June 27, the CFTC announced it is extending the deadline for public comment on a proposal to amend its event contract rules. The extended comment period will close on August 8, 2024. The CFTC is providing an extension to allow interested persons additional time to analyze the proposal and prepare their comments. The proposal would amend CFTC Regulation 40.11 to further specify types of event contracts that fall within the scope of Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) Section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest, such that they may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing on or through a CFTC-registered entity. [NEW]
CFTC Grants ForecastEx, LLC DCO Registration and DCM Designation. On June 25, the CFTC announced that it has issued ForecastEx, LLC an Order of Registration as a derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) and an Order of Designation as a designated contract market (“DCM”) under the CEA. DCO registration was granted under Section 5b of the CEA. DCM designation was granted under Section 5a of the CEA. ForecastEx is a limited liability company registered in Delaware and headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. [NEW]
CFTC Approves Final Capital Comparability Determinations for Certain Non-U.S. Nonbank Swap Dealers. On June 25, the CFTC announced it has approved four comparability determinations and related comparability orders granting conditional substituted compliance in connection with the CFTC’s capital and financial reporting requirements to certain CFTC-registered nonbank swap dealers organized and domiciled in Japan, Mexico, the European Union (France and Germany), or the United Kingdom. Pursuant to the orders, non-U.S. nonbank swap dealers subject to prudential regulation by the Financial Services Agency of Japan, the National Banking and Securities Commission of Mexico and the Mexican Central Bank, the European Central Bank, or the United Kingdom Prudential Regulation Authority may satisfy certain CEA capital and financial reporting requirements by being subject to, and complying with, comparable capital and financial reporting requirements under the respective foreign jurisdiction’s laws and regulations, subject to specified conditions. [NEW]
U.S. Department of Treasury Releases Joint Policy Statement and Principles on Voluntary Carbon Markets. On May 28, the Biden-Harris Administration released a Joint Statement of Policy and new Principles for Responsible Participation in Voluntary Carbon Markets (the “Joint Statement”) announcing the U.S. government’s approach to further developing high-integrity voluntary carbon markets (“VCMs”). The Joint Statement announces seven principles, which are not exhaustive, that seek to codify and strengthen concepts and practices already developed market participants, governments and international bodies. The primary aim of these principles is to inform and support the continuing development of VCMs. On June 17, Gibson Dunn published an alert discussing the principles and key takeaways.

New Developments Outside the U.S.

EBA and ESMA Publish Guidelines on Suitability of Management Body Members and Shareholders for Entities Under MiCA. On June 27, EBA and ESMA published joint guidelines on the suitability of members of the management body, and on the assessment of shareholders and members with qualifying holdings for issuers of asset reference tokens (“ARTs”) and crypto-asset service providers (“CASPs”), under the Markets in Crypto Assets regulation (“MiCA”). The first set of guidelines covers the presence of suitable management bodies within issuers of ARTs and CASPs. The second set of guidelines concerns the assessment of the suitability of shareholders or members with direct or indirect qualifying holdings in a supervised entity. [NEW]
ESAs Propose Improvements to the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation. On June 18, the EBA, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), and ESMA (the three European Supervisory Authorities , i.e., “ESAs”) published a Joint Opinion on the assessment of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (“SFDR”). In the joint opinion, the ESAs call for a coherent sustainable finance framework that caters for both the green transition and enhanced consumer protection, considering the lessons learned from the functioning of the SFDR.
ESMA Publishes 2023 Annual Report. On June 14, ESMA announced that it has published its Annual Report for 2023. ESMA stated that the report sets out the key achievements in the first year of implementing ESMA’s new 5-year strategy, delivering on the mission of enhancing investor protection and promoting stable and orderly financial markets in the European Union (EU). According to the report, ESMA’s key accomplishments during 2023 include enhancing supervisory convergence through peer reviews on the supervision of central counterparties (CCPs) and central securities depositories (CSDs), identifying areas for improvement and issuing recommendations to ensure consistent supervision across the EU, and monitoring retail investment markets and reporting on the costs and performance of retail investment products, highlighting cost reductions and variations across products and member states, and recommending that investors carefully evaluate costs and diversify investments. [NEW]

New Industry-Led Developments

ISDA Publishes Framework to Prepare for Close Out of Derivatives Contracts. On June 27, ISDA published the ISDA Close-out Framework that market participants can use to help prepare for potential terminations of collateralized derivatives contracts. ISDA stated that the Llaunch of the ISDA Close-out Framework is in response to the March 2023 failure of Signature Bank and SVB in the US, which, according to ISDA, highlighted the complexities of potentially terminating over-the-counter derivatives trading relationships following various post-crisis regulatory reforms. Specifically, the reforms require that in-scope entities are now required to post margin for non-cleared derivatives transactions, while various jurisdictions have introduced mandatory stays on termination rights and remedies as part of bank resolution regimes. ISDA stated that Tthe ISDA Close-out Framework is intended to be used as a preparatory resource to help firms coordinate internal business functions and stakeholders and internal and external legal, operational, risk management, infrastructure and other relevant service providers to ensure they are adequately prepared for any potential future stress events. [NEW]
ISDA Responds to CCIL on Proposal for USD/INR FX Options. On June 21, ISDA submitted a response to a consultation paper from the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (“CCIL”) on a proposal to introduce an electronic trading platform and clearing and settlement services for USD/INR FX options of up to one year maturity initially. The response sets out the features of the trading platform, the risk management framework and a questionnaire on the parameters of the product. ISDA’s response focuses mainly on the risk management framework aspect, including the margin models and default management framework. It asks for more clarity and transparency on the choice of margin models and encourages the implementation of scheduled variation margin calls and stress-based anti-procyclicality measures. [NEW]
ISDA Responds to FSB Consultation on Liquidity Preparedness for Margin and Collateral Calls. On June 18, ISDA submitted a response to the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) consultation on liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls. The response notes that the recommendations are generally sensible and seek to incorporate a proportionate and risk-based approach. It also highlights a number of considerations relevant to the non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector’s liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls.
ISDA Responds to FCA Consultation on Sustainability Disclosure Requirements. On June 14, ISDA responded to the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) consultation on sustainability disclosure requirements for portfolio management. ISDA stated that it supports the FCA taking a proportionate approach to the use of derivatives in sustainable investing. ISDA believes that it is important that recommendations on the treatment of derivatives, expected to be proposed by the European Union’s Platform on Sustainable Finance (PSF) by the end of 2024, are implemented consistently by the relevant authorities, including those in the UK. In the response, ISDA highlights several issues related to derivatives and makes recommendations.
ISDA Responds to FCA and BoE on UK EMIR Refit. On June 12, ISDA submitted a response to the joint Bank of England and UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) consultation on part two of the UK European Market Infrastructure Regulation (UK EMIR) Refit reporting Q&A and proposed updates to validation rules. In the response, ISDA highlights several topics, including the reporting of equity resets, commodity basis swaps and excess collateral under UK EMIR.
VERMEG Integrates Common Domain Model into COLLINE Collateral Management System. On June 10, ISDA announced that VERMEG, a technology provider for the banking and insurance sector, has integrated the Common Domain Model (CDM) into its COLLINE collateral management system to support the consumption of digitized regulatory initial margin (IM) credit support annexes (CSAs). ISDA stated that VERMEG is the first entity to integrate the CDM to improve the efficiency of collateral processes, with several other firms currently in testing.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys assisted in preparing this update: Jeffrey Steiner, Adam Lapidus, Marc Aaron Takagaki, Hayden McGovern, and Karin Thrasher.

Jeffrey L. Steiner, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3632, [email protected])

Michael D. Bopp, Washington, D.C. (202.955.8256, [email protected])

Michelle M. Kirschner, London (+44 (0)20 7071.4212, [email protected])

Darius Mehraban, New York (212.351.2428, [email protected])

Jason J. Cabral, New York (212.351.6267, [email protected])

Adam Lapidus – New York (212.351.3869, [email protected] )

Stephanie L. Brooker, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3502, [email protected])

William R. Hallatt , Hong Kong (+852 2214 3836, [email protected] )

David P. Burns, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3786, [email protected])

Marc Aaron Takagaki , New York (212.351.4028, [email protected] )

Hayden K. McGovern, Dallas (214.698.3142, [email protected])

Karin Thrasher, Washington, D.C. (202.887.3712, [email protected])

Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572 – Decided June 28, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that Section 1512(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—which prohibits obstructing official proceedings—is limited to acts that impair the availability or integrity of evidence in an official proceeding.

“Although the Government’s all-encompassing interpretation may be literally permissible, it defies the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and (c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of statutory text mere surplusage.”

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court

Background:

Section 1512(c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act provides criminal penalties for anyone who corruptly:

(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.

On January 6, 2021, Joseph W. Fischer allegedly forced his way into the Capitol and assaulted members of the Capitol Police. Fischer was arrested and charged with violating Section 1512(c) by obstructing an official proceeding. Fischer moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute prohibits only acts that impair the integrity or availability of evidence in an official congressional proceeding. The district court agreed and dismissed the count. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that Section 1512(c)(2) is a catchall provision that reaches beyond the specific examples in subsection (c)(1). Judge Katsas dissented, construing Section 1512(c)(2) as limited to acts that affect the integrity or availability of evidence in an official proceeding.

Issue:

Is 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) limited to actions pertaining to evidence for official proceedings?

Court’s Holding:

Yes. Section 1512(c)(2) requires the Government to establish that a defendant impaired or attempted to impair the availability or integrity of evidence intended for use in an official proceeding.

What It Means:

The Court’s decision means that the Government cannot use Section 1512(c)(2) to prosecute obstructive conduct that is unrelated to evidence intended for use in an official proceeding. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on canons of construction that limit generalized statutory terms and phrases—“otherwise” clauses in particular—by reference to more specific neighboring or preceding terms and phrases.
The Court emphasized that Section 1512(c)(2) still has teeth. For example, the Court noted that it is possible to violate Section 1512(c)(2) by creating false evidence, impairing witness testimony, or tampering with intangible information.
Justice Jackson voted with the majority and wrote a concurrence to emphasize that the Court’s holding “follows from” the statute’s “legislative purpose.” Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, dissented and would have adopted a broader construction of Section 1512(c)(2) that covered Fischer’s alleged conduct even though it was not related to evidence tampering.
Today’s decision is the latest example of the Court narrowly construing broad criminal law provisions to avoid sweeping in conduct addressed by other statutes. Earlier this week, in Snyder v. United States, the Court narrowly construed the federal bribery statute to exclude after-the-fact gratuities that may be regulated by state law. And in 2015, in Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court construed Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal spoliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, to limit the broad phrase “a tangible object” to one used to record or preserve information.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: White Collar Defense and Investigations

Stephanie Brooker +1 202.887.3502 [email protected]	Winston Y. Chan +1 415.393.8362 [email protected]	Nicola T. Hanna +1 213.229.7269 [email protected]
F. Joseph Warin +1 202.887.3609 [email protected]

Related Practice: Public Policy

Michael D. Bopp
+1 202.955.8256
[email protected]

Mylan L. Denerstein
+1 212.351.3850
[email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Tessa Gellerson and Salah Hawkins.

The groups are seeking a total reversal of the EPA’s decision to grant Louisiana primacy over Class VI wells.

On June 12, 2024, three environmental activist groups—the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and the Alliance for Affordable Energy—challenged the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (the “EPA”) final rule granting Louisiana primary enforcement authority (also known as “primacy”) over Class VI injection wells.[1] The groups filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, claiming that the EPA’s final primacy rule was improper and violated the Safe Drinking Water Act (the “SDWA”) and other federal statutes on a number of grounds. The groups are seeking a total reversal of the EPA’s decision to grant Louisiana primacy over Class VI wells, and if the challenge is successful, Louisiana may be forced to resubmit portions of its Class VI primacy application, potentially stranding pending Class VI well permit applications that were transferred to the Louisiana Department of Energy and Natural Resources (the “LDENR”) for review or shifting those applications back to the EPA to undergo its lengthy review process.

Louisiana’s Path to Class VI Primacy

On September 17, 2021, Louisiana submitted an application to the EPA to expand Louisiana’s primacy over underground injection wells to include Class VI injection wells under the state’s existing Underground Injection Control (the “UIC”) program under the SDWA.[2] To gain primacy for a Class VI injection well, a state must demonstrate that it (1) has jurisdiction over underground injection, (2) has implemented UIC laws and regulations that are at least as stringent as the applicable EPA requirements, and (3) has the necessary expertise and administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement mechanisms to enforce its UIC program.[3]

After a year-long review process that included the consideration of over 40,000 public comments, the EPA determined that Louisiana’s Class VI UIC program met all federal requirements, concluding that Louisiana had demonstrated that it has the requisite jurisdiction, stringent UIC provisions, enforcement procedures, and expertise in place to oversee a UIC program.[4] Consequently, on December 28, 2023, the EPA signed a final rule granting primacy over Class VI wells to Louisiana, which became effective on February 5, 2024.[5] We have previously covered Louisiana’s primacy application in greater detail here.

Activist Groups Argue the EPA Violated the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.

The three activist groups, aided by their counsel at Earthjustice, challenged the EPA’s decision to grant Louisiana primacy over Class VI wells by arguing that the EPA’s decision violated both the SDWA and the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). Two of these claims are described below:

Louisiana’s Waiver of Liability after Site Closure

The activist groups’ primary challenge to Louisiana’s grant of primacy centers on a liability waiver provision in Louisiana’s Class VI regulations governing post-injection site care and closure requirements. These groups argue in their challenge that, even though Louisiana’s post-injection site care and closure regulations appear to meet or exceed the analogous regulations issued by the EPA, these regulations are effectively nullified by a liability release that is given to (1) Class VI storage site operators, (2) the emitters that generated the CO2 that was injected at the applicable site, (3) the owners of the CO2 stored at the applicable site, and (4) other parties.[6] Louisiana’s liability release states:

Upon the issuance of the certificate of completion of injection operations, the storage operator, all generators of any injected carbon dioxide, all owners of carbon dioxide stored in the storage facility, and all owners otherwise having any interest in the storage facility shall be released from any and all future duties or obligations under this Chapter and any and all liability associated with or related to that storage facility which arises after the issuance of the certificate of completion of injection operations.[7]

The activist groups argue that Louisiana’s release of site operators and others from “future duties or obligations” and all liabilities related to the Class VI injection site arising after the site closure certificate is issued by the LDENR means that site operators are released from the state’s post-injection site care and closure requirements and will have no liability if they do not meet such requirements. In addition, the groups point out that under Louisiana’s UIC regulations, upon the state’s issuance of a site closure certificate, the ownership of Class VI wells eventually automatically transfers to the state, but the related liabilities do not. This, they claim, may orphan the responsibility and liability associated with post-injection site care and closure requirements.[8] Consequently, the activist groups argue, “Louisiana’s liability waiver renders the state’s program less stringent [than the EPA’s program] on its face” because the EPA’s Class VI regulations do not include similar liability waiver provisions.[9] Thus, the groups claim in their challenge that Louisiana’s primacy application did not satisfy the necessary requirements and the EPA did not have the authority to grant primacy based on the application.

The EPA appears to have already addressed the arguments made by the activist groups. In its final rule granting Louisiana primacy, the EPA stated that “[t]he EPA disagrees that long term liability provisions are always incompatible with the SDWA and the EPA’s UIC regulatory requirements”.[10] The EPA also pointed out that in its Class VI Rule of 2010 “the EPA did not conclude that states that authorize liability transfer after site closure cannot receive UIC Class VI primacy” and a state may receive primacy if “such state liability transfer provisions [are] appropriately crafted so that the state’s Class VI program meets UIC regulatory requirements”, concluding that Louisiana’s provisions were appropriately crafted and met all federal requirements. [11]

North Dakota and Wyoming, the two other states to have been granted Class VI primacy from the EPA, provide for a possible liability transfer to the state after a Class VI well is closed, after 10 years and 20 years, respectively.[12] Additionally, several other states that are in the process of applying for Class VI primacy have adopted similar liability transfer provisions regarding Class VI wells. Of all these states’ liability transfer provisions, Louisiana’s are the strictest, with a 50-year minimum wait before liability transfer can occur.[13]

Alleged Lack of Expertise at the LDNER

The activist groups further claim that the EPA’s decision to grant Class VI primacy to Louisiana was “arbitrary and capricious” and thus in violation of the APA because, the groups allege, Louisiana failed to demonstrate that the LDENR has the proper staff and expertise necessary to implement its UIC Program.[14] The SWDA and the EPA’s guidelines for making primacy determinations require applicant states to provide a description of the state agency staff that will carry out the UIC program and to demonstrate the technical expertise required to evaluate Class VI projects.

The groups argue that Louisiana “conceded” that the LDENR does not have the requisite expertise because the LDENR plans to utilize third-party contractors to review Class VI well permit applications for factors like site characterization, modeling, risk, and environmental justice analysis.[15] They note that, while the “EPA allows use of contractor support” and states may demonstrate in their primacy applications that “they have in-house staff or access to contractor support” for all requisite areas of expertise,[16] Louisiana’s primacy application did not identify specific contractors or provide details regarding LDENR’s access to contractors. They further argue that access to contractors could prove to be difficult in the future due to either a limited number of contractors or to conflicts of interest.[17] As a result, the groups conclude that the EPA does not have support for the assertion that the LDENR has access to the required expertise, either through in-house staff or through third party contractors.

The activist groups further claim that Louisiana lacks the requisite expertise “in light of the state’s past failures regulating less complicated wells” [18], alleging that performance audits on the state’s oil and gas wells from 2014 through 2020 show a failure to monitor and enforce violations.[19] The groups also allege two instances in which a Class II and Class III well, respectively, caused water contamination in the state, even though Louisiana has primacy over Class II and III wells.[20] The groups claim that, given the state’s alleged lack of expertise and oversight, the EPA failed to reasonably explain why it granted Louisiana Class VI primacy, making the decision to do so arbitrary and capricious.[21]

In its published final rule, the EPA responded to public comments that had expressed similar concerns that Louisiana lacked the requisite staff and expertise to be granted Class VI primacy. The EPA concluded that the LDENR did have the requisite staff and technical expertise to oversee all aspects of its UIC program in accordance with federal standards.[22] The EPA also stated that the previous environmental incidents either were unrelated to UIC program implementation or they did not involve LDENR and thus could not have any bearing on LDENR’s expertise.[23]

Other Claims and Future Developments

The activist groups also challenged Louisiana’s primacy on other grounds, including that (1) the EPA’s adoption of Louisiana’s liability waiver violated federal law by releasing Class VI project participants from liability under the Clean Water Act, CERCLA, and RCRA,[24] and (2) the EPA violated the APA by failing to evaluate certain differences between the EPA’s regulations and Louisiana’s regulations to determine if Louisiana’s regulations are less stringent.[25]

It is not clear if the challenges raised by the activist groups will be successful. The EPA’s responses to public comments appear to show that it was aware of, and not concerned by, these challenges when it issued its final rule granting Louisiana primacy over Class VI wells. While these challenges might delay the development of the carbon capture industry in the United States if successful, the interest in carbon capture projects (and the tax credits that these projects generate) will likely lead to market solutions for any delays that result. Gibson Dunn will continue to monitor this case and other potential challenges to carbon capture projects throughout the United States.

[1] Class VI wells are used by the carbon capture and sequestration industry to permanently sequester captured carbon in underground geological formations.

[2] https://www.epa.gov/uic/primary-enforcement-authority-underground-injection-control-program-0.

[3] 89 Fed. Reg. 703, 704 (Jan. 5, 2024); 40 CFR parts 124, 144, 145, and 146.

[4] 89 Fed. Reg. at 706-10.

[5] 89 Fed. Reg. at 703.

[6] Petitioners’ Brief at 11.

[7] La. Rev. Stat. Section 30:1109(A)(3).

[8] Petitioners’ Brief at 12.

[9] Petitioners’ Brief at 17.

[10] 89 Fed. Reg. at 707.

[11] Id. At 706-07.

[12] N.D. Cent. Code Section 38-22-17; W.S. Section 35-11-319.

[13] La. Rev. Stat. Section 30:1109(A)(1).

[14] Petitioners’ Brief at 1; 49.

[15] Petitioners’ Brief at 46.

[16] Petitioners’ Brief at 46-47.

[17] Petitioners’ Brief at 47.

[18] Petitioners’ Brief at 1.

[19] Petitioners’ Brief at 47-48.

[20] Petitioners’ Brief at 48.

[21] Petitioners’ Brief at 49.

[22] 89 Fed. Reg. at 706-07.

[23] 89 Fed. Reg. at 708-09.

[24] Petitioners’ Brief at 13.

[25] Petitioners’ Brief at 16.

The following Gibson Dunn attorneys prepared this update: Michael P. Darden, Rahul D. Vashi, Zain Hassan, Mariana Lozano, and Graham Valenta.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have about these developments. To learn more, please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Oil and Gas, Tax, or Environmental Litigation and Mass Tort practice groups, or the authors:

Oil and Gas:
Michael P. Darden – Houston (+1 346.718.6789, [email protected])
Rahul D. Vashi – Houston (+1 346.718.6659, [email protected])
Graham Valenta – Houston (+1 346.718.6646, [email protected])
Zain Hassan – Houston (+1 346.718.6640, [email protected])
Mariana Lozano – Houston (+1 346.718.6711, [email protected])

Environmental Litigation and Mass Tort:
Stacie B. Fletcher – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3627, [email protected])
David Fotouhi – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8502, [email protected])
Rachel Levick – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.887.3574, [email protected])

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859 – Decided June 27, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the SEC to sue in federal court, not in the agency’s in-house court, when the SEC seeks civil penalties for fraud.

“[T]he Government has created claims whose causes of action are modeled on common law fraud and that provide a type of remedy available only in law courts. This is a common law suit in all but name. And such suits typically must be adjudicated in Article III courts.”

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court

Background:

In 2013, the SEC brought administrative enforcement proceedings against George Jarkesy and his investment advisor for securities fraud. After an SEC in-house administrative law judge found that Jarkesy committed securities fraud, the SEC ordered Jarkesy to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in civil penalties and disgorgement.

A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional parts of the SEC’s in-house adjudication process for three independent reasons: (1) The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial barred the SEC’s use of administrative proceedings to impose civil penalties; (2) Congress unconstitutionally vested the SEC with the unfettered discretion to decide whether to enforce securities laws in an agency adjudication or in federal court; and (3) Congress unconstitutionally insulated SEC administrative law judges from removal by allowing their firing only upon a finding of “good cause” by the Merit Systems Protection Board, whose members themselves are subject to removal only in certain limited circumstances.

Issue:

Can the SEC require defendants in actions for civil penalties to defend themselves before the agency tribunal rather than before a jury in federal court?

Court’s Holding:

No. The Seventh Amendment entitles defendants to a jury trial in federal court for SEC fraud actions seeking civil penalties.

What It Means:

Today’s decision will have a significant impact on the forum in which the SEC can enforce the statutes it administers—in the agency’s in-house administrative court, or in federal court before an Article III judge and a jury. The Court explained that “if a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by an Article III court is mandatory.” The Court also emphasized that the form of relief the SEC sought in this case—civil penalties—was “all but dispositive” on the issue of whether the Seventh Amendment applied because civil penalties are “a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” Thus, going forward, if the SEC seeks civil penalties on a claim that resembles a traditional common-law action, the SEC very likely must proceed only in federal court, not in the administrative court.
The decision will also likely impact how the SEC settles enforcement actions with unregistered parties, including public companies and individual executives, at least for violations that resemble traditional common-law actions. The imposition of penalties in such settlements will likely require a federal court judgment, which in turn will subject settlements to potential scrutiny by a district court prior to endorsement of the judgment.
In the near term, the decision may have little impact on SEC enforcement because the agency hasn’t pursued contested actions seeking penalties in its administrative forum. But long term, requiring the SEC to bring enforcement actions in federal court will afford defendants access to independent judges and juries, the rules of evidence and civil procedure, and other procedural protections.
The Court’s decision could have broader implications for other agencies and other theories of liability. Many agencies have in-house courts that adjudicate alleged violations of the statutes they implement. If an agency seeks monetary penalties on a ground that resembles a traditional action at common law—such as a fraud or negligence claim—the Seventh Amendment presumptively requires the agency to proceed in federal court. The “public rights” exception to this principle will be construed more narrowly than suggested by some prior Court decisions. Defendants facing agency enforcement actions therefore should carefully consider the nature of the agency’s claims and requested penalties and assert their constitutional rights to a jury trial. Similarly, parties to agency investigations should consider asserting those constitutional rights in the event the agency signals it intends to take enforcement action.
Because the Seventh Amendment question resolved the case, the Court declined to reach the other constitutional questions that the petitioner presented. Thus, the Court has yet to decide whether Congress unconstitutionally delegated to the SEC the power to choose the forum in which to proceed or unconstitutionally insulated the administrative law judge from removal.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Securities Enforcement

Mark K. Schonfeld
+1 212.351.2433
[email protected]

David Woodcock
+1 214.698.3211
[email protected]

Related Practice: Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice

Eugene Scalia +1 202.955.8210 [email protected]	Helgi C. Walker +1 202.887.3599 [email protected]	Stuart F. Delery +1 202.955.8515 [email protected]
Akiva Shapiro +1 212.351.3830 [email protected]	Russell Balikian +1 202.955.8535 [email protected]

Related Practice: Securities Litigation

Reed Brodsky +1 212.351.5334 [email protected]	Monica K. Loseman +1 303.298.5784 [email protected]	Brian M. Lutz +1 415.393.8379 [email protected]
Craig Varnen +1 213.229.7922 [email protected]	Mary Beth Maloney +1 212.351.2315 [email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Elizabeth Kiernan and Jessica Lee.

Ohio v. EPA, Nos. 23A349, 23A350, 23A351, and 23A384 – Decided June 27, 2024

Today, in a case that further highlights the significance of the Court’s emergency docket for challenging agency rules, the Supreme Court (5-4) granted Ohio and several other applicants a stay that suspends the EPA’s “Good Neighbor” plan regulating some states’ emissions.

“Perhaps there is some explanation why the number and identity of participating States does not affect what measures maximize cost-effective downwind air-quality improvements. But if there is an explanation, it does not appear in the final rule. As a result, the applicants are likely to prevail on their argument….”

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court

Background:

The Clean Air Act directs each state to develop plans to implement air-quality standards. If a state’s plan fails to meet the relevant requirements, the EPA can reject that plan and impose a federal plan instead. One requirement in the Act is a “Good Neighbor” provision, which requires upwind states to reduce emissions to account for pollution exported to downwind states. In 2022, the EPA proposed to reject the plans of 23 upwind states whose emissions it said would have an effect on downwind states. The EPA proposed a single, coordinated federal plan for all 23 states. The EPA ultimately disapproved 21 states’ plans. Before the federal plan was final, several courts of appeals held that the EPA had likely violated the Act in disapproving certain states’ plans and granted stays of the disapprovals pending review. In June 2023, the EPA nonetheless finalized the proposed federal plan—the “Good Neighbor” plan. Since then, several other states have obtained stays of the EPA’s state-plan disapprovals. The Good Neighbor plan now applies to only 11 states, regulating far less emissions than the plan’s stated intent.

Ohio and several other states still subject to the federal plan, as well as several industry participants, challenged the plan in the D.C. Circuit and sought a stay pending that court’s review. After the D.C. Circuit declined to stay the federal plan, several of the states and industry participants applied to the Supreme Court for a stay, arguing that the Good Neighbor plan violates the Administrative Procedure Act because the EPA failed to consider how the federal plan would work if it applied to fewer than 23 states.

Issue:

Are applicants entitled to a stay of the Good Neighbor plan?

Court’s Holding:

Yes. The applicants are likely to succeed on the merits because the Good Neighbor plan does not comply with the APA’s requirement that the agency provide a reasoned explanation, and applicants have demonstrated that they face irreparable harm justifying a stay of the plan pending final judicial review.

What It Means:

The Court concluded that the applicants were likely to succeed on the merits. The Court emphasized that the “long-settled standards” of federal rulemaking require the agency to explain its response to all material comments raised during the notice and comment period. While the Court recognized that EPA was aware of the concern that the Good Neighbor plan might not apply to all 23 States, the Court faulted EPA for failing “to explain why it believed its rule would continue to offer cost-effective improvements in downwind air quality with only a subset of the States it originally intended to cover.”
Because the Court concluded that the “harms and equities” relevant to a stay of the enforcement of a federal regulation were “very weighty on both sides,” it held that the propriety of the stay turned on the likelihood of success on the merits. The Court did credit—and the dissent did not dispute—the applicants’ argument that the unrecoverable costs of compliance with the rule during the pendency of the litigation would constitute irreparable harm. This argument would likely extend more broadly to challenges of other agency actions.
Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. She did not object to the Court’s analysis of the equities but concluded that the States were unlikely to succeed on the merits. She closed by noting that the Court “should proceed all the more cautiously” when addressing emergency applications “with voluminous, technical records and thorny legal questions.”
The Court’s decision indicates a willingness to grant stays while an agency rule is being challenged in lower courts and even before any lower court has expressed its views on the merits of the rule. This further highlights the importance of the Court’s emergency docket, particularly for challenges to broad federal rules.
Notably, the Court defused criticism over the so-called “shadow docket” by holding oral argument, rather than deciding the stay merely on the briefs.

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]

Related Practice: Environmental Litigation and Mass Tort

Stacie B. Fletcher
+1 202.887.3627
[email protected]

Daniel W. Nelson
+1 202.887.3687
[email protected]

This alert was prepared by associates Zachary Tyree, Aly Cox, and Aaron Gyde.

Snyder v. United States, No. 23-108 – Decided June 26, 2024

Today, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that a federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), does not criminalize after-the-fact “gratuities” paid to state or local government officials in recognition for official acts, where there was no quid pro quo agreement to take those acts.

“The question in this case is whether [federal law] also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The answer is no.”

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court

Background:

Petitioner James Snyder is the former mayor of Portage, Indiana. While Snyder was mayor, Portage contracted with a local truck company to buy garbage trucks worth $1.125 million. Several months later, Snyder solicited and accepted $13,000 from the truck company’s owners, which Snyder contended he received for providing the company with consulting services. It is undisputed that Snyder did not engage in this solicitation until after the city awarded the garbage truck contracts.

Snyder was later indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 666, which prohibits state and local officials from “corruptly solicit[ing,] demand[ing,] . . . or accept[ing]” anything of value offered with the intent to “influence[] or reward[]” in connection with certain government business. Snyder moved to dismiss and, after the jury returned a guilty verdict, filed a post-trial motion for acquittal, arguing that Section 666 applies only to acts of quid pro quo bribery and does not criminalize “gratuities” paid in recognition of actions already taken. The district court denied both motions, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue:

Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?

Court’s Holding:

No. Section 666 applies only to quid pro quoacts of bribery. State and local officials may not be found guilty under this statute unless the prosecution proves that they solicited, demanded, or accepted something of value in exchange for taking an official act.

What It Means:

This decision is the latest in a series of cases in which the Court has rejected novel and expansive readings of federal fraud statutes in state and local public corruption cases.
E.g., Ciminelli v. United States, 143 S.Ct. 1121 (2023); Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).

Today’s holding clarifies that providing state and local officials with tokens of appreciation—for example, gift cards, meals, events, or as in this case, a $13,000 payment—does not subject those officials to federal prosecution. At the same time, the Court reiterated that today’s decision does not affect the ability of state and local governments to regulate gratuities: “state and local governments may and often do regulate gratuities to state and local officials.” So before providing state and local officials with gifts or other benefits that might be considered gratuities, you should consult applicable state and local law.
The Court’s holding also should lend confidence to those subject to other federal public corruption statutes that they will not face prosecution for payments that might be seen as after-the-fact “gratuities.” This is especially true for statutes like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits the offer, promise, or payment of anything of value to improperly influence foreign officials. The Court’s ruling today further solidifies the conclusion that the FCPA, which proscribes influencing but not rewarding, does not extend to gratuities.
Justice Gorsuch wrote separately to emphasize that today’s decision is driven by the rule of lenity, which requires construing ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented, contending that the Court’s opinion “elevates nonexistent federalism concerns over the plain text of the statute.”

The Court’s opinion is available here.

Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice

Thomas H. Dupree Jr. +1 202.955.8547 [email protected]	Allyson N. Ho +1 214.698.3233 [email protected]	Julian W. Poon +1 213.229.7758 [email protected]
Lucas C. Townsend +1 202.887.3731 [email protected]	Bradley J. Hamburger +1 213.229.7658 [email protected]	Brad G. Hubbard +1 214.698.3326 [email protected]
Jonathan C. Bond +1 202-887-3704 [email protected]

Related Practice: White Collar Defense and Investigations

Stephanie Brooker +1 202.887.3502 [email protected]	F. Joseph Warin +1 202.887.3609 [email protected]
Charles J. Stevens +1 415.393.8391 [email protected]	Nicola T. Hanna +1 213.229.7269 [email protected]

This alert was prepared by associate Cate McCaffrey and partner Jillian London.

This proposed legislation, if enacted, would constitute the most significant modification of PAGA since it was enacted two decades ago, and would provide employers with significant new options when facing claims brought under PAGA.

After months of negotiations, bills that would substantially reform the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) were introduced in the California Assembly and Senate on June 21, 2024. This proposed legislation, if enacted, would constitute the most significant modification of PAGA since it was enacted two decades ago, and would provide employers with significant new options when facing claims brought under PAGA.

Among other things, the proposed reform would impose new limits on who can bring a PAGA action and the scope of Labor Code violations that a plaintiff can pursue, create caps on penalties for employers who can demonstrate reasonable compliance, reduce penalties for certain types of violations (such as technical defects in wage statements), and provide employers with greater opportunities to cure alleged violations. The law would also for the first time permit injunctive relief in PAGA actions and allocate a greater share of any civil penalties to employees. The bills state that these reforms would apply to PAGA actions brought on or after June 19, 2024, unless the plaintiff submitted a PAGA notice before June 19.

Given the nature of these reforms, and the prevalence of PAGA actions in recent years, we expect significant litigation over the meaning and application of these new provisions if the proposed reform is enacted. California employers should be prepared to leverage these changes in any new PAGA litigation.

I. Background of PAGA Reform

There is currently a ballot measure to repeal PAGA that is set to go to California voters in the November 2024 election. The ballot measure, if enacted, would eliminate private PAGA actions, and replace PAGA with a new law imposing increased penalties but with enforcement limited to state regulators.

Last week, following months of discussions between Governor Newsom, labor advocates, and business groups, Governor Newsom announced a deal on proposed PAGA amendments to “avert [the] contentious ballot measure.” On Friday, Assembly Bill 2288 and Senate Bill 92 were introduced, which memorialize the agreement to reform PAGA. If the legislation is signed into law by June 27, then the PAGA repeal ballot initiative will be withdrawn from the ballot.

II. Key Provisions of the Proposed PAGA Reform

A. Limitations on Standing

The proposed legislation would impose two substantive limitations on standing. First, it would require a plaintiff to have personally suffered each of the Labor Code violations they are seeking to pursue on a representative basis. This change is a response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Huff v. Securitas Security USA Services, Inc., 23 Cal.App.5th 745 (2018), which has been interpreted to permit a PAGA plaintiff to recover PAGA penalties not only for alleged Labor Code violations that the plaintiff personally suffered, but also other alleged violations that only affected other employees. The proposed legislation makes clear that a plaintiff must prove that they personally suffered the same alleged Labor Code violations they seek to pursue on behalf of other employees. There is an exception to this new requirement for PAGA actions filed by employees represented by certain nonprofit legal aid organizations.

Second, the proposed legislation makes clear that the PAGA plaintiff must have personally suffered each alleged violation within one year of filing a PAGA notice with the Labor & Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). This change is a response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Johnson v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., 66 Cal.App.5th 924 (2021), which PAGA plaintiffs have used to argue that a PAGA action could be premised on a Labor Code violation regardless of when it occurred. The proposed legislation clarifies that a plaintiff seeking to file a PAGA action must have experienced a Labor Code violation during the one-year limitations period under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

B. Courts May “Limit the Scope” of PAGA Claims Prior to Trial

The proposed legislation empowers trial courts to both limit evidence at trial and limit the scope of any PAGA claim to ensure that it can be effectively tried. This is effectively a codification of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Estrada v. Carpet Royalty Mills, Inc., 15 Cal.5th 582 (2024), which held that trial courts cannot strike an entire PAGA claim on manageability grounds, but can and should use their “numerous tools . . . to manage complex cases generally, and PAGA cases in particular.” Id. at 618 (emphasis added). More information about the Estrada decision is available here.

This particular provision will likely be a source of significant litigation, particularly given that the legislation does not describe how or when courts should “limit the scope” of a PAGA action.

C. Reductions in PAGA Penalties

1. Caps When Employer Takes “All Reasonable Steps to Comply”

The proposed legislation expands PAGA’s cure provisions and rewards employers who proactively take “all reasonable steps” to comply with the Labor Code.

First, if an employer cures an alleged violation and takes “all reasonable steps to be prospectively in compliance” either before or within 60 days of receiving a notice of a claimed PAGA violation, then the employer will not be liable for any penalty. The proposed legislation provides examples of “reasonable steps,” including: conducting periodic payroll audits, disseminating lawful written policies, providing trainings on Labor Code and Wage Order compliance, and taking corrective action with regard to supervisors. An employer’s attempts to take reasonable steps shall be evaluated by a “totality of the circumstances and take into consideration the size and resources available to the employer, and the nature, severity and duration of the alleged violation.”

Second, if an employer demonstrates that it “has taken all reasonable steps to be in compliance” with the law prior to receipt of a PAGA notice or a request for personnel records, but does not cure the alleged violation, then the available penalties are capped at 15% of the penalties sought.

Third, if an employer demonstrates that it “has taken all reasonable steps to prospectively be in compliance” with the law within 60 days of receiving a PAGA notice, but does not cure the alleged violations, then penalties would be capped at 30%.

Finally, penalties will be capped at $15 per employee per pay period if an employer cures the alleged violations but does not take “all reasonable steps to prospectively be in compliance” with the law.

These cure provisions, if enacted, will likely become a significant part of responding to PAGA actions given the potential for substantial reductions in PAGA penalties.

2. Reductions for Harmless Violations

Under the proposed legislation, penalties for technical wage statement violations would be capped at $25 per employee per pay period if an employee can easily determine the required information despite the alleged error. In addition, for isolated errors that occur for less than 30 days or four consecutive pay periods, the maximum penalty available is $50.

3. Limits on $200 Penalty for “Subsequent Violations”

PAGA currently allows for a default penalty of $200 per pay period for each “subsequent violation,” rather than the standard $100 penalty for “initial” violations. The proposed legislation limits this higher penalty by making it clear that it will be assessed only after any agency or court “has issued a finding or determination to the employer that its policy or practice giving rise to the violation was unlawful” within the five years preceding the alleged violation, or if the court finds the employer’s conduct was “malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive.”

4. Prohibition on Certain Derivative PAGA Penalties

Currently, PAGA plaintiffs often seek to recover penalties for alleged underpayment of wages and derivative penalties for alleged wage statement violations, failure to timely pay wages during employment, and failure to timely pay wages upon termination based on the same underlying underpayment. The proposed legislation would prohibit an employee from seeking derivative penalties for failure to timely pay wages claims unless the underpayment was willful or intentional, and, for wage statement claims, unless the violation was knowing or intentional.

D. Early Case Resolution Procedures

The proposed legislation also introduces new cure mechanisms for employers wanting early resolution. If an employer has less than 100 total employees during the PAGA period, then the employer can submit a confidential proposal to the LWDA to cure the alleged violations. The LWDA may then arrange a settlement conference with the plaintiff and employer in an attempt to reach an early resolution for the matter. If the LWDA determines that the employer’s proposal is not sufficient, or if the LWDA fails to act, then the employee may proceed to file a PAGA action in court.

For employers with more than 100 employees during the PAGA period, the bill allows the employer to file a request for a stay and an “early evaluation conference” with the court after a PAGA claim is filed, which requires the court stay all discovery and responsive pleading deadlines. Once the conference is set, the employer must submit (and serve plaintiff) a confidential statement to a “neutral evaluator”—which the legislation does not define—that details the allegations the employer disputes, which alleged violations it intends to cure, and the proposed plan to cure the alleged violations. The plaintiff must submit a response statement, including the factual basis for each alleged violation, the amount of penalties claimed for each violation, the total amount of attorney’s fees incurred as of the date of the submission, any settlement demand, and the basis for accepting or rejecting the employer’s cure proposal. If the conference is successful (i.e., the neutral and parties agree to a proposal and the alleged violations are cured), then it is treated as a confidential settlement of that claim. Notably, if the neutral or plaintiff does not agree that the employer has cured the alleged violations, then the employer may file a motion to request the court approve the cure and submit evidence showing correction of the alleged violations.

Unlike the other proposed amendments to PAGA, the early resolution provisions do not become operative until October 1, 2024. But like the other proposed amendments, the early resolution procedures would apply to PAGA actions brought on or after June 19, 2024 (unless the plaintiff submitted a PAGA notice before June 19).

E. Limitations of Potential Penalties for Employers Who Pay Weekly

Because PAGA penalties are based on the number of pay periods in which employees suffered a violation, employers with weekly payroll schedules are penalized twice as much as those employers with bi-weekly payroll schedules. The proposed legislation provides relief to these employers by reducing by 50% the penalties if an employee’s regular pay period is weekly rather than bi-weekly or semi-monthly.

F. Employee-Focused Reforms

Although most of the proposed reforms are designed to address concerns of employers over abuses of PAGA, the proposed legislation does have two changes designed to benefit employees. First, for the first time a PAGA plaintiff would be able to seek injunctive relief. Second, aggrieved employees will now receive a 35% share of any recovery (an increase from 25%).

III. Conclusion

The proposed reform of PAGA would create a new era in California employment litigation, as it would provide employers with significant additional tools to address and defend PAGA claims. Employers should begin preparing now to utilize these tools in future PAGA litigation and should carefully track how courts are applying and interpreting these amendments.

The following Gibson Dunn lawyers prepared this update: Jason Schwartz, Jesse Cripps, Bradley Hamburger, Michael Holecek, Megan Cooney, Amina Mousa, and Tim Kolesk.

Jesse A. Cripps – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7792, [email protected])
Bradley J. Hamburger – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7658, [email protected])
Michael Holecek – Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7018, [email protected])
Megan Cooney – Orange County (+1 949.451.4087, [email protected])
Jason C. Schwartz – Co-Chair, Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8242, [email protected])
Katherine V.A. Smith – Co-Chair, Los Angeles (+1 213.229.7107, [email protected])